LIBRARY     5 

UNIVERSITY  OF 


SAN  DIEGO 


presented  to  the 

LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  -  SAN  DIEGO 

by 
FRIENDS  OF  THE  LIBRARY 


_ 

donor 


PLATO'S    BEST    THOUGHTS 


COMPILED   FROM 


PEOF.  JOWETT'S  TEAXSLATION 


DIALOGUES    OF    PLATO 


BY 


REV.  C.  H.  A.  BULKLEY,  D.  D. 

PROFESSOR    OF  RHETORIC    AND   LITERATURE    IN   HOWARD 
UNIVERSITY,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


NEW  EDITION 


NEW  YORK 
CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

1897 


CopnuaHT,  1876, 
*T  SOfclBXER    ARMSTBONG.  AND  COMPACT 


To 
PROFESSOR  JOWETT, 

WHOSE    SCHOLARSHIP   IS  UNEXCELLED   IN   EITHER   HEMISPHEBB, 
AND   WHO  PREEMIMENTLY  MERITS 

THE  TITLE  OK 

"PLATO'S  INTERPRETER,' 

£5)ts  Folutnr, 

THE   GATHERED   FRUIT  OF  HIS  TOO* 
U   KE8PECTFULLT 


RALPH  WALDO  EMERSON,  in  his  Essay  on  Books,  writes  thus :  "  Of  Plato  i 
hesitate  to  speak,  lest  there  should  be  no  end.  You  find  in  him  that  which  you 
have  already  found  in  Homer,  now  ripened  to  thought,  —  the  poet  converted  to  a 
philosopher,  with  loftier  strains  of  musical  wisdom  than  Homer  reached;  as  if 
Homer  were  the  youth,  and  Plato  the  finished  man ;  yet  with  no  less  security  of  bold 
and  perfect  song,  when  he  cares  to  use  it,  and  with  some  harp-strings  fetched 
from  a  higher  heaven.  He  contains  the  future,  as  he  came  out  of  the  past.  In 
Plato,  you  explore  modern  Europe  in  its  causes  and  seed,  —  all  that  in  thought 
which  the  history  of  Europe  embodies  or  has  yet  to  embody.  The  well-informed 
man  finds  himself  anticipated,  —  Plato  is  up  with  him  too.  Nothing  has  escaped 
him.  Every  new  crop  in  the  fertile  harvest  of  reform,  everj  fresh  suggestion  of 
modern  humanity  is  there.  If  the  student  wish  to  see  both  sides,  and  justice  done 
to  the  man  of  the  world,  pitiless  exposure  of  pedants,  and  the  supremacy  of  truth 
and  the  religious  sentiment,  he  shall  be  contented  also.  Why  should  not  young 
men  be  educated  on  this  book  ?  It  would  suffice  for  the  tuition  of  the  race,  —  to  test 
their  understanding  and  to  express  their  reason.  Here  is  that  which  is  so  attractive 
to  all  men,  —  the  literature  of  aristocracy  shall  I  call  it  ?  —  the  picture  of  the  best 
persons,  sentiments,  and  manners,  by  the  first  master,  in  the  best  times,  —  portraits 
of  Pericles,  Alcibiades,  Crito,  Prodicus.  Protagoras,  Anaxagoras,  and  Socrates,  with 
the  lovely  background  of  the  Athenian  and  suburban  landscape,  —  or,  who  can  over- 
estimate the  images  with  which  Plato  has  enriched  tne  minds  of  men,  and  which  pass 
like  bullion  in  the  currency  of  all  Nations  ?  Read  the  '  Phsedo,'  the  '  Protagoras, 
the  '  Phsedrus,'  the  '  Timteus,'  the  Republic,  —  and  the  '  Apology  of  Socrates.' " 


INTRODUCTION. 

BY  THE   COMPILER. 


THE  late  Dr.  Nott,  who,  for  so  many  years,  was  the  efficient 
President  of  Union  College,  is  said  to  have  remarked  that,  '"  a 
professional  man  —  especially  a  clergyman  —  needed  to  be 
familiar  with  but  three  books,  namely  the  Bible,  Butler's 
Analogy,  and  Shakespeare."  To  complete  the  circle,  he  might 
have  added  Plato.  With  his  dialectic  skill,  universality  of 
thought,  subtle  philosophy  and  purity  of  style,  every  scholar 
and  thinker  should  familiarize  himself.  Their  influence  on 
all  one's  mental  processes  cannot  fail  to  be  stimulating  and 
strengthening. 

Few  readers  of  the  Greek,  however,  in  this  land,  are  suffi- 
ciently versed  in  that  language  to  read  Plato's  original  with 
much  freedom  and  pleasure.  Fewer  professional  men,  in  our 
age  of  active  toil,  have  the  time  and  opportunity  even,  to  pe- 
ruse throughout,  the  admirable  translation  of  Prof.  Jowett. 
Nevertheless,  every  thoughtful  man  —  and  even  ordinary 
readers  —  may  desire  to  reap  the  benefits  of  such  a  work,  and 
become  somewhat  acquainted  with  the  best  thoughts  of  the 
great  Greek  Philosopher.  The  present  volume  has  been  un- 
dertaken with  this  design.  It  presents,  in  the  most  accessible 
form,  the  wide  range  of  subjects  upon  which  Plato  dwells,  and 
exhibits  him  in  all  his  varied  aspects  of  philosopher,  moralist, 
socialist,  logician,  rhetorician,  scientist,  and  critic.  The  ex- 
tracts here  given  have  been  carefully  collated,  so  as  to  be 
unique  and  integral  in  thought.  A  few  of  the  discussions, 
however,  may  seem  to  ->nd  somewhat  abruptly,  as  could 


Vi  INTRODUCTION. 

scarcely  be  avoided  when  taken  from  the  midst  of  a  prolonged 
dialogue. 

These  quotations  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  giving,  in  every 
case,  the  proper  views  of  Plato,  or  even  of  Socrates.  Other 
characters,  opposed  and  refuted,  are  made  to  speak.  Their 
words  are  here  given  to  be  read  and  received  as  germs  of 
thought,  and  stimulants  to  inquiry  in  the  reader,  even  as  they 
were  first  written  by  Plato,  rather  than  as  expressions  of  his 
own  opinions. 

Many  fine  passages  have  been  necessarily  omitted  with  re- 
gret, because  their  introduction  here  would  swell  this  volume 
beyond  the  dimensions  designed  for  the  ordinary  reader. 
Every  theme,  therefore,  upon  which  Plato  dilates,  has  not 
been  presented  in  full.  But  there  has  been  such  a  selection  as 
may  give  the  reader  a  fair  idea  of  his  diversity  of  thought. 

While  those  who  are  able  to  purchase,  and  desirous  to  pe- 
ruse the  complete  translation  of  Prof.  Jowett,  will  doubtless  do 
this,  yet  there  are  many  others  to  whom  this  volume  will  be 
welcome  as  giving  them  the  finest  wheat  of  Plato  in  a  ready, 
readable  form,  at  a  moderate  rate.  Even  the  possessor  and 
reader  of  the  fuller  work  may  be  glad  to  have  with  him  a  com- 
pendium of  Platonic  thought  so  available,  —  because  alphabet- 
ical,—  for  cursory  perusal  and  casual  quotation. 

It  is  hoped,  at  least,  by  the  compiler,  that  these  limited 
morsels  of  Plato's  Hymettian  honey  will  excite  the  desire  for 
a  fuller  feast  from  the  rich  banquet  which  Prof.  Jowett  has  so 
laboriously  and  sumptuously  provided  for  those  who  relish  true 
thought  and  elegant  language,  whether  coming  from  ancient  or 
modern  thinkers. 

The  design  at  first  was  to  interweave  the  choicest  para- 
graphs of  this  Translator  from  his  learned  and  thoughtful 
Introductions,  but  it  was  found  that  this  would  have  made  too 
large  a  book.  Those  who  desire  to  enter  Plato's  temple  of 
thought  with  the  clearest  comprehension  of  his  master-mind, 
should  pass  through  the  grand  gateways  which  this  eminent 
English  scholar  has  erected 


INTRODUCTION.  vii 

These  interpretations  of  the  great  Greek  thinker,  are  essen- 
tial to  the  full  understanding  of  his  ideas.  Meanwhile,  those 
who  cannot  yet  reach  the  head-waters  of  such  mental  invigora- 
tion,  may  refresh  themselves  with  the  limited  draughts  of 
Plato's  lore,  herein  bottled  up  for  them,  from  his  perennial 
springs  of  thought.  c.  H.  A.  K. 


PUBLISHER'S  NOTE. 


This  volume  was  originally  prepared  from  the  American  edi- 
tion, to  which  the  references  with  each  extract  are  made, 
Every  page  of  it,  however,  has  since  then  been  carefully 
compared  with  and  corrected  by  Prof.  Jowett's  latest  and  im- 
proved issie. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 


Ability  and  strength,  difference  between. 

Socrates,  When   you  asked  me,  I  certainly  did  say  that 

the  courageous  are  the  confident ;  but  I  was  not  asked  whether 
the  confident  are  the  courageous  ;  for  if  you  had  asked  me  that, 
I  should  have  answered,  "  Not  all  of  them : "  and  what  I  did 
answer  you  have  not  disproved,  although  you  proceed  to  show 
that  those  who  have  knowledge  are  more  courageous  than  they 
were  before  they  had  knowledge,  and  more  courageous  than 
others  who  have  no  knowledge  ;  and  this  makes  you  think  that 
courage  is  the  same  as  wisdom.  But  in  this  way  of  arguing 
you  might  come  to  imagine  that  strength  is  wisdom.  You 
might  begin  by  asking  whether  the  strong  are  able,  and  I 
should  say,  "  Yes : "  and  then  whether  those  who  know  how  to 
wrestle  are  not  more  able  to  wrestle  than  those  who  do  not 
know  how  to  wrestle,  and  more  able  after  than  before  they  had 
learned,  and  I  should  assent.  And  when  I  had  admitted  this, 
you  might  use  my  admissions  in  such  a  way  as  to  prove  that 
upon  my  view  wisdom  is  strength  ;  whereas  in  that  case  I 
should  not  have  admitted,  any  more  than  in  the  other,  that  the 
able  are  strong,  although  I  have  admitted  that  the  strong  are 
able.  For  there  is  a  difference  between  ability  and  strength ; 
the  former  is  given  by  knowledge  as  well  as  by  madness  or  rage, 
but  strength  comes  from  nature  and  a  healthy  state  of  the  body. 
And  in  like  manner  I  say  of  confidence  and  courage,  that  they 
are  not  the  same  ;  and  I  argue  that  the  courageous  are  confi- 
dent, but  not  all  the  confident  courageous.  For  confidence  may 
be  given  to  men  by  art,  and  also,  like  ability,  by  madness  and 
rage  ;  but  courage  comes  to  them  from  nature  and  the  healthj 
state  of  the  soul.  —  Protagoras,  i.  150. 


10  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Absolute,  the. 

Simtnias :  Is  there  or  is  there  not  an  absolute  justice? 

Assuredly  there  is. 

And  an  absolute  beauty  and  absolute  good  ? 

Of  course. 

But  did  you  ever  behold  any  of  them  with  your  eye*  ? 

Certainly  not. 

Or  did  you  ever  reach  them  with  any  other  bodily  sense  ? 
(and  I  speak  not  of  these  alone,  but  of  absolute  greatness,  and 
health,  and  strength,  and  of  the  essence  or  true  nature  of 
everything).  Has  the  reality  of  them  ever  been  perceived  by 
you  through  the  bodily  organs  ?  or  rather,  is  not  the  nearest 
approach  to  the  knowledge  of  their  several  natures  made  by 
him  who  so  orders  his  intellectual  vision  as  to  have  the  most 
exact  conception  of  the  essence  of  that  which  he  considers  ? 

Certainly. 

And  he  attains  to  the  purest  knowledge  of  them  who  goes 
to  each  of  them  with  the  mind  alone,  not  allowing  when  in  the 
act  of  thought  the  intrusion  or  introduction  of  sight  or  any 
other  sense  in  the  company  of  reason,  but  with  the  very  light 
of  the  mind  in  her  clearness  searches  into  the  very  truth  of 
each  ;  he  has  got  rid,  as  far  as  he  can,  of  eyes  and  ears  and  of 
the  whole  body,  which  he  conceives  of  only  as  a  disturbing 
element,  hindering  the  soul  from  the  acquisition  of  truth  and 
knowledge  when  in  company  with  her  —  is  not  this  the  sort  of 
man  who,  if  any  man,  is  likely  to  attain  to  the  knowledge  of  true 
being?  —  Phaedo,  i.  391. 
Absolute  knowledge  in  God. 

Would  you,  or  would  you  not,  say  that  absolute  knowl- 
edge, if  there  is  such  a  thing,  must  be  a  far  more  exact  knowl- 
edge than  our  knowledge,  and  the  same  of  beauty  and  of  all 
other  things  ? 

Yes. 

And  if  there  be  such  a  thing  as  participation  in  absolute 
knowledge  no  one  is  more  likely  than   God  to  have  this  most 
exact  knowledge  ? 
Certainly. 

But    then,  will    God,  having    absolute    knowledge,  have    a 
knowledge  of  human  things  ? 
Why  not  ? 

Because,  Socrates,  said   Parmenides,  we  have  admitted  that 
the   ideas  are  not  relative  to  human  things,  nor  human  things 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  11 

to  them ;  the  relations  of  either  are  in  their  respective 
spheres. 

Yes,  that  has  been  admitted. 

And  if  God  has  this  perfect  authority,  perfect  knowledge, 
his  authority  cannot  rule  us,  nor  his  knowledge  know  us,  or 
any  human  thing ;  just  as  our  authority  does  not  extend  to  the 
gods,  nor  our  knowledge  know  anything  which  is  divine,  so  by 
parity  of  reason  they,  being  gods,  are  not  our  masters ;  neither 
do  they  know  the  things  of  men. 

Yet,  surely,  said  Socrates,  to  deprive  God  of  knowledge  is 
monstrous. 

These,  Socrates,  said  Parmenides,  are  a  few,  and  only  a 
few,  of  the  difficulties  which  arise  on  the  hypothesis  that  there 
are  ideas  of  things  and  that  each  idea  is  an  absolute  and  de- 
terminate unity  ;  they  will  lead  him  who  is  told  of  them  to 
doubt  the  very  existence  of  ideas  —  he  will  say  that  even  if  they 
do  exist  they  must  of  necessity  be  unknown  to  man  ;  and  he 
will  seem  to  have  reason  on  his  side  ;  and  as  we  were  re- 
marking just  now,  will  be  very  difficult  to  convince  ;  a  man 
must  be  a  man  of  very  considerable  ability  before  he  can  learn 
that  everything  has  a  class  and  an  absolute  essence  ;  and  still 
more  remarkable  will  he  be  who  discovers  all  these  things  for 
himself,  and  can  teach  another  to  understand  them  thoroughly. 
Parmenides,  iii.  252. 
Abstract  ideas.  See  Ideas,  abstract. 
Achilles  ;  his  self-sacrifice. 

Now  Achilles  was  quite  aware,  for  he  had  been  told  by 

his  mother,  that  he  might  avoid  death  and  return  home,  and 
live  to  a  good  old  age,  if  he  abstained  from  slaying  Hector. 
Nevertheless  he  gave  his  life  to  revenge  his  friend,  and  dared 
to  die,  not  only  on  his  behalf,  but  after  his  death.  Where- 
fore the  gods  honored  him  even  above  Alcestis,  and  sent  him 
to  the  Islands  of  the  Blest.  These  are  my  reasons  for  affirm- 
ing that  Love  is  the  eldest  and  noblest  and  mightiest  of  the 
gods,  and  the  chiefest  author  and  giver  of  virtue,  in  life  and 
of  happiness  after  death.  —  The  Symposium,  i.  475. 
Achilles ;  condemned. 

Neither  is  Phoenix,  the  tutor  of  Achilles,  to  be  approved 

or  regarded  as  having  given  his  pupil  good  counsel  when  he  told 
him  that  he  should  take  the  gifts  of  the  Greeks  and  assist  them , 
but  that  without  a  gift  he  should  not  be  reconciled  to  them. 
Neither  will  we  believe  or  allow  Achilles  himself  to  have  been 


12  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS, 

such  a  lover  of  money  that  he  took  Agamemnon's  gifts,  or 
required  a  price  as  the  ransom  of  the  dead. 

Undoubtedly,  he  said,  these  are  not  sentiments  which  ought 
to  be  approved. 

Loving  Homer  as  I  do,  I  hardly  like  to  say  what  I  must 
say,  nevertheless,  that  in  speaking  thus  of  Achilles,  or  in  believ- 
ing these  words  when  spoken  of  him  by  others,  there  is  down- 
right impiety.  As  little  can  I  credit  the  narrative  of  his  inso- 
lence to  Apollo,  where  he  says,  — 

"  Thou  hast  wronged  me,  O  far-darter,  most  abominable  of  dei- 
ties. Verily  I  would  be  even  with  thee,  if  I  had  only  the  power  ;  " 

or  his  insubordination  to  the  river-god,  011  whose  divinity  he  is 
ready  to  lay  hands;  or  the  dedication  to  the  dead  Patroclus 
of  his  own  hair,  which  had  been  previously  dedicated  to  the 
other  river-god  Spercheius  ;  or  his  dragging  Hector  round  the 
tomb  of  Patroclus,  and  his  slaughter  of  the  captives  at  the 
pyre  ;  of  all  this  I  cannot  believe  that  he  was  guilty,  any  more 
than  I  can  allow  our  citizens  to  believe  that  he,  Cheiron's  pupil, 
the  son  of  a  goddess  and  of  Peleus  who  was  the  gentlest  of 
men  and  third  in  descent  from  Zeus,  was  in  such  rare  perturba- 
tion of  mind  as  to  be  at  one  time  the  slave  of  two  seemingly 
inconsistent  passions,  meanness,  not  untainted  by  avarice,  com- 
bined with  overwhelming  contempt  of  gods  and  men.  —  The 
Republic,  ii.  214. 

Actual  and  Ideal.     See  State,  actuaL 
Adulterations.     See  Oaths. 

Advocate,  Art  of  the,  corrupting  the  State.    See  State,  etc. 
Affections ;  opposing. 

Ath.  Each  one  of  us  has  in  his  bosom   two  counselors, 

both  foolish  and  also  antagonistic ;  of  which,  the  one  we  call 
pleasure  and  the  other  pain. 

Cle.  True. 

Ath.  Also  there  are  opinions  about  the  future,  which  have 
the  general  name  of  expectations ;  and  the  specific  name  of 
fear,  when  the  expectation  is  of  pain  ;  and  of  hope,  when  of 
pleasure;  and  further,  there  is  reflection  about  the  good  or  evil 
of  them,  and  this  when  embodied  in  a  decree  by  the  State,  is 
called  Law. 

Cle.  I  am  hardly  able  to  follow  you  ;  proceed,  however,  as 
if  I  were. 

Meg.  I  am  in  the  like  case. 

Ath.  Let  us  look  at  the  matter  in  this   way  :  May  we  not 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  13 

regard  every  living  being  as  a  puppet  of  the  gods,  either  their 
plaything  only,  or  created  with  a  purpose  —  which  of  the  two 
we  cannot  certainly  know  ?  But  this  we  know,  that  these  affec- 
tions in  us  are  like  cords  and  strings,  which  pull  us  different  and 
opposite  ways,  and  to  opposite  actions ;  and  herein  lies  the  dif- 
ference between  virtue  and  vice.  According  to  the  argument 
there  is  one  among  these  cords  which  every  man  ought  to  grasp, 
and  never  let  go  but  to  pull  with  it  against  all  the  rest ;  and  this 
is  the  sacred  and  golden  cord  of  reason,  called  by  us  the  com- 
mon law  of  the  state ;  there  are  others  which  are  hard  and  of 
iron,  but  this  is  soft  because  golden;  and  there  are  several 
other  kinds.  Now  we  ought  always  to  cooperate  with  the  lead 
of  the  best,  which  is  law.  For  inasmuch  as  reason  is  beauti- 
ful and  gentle,  and  not  violent,  her  rule  must  needs  have  min- 
isters in  order  to  help  the  golden  principle  in  vanquishing  the 
other  principles.  And  thus  the  moral  of  the  tale  about  our 
being  puppets  will  not  be  lost,  and  the  meaning  of  the  expres- 
sion "  superior  or  inferior  to  a  man's  self  "  will  become  clearer ; 
as  also  that  in  this  matter  of  pulling  the  strings  of  the  puppet, 
cities  as  well  as  individuals  should  live  according  to  reason ; 
which  the  individual  attains  in  himself,  and  the  city  receives 
from  some  god,  or  from  the  legislator ;  and  makes  it  her  law 
in  her  dealings  with  herself  and  with  other  states.  In  this  way 
virtue  and  vice  will  be  more  clearly  distinguished  by  us.  And 
when  they  have  become  clearer,  education  and  other  institu- 
tions will  in  like  manner  become  clearer.  —  Laws,  iv.  175. 
Age  ;  its  evil  and  its  good. 

I  find  that  at  my  time  of  life,  as  the  pleasures  and  de- 
lights of  the  body  fade  away,  the  love  of  discourse  grows  upon 
me.  I  only  wish  that  you  would  come  oftener,  and  be  with 
your  young  friends  here,  and  make  yourself  altogether  at  home 
with  us. 

I  replied  :  There  is  nothing  which  I  like  better,  Cephalus, 
than  conversing  with  aged  men  like  yourself ;  for  I  regard 
them  as  travelers  who  have  gone  a  journey  which  I  too  may 
have  to  go,  and  of  whom  I  ought  to  inquire,  whether  the  way  ia 
smooth  and  easy,  or  rugged  and  difficult.  And  this  is  a  ques- 
tion which  I  should  like  to  ask  of  you  who  have  arrived  at 
that  time  which  the  poets  call  the  "  threshold  of  old  age,"  — 
Is  life  harder  towards  the  end,  or  what  report  do  you  give 
of  it? 

I  will  tell  you,   Socrates,  he  said,  what  my  own  feeling  is. 


14  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Old  men  flock  together;  they  are  birds  of  a  feathc.,  as  the 
proverb  says  ;  and  at  our  meetings  the  tale  of  my  acquaintance 
commonly  is  —  I  cannot  eat,  I  cannot  drink  ;  the  pleasures  of 
youth  and  love  are  fled  away  :  there  was  a  good  time  once, 
but  that  is  gone,  and  now  life  is  no  longer  life.  Some  of 
them  lament  over  the  slights  which  are  put  upon  them  by 
relations,  and  then  they  tell  you  plaintively  of  how  many 
evils  their  old  age  is  the  cause.  But  to  me,  Socrates,  they 
seem  to  blame  what  is  not  to  blame  ;  for  if  old  age  were  the 
cause,  I  too  being  old,  and  every  other  old  man,  would  have 
felt  the  same.  Such  however  is  not  my  experience,  nor  that 
of  others  whom  I  have  known.  How  well  I  remember  the 
aged  poet  Sophocles,  when  in  answer  to  the  question,  How 
does  love  suit  with  age,  Sophocles,  —  are  you  still  the  man 
you  were  ?  Peace,  he  replied ;  most  gladly  have  I  escaped 
that,  and  I  feel  as  if  I  had  escaped  from  a  mad  and  furious 
master.  His  words  have  often  come  into  my  mind  since,  and 
they  seem  to  me  still  as  good  as  at  the  time  when  I  first  heard 
them.  For  certainly  old  age  has  a  great  sense  of  calm  and 
freedom  ;  when  the  passions  relax  their  hold,  then,  as  Sophocles 
says,  you  have  escaped  from  the  control  not  of  one  mad  master 
only,  but  of  many.  And  of  these  regrets,  as  well  as  of  the 
complaint  about  relations,  Socrates,  the  cause  is  to  be  sought, 
not  in  men's  ages,  but  in  their  characters  and  tempers ;  for  he 
who  is  of  a  calm  and  happy  nature  will  hardly  feel  the  pressure 
of  age,  but  he  who  is  of  an  opposite  disposition  will  find  youth 
and  age  equally  a  burden.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  149. 
Age,  poverty  and  riches  in.  See  Poverty. 
Age,  love  in  old.  See  Ibycus. 
Age,  as  viewing  eternity. 

Let  me  tell  you,  Socrates,  that  when  a  man  thinks  him- 
self to  be  near  death  he  has  fears  and  cares  which  never  entered 
into  his  mind  before  ;  the  tales  of  a  life  below  and  the  punish- 
ment which  is  exacted  there  of  deeds  done  here  were  a  laughing 
matter  to  him  once,  tut  now  he  is  haunted  with  the  thought  that 
they  may  be  true :  either  because  of  the  feebleness  of  age,  or  from 
the  nearness  of  the  prospect,  he  seems  to  have  a  clearer  view  of 
the  other  world  ;  suspicions  and  alarms  crowd  upon  him,  and  he 
begins  to  reckon  up  in  his  own  mind  what  wrongs  he  has  done 
to  others.  And  when  he  finds  that  the  sum  of  his  transgres- 
sions is  great,  he  will  many  a  time  like  a  child  start  up  in  hia 
sleep  for  fear,  and  he  is  filled  with  dark  forebodings.  But  tc 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHT*,.  15 

him  who  is  conscious  of  no  sin,  sweet  hope,  as  Pindar  charm 
iugly  says,  is  the  kind  nurse  of  age  : 

"  Hope,"  as  he  says,  "  cherishes  the  soul  of  him  who  lives  in  holi- 
ness and  righteousness,  and  is  the  nurse  of  his  age  and  the  com- 
panion of  his  journey  ;  —  hope,  which  is  mightiest  to  sway  the  rest- 
less soul  of  man." 

How  admirable  his  words  are  !  —  The  Republic,  ii.  151. 
Age,  Philosophy  in.     See  Philosophy,  etc. 
Age ;  learning  in. 

Solon  was  under  a  delusion  when  he  said  that  a  man  as  he 

is  growing  older  may  learn  many  things  —  for  he  can  no  more 
learn  than  he  can  run  ;  youth  is  the  time  of  toil. 

Very  true. 

And,  therefore,  calculation  and  geometry,  and  all  the  other 
elements  of  instruction,  which  are  a  preparation  for  dialectic, 
should  be  presented  to  the  mind  in  childhood  ;  not,  however, 
under  any  notion  of  forcing  them.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  364. 
Allegory  ;  not  for  youth. 

The  narrative  of  Hephaestus  binding  Here  his  mother, 

or  how  on  another  occasion  Zeus  sent  him  flying  for  taking 
her  part  when  she  was  being  beaten,  —  such  tales  must  not 
be  admitted  into  our  State,  whether  they  are  supposed  to  have 
an  allegorical  meaning  or  not.  For  the  young  man  cannot 
judge  what  is  allegorical  and  what  is  literal ;  anything  that 
he  receives  into  his  mind  at  that  age  is  apt  to  become  indel- 
ible and  unalterable ;  and  therefore  the  tales  which  they  first 
hear  should  be  models  of  virtuous  thoughts. —  The  Republic, 
ii.  201. 

Ambition,  inordinate.     See  Inordinate,  etc. 
Ambition  of  money-making. 

Suppose  the  representative  of  timocracy  to  have  a  son : 

at  first  he  begins  by  emulating  his  father  and  walking  in  his 
footsteps,  but  presently  he  sees  him  founder  in  a  moment  on  a 
sunken    reef,  and  he  and  all  that  he  has  are  lost ;    he  may 
have  been  a  general  or  some  other  high  officer  who  is  brought 
to  trial  under  a  prejudice  raised  by  informers,  and  either  put 
to  death,  or  exiled,  or  deprived  of  the  privileges  of  a  citizen, 
and  all  his  property  taken  from  him. 

Nothing  more  likely. 

And  the  son  has  seen  and  known  all  this  —  he  is  a  rumed 
man,  ard  his  fear  has  taught  him  to  knock  ambition  and  pas- 


16  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

sion  headforemost  from  his  bosom's  throne  ;  humbled  by  poverty 
he  takes  to  money-making,  and  by  mean  and  miserly  savmgs 
and  hard  work  gets  a  fortune  together.  Is  not  such  an  one 
likely  to  seat  the  concupiscent  and  covetous  elements  on  the 
vacant  throne  ?  They  will  play  the  great  king  within  him, 
and  he  will  array  them  with  tiara  and  collar  and  scimitar. 

Most  true,  he  replied. 

And  when  he  has  made  reason  and  spirit  sit  on  the  ground 
obediently  on  either  side,  and  taught  them  to  know  their  place, 
he  compels  the  one  to  think  only  of  the  method  by  which  lesser 
sums  may  be  converted  into  larger  ones,  and  schools  the  other 
into  the  worship  and  admiration  of  riches  and  rich  men  ;  and 
to  be  ambitious  only  of  wealth,  and  of  the  pursuits  which  lead 
to  it. 

Of  all  conversions,  he  said  there  is  none  so  speedy  or  so 
sure  as  when  the  ambitious  youth  changes  into  the  avaricious 
one. —  The  Republic,  ii.  381. 
Ambitious  men. 

If  they  cannot  be  generals,  they  are  willing  to  be  cap- 
tains ;  and  if  they  cannot  be  honored  by  really  great  and  im- 
portant persons,  they  are  glad  to  be  honored  by  inferior  people, 
—  but  honor  of  some  kind  they  must  have.  —  The  Republic, 
ii.  302. 
Ambitious  •woman. 

The  character  of  the  son  begins  to  develop  when  he  hears 

his  mother  grumbling  at  her  husband  for  not  having  a  seat  in 
the  government,  of  which  the  consequence  is  that  she  loses  her 
precedence  among  other  women.  Further,  when  she  sees  her 
husband  not  very  eager  about  money,  and  instead  of  battling 
and  railing  in  the  law  courts  or  assembly,  taking  whatever 
happens  to  him  quietly ;  and  when  she  observes  that  his 
thoughts  always  centre  in  himself,  while  he  treats  her  with 
considerable  indifference,  she  is  annoyed,  and  says  to  her  son 
that  his  father  is  only  half  a  man  and  far  too  easy-going;  not 
to  mention  other  similar  complaints  which  women  love  to  utter. 
The  Republic,  ii.  376. 
Amusement;  arguing  for. 

Young  men,  as  you  may  have  observed,  when  they  first 

get  the  taste  in  their  mouths,  argue  for  amusement,  and  are 
always  contradicting  and  refuting  others  in  imitation  of  those 
who  refute  them ;  like  puppy-dogs,  they  delight  to  tear  and 
pull  at  all  who  come  near  them. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  17 

Yes,  he  said,  there  is  nothing  of  which  they  are  fonder. 

And  when  they  have  made  many  conquests  and  received 
defeats  at  the  hands  of  many,  they  violently  and  speedily  get 
into  a  way  of  not  believing  anything  that  they  believed  before, 
and  hence,  not  only  they,  but  philosophy  generally,  has  a  bad 
nams  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Too  true,  he  said. 

But  when  a  man  begins  to  get  older,  he  will  no  longer  be 
guilty  of  such  insanity ;  he  will  imitate  the  dialectician  who  is 
seeking  for  truth,  and  not  the  eristic,  who  is  contradicting  for 
the  sake  of  amusement;  and  the  greater  moderation  of  his 
character  will  increase  instead  of  diminishing  the  honor  of  the 
pursuit.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  367. 
Amusement  and  harmless  pleasure. 

Ath.  I  should  say  that  learning  has  a  certain  accompanying 

charm  which  is  the  pleasure ;  and  that  the  right  and  the  profit- 
able, the  good  and  the  noble,  are  qualities  given  to  it  by  the 
truth. 

Cle.  Exactly. 

Ath.  And  so  in  the  imitative  arts,  if  they  succeed  in  making 
likenesses,  and  are  accompanied  by  pleasure,  may  not  their 
works  be  said  to  have  a  charm  ? 

Cle.  Yes. 

Ath.  But  equal  proportions,  whether  of  quality  or  quantity, 
and  not  pleasure,  speaking  generally,  would  give  them  truth 
or  Tightness. 

Cle.  Yes. 

Ath.  Then  that  only  can  be  rightly  judged  by  the  standard 
of  pleasure,  which  makes  or  furnishes  no  utility,  or  truth,  or  like- 
ness, nor  on  the  other  hand  is  productive  of  any  hurtful  quality,. 
but  exists  solely  for  the  sake  of  the  accompanying  charm  ;  and 
the  term  "  pleasure  "  is  most  appropriately  used  when  these 
other  qualities  are  absent. 

Cle.  You  are  speaking  of  harmless  pleasure,  are  you  not  ? 

Ath.  Yes ;  and  this  I  term  amusement,  when  doing  neither 
harm  nor  good  in  any  degree  worth  speaking  of.  —  Laws,  iv. 
197. 
Anarchy  resulting  from  freedom. 

Freedom  in  a  democracy  is  the  glory  of  the  State,  and 

therefore,  in  a  democracy  only  will  the  freeman  of  nature  deign 
to  dwell. 

Yes  ;  the  saying  is  often  enough  repeated. 

2 


18  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

I  was  going  to  observe,  that  the  insatiable  desire  of  this 
and  the  neglect  of  other  things  introduces  the  change  in  de- 
mocracy, which  occasions  a  demand  for  tyranny. 

How  so  ? 

When  a  democracy  which  is  thirsting  for  freedom  has  evil 
cup-bearers  presiding  over  the  feast,  and  has  drunk  too  deeply  of 
the  strong  wine  of  freedom,  then,  unless  her  rulers  are  very 
amenable  and  give  a  plentiful  draught,  she  calls  them  to  ac- 
count and  punishes  them,  and  says  that  they  are  cursed  oligarchs. 

Yes,  he  replied,  a  very  common  thing. 

Tes,  I  said ;  and  loyal  citizens  are  insulted  by  her  as  lovers 
of  slavery  and  men  of  naught ;  she  would  have  subjects  who 
are  like  rulers,  and  rulers  who  are  like  subjects  :  these  are 
men  after  her  own  heart,  whom  she  praises  and  honors  both 
in  private  and  public.  Now,  in  such  a  state,  can  liberty  have 
any  limit  ? 

Certainly  not. 

By  degrees  the  anarchy  finds  a  way  into  private  houses,  and 
ends  by  getting  among  the  animals  and  infecting  them. 

How  do  you  mean  ? 

I  mean  that  the  father  gets  accustomed  to  descend  to  the 
level  of  his  sons  and  to  fear  them,  and  the  son  to  be  on  a 
level  with  his  father,  he  having  no  shame  or  fear  of  either  of 
his  parents ;  and  this  is  his  freedom,  and  the  me  tic  is  equal  with 
the  citizen  and  the  citizen  with  the  metic,  and  the  stranger  on  a 
level  with  either. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  true. 

That  is  true  ;  and  there  are  other  slight  evils  such  as  the 
following ;  the  master  fears  and  flatters  his  scholars,  and  the 
scholars  despise  their  masters  and  tutors  ;  and,  in  general, 
young  and  old  are  alike,  and  the  young  man  is  on  a  level 
with  the  old,  and  is  ready  to  compete  with  him  in  word  or  deed  : 
and  old  men  condescend  to  the  young,  and  are  full  of  pleasantry 
and  gayety  ;  they  do  not  like  to  be  thought  morose  and  au- 
thoritative, and  therefore  they  adopt  the  manners  of  the 
young. 

Quite  true,  he  said. 

The  last  extreme  of  popular  liberty  is  when  the  slave  bought 
with  money,  whether  male  or  female,  is  just  as  free  as  his  or 
her  purchaser ;  nor  must  I  forget  to  tell  of  the  liberty  and  equal- 
ity of  the  two  sexes  in  relation  to  each  other.  —  The  Republic, 
ii.  891. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  19 

Animal,  —  the  world  a  great  and  intelligent. 

Let  me  tell  you  why  the  creator  created  and  made  the 

universe.  He  was  good,  and  no  goodness  can  ever  have  any 
jealousy  of  anything.  And  being  free  from  jealousy,  he  desired 
that  all  things  should  be  as  like  himself  as  possible.  This  is 
the  true  beginning  of  creation  and  of  the  world  a*  we  shall 
do  well  in  believing  on  the  testimony  of  wise  men :  God  de- 
sired that  all  things  should  be  good  and  nothing  bad  in  so  far 
as  this  could  be  accomplished.  Wherefore  also  finding  the 
whole  visible  sphere  not  at  rest,  but  moving  in  an  irregular 
and  disorderly  manner,  out  of  disorder  he  brought  order,  consid- 
ering that  this  was  far  better  than  the  other.  Now  the  deeds 
of  him  who  is  the  best  can  never  be  or  have  been  other  than 
the  fairest,  and  the  creator,  reflecting  upon  the  visible  works  of 
nature,  found  that  no  unintelligent  creature  taken  as  a  whole 
was  fairer  than  the  intelligent  taken  as  a  whole  ;  and  that  in- 
telligence could  not  exist  in  anything  which  was  devoid  of  soul. 
For  these  reasons  he  put  intelligence  in  soul,  and  soul  in  body, 
and  framed  the  universe  to  be  the  best  and  fairest  work  in  the 
order  of  nature.  And  therefore,  using  the  language  of  proba- 
bility, we  may  say  that  the  world  became  a  living  soul  and  truly 
rational  through  the  providence  of  God. 

This  being  supposed,  let  us  proceed  to  consider  the  fur- 
ther question,  in  the  likeness  of  what  animal  did  the  Creator 
make  the  world  ?  Certainly  we  cannot  suppose  that  the  form 
was  like  that  of  any  being  which  exists  in  parts  only ;  for 
nothing  can  be  beautiful  which  is  like  any  imperfect  thing  ;  but 
we  may  regard  the  world  as  the  very  likeness  of  that  whole  of 
which  all  other  animals,  both  individually  and  in  their  tribes 
are  portions.  For  the  original  of  the  universe  contains  in  itself 
all  intelligible  beings,  just  as  this  world  comprehends  us  and  all 
other  visible  creatures.  For  the  Deity,  intending  to  make  this 
world  like  the  fairest  and  most  perfect  of  intelligible  beings, 
framed  one  visible  animal  comprehending  all  other  animals  of 
a  kindred  nature.  Are  we  right  in  saying  that  there  is  one 
heaven,  or  shall  we  rather  say  that  there  are  many  and  infi- 
nite ?  There  is  one,  if  the  created  heaven  accords  with  the 
original.  For  that  which  includes  all  other  intelligible  creat- 
ures cannot  have  a  second  or  companion ;  in  that  case  there 
would  be  need  of  another  living  being  which  would  include 
those  two,  and  of  which  they  would  be  parts,  and  the  likeness 
would  be  more  truly  said  to  resemble  not  those  two,  but  that 


20  PLATO'S  BEST  rHOUGHTS. 

other  which  included  them.  In  order  then  that  the  world 
might  be  like  the  perfect  animal  in  unity,  he  who  made  the 
worlds  made  them  not  two  or  infinite  in  number  ;  but  there  is 
and  ever  will  be  one  only-begotten  and  created  heaven  — 
TimaeuSj  ii.  524. 
Animalism. 

Those  who  know  not  wisdom  and  virtue,  and  are  always 

busy  with  gluttony  and  sensuality,  go  down  and  np  again  as  far 
as  the  mean ;  and  in  this  region  they  move  at  random  through- 
out life,  but  they  never  pass  into  the  true  upper  world ;  thither 
they  neither  look,  nor  do  they  ever  find  their  way,  neither  are 
they  truly  filled  with  true  being,  nor  do  they  taste  of  true  and 
abiding  pleasure.  Like  cattle,  with  their  eyes  always  looking 
down  and  their  heads  stooping,  not  indeed  to  the  earth  but 
to  the  dining-table,  they  fatten  and  feed  and  breed,  and,  in 
their  excessive  love  of  these  delights,  they  kick  and  butt  at 
one  another  with  horns  and  hoofs  which  are  made  of  iron  ; 
and  they  kill  one  another  by  reason  of  their  insatiable  lust. 
For  they  fill  themselves  with  that  which  is  not  substantial, 
and  the  part  of  themselves  which  they  fill  is  also  unsubstantial 
and  incontinent. 

Their  pleasures  are  mixed  with  pains.  How  can  they  be 
otherwise?  For  they  are  mere  images  and  pictures  of  the 
true,  and  are  colored  by  contrast,  which  exaggerates  both  light 
and  shade,  and  so  they  implant  in  the  minds  of  fools  insane  de- 
sires of  themselves  ;  and  they  are  fought  about  as  Stesichorus 
says  that  the  Greeks  fought  about  the  shadow  of  Helen  at 
Troy  in  ignorance  of  the  truth. 

And  must  not  the  like  happen  with  the  spirited  or  pas- 
sionate element  of  the  soul?  Will  not  the  passionate  man  who 
carries  his  passion  into  action  be  in  a  like  case  whether  he  is 
envious  and  ambitious,  or  violent  and  contentious,  or  angry  and 
discontented,  if  he  be  seeking  to  attain  honor  and  victory  and 
the  satisfaction  of  his  anger  without  reason  or  sense  ?  —  The 
Republic,  ii.  417. 
Antagonisms;  human. 

There  is  a  story  which  I  remember  to  have  heard,  and 

on  which  I  rely.  The  story  is  that  Leontius,  the  sou  of 
Aglaiou,  coming  up  one  day  from  the  Piraeus,  under  the  north 
wall  on  the  outside,  observed  some  dead  bodies  lying  on  the 
ground  by  the  executioner.  He  felt  a  longing  desire  to  see 
them,  and  also  a  disgust  and  abhorrence  of  them  ;  for  a  time 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  21 

he  tinned  away  and  averted  his  eyes,  and  then,  suddenly  o\er- 
come  by  the  impulse,  forced  them  open,  and  ran  up,  saying  (to 
his  eyes),  Take  your  fill,  ye  wretches,  of  the  lovely  sight, 

I  have  heard  the  story  myself,  he  said. 

The  moral  is  that  anger  differs  from  the  desires,  and  is  some- 
times at  war  with  them. 

Yes,  that  is  the  meaning,  he  said. 

And  are  there  not  many  other  cases  in  which  we  obserre 
that  when  a  man's  desires  violently  prevail  over  his  reason,  he 
reviles  himself,  and  is  angry  at  the  violence  within  him,  and 
that  in  this  struggle,  which  is  like  the  struggle  of  factions  in  a 
state,  his  spirit  is  on  the  side  of  his  reason ;  but  for  the  pas- 
sionate or  spirited  element  to  take  part  with  the  desires  when 
reason  decides  that  she  should  not  be  opposed,  is  a  sort  of 
thing  which,  I  believe,  that  you  never  observed  occurring  in 
yourself,  nor,  as  I  think,  in  any  one  else  ? 

Certainly  not,  he  said. 

Suppose,  I  said,  that  a  man  thinks  he  has  done  a  wrong  to 
another,  the  nobler  he  is  the  less  able  he  is  to  feel  indignant ; 
his  anger  refuses  to  be  excited  at  the  hunger  or  cold  or  other 
suffering,  which  he  deems  that  the  injured  person  may  justly 
inflict  upon  him  ? 

True,  he  said. 

But  when  he  thinks  that  he  is  the  sufferer  of  the  wrong, 
then  he  boils  and  chafes,  and  is  on  the  side  of  what  he  be- 
lieves to  be  justice  ;  and  because  he  suffers  hunger  or  cold  or 
other  pain  he  is  only  the  more  determined  to  persevere  and 
conquer ;  he  must  do  or  die,  and  will  not  desist,  until  he  hears 
the  voice  of  the  shepherd,  that  is,  reason,  bidding  his  dog  bark 
no  more.  —  Tlie  Republic,  ii.  266. 
Antagonisms  and  counterparts  in  nature. 

Soc.  Whereas  the  sharp  and  flat,  the  swift  and  the  slow  are 

infinite  or  unlimited,  does  not  the  addition  of  them  introduce  a 
limit,  and  perfect  the  whole  frame  of  music  ? 

Pro.  Yes,  certainly. 

Soc.  Or,  again,  when  cold  and  heat  prevail,  does  not  the  in- 
troduction of  them  take  away  excess  and  indefiniteness  and  in- 
fuse moderation  and  harmony  ? 

Pro.  Certainly. 

Soc.  And  from  a  like  admixture  of  the  finite  and  infinite 
come  the  seasons,  and  all  the  delights  of  life? 

Pro.  Most  true. 


22  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Soc.  I  omit  to  speak  of  ten  thousand  other  things,  such  as 
beauty  and  health  and  strength,  and  of  the  many  beauties  and 
high  perfections  of  the  soul ;  methinks,  O  my  fair  Philebus, 
that  the  goddess  saw  the  universal  wantonness  and  wickedness 
of  all  things,  having  no  limit  of  pleasure  or  satiety,  and  she  de- 
vised the  limit  of  law  and  order,  tormenting,  as  you  say,  Phile- 
bus, or,  as  I  affirm,  saving  the  soul.  —  Philebus,  iii.  161. 
Appearance  of  good. 

Do  we  not  see  that  many  are  willing  to  appear   to   have, 

or  to  do,  or  to  be  the  just  and  honorable  without  the  reality ; 
but  no  one  is  satisfied  with  the  appearance  of  good  —  the 
reality  is  what  they  seek ;  in  the  case  of  the  good,  appearance 
is  despised  by  every  one. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

This,  then,  which  every  man  pursues  and  makes  his  end, 
having  a  presentiment  that  there  is  such  an  end,  and  yet  hesi- 
tating because  neither  knowing  the  nature  nor  having  the 
same  sure  proof  of  this  as  of  other  things,  and  therefore  having 
no  profit  in  other  things,  —  is  this,  I  would  ask,  a  principle 
about  which  the  best  men  in  our  State,  to  whom  everything  is 
to  be  intrusted,  ought  to  be  in  darkness  ?  —  The  Republic,  ii. 
333. 
Appetites  natural. 

I  see  that  among  men  all  things  depend  upon  three  wants 

and  desires,  of  which  the  end  is  virtue,  if  they  are  rightly  led 
by  them,  or  the  opposite,  if  wrongly.  Now  these  are  eating 
and  drinking,  which  begin  at  birth ;  every  animal  has  a  natural 
desire  for  them,  and  is  violently  excited,  and  rebels  against  him 
who  says  that  he  must  not  satisfy  all  his  pleasures  and  appe- 
tites, and  get  rid  of  the  corresponding  pains.  And  the  third 
and  greatest  and  sharpest  want  and  desire  breaks  out  last,  and 
is  the  fire  of  sexual  lust,  which  kindles  in  men  every  species  of 
wantonness  and  madness.  And  these  three  disorders  we  must 
endeavor  to  master  by  the  three  great  principles  of  fear  and 
law  and  right  reason  ;  turning  them  away  from  that  which  is 
called  pleasautest  to  the  best,  using  the  muses  and  the  Goda 
who  preside  over  contests  to  extinguish  their  increase  and  in- 
flux. —  Laws,  iv.  303. 
Argument ;  the  state  of  mind  for. 

Let  us  be  careful  of  admitting  into  our  souls  the  notion 

that  there  is  no  truth  or  health  or  soundness  in  any  arguments 
at  all ;  but  let  us  rather  say  that  there  is  as  yet  no  health  in 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  23 

us,  and  that  we  must  quit  ourselves  like  men  and  do  our  best  to 
gain  health,  —  you  and  all  other  men  with  a  view  to  the  whole 
of  your  future  life,  and  I  myself  with  a  view  to  death.  For 
at  this  moment  I  am  sensible  that  I  have  not  the  temper  ol  a 
philosopher ;  like  the  vulgar,  I  am  only  a  partisan.  For  the 
partisan,  when  he  is  engaged  in  a  dispute,  cares  nothing  about 
the  rights  of  the  question,  but  is  anxious  only  to  convince  his 
hearers  of  his  own  assertions.  And  the  difference  between  him 
and  me  at  the  present  moment  is  only  this,  —  that  whereas  he 
seeks  to  convince  his  hearers  that  what  he  says  is  true,  I  am 
rather  seeking  to  convince  myself ;  to  convince  my  hearers  is  a 
secondary  matter  with  me.  And  do  but  see  how  much  I  gain 
by  the  argument.  For  if  what  I  say  is  true,  then  I  do  well  to 
be  persuaded  of  the  truth ;  but  if  there  be  nothing  after  death, 
still,  during  the  short  time  that  remains,  I  shall  not  distress  my 
friends  with  lamentations,  and  my  ignorance  will  not  last,  but 
will  die  with  me  and  therefore  no  harm  will  be  done.  This  is 
the  state  of  mind,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  in  which  I  approach  the 
argument.  And  I  would  ask  you  to  be  thinking  of  the  truth 
and  not  of  Socrates ;  agree  with  me,  if  I  seem  to  you  to  be 
speaking  the  truth  ;  or  if  not,  withstand  me  might  and  main, 
that  I  may  not  deceive  you  as  well  as  myself  in  my  enthusiasm, 
and  like  the  bee,  leave  my  sting  in  you  before  I  die.  —  Phaedo, 
i.  419. 
Argument,  less  than  character. 

Let  others  praise  the  rewards  and  appearances  of  jus 

tice  ;  that  is  a  manner  of  arguing  which,  coming  from  them, 
I  am  ready  to  tolerate,  but  from  you  who  have  spent  your 
whole  life  in  thinking  about  the  question,  unless  I  hear  the  con- 
trary from  your  own  lips,  I  expect  something  better.  And 
therefore,  I  say,  not  only  prove  to  us  that  justice  is  better 
than  injustice,  but  show  what  they  either  of  them  do  to  the 
possessor  of  them,  which  makes  the  one  to  be  a  good  and  the 
other  an  evil,  whether  seen  or  unseen  by  gods  and  men.  —  The, 
Republic,  ii.  189. 
Argument,  not  found  in  numbers. 

If  you  have  no  better  argument   than   numbers,  let  mo 

have  a  turn,  and  do  you  make  trial  of  the  sort  of  proof 
which,  as  I  think,  ought  to  be  given ;  for  I  shall  produce  one 
witness  only  of  the  truth  of  my  words,  and  he  is  the  person 
with  whom  I  am  arguing ;  his  suffrage  I  know  how  to  take  ; 
but  with  the  many  I  have  codling  to  do,  and  do  not  even 
address  myself  to  them. —  Gorgias,  iii.  60. 


24  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Art,  —  nature  and  chance  as  opposed  to.     See  Nature,  etc. 
Art  imitative.     See  Likeness-making. 
Art-colors  less  than  words. 

Our  discussion  might  be  compared  to  a   picture  of  some 

living  being  which  had  been  fairly  drawn  in  outline,  but  had 
not  yet  attained  the  life  and  clearness  which  is  given  by  the 
blending  of  colors.  Now  to  intelligent  persons  a  living  being 
is  more  truly  delineated  by  language  and  discourse  than  by 
any  painting  or  work  of  art;  to  the  duller  sori  by  works  of 
art.  —  Statesman,  iii.  561. 

Art  military,  youth  instructed  in.     See  Military. 
Arts  ;  the  higher,  what  they  require. 

All    the    superior    arts    require   many  words  and  much 

discussion  of  the  higher  truths  of  nature ;  hence  comes  all 
loftiness  of  thought  and  perfectness  of  execution.  And  this, 
as  I  conceive,  was  the  quality  which,  in  addition  to  his  natural 
gifts,  Pericles  acquired  from  Anaxagoras  whom  he  happened 
to  know.  He  was  thus  imbued  with  the  higher  philosophy  and 
attained  the  knowledge  of  Mind,  which  was  the  favorite  theme 
of  Anaxagoras  and  applied  what  he  learned  to  the  art  of  speak- 
ing.—  Phaedrus,  i.  575. 
Arts;  experimental. 

O  Chaerephon,  there  are  many  arts  among  mankind  which 

are  experimental,  and  have  their  origin  in  experience,  for  ex- 
perience makes  the  days  of  men  to  proceed  according  to  art, 
and  inexperience  according  to  chance,  and  different  persons  in 
different  ways  are  proficients  in  different  arts,  and  the  best 
persons  in  the  best  arts.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  32. 
Arts ;  inquiry  ruinous  to. 

Sir.  Yet  once  more,  we  shall  have  to  enact,  that  if  any 

one  is  detected  inquiring  into  sailing  and  navigation  or  health, 
or  into  the  true  nature  of  medicine,  or  about  the  winds,  or  other 
conditions  of  the  atmosphere,  contrary  to  the  written  rules 
and  has  any  ingenious  notions  about  such  matters,  he  is  not 
to  be  called  a  pilot  or  physician,  but  a  cloudy  talking  sophist ; 
also  a  corrupter  of  the  young,  who  would  persuade  them  to  fol- 
low the  art  of  medicine  or"  piloting  in  an  unlawful  manner,  as 
the  irresponsible  masters  of  the  patients  or  ships ;  and  any  one 
who  is  qualified  by  law  may  inform  against  him,  and  indict 
him  in  some  court,  and  then  if  he  is  found  to  be  corrupting  any, 
whether  young  or  old,  he  is  to  be  punished  with  the  utmost 
rigor  of  the  law ;  for  no  one  should  presume  to  be  wiser  than 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  26 

the  laws  ;  and  as  touching  healing  and  health  and  piloting  and 
navigation,  the  nature  of  them  is  known  to  all,  for  anybody 
may  learn  the  written  laws  and  the  national  customs.  If  such 
were  the  mode  of  procedure,  Socrates,  about  these  sciences  and 
about  generalship,  and  any  branch  of  hunting,  or  about  paint- 
ing or  imitation  in  general,  or  carpentry,  or  any  sort  of  manu- 
facture, or  husbandry,  or  planting,  or  if  we  were  to  see  an  art 
of  rearing  horses,  or  tending  herds,  or  divination,  or  any  minis- 
terial service,  or  draught-playing,  or  any  science  conversant 
with  number,  whether  simple  or  square  or  cube,  or  comprising 
motion,  —  I  say,  if  all  these  things  were  done  in  this  way  ac- 
cording to  written  regulation,  and  not  according  to  art,  what 
would  be  the  result? 

T.  Soc.  All  the  arts  would  utterly  perish,  and  could  never 
be  recovered,  because  inquiry  would  be  unlawful.     And  human 
life,  which  is  bad  enough  already,  would  then  become  utterly 
unendurable.  —  Statesman,  iii.  585. 
Artists ;  what  they  should  be. 

Are  they  also  to  be  prohibited  from  exhibiting  the  oppo- 
site forms  of  vice  and  intemperance  and  meanness  and  indecency 
in  sculpture  and  building  and  the  other  creative  arts  ;  and  is  he 
who  does  not  conform  to  this  rule  of  ours  to  be  prohibited 
from  practicing  his  art  in  our  State,  lest  the  taste  of  our  citi- 
zens be  corrupted  by  him  ?  We  would  not  have  our  guardians 
grow  up  amid  images  of  moral  deformity,  as  in  some  noxious 
pasture,  and  there  browse  and  feed  upon  many  a  baneful  herb 
and  flower  day  by  day,  little  by  little,  until  they  silently  gather 
a  festering  mass  of  corruption  in  their  own  soul.  Let  our 
artists  rather  be  those  who  are  gifted  to  discern  the  true  nat- 
ure of  beauty  and  grace ;  then  will  our  youth  dwell  in  a  land 
of  health,  amid  fair  sights  and  sounds  ;  and  beauty,  the  effluence 
of  fair  works,  will  visit  the  eye  and  ear,  like  a  healthful  breeze 
from  a  purer  region,  and  insensibly  draw  the  soul  even  in  child- 
hood into  harmony  with  the  beauty  of  reason.  —  The  Republic, 
ii.  225. 
Artists ;  their  work. 

Will  not  the  good  man,  who  says  whatever  he  says  with 

a  view  to  the  best,  speak  with  a  reference  to  some  standard  and 
not  at  random  ;  just  as  all  other  artist?,  whether  the  painter, 
the  builder,  the  shipwright,  or  any  other,  look  to  their  work, 
and  do  not  select  and  apply  at  random  what  they  apply,  but 
keep  in  view  the  form  of  their  work  ?  The  artist  disposes 


26  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

all  things  in  order,  and  compels  the  one  part  to  harmonize  and 
accord  with  the  other  part,  until  he  has  constructed  a  regular 
and  systematic  whole  ;  and  this  is  true  of  all  artists,  and  in  the 
same  way  the  trainers  and  physicians,  of  whom  we  spoke  be- 
fore, give  order  and  regularity  to  the  body.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  94. 
Astronomy,  how  learned.  See  Heavenly  bodies. 
Authority  of  the  State. 

•'  Tell  us  what  complaint  you  have  to  make  against  us 

which  justifies  you  in  attempting  to  destroy  us  and  the  State  ? 
In  the  first  place  did  we  not  bring  you  into  existence  ?  Your 
father  married  your  mother  by  our  aid  and  begat  you.  Say 
whether  you  have  any  objection  to  urge  against  those  of  us 
who  regulate  marriage  ?  "  None,  I  should  reply.  "  Or  against 
those  of  us  who  after  birth  regulate  the  nurture  and  education 
of  children  in  which  you  also  were  trained  ?  Were  not  the 
laws,  which  have  the  charge  of  education,  right  in  commanding 
your  father  to  train  you  in  music  and  gymnastic  ?  "  Right,  I 
should  reply.  "  Well  then,  since  you  were  brought  into  the 
world  and  nurtured  and  educated  by  us,  can  you  deny  in  the 
first  place  that  you  are  our  child  and  slave,  as  your  fathers 
were  before  you  ?  And  if  this  is  true  you  are  not  on  equal 
terms  with  us  ;  nor  can  you  think  that  you  have  a  right  to  do 
to  us  what  we  are  doing  to  you.  Would  you  have  any  right 
to  strike  or  revile  or  do  any  other  evil  to  your  father  cr  to 
your  master,  if  you  had  one,  because  you  have  been  struck  or 
reviled  by  him,  or  received  some  other  evil  at  his  hands  ?  — 
you  would  not  say  this  ?  And  because  we  think  right  to  de- 
stroy you,  do  you  think  that  you  have  any  right  to  destroy  us 
in  return,  and  your  country  as  far  as  in  you  lies  ?  Will  you, 
O  professor  of  true  virtue,  pretend  that  you  are  justified  in 
this  ?  Has  a  philosopher  like  you  failed  to  discover  that  our 
country  is  more  to  be  valued  and  higher  and  holier  far  than 
mother  or  father  or  any  ancestor,  and  more  to  be  regarded  in 
the  eyes  of  the  gods  and  of  men  of  understanding  ?  also  to  be 
soothed,  and  gently  and  reverently  entreated  when  angry,  even 
more  than  a  father,  and  if  not  persuaded,  obeyed  ?  And  when 
we  are  punished  by  her,  whether  with  imprisonment  or  stripes, 
the  punishment  is  to  be  endured  in  silence ;  and  if  she  lead  us 

to  wounds  or  death  in  battle,  thither  we  follow  as  is  ri°-ht  - 
. 

neither  may  any  one  yield  or  retreat  or  leave  his  rank,  but 
whether  in  battle  or  in  a  court  of  law,  or  in  any  other  place, 
he  must  do  what  his  city  and  his  country  order  him  ;  or  he 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  27 

must  change  their  view  of  what  is  just :  and  if  he  may  do  no 
violence  to  his  father  or  mother,  much  less  may  he  do  violence 
to  his  country." —  Crito,  i.  355. 
Authorship ;  motives  to. 

1  see,  Parmenides,  said  Socrates,  that  Zeuo  is  your  sec- 
ond self  in  his  writings  too ;  he  puts  what  you  say  in  another 
way,  and  would  fain  deceive  us  into  believing  that  he  is  telling 
what  is  new.  For  you,  in  your  poems,  say  All  is  one,  and 
of  this  you  adduce  excellent  proofs  ;  and  he,  on  the  other  hand, 
says  There  is  no  many ;  and  on  behalf  of  this  he  offers  over- 
whelming evidence.  To  deceive  the  world,  as  you  have  done, 
by  saying  the  same  thing  in  different  ways,  one  of  you  affirm- 
ing the  one  and  the  other  denying  the  many,  is  a  strain  of  art 
beyond  the  reach  of  most  of  us. 

Yes,  Socrates,  said  Zeno.  But  although  you  are  as  keen 
as  a  Spartan  hound  in  pursuing  the  track,  you  do  not  quite  ap- 
prehend the  true  motive  of  the  composition,  which  is  not  really 
such  an  ambitious  work  as  you  imagine  ;  for  what  you  speak 
of  was  an  accident ;  I  had  no  serious  intention  of  deceiving  the 
world.  The  truth  is,  that  these  writings  of  mine  were  meant 
to  protect  the  arguments  of  Parmenides  against  those  who 
scoff  at  him,  and  show  the  many  ridiculous  and  contradictory 
results  which  they  supposed  to  follow  from  the  affirmation  of 
the  one.  My  answer  is  an  address  to  the  partisans  of  the 
many,  whose  attack  I  return  with  interest  by  retorting  upon 
them  that  their  hypothesis  of  the  being  of  many,  if  carried 
out,  appears  in  a  still  more  ridiculous  light  than  the  hypoth- 
esis of  the  being  of  one.  A  love  of  controversy  led  me  to 
write  the  book  in  the  days  of  my  youth,  and  some  one  stole 
the  copy  ;  and  therefore  I  had  no  choice  of  whether  it  should 
be  published  or  not ;  the  motive,  however,  of  writing,  was  not 
the  ambition  of  an  old  man,  but  the  pugnacity  of  a  young  one. 
—  Parmenides,  iii.  244. 
Avaricious  men.  See  Miserly  men,  etc. 

Bachelorhood  an  impiety.     See  Immortality  in  time. 
Bad  man's  faults  increased  by  power. 

He  who  is  the  real  tyrant,  whatever  men  may  think,  is 

the  real  slave,  and  is  obliged  to  practice  the  greatest  adulation 
and  servility,  and  to  be  the  flatterer  of  the  vilest  of  mankind. 
He  has  desires  which  he  is  utterly  unable  to  satisfy,  and  has 
more  wants  than  any  one,  and  is  truly  poor,  if  you  know  how 


28  PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS. 

to  inspect  the  whole  soul  of  him :  all  his  life  long  he  is  beset 
with  fear  and  is  full  of  convulsions  and  distractions,  even  as  the 
State  which  he  resembles;  and  surely  the  resemblance  holds? 

True,  he  said. 

Moreover,  as  we  said  before,  he  grows  worse  from  having 
power :  he  becomes  of  necessity  more  jealous,  more  faithless, 
more  unjust,  more  friendless,  more  impious  than  he  was  at 
first ;  he  entertains  and  nurtures  every  evil  sentiment,  and  the 
consequence  is  that  he  is  supremely  miserable,  and  he  makes 
everybody  else  equally  miserable.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  409. 
Battle;  death  in. 

O  Menexenus !  death  in  battle  is  certainly  in  many  re- 
spects a  noble  thing.  The  dead  man  gets  a  fine  and  costly 
funeral,  although  he  may  have  been  poor,  and  an  elaborate 
speech  is  made  over  him  by  a  wise  man  who  has  long  ago  pre- 
pared what  he  has  to  say,  although  he  who  is  praised  may  not 
have  been  good  for  much.  The  speakers  praise  him  for  what 
he  has  done  and  for  what  he  has  not  done  —  that  is  the  beauty 
of  them  —  and  they  steal  away  our  souls  with  their  embellished 
words ;  in  every  conceivable  form  they  praise  the  city ;  and 
they  praise  those  who  died  in  war,  and  all  our  ancestors  who 
went  before  us  ;  and  they  praise  ourselves  also  who  are  still 
alive. — Menexenus,  iv.  565. 
Beauties  tyrannical. 

Soc.  A  man  who  was  blindfolded  has  only  to  hear  you 

talking,  and  he  would  know  that  you  are  a  fair  creature  and 
have  still  many  lovers. 

Men.  Why  do  you  say  that  ? 

Soc.  Why,  because  you  always  speak  in  imperatives  :  like 
all  beauties  when  they  are  in  their  prime,  you  are  tyrannical ; 
and  also,  as  I  suspect,  you  have  found  out  that  I  have  a  weak- 
ness for  the  fair,  and  therefore  I  must  humor  you  and  answer. 
—  Meno,  i.  249. 
Beautiful  true  and  good,  the. 

Now,   that  which  imparts  truth  to  the    known  and  the 

power  of  knowing  to  the  knower  is  what  I  would  have  you 
term  the  idea  of  good,  and  that  you  will  regard  as  the  cause  of 
science  and  of  truth,  as  known  by  us;  beautiful  too,  as  are 
both  truth  and  knowledge,  you  will  be  right  in  esteeming  this 
other  nature  as  more  beautiful  than  either ;  and,  as  in  the  pre- 
vious instance,  light  and  sight  may  be  truly  said  to  be  like  the 
sun,  and  yet  not  to  be  the  sun,  so  in  this  other  sphere,  science 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHT*.  29 

and  truth  may  be  deemed  like  the  good,  but  not  the  good ;  the 
good  has  a  place  of  honor  yet  higher. 

"What  a  wonder  of  beauty  that  must  be,  he  said,  which  is  the 
author  of  science  and  truth,  and  yet  surpasses  them  in  beauty. 
—  The  Republic,  ii.  336. 
Beauty  permeating  our  souls. 

Beauty  is  certainly  a  soft,  smooth,  slippery   thing,  and 

therefore  of  a  nature  which  easily  slips  in  and  permeates  our 
souls.  For  I  affirm  that  the  good  is  the  beautiful.  Ycu  will 
agree  to  that  ? 

Yes. 

This  I  say  from  a  sort  of  notion  that  what  is  neither  good 
nor  evil  is  the  friend  of  the  beautiful  and  the  good,  and  I  will 
tell  you  why  I  am  inclined  to  think  so  ;  I  assume  that  there 
are  three  principles  —  the  good,  the  bad,  and  that  which  is 
neither  good  nor  bad.  What  do  you  say  to  that? 

I  agree. 

And  neither  is  the  good  the  friend  of  the  good,  nor  the  evil 
of  the  evil,  nor  the  good  of  the  evil,  —  that  the  preceding  ar- 
gument will  not  allow ;  and  therefore  the  only  alternative  is  — 
if  there  be  such  a  thing  as  friendship  or  love  at  all  —  that  what 
is  neither  good  nor  evil  must  be  the  friend,  either  of  the  good, 
or  of  that  which  is  neither  good  nor  evil,  for  nothing  can  be 
the  friend  of  the  bad.  —  Lysis,  i.  56. 
Beauty,  absolute. 

There  is  nothing  new,  he  said,  in  what  I  am  about  to  tell 

you ;  but  only  what  I  have  been  always  and  everywhere  re- 
peating in  the  previous  discussion  and  on  other  occasions  ;  I 
want  to  show  you  the  nature  of  that  cause  which  has  occupied 
my  thoughts,  and  I  shall  have  to  go  back  to  those  familiar  words 
which  are  in  the  mouth  of  every  one,  and  first  of  all  assume 
that  there  is  an,  absolute  beauty  and  goodness,  and  greatness, 
and  the  like ;  grant  me  this,  and  I  hope  to  be  able  to  show  you 
the  nature  of  the  cause,  and  to  prove  the  immortality  of  the 
soul. 

Cebes  said :  You  may  proceed  at  once  with  the  proof,  for  1 
grant  you  this. 

Well,  he  said,  then  I  should  like  to  know  whether  you  agree 
with  me  in  the  next  step  ;  for  I  cannot  help  thinking  that  if 
there  be  anything  beautiful  other  than  absolute  beauty,  that  can 
only  be  beautiful  in  as  far  as  it  partakes  of  absolute  beauty  — 
feud  this  I  should  say  of  everything.  Do  you  agree  in  this  no- 
tion of  the  cause  ? 


30  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS, 

Yes,  he  said,  I  agree. 

He  proceeded :  I  know  nothing  and  can  understand  nothing 
of  any  other  of  those  wise  causes  which  are  alleged ;  and  if  a 
person  says  to  me  that  the  bloom  of  color,  or  form,  or  anything 
else  of  that  sort  is  a  source  of  beauty,  I  leave  all  that,  which  is 
only  confusing  to  me,  and  simply  and  singly,  and  perhaps  fool- 
ishly, hold  and  am  assured  in  my  own  mind  that  nothing  makes 
a  thing  beautiful  but  the  presence  and  participation  of  beauty 
in  whatever  way  or  manner  obtained ;  for  as  to  the  manner  I 
am  uncertain,  but  I  stoutly  contend  that  by  beauty  all  beautiful 
things  become  beautiful.  That  appears  to  me  to  be  the  only 
safe  answer  that  I  can  give,  either  to  myself  or  to  any  other, 
and  to  that  I  cling,  in  the  persuasion  that  I  shall  never  be 
overthrown.  —  Phaedo,  i.  429. 

The  lovers  of  sounds  and  sights,  I  replied,  are,  as  I  conceive, 
fond  of  fine  tones  and  colors  and  forms,  and  all  the  artificial 
products  that  are  made  out  of  them,  but  their  mind  is  incapable 
of  seeing  or  loving  absolute  beauty. 

True,  he  replied. 

Few  are  they  who  are  able  to  attain  the  sight  of  this. 

Very  true. 

And  he  who,  having  a  sense  of  beautiful  things,  has  no  sense 
of  absolute  beauty,  or  who,  if  another  lead  him  to  a  knowledge 
of  that  beauty  is  unable  to  follow  —  of  such  an  one  I  ask,  Is 
he  awake  or  in  a  dream  only  ?  Reflect :  is  not  the  dreamer, 
sleeping  or  waking,  one  who  puts  the  resemblance  in  the  place 
of  the  real  object? 

I  should  certainly  say  that  such  an  one  was  dreaming. 

But  take  the  case  of  the  other,  who  recognizes  the  existence 
of  absolute  beauty  and  is  able  to  distinguish  the  idea  from  the 
objects  which  participate  in  the  idea,  neither  putting  the  ob- 
jects in  the  place  of  the  idea  nor  the  idea  in  the  place  of  the 
objects  —  is  he  a  dreamer,  or  is  he  awake  ? 

He  is  wide  awake.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  304. 
Beauty,  one  and  everlasting. 

"  These  are  the  lesser  mysteries  of  love,  into  which  even 

you,  Socrates,  may  enter ;  to  the  greater  and  more  hidden  ones 
which  are  the  crown  of  these,  and  to  which,  if  you  pursue  them 
in  a  right  spirit,  they  will  lead,  I  know  not  whether  you  will  be 
able  to  attain.  But  I  will  do  my  utmost  to  inform  you,  and 
io  you  follow  if  you  can.  For  he  who  wouM  proceed  aright 
in  this  matter  should  begin  jn  youth  to  visit  beautiful  forms ; 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  31 

and  first,  if  he  be  guided  by  his  instructor  aright  to  love  one 
such  form  only  —  out  of  that  he  should  create  fair  thoughts ; 
and  soon  he  will  of  himself  perceive  that  the  beauty  of  one 
form  is  akin  to  the  beauty  of  another ;  and  then  if  beauty  of 
form  in  general  is  his  pursuit,  how  foolish  would  he  be  not  to 
recognize  that  the  beauty  in  every  form  is  one  and  the  same ! 
And  when  he  perceives  this  he  will  abate  his  violent  love  of 
the  one,  which  he  will  despise  and  deem  a  small  thing,  and  will 
become  a  lover  of  all  beautiful  forms  ;  in  the  next  stage  he 
will  consider  that  the  beauty  of  the  mind  is  more  honorable 
than  the  beauty  of  the  outward  form.  So  that  if  a  virtuous 
soul  have  but  a  little  comeliness,  he  will  be  content  to  love  and 
tend  him,  and  will  search  out  and  bring  to  the  birth  thoughts 
which  may  improve  the  young,  until  he  is  compelled  to  con- 
template and  see  the  beauty  of  institutions  and  laws,  and  to 
understand  that  the  beauty  of  them  all  is  of  one  family,  and 
that  personal  beauty  is  a  trifle ;  and  after  laws  and  institutions 
he  will  go  on  to  the  sciences,  that  he  may  see  their  beauty,  be- 
ing not  like  a  servant  in  love  with  the  beauty  of  one  youth  or 
man  or  institution,  himself  a  slave,  mean  and  narrow-minded, 
but  drawing  toward  and  contemplating  the  vast  sea  of  beauty, 
he  will  create  many  fair  and  noble  thoughts  and  notions  in 
boundless  love  of  wisdom ;  until  on  that  shore  he  grows  and 
waxes  strong,  and  at  last  the  vision  is  revealed  to  him  of  a 
single  science,  which  is  the  science  of  beauty  everywhere.  To 
this  I  will  proceed ;  please  to  give  me  your  very  best  attention. 
He  who  has  been  instructed  thus  far  in  the  things  of  love,  and 
who  has  learned  to  see  the  beautiful  in  due  order  and  succes- 
sion, when  he  comes  toward  the  end  will  suddenly  perceive  a 
nature  of  wondrous  beauty  —  (and  this,  Socrates,  is  the  final 
cause  of  all  our  former  toils,)  a  nature  which  in  the  first  place 
is  everlasting,  not  growing  and  decaying,  or  waxing  and  wan- 
ing ;  m  the  next  place  not  fair  in  one  point  of  view  and 
foul  in  another,  or  at  one  time  or  in  one  relation  or  at  one 
place  fair,  at  another  time  or  in  another  relation  or  at  another 
place  foul,  as  if  fair  to  some  and  foul  to  others,  or  in  the  like- 
ness of  a  face  or  hands  or  any  otker  part  of  the  bodily  frame, 
or  in  any  form  of  speech  or  knowledge,  or  existing  in  any 
other  being ;  as  for  example,  in  an  animal,  or  in  heaven  or  in 
earth,  or  in  any  other  place,  but  beauty  only,  absolute,  sepa- 
rate, simple,  and  everlasting,  which  without  diminution  and 
without  increase,  or  any  change,  is  imparted  to  the  ever-grow- 


32  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

ing  and  perishing  beauties  of  all  other  things.  He  who  under 
the  influence  of  true  love  rising  upward  from  these  begins  to 
see  that  beauty,  is  not  far  from  the  end.  And  the  true  order 
of  going  or  being  led  by  another  to  the  things  of  love,  is  to  use 
the  beauties  of  earth  as  steps  along  which  he  mounts  upwards 
for  the  sake  of  that  other  beauty,  going  from  one  to  two,  and 
from  two  to  all  fair  forms,  and  from  fair  forms  to  fair  practices, 
md  from  fair  practices  to  fair  notions,  until  from  fair  notions 
he  arrives  at  the  notion  of  absolute  beauty,  and  at  last  knows 
what  the  essence  of  beauty  is.  This,  my  dear  Socrates,"  said 
the  stranger  of  Mantiueia,  "  is  that  life  above  all  others  which 
man  should  live,  in  the  contemplation  of  beauty  absolute  ;  a 
beauty  which  if  you  once  beheld,  you  would  see  not  to  be  after 
the  measure  of  gold,  and  garments,  and  fair  boys  and  youths, 
whose  presence  now  entrances  you  ;  and  you  and  many  a  one 
would  be  content  to  live  seeing  only  and  conversing  with  them 
without  meat  or  drink,  if  that  were  possible  —  you  only  want 
to  be  with  them  and  to  look  at  them.  But  what  if  man  had 
eyes  to  see  the  true  beauty  —  the  divine  beauty,  I  mean,  pure 
and  clear  and  unalloyed,  not  clogged  with  the  pollutions  of 
mortality,  and  all  the  colors  and  vanities  of  human  life  — 
thither  looking,  and  holding  converse  with  the  true  beauty 
divi*ie  and  simple  ?  Do  you  not  see  that  in  that  communion 
only,  beholding  beauty  with  the  eye  of  the  mind,  he  will  be 
enabled  to  bring  forth,  not  images  of  beauty,  but  realities  ;  (for 
he  has  hold  not  of  an  image  but  of  a  reality,)  and  bringing  forth 
and  nourishing  true  virtue  to  become  the  friend  of  God  and  be 
immortal,  if  mortal  man  may.  Would  that  be  an  ignoble  life  ?  " 
—  The  Symposium,  i.  502. 
Beauty,  madness  of. 

Thus  far  I  have  been   speaking  of  the  fourth  and  last 

kind  of  madness,  which  is  imputed  to  him  who,  when  he  sees 
the  beauty  of  earth,  is  transported  with  the  recollection  of  the 
true  beauty ;  he  would  like  to  fly  away,  but  he  cannot ;  he  is 
like  a  bird  fluttering  and  looking  upward  and  careless  of  the 
world  below ;  and  he  is  therefore  esteemed  mad.  And  I  have 
shown  this  is  of  all  inspirations  to  be  the  noblest  and  highest, 
and  the  offspring  of  the  highest,  and  that  he  who  loves  the 
beautiful  is  called  a  lover  because  he  partakes  of  it.  For,  as 
has  been  already  said,  every  soul  of  man  has  in  the  way  of 
nature  beheld  true  being ;  this  was  the  condition  of  her  pass- 
ing into  the  form  of  man.  But  all  souls  do  not  easily  recall 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  33 

the  things  of  the  other  world ;  they  may  have  seen  them  for 
a  short  time  only,  or  they  may  have  been  unfortunate  in  their 
earthly  lot,  and  may  have  lost  the  memory  of  the  holy  things 
which  they  saw  there,  through  some  evil  and  corrupting  asso- 
ciation. Few  only  retain  an  adequate  remembrance  of  them  ; 
and  they,  when  they  behold  any  image  of  that  other  world, 
are.  rapt  in  amazement ;  but  they  are  ignorant  of  what  this 
rapture  means,  because  they  do  not  clearly  perceive.  For 
there  is  no  light  in  the  earthly  copies  of  justice  or  temperance 
or  any  of  the  higher  qualities  which  are  precious  to  souls  : 
they  are  seen  but  through  a  glass  dimly ;  and  there  are  few 
who,  going  to  the  images,  behold  in  them  the  realities,  and 
they  only  with  difficulty.  They  might  have  seen  beauty  shin- 
ing in  brightness,  when,  with  the  happy  band  following  in  the 
train  of  Zeus,  as  we  philosophers,  or  of  other  gods  as  others  did, 
they  saw  a  vision  and  were  initiated  into  mysteries,  which  may 
be  truly  called  most  blessed,  and  which  we  celebrated  in  our 
state  of  innocence ;  having  no  experience  of  evils  as  yet  to 
come ;  admitted  to  the  sight  of  apparitions  innocent  and  sim- 
ple and  calm  and  happy  ;  shinirig  in  pure  light,  pure  ourselves 
and  not  yet  enshrined  in  that  living  tomb  which  we  carry 
about,  now  that  we  are  imprisoned  in  the  body,  like  an  oyster 
in  his  shell.  Let  me  linger  thus  long  over  the  memory  of 
scenes  which  have  passed  away.  —  Phaedrus,  i.  554. 
Beauty,  celestial. 

But  of  beauty,  I  repeat  again  that  we  saw  her  there 

shining   in  company  with   the  celestial  forms ;  and   coming  to 
earth  we  find  her  here  too,  shining  in  clearness  through  the 

'  O  O 

clearest  aperture  of  sense.  For  sight  is  the  keenest  of  our 
bodily  senses ;  though  not  by  that  is  wisdom  seen  ;  her  loveli- 
ness would  have  been  transporting  if  there  had  been  a  visible 
image  of  her,  and  the  same  is  true  of  the  loveliness  of  the 
other  ideas  as  well.  But  this  is  the  privilege  of  beauty  that  she 
is  the  loveliest  and  also  the  most  palpable  to  sight.  Now  he 
who  is  not  newly  initiated,  or  who  has  become  corrupted,  does 
not  easily  rise  out  of  this  world  to  the  sight  of  true  beauty 
in  the  other ;  he  looks  only  at  her  earthly  namesake,  instead  of 
being  awed  at  the  sight  of  her,  like  a  brutish  beast  he  rushes 
on  to  enjoy  and  beget ;  he  consorts  with  wantonness  and  is 
not  afraid  or  ashamed  of  pursuing  pleasure  in  violation  of  nat- 
ure. But  he  whose  initiation  is  recent,  and  who  has  been 
the  spectator  of  many  glories  in  the  other  world,  is  amazed 
3 


84  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUG  VTS. 

when  he   sees  any  one  having  a  godlike  face  or  urm,  which  L 
the  expression   of  divine  beauty  ;  and  at  first  a  shudder  runs 
through  him,  and  again  the  old  awe  steals  over  him.  —  Phae- 
drus,  i.  556. 
Beauty,  proportionate. 

If  we  were  painting  a  statue,  and  some  one  were  to  come 

and  blame  us  for  not  putting  the  most  beautiful  colors  on  the 
most  beautiful  parts  of  the  body  —  for  the  eyes,  he  would  say, 
ought  to  be  purple,  but  they  are  black  —  in  that  case  we  might 
fairly  answer,  "  Sir,  do  not  imagine  that  we  ought  to  beautify 
the  eyes  to  such  a  degree  that  they  are  no  longer  eyes  ;  but  see 
whether,  by  giving  this  and  the  other  features  their  due,  we 
make  the  whole  beautiful."  —  The  Republic,  ii.  244. 
Beauty  of  figure  and  melody. 

Ath.    What   is   beauty   of    figure,    or   beautiful   melody  ? 

When  a  manly  soul  is  in  trouble,  and  when  a  cowardly  soul  is 
in  a  similar  case,  are  they  likely  to  use  the  same  figures  and 
gestures,  or  to  give  utterance  to  the  same  sounds  ? 

Gle.  How  can  they,  when  the  very  colors  of  their  faces  dif- 
fer? 

Ath.  Good,  my  friend;  I  may  observe,  however,  in  passing, 
that  in  music  there  certainty  are  figures  and  there  are  melo- 
dies ;  and  music  is  concerned  with  harmony  and  rhythm,  so 
that  you  may  speak  of  a  melody  or  figure  having  rhythm  or 
harmony ;  the  term  is  correct  enough,  but  you  cannot  speak 
correctly,  as  the  masters  of  choruses  have  a  way  of  talking 
metaphorically  of  the  u  color "  of  a  melody  or  figure.  Al- 
though you  can  speak  of  the  melodies  or  figures  of  the  brave 
and  the  coward,  praising  the  one  and  censuring  the  other. 
And  not  to  be  tedious,  the  figures  and  melodies  which  are  ex- 
pressive of  virtue  of  soul  or  body,  or  of  images  of  virtue,  are 
without  exception  good,  and  those  which  are  expressive  of  vice 
nre  the  reverse  of  good. 

Gle.  You  are  right  in  calling  upon  us  to  make  that  division. 

Ath.  But  are  all  of  us  equally  delighted  with  every  sort  of 
dance  ? 

Cle.   Far  otherwise. 

Ath.  What  is  the  cause  of   error   or   division   among 

us?  Are  beautiful  things  not  the  same  to  us  all,  or  are  they 
the  same  in  themselves,  but  not  in  our  opinion  of  them  ?  For 
no  one  will  admit  that  forms  of  vice  in  the  dance  are  more 
beautiful  than  forms  of  virtue,  or  that  he  himself  delights  in 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS-  35 

the  forms  of  vice,  and  others  in  a  muse  of  another  character. 
And  yet  most  persons  say,  that  the  excellence  of  music  is  to 
give  pleasure  to  our  souls.  But  this  is  intolerable  and  blas- 
phemous ;  there  is,  however,  a  more  plausible  account  of  the 
delusion.  —  Laws,  iv.  185. 
Being,  real. 

Which  classes  of  things  have  a  greater  share  in  pure  ex- 
istence, in  your  judgment —  those  of  which  food  and  drink  and 
condiments  and  all  kinds  of  sustenance  are  examples,  or  the 
class  which  contains  true  opinion  and  mind  and,  in  general,  all 
virtue  ?  Put  the  question  in  this  way :  —  Which  has  a  more 
pure  being,  —  that  which  is  concerned  with  the  invariable,  the 
immortal,  and  the  true,  and  is  found  in  the  invariable,  immor- 
tal, true ;  or  that  which  is  concerned  with  the  rariable  and 
mortal,  and  is  found  in  the  variable  and  mortal  ? 

Far  purer,  he  replied,  is  that  which  is  concerned  with  the 
invariable.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  41 6. 
Belief  and  learning. 

Soc.    Let  me  raise  this  question  :  you  would  say   that 

there  is  such  a  thing  as  "  having  learned  ?  " 

Gor.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  there  is  also  "  having  believed  ?  " 

Gor.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  is  the  "  having  learned  "  the  same  as  "  having  be- 
lieved," and  are  learning  and  belief  the  same  things  ? 

Gor.  In  my  judgment,  Socrates,  they  are  not  the  same. 

Soc.  And  your  judgment  is  right,  as  you  may  ascertain  in 
this  way :  If  a  person  were  to  say  to  you,  "  Is  there,  Gorgias, 
a  false  belief  as  well  as  a  true  ?  "  you  would  reply,  if  I  am  not 
mistaken,  that  there  is. 

Gor.  Yes. 

Soc.  Well,  but  is  there  a  false  knowledge  as  well  as  a  true  / 

Gor.  No. 

Soc.  No,  indeed ;  and  this  again  proves  that  knowledge  and 
belief  differ. 

Gor.  That  is  true. 

Soc.  And  yet  those  who  have  learned  as  well  as  those  who 
have  believed  are  persuaded  ? 

Gor.  That  is  so. 

Soc.  Shall  we  then  assume  two  sorts  of  persuasion,  —  one 
which  is  the  source  of  belief  without  knowledge,  as  it  e  other  la 
of  knowledge  ? 

Gor.  By  all  means.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  39. 


JJtJ  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Beliefs  and  opinions,  true. 

Now  when   the   Creator  had  framed   the  soul  according 

to  his  will,  he  formed  within  her  the  corporeal  universe,  and 
brought  them  together,  and  united  them  centre  to  centre.  The 
soul,  interfused  everywhere  from  the  centre  to  the  circumfer- 
ence of  heaven,  of  which  she  is  the  external  envelopment,  her- 
self turning  in  herself,  began  a  divine  beginning  of  never-ceas- 
ing and  rational  life  enduring  throughout  all  time.  The  body 
of  heaven  is  visible,  but  the  soul  is  invisible,  and  partakes  of 
reason  and  harmony,  and  being  made  by  the  best  of  intellectual 
and  everlasting  natures  is  the  best  of  things  created.  And  be- 
cause she  is  composed  of  the  same  and  of  the  other  and  of  the 
essence,  these  three,  and  divided  and  bound  together  in  pro- 
portion, and  is  revolving  backwards  and  forwards  in  herself, 
the  soul,  when  touching  anything  which  has  essence,  whether 
dispersed  in  parts  or  undivided,  is  stirred  through  all  her  pow- 
ers to  declare  the  sameness  or  difference  of  that  and  some 
other  thing,  and  in  relation  to  what  and  in  what  way  and  how 
and  when  individuals  are  connected  or  affected,  both  in  the 
world  of  generation  and  in  the  world  of  immutable  being. 
And  when  reason,  which  works  with  equal  truth  both  in  the 
circle  of  the  diverse  and  of  the  same,  —  in  the  sphere  of  the 
self-moved  in  voiceless  silence  moving,  —  when  reason,  I  say, 
is  hovering  around  the  sensible  world  and  the  circle  of  the 
diverse  also  moving  truly  imparts  the  intimations  of  sense  to 
the  whole  soul,  then  arise  fixed  and  true  opinions  and  beliefs. 
But  when  reason  is  dwelling  in  the  rational,  and  the  circle  of 
the  same  moving  smoothly  indicates  this,  then  intelligence  and 
knowledge  are  of  necessity  perfected.  And  if  any  one  affirms 
that  in  which  these  are  found  to  be  other  than  the  soul,  he 
will  say  the  very  opposite  of  the  truth.  —  Timaeus,  ii.  529. 
Bodily  pleasures  desired  by  men. 

Consider,  my  friend,  whether  you  and  I  are  agreed  about 

another  question,  which  will  probably  throw  light  on  our  pres- 
ent inquiry  :  Do  you  think  that  the  philosopher  ought  to  care 
about  the  pleasures  —  if  they  are  to  be  called  pleasures  /—  oi 
eating  and  drinking? 

Certainly  not,  answered  Simmias. 

And  what  do  you  say  of  the  pleasures  of  love  —  should  he 
care  about  them  ? 

By  no  uceans. 

And  wil]  he  think  much  of  the  other  ways  of  indulging  the 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  u7 

body,  for  example,  the  acquisition  01  costly  raiment,  or  sandals, 
or  other  adornments  of  the  body  ?  Instead  of  caring  about 
them,  does  he  not  rather  despise  anything  more  than  i  ature 
needs  ?  What  do  you  say  ? 

I  should  say  that  the  true  philosopher  would  despise  them. 

Would  you  not  say  that  he  is  entirely  concerned  with  the 
soul  and  not  with  the  body  ?  He  would  like,  as  far  as  he  can, 
to  be  quit  of  the  body  and  turn  to  the  soul. 

That  is  true. 

In  matters  of  this  sort  philosophers,  above  all  other  men, 
may  be  observed  in  every  sort  of  way  to  dissever  the  soul  from 
the  communion  of  the  body. 

That  is  true. 

Whereas,  Simmias,  the  rest  of  the  world  are  of  opinion  that 
a  life  which  has  no  share  in  bodily  pleasures  is  not  worth  hav- 
ing ;  and  that  he  who  is  indifferent  about  them  is  as  good  as 
dead. 

That  is  quite  true. 

What  again  shall  we  say  of  the  actual  acquirement  of  knowl- 
edge ?  —  is  the  body,  if  invited  to  share  in  the  inquiry,  a  hin- 
derer  or  a  helper  ?  I  mean  to  say,  have  sight  and  hearing  any 
truth  in  them  ?  Are  they  not,  as  the  poets  are  always  telling 
us,  inaccurate  witnesses  ?  and  yet,  if  even  they  are  inaccurate 
and  indistinct,  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  other  senses  ?  —  for 
you  will  allow  that  they  are  the  best  of  them  ? 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

Then  when  does  the  soul  attain  truth  ?  —  for  in  attempting 
to  consider  anything  in  company  with  the  body  she  is  obviously 
deceived. 

Yes,  that  is  true. 

Then  must  not  existence  be  revealed  to  her  in  thought,  if  at 
all? 

Yes. 

And  thought  is  best  when  the  mind  is  gathered  into  herself 
»nd  none  of  these  things  trouble  her  —  neither  sounds  nor 
sights  nor  pain  nor  any  pleasure,  —  when  she  has  as  little  as 
possible  to  do  with  the  body,  and  has  no  bodily  sense  or  feel- 
ing, but  is  aspiring  after  true  being  ? 

Certainly. 

And  in  this  the  philosopher  dishonors  the  body  ;  his  soul 
runs  away  from  the  body  and  desires  to  be  alone  and  by  her- 
self? 

That  is  true.  —  Phaedo,  i.  391. 


38  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Body,  soul  the  life  of.     See  Soul,  etc. 

Body  and  soul,  their  relative  value.     See  Soul,  etc. 

• If  you  were  going  to  commit  your  body   to   some  one, 

who  might  do  good  or  harm  to  it,  would  you  not  carefully  con- 
sider and  ask  the  opinion  of  your  friends  and  kindred,  and 
deliberate  many  days  as  to  whether  you  should  give  him  the 
care  of  your  body  ?  But  when  the  soul  is  in  question,  which 
you  hold  to  be  of  far  more  value  than  the  body,  and  upon  the 
good  or  evil  of  which  depends  the  well-being  of  your  all,  — 
about  this  you  never  consulted  either  with  your  father  or  with 
your  brother  or  with  any  one  of  us  who  are  your  companions. 
But  no  sooner  does  this  foreigner  appear,  than  you  instantly 
commit  your  soul  to  his  keeping.  In  the  evening,  as  you  say, 
you  hear  of  him,  and  in  the  morning  you  go  to  him,  never  de- 
liberating, or  taking  the  opinion  of  any  one  as  to  whether  you 
ought  to  intrust  yourself  to  him  or  not ;  you  have  quite  made 
up  your  mind  that  you  will  be  a  pupil  of  Protagoras,  and  are 
prepared  to  expend  all  the  property  of  yourself  and  of  your 
friends  in  carrying  out  at  any  price  this  determination,  although, 
as  you  admit,  you  do  not  know  him,  and  have  never  spoken 
with  him  ;  and  you  call  him  a  Sophist,  but  are  manifestly  igno- 
rant of  what  a  Sophist  is  ;  and  yet  you  are  going  to  commit 
yourself  to  his  keeping.  —  Protagoras,  i.  113. 
Body,  affecting  soul. 

The  lovers  of  knowledge  are  conscious  that  their  souls, 

when  philosophy  takes  them  in  hand,  are  simply  fastened  and 
glued  to  their  bodies :  the  soul  is  able  to  view  real  existence 
through  the  bars  of  a  prison,  and  not  of  herself  unhindered  ; 
she  is  wallowing  in  the  mire  of  all  ignorance  ;  and  philosophy 
beholding  the  terrible  nature  of  her  confinement,  inasmuch  as 
the  captive  through  lust  becomes  a  chief  accomplice  in  her  o\vn 
captivity  —  for  the  lovers  of  knowledge  are  aware  that  this  was 
the  original  state  of  the  soul,  but  that  when  she  was  in  this 
state  philosophy  adopted  and  comforted  her,  and  wanted  to  re- 
lease her,  pointing  out  to  her  that  the  eye  and  the  ear  and  the 
other  senses  are  full  of  deceit,  and  persuading  her  to  retire  from 
them  in  all  but  the  necessary  use  of  them,  and  to  be  gathered 
up  and  collected  into  herself,  and  to  trust  only  to  herself  and 
her  own  pure  apprehensions  of  pure  existence,  and  to  mistrust 
whatever  comes  to  her  through  other  channels  and  is  subject  to 
ricissitude  —  philosophy,  I  say,  shows  her  that  all  this  is  visible 
and  tangible,  but  that  what  she  sees  in  her  own  nature  is  in- 


PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS.  89 

tellectuai  and  invisible.  And  the  soul  of  the  true  philosopher 
thinks  that  she  ought  not  to  resist  this  deliverance,  and  there- 
fore abstains  from  pleasure  and  desires  and  pains  and  fears,  as 
far  as  she  is  able  ;  reflecting  that  when  a  man  has  great  joys 
or  sorrows  or  fears  or  desires,  he  suffers  from  them,  not  merely 
the  sort  of  evil  which  might  be  anticipated  —  as  for  example, 
the  loss  of  his  health  or  property  which  he  had  sacrificed  to 
his  lusts  —  but  an  evil  greater  far,  which  is  the  greatest  and 
worst  of  all  evils,  and  one  of  which  he  never  thinks. 

And  what  is  that,  Socrates  ?  said  Cebes. 

Why,  that  when  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain  in  the  soul 
is  most  intense,  all  of  us  naturally  suppose  that  the  object  of 
this  intense  feeling  is  then  plainest  and  truest :  but  such  is  not 
the  case. 

Very  true. 

And  this  is  the  state  in  which  the  soul  is  most  enthralled  by 
the  body. 

How  is  that  ? 

Why,  because  each  pleasure  and  pain  is  a  sort  of  nail  which 
nails  and  rivets  the  soul  to  the  body,  until  she  becomes  like  the 
body  and  believes  that  to  be  true  which  the  body  affirms  to  be 
true  ;  and  from  agreeing  with  the  body  and  having  the  same 
delights,  she  is  obliged  to  have  the  same  habits  and  haunts,  and 
is  not  likely  ever  to  be  pure  at  her  departure  to  the  world 
below,  but  is  always  infected  by  the  body;  and  so  she  sinks 
into  another  body  and  there  germinates  and  grows,  and  has 
therefore  no  part  in  the  communion  of  the  divine  and  pure  and 
simple. 

That  is  most  true,  Socrates,  answered  Cebes. 

And  this,  Cebes,  is  the  reason  why  the  true  lovers  of  knowl- 
edge are  temperate  and  brave ;  and  not  for  the  reason  which 
the  world  gives. 

Certainly  not. 

Certainly  not !  For  the  soul  of  a  philosopher  will  reason 
in  another  way ;  she  will  not  ask  philosophy  to  release  her  in 
order  that  when  released  she  may  deliver  herself  up  again  to 
the  thralldom  of  pleasures  and  pains,  doing  a  work  only  to  be 
undone  again,  weavirg  instead  of  unweaving  her  Penelope's 
web.  But  she  will  calm  passion  and  follow  Reason,  and  dwell 
in  her,  beholding  the  true  and  divine  (which  is  not  matter  of 
opinion),  and  thence  derive  nourishment.  Thus  she  seeks  to 
live  while  she  lives,  and  after  death  she  hopes  to  go  to  her  own 


40  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

kindred  and  to  a  congenial  world  and  to  be  freed  from  human 
ills.  Never  fear,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  that  a  soul  which  has 
been  thus  nurtured  and  has  had  these  pursuits,  will  at  her 
departure  from  the  body  be  scattered  and  blown  away  by  the 
winds  and  be  nowhere  and  nothing.  —  Phaedo,  i.  411. 
Body,  affections  of  the. 

The  most  important  of  the  affections  which  concern  the 

whole  body,  remains  to  be  considered.  This  is  the  cause  of 
pleasure  and  pain  in  the  things  which  we  have  mentioned,  and 
in  all  other  things  which  are  perceived  by  sense  through  the 
parts  of  the  body,  and  have  pleasures  and  pains  consequent 
upon  them.  Let  us  imagine  the  causes  of  every  affection, 
whether  of  sense  or  not,  to  be  of  the  following  nature,  remem- 
bering that  we  have  already  distinguished  between  the  nature 
which  moves  and  that  which  is  immovable ;  for  this  is  the  di- 
rection in  which  we  must  hunt  the  prey  which  we  mean  to 
take.  A  body  which  is  easily  moved  on  receiving  any  slight 
impression  communicates  this  to  the  parts  affected,  and  these  to 
other  parts  in  an  ever  widening  circle,  until  at  last  reaching 
the  principle  of  mind  they  announce  the  power  of  the  produc- 
ing cause.  But  a  body  of  the  opposite  kind,  being  at  rest,  and 
having  no  circular  motion,  is  alone  affected,  and  does  not  move 
any  of  the  neighboring  parts  ;  and  thus  the  parts  not  distribut- 
ing their  first  impression  to  other  parts,  having  no  effect  of 
motion  on  the  whole  animal,  produce  no  effect  on  the  patient. 
This  is  true  of  the  bones  and  hair  and  other  more  earthly  parts 
of  the  human  body ;  whereas  what  was  said  above  relates 
mainly  to  sight  and  hearing,  because  they  have  in  them  the 
greatest  force  of  fire  and  air.  Now,  we  must  conceive  of 
pleasure  and  pain  in  this  way.  An  impression  produced  in  us 
contrary  to  nature  and  violent,  if  sudden,  is  painful ;  and,  again, 
the  sudden  return  to  nature  is  pleasant,  and  that  which  is  gentle 
and  gradual  is  imperceptible,  and  vice  versa.  But  the  impres- 
sion which  is  most  easily  produced  is  most  readily  felt,  and  is 
not  accompanied  by  pleasure  or  pain  ;  such,  for  example,  are 
the  affections  of  the  sight  itself,  which  has  been  already  said  to 
be  a  kindred  body  communicating  with  us  in  the  daytime  ;  for 
cuttings  and  burnings  and  other  affections  which  happen  to  the 
sight  do  not  give  pain,  nor  is  their  pleasure  when  the  sight  re- 
turns to  its  natural  state ;  but  the  impressions  are  clearest  and 
strongest  according  to  the  manner  of  the  affection  and  the  num- 
ber of  the  objects  perceived ;  for  there  is  no  violence  either 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  41 

in  the  contraction  or  dilation  of  the  eye.  But  bodies  which 
are  formed  of  larger  particles  yield  to  the  agent  only  with  a 
struggle  ;  and  then  they  impart  their  motions  to  the  whole  and 
cause  pleasure  and  pain  —  pain  when  alienated  from  theii 
natural  conditions,  and  pleasure  when  restored  to  them. 
Things  which  experience  gradual  withdrawing^  and  emptyings 
of  their  nature,  and  great  and  sudden  replenishments,  fail  to 
perceive  the  emptying,  and  do  perceive  the  replenishment  ; 
these  occasion  no  pain,  but  the  greatest  pleasure  to  the  mortal 
part  of  the  human  soul,  as  is  manifest  in  the  case  of  perfumes. 
But  things  which  are  changed  all  of  a  sudden,  and  only  gradu- 
ally and  with  difficulty  return  to  their  own  nature,  have  all 
the  opposite  effects,  as  is  evident  in  the  case  of  burnings  and 
cuttings  of  the  body. —  Ti/naeus,  ii.  556. 
Body  ;  construction  of  the. 

When   all  things  were   in  disorder,  God  created  in  eacl 

thing,  both  internally  in  relation  to  itself  and  externally  in  re- 
lation to  other  things,  certain  harmonies  in  which  were  in- 
cluded all  possible  harmonies  and  proportions.  For  in  thosf 
days  nothing  had  any  order  except  by  accident ;  nor  did  am 
of  the  things  which  now  have  names  deserve  to  be  named  a: 
all  —  as,  for  example,  fire,  water,  and  the  rest  of  the  elements 
All  these  the  Creator  first  arranged,  and  out  of  them  he  con- 
structed the  universe,  which  was  a  single  animal  comprehend- 
ing all  other  animals,  mortal  and  immortal,  in  itself.  Now  oi 
the  divine,  he  himself  was  the  Creator,  but  the  creation  o*  the 
mortal  he  committed  to  his  offspring.  And  they,  imitating 
him,  received  from  him  the  immortal  principle  of  the  soul  • 
and  around  this  they  fashioned  a  mortal  body,  and  made  the 
whole  body  to  be  a  vehicle  of  the  soul,  and  constructed  within 
a  soul  of  another  nature  which  was  mortal,  subject  to  terrible 
and  irresistible  affections,  —  first  of  all,  pleasure,  the  greatest 
incitement  of  evil ;  then  pain,  which  deters  from  good ;  also 
rashness  and  fear,  two  foolish  counselors,  anger  hard  to  be  ap- 
peased and  hope  easily  deceived  by  sense  without  reason  and 
by  all-daring  love ;  these  they  mingled  together  according  to 
necessary  laws,  and  framed  man.  Wherefore,  fearing  to  pol- 
lute the  divine  any  more  than  is  necessary,  they  separated 
the  mortal  nature,  and  to  that  gave  a  habitation  in  another 
part  of  the  body,  placing  the  neck  between  them  to  be  the 
isthmus  and  boundary,  which  they  constructed  between  the 
head  and  breast,  in  order  that  they  might  be  kept  distinct. 


42  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

And  in  the  breast,  and  in  what  is  termed  the  thorax  they  eu- 
cased  the  mortal  soul,  and  as  one  part  of  this  was  superior  and 
the  other  inferior  they  divided  the  cavity  of  the  thorax  into 
two  parts,  as  the  women's  and  men's  apartments  are  divided  in 
houses ;  and  placed  the  midriff  to  be  a  wall  of  partition  l>e- 
tween  them. 

That  part  of  the  inferior  soul  which  is  endowed  with  cour- 
age and  passion  and  loves  contention  they  settled  nearer  the 
head,  in  the  interval  between  the  midriff  and  the  neck,  in 
order  that  it  might  be  under  the  rule  of  reason,  and  might 
join  with  it  in  controlling  and  restraining  the  desires  when  they 
are  no  longer  willing  of  their  own  accord  to  obey  the  word  of 
command  issuing  from  the  citadel. 

The  heart,  which  is  the  knot  of  the  veins  and  the  fountain  of 
the  blood  flowing  rapidly  through  all  the  limbs,  was  set  in  the 
place  of  guard  that  when  passion  was  roused  by  reason  mak- 
ing proclamation  of  any  wrong  assailing  them  from  without  or 
being  perpetrated  by  the  desires  within,  quickly  the  whole 
power  of  feeling  in  the  body,  perceiving  these  commands  and 
threats,  might  obey  and  follow  through  every  turn  and  alley, 
and  thus  allow  the  principle  of  the  best  to  have  the  command 
in  all  of  them.  But  as  the  gods  foreknew  that  the  palpitation 
of  the  heart  in  the  expectation  of  danger  and  the  swelling  and 
excitement  of  passion  was  caused  by  fire,  they  formed  and  im- 
planted as  a  supporter  to  the  heart  the  lung,  which  was,  in  the 
first  place,  soft  and  bloodless,  and  also  had  within  hollows  like 
the  pores  of  a  sponge,  in  order  that,  receiving  the  breath  and 
the  drink  and  cooling  them,  it  might  give  the  power  of  respi- 
ration and  alleviate  the  heat.  For  which  reason  they  cut  the 
arteries  or  air  vessels  as  passages  to  the  lung,  and  placed  the 
lung  about  the  heart  as  a  soft  spring,  that,  when  passion  was 
rife  within,  the  heart,  beating  against  the  yielding  body,  might 
be  refreshed  and  suffer  less,  and  might  thus  become  more  ready 
to  enlist  passion  in  the  service  of  reason. 

The  part  of  the  soul  which  desires  meats  and  drinks  and 
such  things  as  the  bodily  frame  needs,  they  placed  between 
the  midriff  and  the  navel,  contriving  in  all  this  region  a  sort 
of  manger  for  the  food  of  the  body ;  and  there  they  bound 
the  desires  down  as  a  wild  animal  which  was  chained  up  with 
man,  and  must  be  nourished  if  man  was  to  exist.  They  ap- 
pointed this  lower  creation  his  place  here  in  order  that  he 
might  be  always  feeding  at  the  manger,  and  have  his  dwell- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  43 

ing  as  far  as  possible  from  the  council  chamber,  making  as 
little  noise  and  disturbance  as  possible,  and  permitting  the 
best  part  to  advise  quietly  for  the  good  of  the  whole.  And 
knowing  and  considering  that  this  lower  principle  in  man 
would  not  listen  to  reason,  and  even  if  attaining  to  some  de- 
gree of  perception  would  never  naturally  care  for  any  argu- 
ments, and  was  liable  to  be  led  away  by  phantoms  and  visions 
of  the  night  and  also  by  day,  God  framed  the  liver,  to  dwell 
in  the  same  house  with  the  lower  nature,  contriving  that  it 
should  be  solid  and  smooth,  and  bright  and  sweet,  and  also  bit- 
ter, in  order  that  the  power  of  thought,  which  originates  in  the 
mind,  might  be  reflected  as  in  a  mirror  which  receives  and 
gives  back  images  of  them  to  the  sight.  And  this  power 
making  use  of  the  bitter  part  of  the  liver,  to  which  it  is  akin, 
inspires  terror,  and  comes  threatening  and  invading,  and  sud- 
denly mingling  with  the  entire  liver  produces  colors  like  bile, 
and  contracts  every  part,  and  makes  it  wrinkled  and  rough  ; 
or,  on  the  other  hand,  twisting  out  of  their  right  place  and 
contracting  the  lobe  and  receptacles  and  gates,  or  again,  closing 
and  shutting  them  up  —  in  these  and  other  ways  creates  pain 
and  disgust.  And  the  converse  happens  when  some  gentle  in- 
spiration of  the  understanding  pictures  images  of  an  opposite 
character,  and  allays  the  bile  and  bitterness  by  not  stirring 
them,  and  refuses  to  touch  the  nature  opposed  to  itself,  but  by 
making  use  of  the  natural  sweetness  of  the  liver,  corrects  all 
things  and  makes  them  to  be  right  and  smooth  and  free,  and 
makes  the  portion  of  the  soul  which  resides  about  the  liver 
happy  and  joyful,  having  in  the  night  a  time  of  peace  and 
moderation,  and  the  power  of  divination  in  dreams,  inasmuch 
as  it  does  not  share  in  mind  and  reason.  For  the  authors  of 
our  being,  remembering  the  command  of  their  father  when  he 
bade  them  make  the  human  race  as  good  as  they  could,  thus 
ordered  our  inferior  parts  in  order  that  they  too  might  obtain 
a  measure  of  truth,  and  iu  the  liver  placed  their  oracle,  and 
herein  is  a  proof  that  God  has  given  the  art  of  divination  not 
to  the  wisdom,  but  to  the  foolishness  of  man.  For  no  nan, 
when  in  his  wits,  attains  prophetic  truth  and  inspiration ;  but 
when  he  receives  the  inspired  word  either  his  intelligence  is 
enthralled  by  sleep,  or  he  is  demented  by  some  distemper  or 
possession.  And  he  who  would  understand  what  he  remem 
bers  to  have  been  said,  whether  in  a  dream  or  when  he  was 
awake,  by  the  prophotic  and  enthusiastic  nature,  or  what  he 


44  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

has  seen,  must  first  recover  his  wits  ;  and  then  he  will  be  able 
to  explain  rationally  what  all  such  words  and  apparitions 
mean,  and  what  indications  they  afford  to  this  man  or  that,  of 
past,  present,  or  future  good  and  evil.  But,  while  he  contin- 
ues demented,  he  cannot  judge  of  the  visions  which  he  sees  or 
the  words  which  he  utters ;  the  ancient  saying  is  very  true,  that 
"only  a  man  who  has  his  wits  can  act  or  judge  about  himaelf 
and  his  own  affairs."  And  for  this  reason  it  is  customary  to 
appoint  diviners  or  interpreters  to  be  judges  of  the  true  inspi- 
ration. Some  persons  call  them  prophets ;  they  do  not  know 
that  they  are  only  repeaters  of  dark  sayings  and  visions,  and 
are  not  to  be  called  prophets  at  all,  but  only  interpreters  of 
prophecy.1 —  Timaeus,  ii.  561. 
Body  and  soul,  health  of. 

Soc.  What  use  is  there,  Callicles,  in  giving  to  the  body 

of  a  sick  man  who  is  in  a  bad  state  of  health  a  quantity  of  the 
most  delightful  food  or  drink  or  any  other  pleasant  thing,  which 
may  be  really  as  bad  for  him  as  if  you  gave  him  nothing,  or 
even  worse,  if  rightly  estimated.  Is  not  that  true? 

Gal.  I  will  not  say  no  to  that. 

Soc.  For  in  my  opinion  there  is  no  profit  in  a  man's  life  if 
his  body  is  in  an  evil  plight  —  in  that  case  his  life  also  is  evil . 
am  I  not  right  ? 

Gal  Yes. 

Soc.  When  a  man  is  in  health  the  physicians  will  generally 
allow  him  to  eat  when  he  is  hungry,  and  drink  when  he  is 
thirsty,  and  to  satisfy  his  desires  as  he  likes,  but  when  he  is 
sick  they  hardly  suffer  him  to  satisfy  his  desires  at  all :  even 
you  will  admit  that  ? 

Gal.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  does  not  the  same  argument  hold  of  the  soul,  my 
good  sir  ?  While  she  is  in  a  bad  state  and  is  senseless  and  in- 
temperate and  unjust  and  unholy,  her  desires  ought  to  be  con- 
trolled, and  she  ought  to  be  prevented  from  doing  anything 
which  does  not  tend  to  her  own  improvement. 

GaL  Yes. 

Soc.  And  that  will  be  for  her  true  interests  ? 

GaL  To  be  sure. 

Soc.  And  controlling  her  desires  is  chastising  her  ? 

1  Plato's  ideas  on  the  physical  structure  of  man  are  given  at  large  in  succeeding 
pages  too  lengthily  to  be  inserted  here.  Those  who  are  curious  to  know  in  full  hit 
views  on  human  physiology  should  read  the  whole  of  the  "  Timaeus." 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  45 

Gal.  Yes. 

Soc.  Then  control  or  chastisement  is  better  for  theso.il  than 
intemperance  or  the  absence  of  control.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  96. 
Body  and  soul,  two  processes  of  training. 

Oh,  my  friend !  I  want  you  to  see  that  the  noble  and  the 

good  may  possibly  be  something  different  from  saving  and  being 
saved,  and  that  he  who  is  truly  a  man  ought  not  to  care  about 
living  a  certain  time  ;  he  knows,  as  women  say,  that  we  must 
all  die,  and  therefore  he  is  not  fond  of  life  ;  he  leaves  all  that 
with  God,  and  considers  in  what  way  he  can  best  spend  his 
appointed  term  ;  whether  by  assimilating  himself  to  that  con- 
stitution under  which  he  lives,  as  you  at  this  moment  have  to 
consider,  how  you  may  become  as  like  as  possible  to  the  Athe- 
nian people,  if  you  intend  to  be  dear  to  them,  and  to  have 
power  in  the  State ;  whereas  I  want  you  to  think  and  see 
whether  this  is  for  the  interest  of  either  of  us ;  I  would  not 
have  us  risk  that  which  is  dearest  on  the  acquisition  of  this 
power,  like  the  Thessalian  enchantresses,  who,  as  they  say, 
brino-  down  the  moon  from  heaven  at  the  risk  of  their  own 

O 

perdition.  But  if  you  suppose  that  any  man  will  show  you  the 
art  of  becoming  great  in  the  city,  and  yet  not  conforming  your- 
self to  the  ways  of  the  city,  whether  for  better  or  worse,  then 
I  can  only  say  that  you  are  mistaken,  Callicles ;  for  he  who 
would  deserve  to  be  the  true  natural  friend  of  the  Athenian 
Demns,  aye,  or  of  Pyrilampes'  darling,  who  is  called  after 
them,  must  be  by  nature  like  them,  and  not  an  imitator  only. 
He,  then,  who  will  make  you  most  like  them,  will  make  you 
as  you  desire,  a  statesman  and  orator  :  for  every  man  is  pleased, 
when  he  is  spoken  to  in  his  own  language  and  spirit,  and  dis- 
likes any  other.  But  perhaps  you,  sweet  Callicles,  may  be  of 
another  mind.  What  do  you  say  ? 

Col.  Somehow  or  other  your  words,  Socrates,  always  appear 
to  me  to  be  good  words ;  and  yet,  like  the  rest  of  the  world,  I 
am  not  quite  convinced  by  you. 

Soc.  The  reason  is,  Callicles,  that  the  love  of  Demus  which 
abides  in  your  soul  is  an  adversary  to  me ;  but  I  dare  say 
that  if  we  recur  to  these  same  matters,  and  consider  them 
more  thoroughly,  you  may  be  convinced  for  all  that.  Please, 
then,  to  remember  that  there  are  two  processes  of  training 
all  things,  including  body  and  soul ;  in  the  one,  as  we  said, 
we  treat  them  with  a  view  to  pleasure,  and  in  the  other 
with  a  view  to  the  highest  good,  and  then  we  do  not  indulge 


46  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

but   resist    them :    was    not    that   the    distinction    which   we 
drew  ? 

Gal.  Very  true.  — Gorgias,  .ii.  104. 
Body  after  death. 

Death,  if  I  am  right,  is  in  the  first  place  the  separation  from 

one  another  of  two  things,  soul  and  body ;  nothing  else.  And 
after  they  are  separated  they  retain  their  several  characteristics, 
which  are  much  the  same  as  in  life  ;  the  body  has  the  same 
v.ature  and  ways  and  affections,  all  clearly  discernible  ;  for  ex- 
ample, he  who  by  nature  or  training  or  both  was  a  tall  man 
while  he  was  alive,  will  remain  as  he  was,  after  he  is  dead ;  and 
the  fat  man  will  remain  fat ;  and  so  on ;  and  the  dead  man, 
who  in  life  had  a  fancy  to  have  flowing  hair,  will  have  flowing 
hair.  And  if  he  was  marked  with  the  whip  and  had  the  prints 
of  the  scourge,  or  of  wounds  in  him  when  he  was  alive,  you 
might  see  the  same  in  the  dead  body ;  and  if  his  limbs  were 
broken  or  misshapen  when  he  was  alive  the  same  appearance 
would  be  visible  in  the  dead.  And  in  a  word,  whatever  was 
the  habit  of  the  body  during  life  would  be  distinguishable  after 
death,  either  perfectly,  or  in  a  great  measure  and  for  a  con- 
siderable time.  And  I  should  imagine  that  this  is  equally  true 
of  the  soul,  Callicles ;  when  a  man  is  stripped  of  the  body,  all 
the  natural  or  acquired  affections  of  the  soul  are  laid  open  to 
view.  —  And  when  they  come  to  the  judge,  as  those  from  Asia 
come  to  Rhadamanthus,  he  places  them  near  him  and  inspects 
them  quite  impartially,  not  knowing  whose  the  soul  is  :  per- 
haps he  may  lay  hands  on  the  soul  of  the  great  king,  or  of  some 
other  king  or  potentate,  who  has  no  soundness  in  him,  but  his 
soul  is  marked  with  the  whip,  and  is  full  of  the  prints  and  scars 
of  perjuries,  and  crimes  with  which  each  action  has  stained  him, 
and  he  is  all  crooked  with  falsehood  and  imposture,  and  has  no 
straightness,  because  he  has  lived  without  truth.  Him  Rhada- 
manthus beholds,  full  of  all  deformity  and  disproportion,  which 
is  caused  by  license  and  luxury  and  insolence  and  incontinence, 
and  dispatches  him  ignominiously  to  his  prison,  and  there  he 
undergoes  the  punishment  which  he  deserves.1  —  Gorgias,  iii. 
115. 
Body  and  soul,  mixtures  of. 

Soc.  There  are  some  mixtures  which  are  of  the    body, 

and  only  in  the  body,  and  others  which  are  of  the  soul,  and 

i  The  mythology  of  the  Greeks  as  to  the  future  state  is  largely  given  by  Plato  in 
his  "  Gorgias.' 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOwrHTS.  47 

only  in  the  soul ;  while  there  are  other  mixtures  of  pleasures 
with  pains,  common  both  to  soul  and  body,  which  in  their  com- 
posite state  are  called  sometimes  pleasures  and  sometimes  pains. 

Pro.  How  is  that? 

Soc.  Whenever,  in  the  restoration  or  in  the  derangement  of 
nature,  a  man  experiences  two  opposite  feelings  ;  for  example, 
when  he  is  cold  and  is  growing  warm,  or  again,  when  he  is  hot 
and  is  being  cooled,  and  he  wants  to  have  the  one  and  be  free 
from  the  other  ;  the  sweet  has  a  bitter,  as  they  say,  and  both 
together  fasten  upon  him,  and  create  irritation  and  in  time 
drive  him  to  distraction. 

Pro.  That  description  is  very  true  to  nature.  —  Philebus,  iii. 
185. 
Body,  honor  of  the. 

Speaking  generally,  our  glory  is  to  follow  the  better  and 

improve  the  inferior,  which  is  susceptible  of  improvement,  in 
the  best  manner  possible.  And  of  all  the  possessions  which  a 
man  has,  the  soul  is  by  nature  most  inclined  to  avoid  the  evil, 
and  search  out  and  find  the  chief  good  ;  and  having  found,  to 
dwell  with  the  good,  during  the  remainder  of  life.  "Wherefore 
the  soul  also  is  second  in  honor ;  and  third,  as  every  one  will 
perceive,  comes  the  honor  of  the  body  in  natural  order.  Hav- 
ing determined  this,  we  have  next  to  consider  that  there  is 
a  genuine  honor  of  the  body,  and  that  of  honors  some  are  and 
some  are  not  genuine.  The  legislator,  as  I  suspect,  ranks  them 
in  the  following  order  : —  Honor  is  not  to  be  given  to  the  fair,  or 
the  strong,  or  the  swift,  or  the  tall,  or  the  healthy  body  (although 
many  may  think  otherwise),  any  more  than  to  their  opposites  ; 
but  the  mean  states  of  all  these  habits  are  by  far  the  safest  and 
most  moderate ;  for  the  one  extreme  makes  the  soul  braggart 
and  insolent,  and  the  other,  illiberal  and  mean  ;  and  money, 
and  property,  and  distinction,  all  go  to  the  same  tune.  The 
excess  of  any  of  these  things  is  apt  to  be  a  source  of  hatreds  and 
divisions  among  states  and  individuals ;  and  the  defect  of  them 
is  commonly  a  cause  of  slavery.  —  Laws,  iv.  253. 
Boldness  of  the  Philosopher  as  to  death. 

Simmias,  as  the  true  philosophers  are  ever  studying  death, 

to  them,  of  all  men,  death  is  the  least  terrible.  Look  at  the 
matter  in  this  way :  if  they  have  been  always  enemies  of  the 
body,  and  wanting  to  have  the  soul  alone,  when  this  is  granted 
to  them,  how  inconsistent  would  they  be  to  be  trembling  and 
repining ;  instead  of  rejoicing  at  their  departing  to  that  place 


48  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

where,  when  they  arrive,  they  hope  to  gain  that  which  in  life 
they  loved  (and  this  was  wisdom),  and  at  the  same  time  to  be 
rid  of  the  company  of  their  enemy.  Many  a  man  has  been 
willing  to  go  to  the  world  below  animated  by  the  hope  of  see- 
ing there  an  earthly  love,  or  wife,  or  son,  and  conversing  with 
them.  And  will  he  who  is  a  true  lover  of  wisdom,  and  is 
strongly  persuaded  in  like  manner  that  only  in  the  world  below 
he  can  worthily  enjoy  her,  still  repine  at  death  ?  Will  he  not 
depart  with  joy  ?  Surely  he  will,  my  friend,  if  he  be  a  true 
philosopher.  For  he  will  have  a  firm  conviction  that  there 
only,  and  nowhere  else,  he  can  find  wisdom  in  her  purity.  And 
if  this  be  true,  he  would  be  very  absurd,  as  I  was  saying,  if  he 
were  to  fear  death. 

He  would  indeed,  replied  Simmias. 

And  when  you  see  a  man  who  is  repining  at  the  approach 
of  death,  is  not  his  reluctance  a  sufficient  proof  that  he  is  not  a 
lover  of  wisdom,  but  a  lover  of  the  body,  and  probably  at  the 
same  time  a  lover  of  either  money  or  power,  or  both? 

That  is  very  true,  he  replied. 

There  is  a  virtue,  Simmias,  which  is  named  courage.  Is  not 
that  characteristic  of  the  philosopher  ? 

Certainly.  —  Phaedo,  i.  394. 
.boldness  in  thought. 

Theaet.  I  cannot  say,  Socrates,  that  knowledge  is  all  opin- 
ion, because  there  may  be  a  false  opinion ;  but  I  will  venture 
to  say,  that  knowledge  is  true  opinion ;  let  this  then  be  my 
answer  ;  and  if  this  is  hereafter  disproved,  I  must  try  to  find 
another. 

Soc.  That  is  the  way  in  which  you  ought  to  answer,  Theaet- 
etus,  and  not  in  your  former  hesitating  strain,  for  if   we  are 
bold  we  shall  gain  one  of  two  advantages ;  either  we  shall  find 
that  which  we  seek,  or  we  shall  be  less  likely  to  think  that  we 
know  what  we  do  not  know  —  and  this  surely  is  no  mean  re- 
ward. —  Theaetetus,  iii.  391. 
Boundaries,  removal  of.     See  Landmarks. 
Brave,  honor  to  the.     See  Battle,  death  in. 

There  is  another  manner  in  which,  according  to   Homer, 

brave  youths  should  be  honored  ;  for  he  tells  how  Ajax,  after 
he  had  distinguished  himself  in  battle,  was  rewarded  with  long 
chines,  which  seems  to  be  a  complement  appropriate  to  a  hero 
in  the  flower  of  his  age,  being  not  only  a  tribute  of  honor  bui 
also  a  very  strengthening  thing. 


1'LATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  49 

V«;ry  true,  he  said. 

Then  in  this,  I  said,  Homer  will  be  our  teacher  ;  and  we 
too,  at  sacrifices  and  on  the  like  occasions,  will  honor  the  brave, 
whether  men  or  women,  with  hymns  — 

"  and  seats  of  precedence,  and  meats  and  flowing  goblets  ;  " 

and  in  honoring  them,  we  shall  also  be  training  them. 

That,  he  replied,  is  excellent. 

Yes,  I  said ;  and  when  a  man  dies  gloriously  in  war  shall 
we  not  say,  in  the  first  place,  that  he  is  of  the  golden  race  ? 

To  be  sure. 

Nay,  have  we  not  the  authority  of  Hesiod  for  affirming  that 
when  they  are  dead  — 

"  They  are  holy  angels  upon  the  earth,  authors  of  good,  avertera  of  ill,  the  guardians 
of  speech-gifted  men  ?  " 

Yes,  and  we  believe  him. 

We  must  inquire  of  the  God  how  we  are  to  order  the  sepu; 
ture  of  divine  and  heroic  personages,  and  do  as  he  bids  ? 

By  all  means. 

And  in  ages  to  come  we  will  do  service  to  them  and  worship 
at  their  shrines  as  heroes.  And  not  only  they  but  any  who 
are  preeminently  good,  whether  they  die  from  age,  or  in  any 
other  way,  shall  be  admitted  to  the  same  honors. 

That  is  very  right,  he  said. 

Next,  how  shall  our  soldiers  treat  their  enemies?  What  do 
you  say  about  this  ? 

In  what  respect  do  you  mean  ? 

I  mean,  shall  they  be  made  slaves  ?  Do  you  think  that 
Hellenes  ought  to  enslave  Hellenes,  or  allow  others  to  en- 
slave them,  if  they  can  help  ?  Should  not  their  custom  be  to 
spare  them,  considering  the  danger  which  there  is  that  the 
whole  race  may  one  day  fall  under  the  yoke  of  the  barbarians  ? 

To  spare  them  is  infinitely  better.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  296. 
Brave  sons  of  brave  parents.     See  State,  Heroes,  etc. 
Burial  and  remembrance  of  the  dead. 

At  their  death,  the  most  moderate  funeral  is  best,  neither 

exceeding  the  customary  expense,  nor  yet  falling  short  of  the 
honor  which  has  been  usually  shown  by  the  former  generation 
to  their  parents  ;  and  let  a  man  not  forget  to  pay  the  yearly 
tribute  of  respect  to  the  dead,  honoring  them  chiefly  by  omitting 
nothing  that  conduces  to  a  perpetual  remembrance  of  them, 
and  giving  a  reasonable  portion  of  his  fortune  to  the  dead. 
4 


50  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Doing  this,  and  living  after  this  manner,  we  shall  receive  our 
reward  from  the   Gods  and  those  who  are  above  us  ;  and  we 
shall  spend  our  days  for  the  most  part  in  good  hope.  —  Law», 
iv.  245. 
Business,  men  of  —  their  money-sting. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  men  of  business,  stooping  as  they 

walk,  and  pretending  not  even  to  see  those  whom  they  have 
already  ruined,  insert  the  sting  —  that  is,  their  money  — *  into 
some  one  else  who  is  not  on  his  guard  against  them,  and  re- 
cover the  parent  sum  many  times  over  multiplied  into  a  family 
of  children :  and  so  they  make  drone  and  pauper  to  abound  in 
the  State. 

Yes,  he  said,  there  are  plenty  of  them,  that  is  certain. 

The  evil  is  like  a  fire  which  is  blazing  up,  and  which  they 
will  not  extinguish.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  383. 

Calmness  in  view  of  death.     See  Courage. 

Soc.  Why  have  you  come  at  this  hour,  Crito  ?  it  must  be 

quite  early  ? 

Crito.  Yes,  certainly. 

Soc.  What  is  the  exact  time  ? 

Or.  The  dawn  is  breaking. 

Soc.  I  wonder  the  keeper  of  the  prison  would  let  you  in. 

Or.  He  knows  me  because  I  often  come,  Socrates  ;  more 
over,  I  have  done  him  a  kindness. 

Soc.  And  are  you  only  just  arrived  ? 

Cr.  No,  I  came  some  time  ago. 

Soc.  Then  why  did  you  sit  and  say  nothing,  instead  of  at 
once  awakening  me  ? 

Cr.  By  the  Gods,  Socrates,  I  would  rather  not  myself  have 
all  this  sleeplessness  and  sorrow.  I  have  been  wondering  at 
your  peaceful  slumbers,  which  was  the  reason  why  I  did  not 
awaken  you,  because  I  wanted  you  to  be  out  of  pain.  I  have 
always  thought  you  of  a  happy  disposition  ;  bi  t  never  did  I 
see  anything  like  the  easy,  tranquil  manner  in  which  you  bear 
this  calamity. 

Soc.  Why,  Crito,  when  a  man  has  reached  my  age  he  ought 
not  to  be  repining  at  the  prospect  of  death. 

Or.  And  yet  other  old  men  find  themselves  in  similar  mis- 
fortunes, and  age  does  not  prevent  them  from  repinin^. — 
Orito,  i.  347. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  51 

Causes  an  3  conditions  confounded. 

I  found  my  philosopher  altogether  forsaking  mind  or  any 

other  principle  of  order,  but  having  recourse  to  air,  and  ether 
and  uater,  and  other  eccentricities.  I  might  compare  him  to 
a  person  who  began  by  maintaining  generally  that  mind  is  the 
cause  of  the  actions  of  Socrates,  but  who,  when  he  endeavored 
to  explain  the  causes  of  my  several  actions  in  detail,  went  on 
to  show  that  I  sit  here  because  my  body  is  made  up  of  bones 
and  muscles  ;  and  the  bones,  as  he  would  say,  are  hard  and 
have  joints  which  divide  them,  and  the  muscles  are  elastic,  and 
they  cover  the  bones,  which  have  also  a,  coveting  or  environ- 
ment of  flesh  and  skin  which  contains  them  ;  and  as  the  bones 
are  lifted  at  their  joints  by  the  contraction  or  relaxation  of  the 
muscles,  I  am  able  to  bend  my  limbs,  and  this  is  why  I  am  sit- 
ting here  in  a  curved  posture  ;  —  that  is  what  he  would  say,  and 
he  would  have  a  similar  explanation  of  my  talking  to  you, 
which  he  would  attribute  to  sound,  and  air,  and  hearing,  and 
he  would  assign  ten  thousand  other  causes  of  the  same  sort, 
forgetting  to  mention  the  true  cause,  which  is,  that  the  Athe- 
nians have  thought  fit  to  condemn  me,  and  accordingly  I  have 
thought  it  better  and  more  right  to  remain  here  and  undergo 
my  sentence  ;  for  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  these  muscles  and 
bones  of  mine  would  have  gone  off  long  ago  to  Megara  or  Boe- 
otia,  —  by  the  dog  of  Egypt  they  would,  if  they  had  been  moved 
only  by  their  own  idea  of  what  was  best,  and  if  I  had  not  chosen 
as  the  better  and  nobler  part,  instead  of  playing  truant  and  run- 
ning away,  to  undergo  any  punishment  which  the  State  inflicts. 
There  is  surely  a  strange  confusion  of  causes  and  conditions  in 
all  this.  It  may  be  said,  indeed,  that  without  bones  and  mus- 
cles and  the  other  parts  of  the  body  I  cannot  execute  my  pur- 
poses. But  to  say  that  I  do  as  I  do  because  of  them,  and  that 
this  is  the  way  in  which  mind  acts,  and  not  from  the  choice  of 
the  best,  is  a  very  careless  and  idle  mode  of  speaking.  I  won- 
der that  they  cannot  distinguish  the  cause  from  the  condition, 
which  the  many,  feeling  about  in  the  dark,  are  always  mistak- 
ing and  misnaming.  —  Phaedo,  i.  427. 
Cause,  limit  and,  in  the  Universe.  See  Limit,  etc. 
Cause  for  every  creation. 

What  is  that  which  always  is  and  has  no  becoming  ;  and 

what  is  that  which  is  always  becoming  and  never  is  ?  That 
which  is  apprehended  by  intelligence  and  reason  always  is,  and 
is  the  same  ;  but  that  which  is  conceived  Vy  opinion  with  the 


62  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

help  of  sensition  and  without  reason,  is  always  in  a  process  of 
becoming  and  perishing,  but  never  really  is.  Now  everything 
that  becomes  or  is  created  must  of  necessity  be  created  by 
some  cause,  for  nothing  can  be  created  without  a  cause.  The 
work  of  the  artificer  who  looks  always  to  the  abiding  and  the 
unchangeable,  and  who  designs  and  fashions  his  work  after  an 
unchangeable  pattern,  must  of  necessity  be  made  fair  and  per- 
fect ;  but  that  of  an  artificer  who  looks  to  the  created  only, 
and  fashions  his  work  after  a  created  pattern,  is  not  fair  or 
perfect.  Was  the  heaven  then  or  the  world,  whether  called  by 
this  or  any  other  more  acceptable  name  —  assuming  the  name, 
I  am  asking  a  question  which  has  to  be  asked  at  the  beginning 
of  every  inquiry  —  was  the  world,  I  say,  always  in  existence 
and  without  beginning  ?  or  created  and  having  a  beginning  ? 
Created,  I  reply,  being  visible  and  tangible  and  having  a  body, 
and  therefore  sensible  ;  and  all  sensible  things  which  are  ap- 
prehended by  opinion  and  sense  are  in  a  process  of  creation 
and  created.  Now  that  which  is  created  must  of  necessity  be 
created  by  a  cause. —  Timaeus,  ii.  523. 
Cause,  mind  a.  See  Mind,  etc. 
Causes ;  two  kinds  of,  intelligent  and  unintelligent. 

These  are  the  works  of  the  second  and  cooperative  causes 

which  God,  carrying  into  execution  the  idea  of  the  best  as  far 
as  possible,  uses  as  his  ministers.  They  are  thought  by  most 
men  not  to  be  the  second,  but  the  prime  causes  of  all  things, 
because  they  freeze  and  heat,  and  contract  and  dilate,  and  the 
like.  But  they  are  not  so,  for  they  are  incapable  of  reason  or 
intellect ;  the  only  being  which  can  properly  have  mind  is  the 
invisible  soul,  whereas  fire  and  water,  and  earth  and  air,  are 
all  of  them  visible  bodies.  The  lover  of  intellect  and  knowl- 
edge ought  to  explore  causes  of  intelligent  nature  first  of  all, 
cnd,  secondly,  of  those  which  are  moved  by  others  and  of  ne- 
cessity move  others.  And  this  we  too  must  now  do.  Both 
kinds  of  causes  should  be  considered  by  us,  but  a  distinction 
should  be  made  between  those  which  are  endowed  with  mind 
and  are  the  workers  of  things  fair  and  good,  and  those  which 
are  deprived  of  intelligence  and  accomplish  their  several  works 
by  chance  and  without  order.  Of  the  second  or  concurrent 
causes  of  sight,  which  give  to  the  eyes  the  power  which  they 
now  possess,  enough  has  been  said.  I  will  therefore  now  pro- 
ceed to  speak  of  the  higher  use  and  purpose  for  which  God 
has  given  them  to  us.  The  sight  in  my  opinion  is  the  source 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  53 

»f  the  greatest  benefit  to  us,  for  had  the  eyes  never  seen  the 
stars,  and  the  sun,  and  the  heaven,  none  of  the  words  which 
we  have  spoken  about  the  universe  would  ever  have  been  ut- 
tered. But  now  the  sight  of  day  and  night,  and  the  revolution 
of  the  months  and  years,  have  given  us  the  invention  of  number, 
and  a  conception  of  time,  and  the  power  of  inquiring  about  the 
nature  of  the  whole  ;  and  from  this  source  we  have  derived 
philosophy,  than  which  no  greater  good  ever  was  or  will  be 
given  by  the  gods  to  mortal  man.  This  is  the  greatest  boon 
of  sight :  and  of  the  lesser  benefits  why  should  I  speak,  even 
the  ordinary  man  if  he  were  blind  would  in  vain  bewail  the 
loss  of  them. 

Thus  much  let  me  say  however  :  God  invented  and  gave  us 
sight  to  the  end,  that  we  might  behold  the  courses  of  intelli- 
gence in  the  heaven,  and  apply  them  to  the  courses  of  our  own 
intelligence  which  are  akin  to  them,  the  unperturbed  to  the  per- 
turbed ;  and  that  we,  learning  them  and  being  partakers  of  the 
true  computations  of  nature,  might  imitate  the  absolutely  un- 
erring courses  of  God  and  regulate  our  own  vagaries.  The 
same  may  be  affirmed  of  speech  and  hearing ;  they  have  been 
given  by  the  gods  to  the  same  end  and  for  a  like  reason. 
For  this  is  the  principal  end  of  speech,  and  there  is  a  similar 
use  of  musical  sound,  which  is  given  to  the  hearing  for  the  sake 
of  harmony.  And  harmony,  which  has  motions  akin  to  the 
revolutions  of  our  souls,  is  not  regarded  by  him  who  intelli- 
gently uses  the  Muses  as  given  by  them  with  a  view  to  irra- 
tional pleasure,  which  is  the  prevailing  opinion  in  our  day,  but 
with  a  view  to  the  iuharmonical  course  of  the  soul,  and  to  be 
our  ally  in  reducing  this  into  harmony  and  agreement  with 
itself  ;  and  rhythm  was  given  by  them  for  the  same  reason,  on 
account  of  the  irregular  and  graceless  ways  which  prevail 
among  mankind  generally,  and  to  help  us  against  them. 

Thus  far  in  what  we  have  been  saying,  with  small  exceptions 
the  works  of  intelligence  have  been  set  forth  ;  and  now  we 
must  place  by  the  side  of  them  the  things  done  from  necessity 
—  for  the  creation  is  mixed,  being  made  up  of  necessity  and 
mind.  Mind,  the  ruling  power,  persuaded  necessity  to  bring 
the  greater  part  of  created  things  to  perfection,  and  thus  in  the 
beginning,  when  the  influence  of  reason  got  the  better  of  neces- 
sity, the  universe  was  created.  But  if  a  person  will  truly  tell 
of  the  way  in  which  the  work  was  accomplished,  he  must  in- 
clude the  other  influence  of  the  variable  cause  as  well.  Where* 


54  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

tore,  we  must  return  again  and  find  another  suitable  beginning, 
as  about  the  former  matters,  so  also  about  these.  To  which 
end  we  must  consider  the  nature  of  fire,  and  water,  and  air,  and 
earth,  which  were  prior  to  the  creation  of  the  heavens,  and 
•what  happened  before  there  were  elements ;  for  no  one  has  as 
yet  explained  them,  but  we  speak  of  fire  and  the  rest  of  them, 
whatever  they  mean,  as  though  men  knew  their  natures,  and 
we  maintain  them  to  be  the  letters  or  elements  of  the  whole, 
when  they  cannot  reasonably  be  compared  by  a  man  of  any 
sense  even  to  the  syllables  or  first  compounds.  And  let  me 
say  thus  much  .  I  will  not  speak  of  the  first  principle  or  prin- 
ciples of  all  things,  or  by  whatever  name  they  are  to  be  called, 
for  this  reason,  —  because  it  is  difficult  to  set  forth  my  opinion 
according  to  the  mode  of  discussion  which  we  are  at  present 
employing.  Do  not  imagine,  any  more  than  I  can  bring  my- 
self to  imagine,  that  I  should  be  right  in  undertaking  so  diffi- 
cult a  task.  I  will  observe  the  rule  of  probability  with  which 
I  began,  not  less  but  more  than  others  and  especially  when  I 
speak  of  the  beginning  of  each  and  all.  Once  more,  then,  I 
call  upon  God,  at  the  beginning  of  my  discourse,  and  beg  him 
to  be  our  saviour  out  of  a  strange  and  unwonted  inquiry,  and 
to  bring  us  to  probability.  —  Timaeus,  ii.  539. 
Censorship  of  Fiction.  See  Fiction. 
Censure,  right  and  good. 

Ath.  At  our  time  of  life,  Cleinias,  there  should  be  no  feel- 
ing of  irritation. 

Cle.   Certainly  not. 

Ath.  I  will  not  at  present  determine  whether  he  who  cen- 
sures the  Cretan  or  Lacedaemonian  polities  is  right  or  wrong. 
But  I  believe  that  I  can  tell  better  than  either  of  you  what 
the  many  say  about  them.  For  assuming  that  you  have  rea- 
sonably good  laws,  one  of  the  best  of  them  will  be  a  law  for- 
bidding any  young  men  to  inquire  which  of  them  are  right  or 
wrong;  but  with  one  mouth  and  one  voice,  they  must  all  agree 
that  the  laws  are  all  good  and  of  divine  origin  ;  and  any  one 
who  says  the  contrary  is  not  to  be  listened  to.  But  an  old  man 
who  remarks  any  defect,  may  communicate  his  observation  to  a 
ruler  or  to  an  equal  when  no  young  man  is  present. 

Cle.  Exactly  so,  Stranger ;  and  like  a  diviner,  although  not 
there  at  the  time,  you  seem  to  me  quite  to  have  hit  the  mean- 
ing of  the  legislator,  and  to  say  what  is  most  true. 

Ath.  As  there  are  no  young  men  present,  and  the  legislator 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  65 

has  given  old  men  free  license,  there  will  be  no  impropriety  in 
our  discussing  these  matters  now  that  we  are  alone. 

Gle.  True.  And,  therefore,  you  may  be  as  free  as  you  like 
in  your  censure  of  our  laws,  for  there  is  no  discredit  in  know- 
ing what  is  wrong;  he  who  receives  what  is  said  in  a  generou, 
and  friendly  spirit  will  be  the  better  for  it. 

Ath.  Very  good  ;  however,  I  am  not  going  to  censure  your 
laws  until  to  the  best  of  my  ability  I  have  examined  them,  but 
I  am  going  to  raise  doubts  about  them.  For  you  are  the  only 
people  known  to  us,  whether  Greek  or  barbarian,  whom  the 
legislator  commanded  to  eschew  all  great  pleasures  and  amuse 
ments ;  whereas  in  the  matter  of  pains  or  fears  which  we  have 
just  been  discussing,  he  thought  that  they  who  from  infancy 
had  always  avoided  the  pains,  and  fears  and  sorrows  which 
must  be,  when  they  were  compelled  to  face  them  would  run 
away  from  those  who  were  hardened  in  them,  and  become  theii 
subjects. 

Now  the  legislator  ought  to  have  considered  that  this  was 
equally  true  of  pleasure  ;  he  should  have  said  to  himself,  that 
if  our  citizens  are  from  their  youth  upward  unacquainted  with 
the  greatest  pleasure,  and  unused  to  endure  amid  the  tempta- 
tions of  pleasure,  and  are  not  disciplined  to  refrvn  from  all 
things  evil,  the  sweet  feeling  of  pleasure  will  overcome  them 
just  as  fear  would  overcome  the  former  class  ;  and  in  another, 
and  even  a  worse  manner,  they  will  be  the  servants  of  those 
who  are  able  to  endure  amid  pleasures,  and-have  had  the 
opportunity  of  enjoying  them,  they  being  ofte^the  worst  of 
mankind.  One  half  of  their  souls  will  be  a  slave,  the  other  half 
free  ;  and  they  will  not  be  worthy  to  be  called  in  the  true  sense 
men  and  freemen.  Tell  me  whether  you  assent  to  my  words  ' 

Gle.  On  first  hearing,  what  you  say  appears  to  be  the  truth  ; 
but  to  be  hasty  in  coming  to  a  conclusion  about  such  important 
matters,  would  be  very  childish  and  simple.  —  Laws,  >y.  ?  '?c 
Chance  and  Nature.     See  Nature. 
Chance  in  legislation.     See  Legislation,  etc. 
Changeableness  of  Youth. 

When  a  young  man  who  has  been  brought  up  as  we  were 

just  now  describing,  in  a  vulgar  and  miserly  way,  has  tasted 
drones'  honey  and  has  come  to  associate  with  h'erce  and  danger- 
ous natures  who  are  able  to  provide  for  him  all  sorts  of  refine- 
ments and  varieties  of  pleasure,  —  then,  as  you  may  imagine, 
the  change  will  begin  of  the  oligarchical  principle  within  him 
into  the  democratical. 


56  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Inevitably. 

And  as  in  the  city  like  was  helping  like,  and  the  change  was 
effected  by  an  alliance  from  without  assisting  one  division  oi 
the  citizens,  so  the  young  man  also  changes  by  a  class  of  de- 
sires from  without  assisting  the  unsatisfied  desires  within  him, 
that  which  is  akin  and  alike  again  helping  that  which  is  akiii 
and  alike. 

Certainly. 

And  if  there  be  any  ally  which  aids  the  oligarchical  princi- 
ple within  him,  whether  the  influence  of  friends  or  kindred, 
advising  or  rebuking  him,  then  there  arises  a  faction  and  an 
opposite  faction,  and  the  result  is  a  civil  war. 

It  must  be  so. 

And  there  are  times  when  the  democratical  principle  gives 
way  to  the  oligarchical,  and  some  of  his  desires  die,  and  others 
are  banished  ;  a  spirit  of  reverence  enters  into  the  young  man's 
soul  and  order  is  restored. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  sometimes  happens. 

And  then,  again,  after  the  old  desires  have  been  driven  out 
fresh  ones  spring  up,  which  are  akin  to  them  ;  and  because  he 
their  father  does  not  know  how  to  educate  them,  wax  fierce 
and  numerous. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  apt  to  be  the  way. 

They  draw  him  to  his  old  associates,  and  holding  secret  in- 
tercourse with  them,  breed  and  multiply  in  him  ? 

Very  true. 

At  length  they  seize  upon  the  citadel  of  the  young  man's 
soul,  which  they  perceive  to  be  void  of  all  fair  accomplish- 
ments and  pursuits  of  every  true  word,  which  are  the  best 
guardians  and  sentinels  in  the  minds  of  men  who  are  dear  to 
the  gods. 

None  better. 

False  and  boastful  words  and  conceits  mount  upwards  in- 
stead of  them,  and  occupy  the  vacant  post. 

They  are  sure  to  do  so. 

And  so  the  young  man  returns  into  the  country  of  the  lotus- 
eaters,  and  takes  up  his  abode  there  in  the  face  of  all  men, 
and  if  any  help  be  sent  by  his  friends  to  the  oligarchica)  part 
of  him,  the  same  vain  conceits  shut  the  gate  of  the  king's  fast- 
ness ;  they  will  not  allow  the  new  allies  to  pass.  And  if  pri- 
vate individuals,  venerable  for  their  age,  come  and  parley,  they 
do  not  receive  them  ;  the^e  is  a  battle  and  they  win  :  then 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  57 

modesty,  which  they  call  silliness,  is  ignominiously  thrust  into 
exile  by  them.  They  affirm  temperance  to  be  unmauliness, 
and  her  also  they  contemptuously  eject;  and  they  pretend  that 
moderation  and  orderly  expenditure  are  vulgarity  and  mean- 
ness ;  and,  by  the  help  of  a  rabble  of  evil  appetites  they  drive 
them  beyond  the  border. 

Yes,  with  a  will. 

And  when  they  have  emptied  and  swept  clean  the  soul  of 
him  who  is  now  in  their  power,  and  is  being  initiated  by  them 
in  great  mysteries,  the  next  thing  is  to  bring  back  to  their 
house  insolence  and  anarchy  and  waste  and  impudence  in 
bright  array,  having  garlands  on  their  heads,  with  a  great  com- 
pany, while  they  hymn  their  praises  and  call  them  by  sweet 
names  ;  insolence  they  term  breeding,  and  anarchy  liberty,  and 
waste  magnificence,  and  impudence  courage.  And  so  the 
young  man  passes  out  of  his  original  nature,  which  was 
trained  in  the  school  of  necessity,  into  the  freedom  and  liber- 
tinism of  useless  and  unnecessary  pleasures. 

Yes,  he  said,  the  change  in  him  is  visible  enough. 

After  this  he  lives  on,  spending  his  money  and  labor  and 
time  on  unnecessary  pleasures  quite  as  much  as  on  necessary 
ones  ;  but  if  he  be  fortunate,  and  is  not  too  much  intoxicated 
with  passion,  when  he  gets  older,  after  the  great  tumult  has 
passed  away  —  supposing  that  he  then  readmits  into  the  city 
some  part  of  the  exiled  virtues,  and  does  not  wholly  give  him- 
self up  to  their  successors  —  in  that  case  he  balances  his  pleas- 
ures and  lives  in  a  sort  of  equilibrium,  putting  the  government 
of  himself  into  the  hands  of  the  one  which  comes  first  and 
wins  the  turn ;  and  when  he  has  had  enough  of  that,  then  into 
the  hands  of  another,  and  is  very  impartial  in  his  encourage- 
ment of  them  all. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Neither  does  he  receive  or  let  pass  into  the  fortress  any 
true  word  of  advice  ;  if  any  one  says  to  him  that  some  pleas- 
ures are  the  satisfactions  of  good  and  noble  desires,  and  others 
of  evil  desires,  and  that  he  ought  to  use  and  honor  some  and 
curtail  and  reduce  others  —  whenever  this  is  repeated  to  him 
he  shakes  his  head  and  says  that  they  are  all  alike,  and  that 
one  is  as  honorable  as  another. 

Yes,  he  said  ;  that  is  the  way  with  him. 

Yes,  I  said,  he  lives  through  the  day  indulging  the  appetite 
of  the  hour  ;  and  sometimes  he  is  lapped  iu  drink  and  strains 


58  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

of  the  rtzle  ;  then  he  is  for  total  abstinence,  and  tries  to  gel 
thin  ;  then,  again,  he  is  at  gymnastics  ;  sometimes  idling  and 
neglecting  everything,  then  once  more  living  the  life  of  a  phil- 
osopher ;  often  he  is  at  politics,  and  starts  to  his  feet  ind  says 
and  does  whatever  comes  into  his  head  ;  and,  if  he  is  emulous 
of  any  one  who  is  a  warrior,  off  he  is  in  that  direction,  or  of 
men  of  business,  once  more  in  that.  His  life  has  neither 
order  nor  law  ;  and  so  he  goes  on  continually  and  he  terms 
this  joy  and  freedom  and  happiness. 

Yes,  his  life  is  all  liberty,  and  equality. 

Yes,  I  said  ;  and  multiform  and  full  of  the  most  various 
characters;  —  he  answers  to  the  State  which  we  described  »c 
fair  and  spangled.  And  many  a  man  and  many  a  woman  will 
emulate  him  and  many  a  constitution  and  many  an  example  of 
life  is  contained  in  him. — The  Republic,  ii.  388. 
Children,  spoiled  by  friends. 

Soc.  The  question  is,  Which  of  us  is  skillful  or  successful 

m  the  treatment  of  the  soul,  and  which  of  us  has  had  good 
teachers  ? 

La.  Well  but,  Socrates  ;  did  you  never  observe  that  some 
persons,  who  have  had  no  teachers,  are  more  skillful  than  those 
who  have,  in  some  things  ? 

Soc.  Yes,  Laches,  I  have  observed  that ;  but  you  would  not 
oe  very  willing  to  trust  them  if  they  only  professed  to  be  mas- 
ters of  their  art,  unless  they  could  show  some  proof  of  their 
skill  or  excellence  in  one  or  more  works. 

La.  That  is  true. 

Soc.  And  therefore,  Laches  and  Nicias,  as  Lysimachus  and 
Melesias.  in  their  anxiety  to  improve  the  minds  of  their  sons, 
have  asked  our  advice  about  them,  we  too  should  tell  them 
who  our  teachers  were,  if  we  say  that  we  have  had  any,  and 
prove  them  to  be  men  of  merit  and  experienced  trainers  of  the 
minds  of  youth  and  really  our  teachers.  Or  if  any  of  us  says 
that  he  has  no  teacher,  but  that  he  has  works  to  show  of  his 
own  ;  then  he  should  point  out  to  them,  what  Athenians  or 
strangers,  bond  or  free,  he  is  generally  acknowledged  to  have 
improved.  But  if  he  can  show  neither  teachers  nor  works, 
then  he  should  tell  them  to  look  out  for  others  ;  and  not  to 
run  the  risk  of  spoiling  the  children  of  friends,  which  is  the 
most  formidable  accusation  that  can  be  brought  against  any 
one  by  those  nearest  to  him.  —  Laches,  i.  78. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  5S 

Children,  training  of,  not  easy. 

Just  as   I   thought  that  I  had  finished,  and  was  only  too 

;-l:>d  that  I  had  laid  this  question  to  sleep,  and  was  reflecting 
how  fortunate  I  was  in  your  acceptance  of  what  I  then  said, 
you  begin  again,  ignorant  of  what  a  hornet's  nest  of  words, 
you  are  arousing.  Now  I  foresaw  this  coming  trouble,  and 
avoided  it. 

For  what  do  you  think  that  we  are  here  ?  said  Thrasyma- 
chu.= :  to  find  the  philosopher's  stone,  or  to  hear  discourse  ? 

Yes,  but  discourse  should  have  a  limit. 

Yes,  Socrates,  said  Glaucon,  and  the  whole  of  life  is  the 
only  limit  which  wise  men  assign  to  the  hearing  of  such  dis- 
courses. But  never  mind  about  us  ;  only  get  on  and  in  your 
own  way  answer  the  question  :  What  sort  of  community  of 
women  and  children  is  this  which  is  to  prevail  among  the  guard- 
ians ?  and  how  shall  we  manage  the  period  between  birth  and 
education  which  seems  to  require  the  greatest  care  ?  Tell  us 
how  these  things  will  be. 

Yes,  my  simple  friend,  but  the  answer  is  the  reverse  of  easy  ; 
many  more  doubts  arise  about  this  than  about  our  previous 
speculations.  For  the  practicability  of  what  is  said  may  be 
doubted  ;  and  looked  at  in  another  point  of  view,  whether  the 
scheme,  if  ever  so  practicable,  will  be  for  the  best,  is  also 
doubtful.  Hence  there  arises  a  fear,  as  we  draw  near,  lest  our 
aspiration  should  be  a  dream  only.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  274. 
Children,  taught  their  letters. 

Sir.  I  will  proceed,  finding  as  I  do,  such  a  ready  listener  in 

you  :  when  children  are  beginning  to  know  their  letters  — 

Y.  Soc.  What  are  you  going  to  say  ? 

Sir.  That  they  easily  recognize  the  several  letters  in  very 
short  and  easy  syllables,  and  are  able  to  tell  you  them  cor- 
rectly. 

Y.   Soc.   Certainly. 

Sir.  Whereas  in  other  syllables  they  do  not  recognize  them, 
and  think  and  speak  falsely  of  them. 

Y.   Soc.  Very  true. 

Str.  Will  not  the  best  and  easiest  way  of  guiding  them  to 
the  letters  which  they  do  not  as  yet  know,  be  to  refer  them  to 
the  same  letters  in  the  words  which  they  know,  and  to  compare 
these  with  the  letters  which  as  yet  they  do  not  know,  and  show 
them  that  they  are  the  same,  and  have  the  same  character  in 
their  different  combinations,  until  the  letters,  which  they  do  not 


60  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

know,  have  been  all  placed  side  by  side  with  the  letters 

they  do  know?  in  this  way  they  have  examples,  and  are  made 

to  learn   that  every  letter  in   every  combination  is  pronounced 

always  either  as  the  same  or  not  the  same.  —  Statesman,  iii. 

562. 

Children,  what  they  owe  to  their  parents.     See  Parents. 

Next  comes  the  honor  of  living  parents,  to  whom,  as  is 

meet,  we  have  to  pay  the  first  and  greatest  and  oldest  of  all 
debts,  considering  that  all  which  a  man  has  belongs  to  those 
who  gave  him  birth  and  brought  him  up,  and  that  he  must  do 
all  that  he  can  to  minister  to  them :  first,  in  his  property ; 
secondly,  in  his  person ;  and  thirdly,  in  his  soul ;  paying  the 
debts  due  to  them  for  the  care  and  travail  which  they  bestowed 
upon  him  of  old,  in  the  days  of  his  infancy,  and  which  he  is 
now  to  pay  back  to  them  when  they  are  old  and  in  the  ex- 
tremity of  their  need.  And  all  his  life  long  he  ought  never  to 
utter,  or  to  have  uttered,  an  unbecoming  word  to  them ;  for  of 
all  light  and  winged  words  he  will  have  to  give  an  account ; 
Nemesis,  the  messenger  of  Justice,  is  appointed  to  watch  over 
them.  When  they  are  angry,  and  want  to  satisfy  their  feel- 
ings in  word  or  deed,  he  should  not  resist  them,  for  a  father 
who  thinks  that  he  has  been  wronged  by  his  son,  may  be  rea- 
sonably expected  to  be  very  angry.  —  Laws,  iv.  245. 
Children,  falsely  trained. 

Ath.  I  imagine  that  Cyrus,  though  a  great  and  patriotic  gen- 
eral, had  never  given  his  mind  to  education,  and  never  attended 
to  the  order  of  his  household. 

Cle.  What  makes  you  say  so  ? 

Ath.  I  think  that  from  his  youth  upwards  he  was  a  soldier, 
and  intrusted  the  bringing  up  of  his  children  to  the  women ; 
and  they  brought  them  up  from  their  childhood  as  the  favorites 
of  fortune,  who  were  blessed  already,  and  needed  no  more 
blessings.  They  thought  that  they  were  happy  enough,  and 
that  no  one  should  be  allowed  to  oppose  them  iii  any  way,  and 
they  compelled  every  one  to  praise  all  that  they  said  or  did. 
This  was  the  manner  in  which  they  brought  them  up. 

Gle.  A  splendid  education  truly  ! 

Ath.  Such  an  education  as  women  were  likely  to  give  them, 
and  especially  princesses  who  had  recently  grown  rich,  and  in 
the  absence  of  the  men,  too,  who  were  occupied  in  wars  and 
dangers,  and  too  busy  to  look  after  them. 

Cle.  What  would  you  expect? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  61 

Ath.  Their  father  had  possessions  of  cattle  and  sheep,  and 
many  herds  of  men  and  other  animals  ;  but  he  did  not  con- 
sider that  those  to  whom  he  was  about  to  make  them  over, 
were  not  trained  in  his  own  calling,  which  was  Persian ;  for 
the  Persians  are  shepherds  —  sons  of  a  rugged  land,  which  was 
a  stern  mother,  and  well  fitted  to  produce  a  sturdy  race  able  to 
1'T-e  in  the  open  air  and  watch,  and  to  fight  also,  if  fighting  was 
required.  He  did  not  observe  that  his  sons  were  trained  dif- 
ferently ;  through  the  so-called  blessing  of  being  royal,  they 
were  educated  in  the  corrupt  Median  fashion  by  women  and 
eunuchs,  which  led  to  their  becoming  such  as  people  do  become 
when  they  are  brought  up  unreproved.  And  so,  after  the 
death  of  Cyrus,  his  sons,  in  the  fullness  of  luxury  and  license, 
took  the  kingdom,  and  first  one  slew  the  other  because  he 
could  not  endure  a  rival ;  and,  afterwards,  the  slayer  himself, 
mad  with  wine  and  brutality,  lost  his  kingdom  through  the 
Medes  and  the  eunuch,  as  they  called  him,  who  despised  the 
folly  of  Cambyses. 

Cle.  That  is  what  is  said,  and  is  probably  the  truth. 

Ath,  Yes  ;  and  the  tradition  says,  that  the  empire  came  back 
to  the  Persians,  through  Darius  and  the  seven  chiefs. 

Cle.  True. 

Ath.  Let  us  note  the  rest  of  the  story.  Observe,  that  Darius 
was  not  the  son  of  a  king,  and  had  not  received  a  luxurious 
education.  When  he  came  to  the  throne,  being  one  of  the 
seven,  he  divided  the  country  into  seven  portions,  and  of  this 
arrangement  there  are  some  shadowy  traces  still  remaining ;  he 
made  laws  upon  the  principle  of  introducing  universal  equality 
in  the  order  of  the  State,  and  he  embodied  in  a  law  the  settle- 
ment of  the  tribute  which  Cyrus  promised,  —  thus  creating  a 
feeling  of  friendship  and  community  among  all  the  Persians, 
and  attaching  the  people  to  him  with  money  and  gifts.  Hence 
his  armies  cheerfully  acquired  for  him  countries  as  large  as 
those  which  Cyrus  had  left  behind  him.  Darius  was  suc- 
ceeded by  his  son  Xerxes,  and  he  again  was  brought  up  in  the 
royal  and  luxurious  fashion.  Might  we  not  justly  say,  "  O 
Darius,  why  did  you  not  learn  wisdom  from  the  misfortunes  of 
Cyrus,  instead  of  bringing  up  Xerxes  in  the  same  way  in  which 
he  brought  up  Cambyses  ?  "  For  Xerxes  being  the  creation  of 
the  same  education,  met  with  much  the  same  fortune  as  Camby- 
ses ;  and  from  that  time  to  this  there  has  never  been  a  really 
great  king  among  the  Persians,  although  they  are  all  called 


62  l-^^TO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

great.  And  their  degeneracy  is  not  to  be  attributed  to  chance, 
as  I  maintain  ;  the  reason  is  rather  the  evil  life  which  is  gen- 
erally led  by  the  sons  of  very  rich  and  royal  persons ;  for 
never  will  boy  or  man,  young  or  old,  excel  in  virtue,  who  has 
been  thus  educated.  And  this,  I  say,  is  what  the  legislator 
has  to  consider,  and  what  at  this  moment  has  to  be  considered 
by  us.  Justly  may  you,  O  Lacedaemonians,  be  praised  for 
this  —  that  you  do  not  give  special  honor  or  maintenance  to 
wealth  rather  than  to  poverty  in  particular,  or  to  a  royal  rather 
than  to  a  private  station,  where  the  divine  and  inspired  law- 
giver has  not  originally  commanded  them  to  be  given.  For  no 
man  ought  to  have  preeminent  honor  in  a  state  because  he  sur- 
passes others  in  wealth,  any  more  than  because  he  is  swift  or 
fair  or  strong,  unless  he  have  some  virtue  in  him ;  nor  even  if 
he  have  virtue,  unless  he  have  this  particular  virtue  of  temper- 
ance.—  Laws,  iv.  223. 
Children,  riches  an  evil  left  to. 

I  would  not  have  any  one  fond  of  heaping  up  riches  for 

the  sake  of  his  children,  in  order  that  he  may  leave  them  as 
rich  as  possible.  For  the  possession  of  great  wealth  is  of  no 
use,  either  to  them  or  to  the  State.  The  condition  of  youth 
which  is  free  from  flattery,  and  at  the  same  time  not  in  need  of 
the  necessaries  of  life,  is  the  best  and  most  harmonious  of  all, 
being  in  accord  and  agreement  with  our  nature,  and  making 
life  to  be  most  entirely  free  from  sorrow.  Let  parents,  then, 
bequeath  to  their  children  not  riches,  but  the  spirit  of  rever- 
ence. We,  indeed,  fancy  that  they  will  inherit  reverence  from 
us,  if  we  rebuke  them  when  they  show  a  want  of  reverence. 
But  this  quality  is  not  really  imparted  to  them  by  the  present 
style  of  admonition,  which  only  tells  them  that  the  young  ought 
always  to  be  reverential.  A  sensible  legislator  will  rather  ex- 
hort the  elders  to  reverence  the  younger,  and  above  all  to  take 
heed  that  no  young  man  sees  or  hears  him  doing  or  saying 
anything  base;  for  where  old  men  have  no  shame,  there  young 
men  will  most  certainly  be  devoid  of  reverence.  The  best  way 
of  training  the  young,  is  to  train  yourself  at  the  same  time  ; 
not  to  admonish  them,  but  to  be  always  carrying  out  your  own 
principles  in  practice.  —  Laws,  iv.  254. 
Children ;  education  of.  See  Youth,  etc. 

And   now,   assuming  that   children    of  both    sexes   have 

been  born,  their    nurture   and  education  will   properly  follow 
next  in  order ;  this  cannot  be  left  altogether  unnoticed,  and 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  68 

yet  may  be  thought  to  be  rather  a  subject  for  precept  and  ad- 
monition than  for  law.  In  private  life  there  are  many  little 
things,  not  always  apparent,  arising  out  of  the  pleasures  and 
desires  and  pains  of  individuals,  which  are  contrary  to  the  in- 
tention of  the  legislator  ;  these  ininutite  alter  and  discompose 
the  characters  of  the  citizens,  and  cause  great  evil  in  states ; 
for  they  are  so  small  and  of  such  frequent  occurrence,  that 
there  would  be  an  unseemliness  and  want  of  propriety  in  mak- 
ing them  penal  by  law  ;  and  if  made  penal,  they  are  the  de- 
struction of  the  written  law,  because  mankind  get  the  habit  :f 
frequently  transgressing  in  small  matters.  The  result  is  that 
you  cannot  legislate  about  them,  and  still  less  can  you  say 
nothing.  I  speak  somewhat  darkly,  but  I  shall  endeavor  also 
to  bring  my  wares  into  the  light  of  day,  for  I  acknowledge 
that  at  present  there  is  a  want  of  clearness  in  what  I  am  say- 
ing. 

Gle.  Very  true. 

Ath.  Am  I  not  right  in  maintaining  that  a  good  education 
is  that  which  tends  most  to  the  improvement  of  mind  and 
body  ? 

Gle.  Undoubtedly. 

Ath.  And  nothing  can  be  plainer  than  that  the  fairest  bouios 
ought  to  grow  up  from  infancy  in  the  best  and  straightest 
manner  ? 

Gle.  Very  true. 

Ath.  And  do  we  not  further  observe  that  the  first  shoot  of 
every  living  thing  is  by  far  the  greatest  and  fullest  ?  Many 
will  even  contend  that  a  man  at  twenty-five  does  not  grow  to 
twice  the  height  which  he  attained  at  five. 

Gle.  True.1  —  Laws,  iv.  306. 
Choral  song;  harmony  in. 

Ath.  I  was  speaking  at  the  commencement  of  our  dis- 
course, as  you  will  remember,  of  the  fiery  nature  of  young 
creatures ;  I  said  that  they  were  unable  to  keep  quiet  either  in 
limb  or  voice,  and  that  they  called  out  and  jumped  about  in  a 
disorderly  manner ;  and  that  no  other  animal  attained  to  any 
perception  of  order,  but  man  only.  Now  the  order  of  motior 
is  called  rhythm,  and  the  order  of  the  voice,  in  which  high 
and  low  are  duly  mingled,  is  called  harmony  ;  and  both  to- 
gether are  termed  choric  song.  And  I  said  that  the  gods  had 

i  In  Book  vii.  of  his  "  Laws,"  Plato  discusses  quite  extensively  the  education  of 
children. 


64  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

pity  on  us,  and  gave  us  Apollo  and  the  Muses  to  be  our  play- 
fellows and  leaders  in  tLd  dance  ;  and  Dionysus,  as  I  dare  say 
that  you  will  remember,  was  the  third. 

Cle.  I  quite  remember. 

Aih.  Thus  far  I  have  spoken  of  the  chorus  of  Apollo  and 
the  Muses,  and  I  have  still  to  speak  of  the  remaining  chorus, 
which  is  that  of  Dionysus. 

Cle,  How  is  that  arranged  ?  There  is  something  strange,  at 
any  rate,  on  first  hearing,  in  a  Dionysiac  chorus  of  old  men,  if 
you  really  mean  that  those  who  are  above  thirty,  and  may  be 
fifty,  or  from  fifty  to  sixty  years  of  age,  are  to  form  a  dance  in 
his  honor. 

Aih.  That  is  very  true ;  and  I  think  with  you  that  some 
reason  should  be  given  for  the  proposal. 

Cle.   Certainly. 

Ath.  Are  we  agreed  thus  far  ? 

Cle.  About  what  ? 

Ath.  That  every  man  and  boy,  slave  and  free,  both  sexes, 
and  the  whole  city,  should  never  cease  charming  themselves 
with  the  strains  of  which  we  have  spoken ;  and  that  there 
should  be  every  sort  of  change  and  variation  of  them  in  order 
to  take  away  the  effect  of  sameness,  so  that  the  singers  may 
always  receive  pleasure  from  their  hymns,  and  may  never 
weary  of  them.  —  Laws,  iv.  194. 
Choristers ;  how  they  should  sing. 

Music  is  more  celebrated  than  any  other  kind  of  imita- 
tion, and  therefore  requires  the  greatest  care  of  them  all.  For 
if  a  man  makes  a  mistake  here,  he  may  do  himself  the  greatest 
injury  by  welcoming  evil  dispositions,  and  the  mistake  may  be 
very  difficult  to  discern,  because  the  poets  are  artists  very  infe- 
rior in  character  to  the  Muses  themselves,  who  would  never 
fall  into  the  monstrous  error  of  assigning  to  the  words  of  men 
the  gestures  and  songs  of  women  ;  nor  combine  the  melodies 
and  gestures  of  freemen  with  the  rhythms  of  slaves  and  men 
of  the  baser  sort ;  or,  beginning  with  the  rhythms  and  gestures 
of  freemen,  assign  to  them  a  melody  or  words  which  are  of  an 
opposite  character ;  nor  would  they  mix  up  the  voices  and 
sounds  of  animals  and  of  men  and  instruments,  and  every 
other  sort  of  noise,  as  if  they  were  all  one.  But  human  poets 
are  fond  of  introducing  this  sort  of  inconsistent  mixture,  and 
thus  make  themselves  ridiculous  in  the  eyes  of  those  who,  as 
Orpheus  says,  "  are  ripe  for  pleasure."  The  experienced  see  all 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  65 

this  coafusiou,  and  yet  the  poets  go  on  and  make  still  further 
havoc  by  separating  the  rhythm  and  the  figure  of  the  dance 
from  the  melody,  setting  words  to  metre  without  music,  and 
also  separating  the  melody  and  rhythm  from  the  words,  using 
the  lyre  or  the  flute  alone.  For  when  there  are  110  words, 
it  is  very  difficult  to  recognize  the  meaning  of  the  harmony 
and  rhythm,  or  to  see  that  any  worthy  object  is  imitated  by 
them.  And  we  must  acknowledge  that  all  this  sort  of  thing, 
which  aims  only  at  swiftness  and  smoothness  and  a  brutish 
noise,  and  uses  the  flute  and  the  lyre  not  as  the  mere  accom- 
paniments of  the  dance  and  song,  is  exceedingly  rude  and 
coarse.  The  use  of  either,  when  unaccompanied  by  the  others, 
leads  to  every  sort  of  irregularity  and  trickery.  This  is  all 
true  enough.  But  we  are  considering  not  how  our  choristers, 
who  are  from  thirty  to  fifty  years  of  age,  and  may  be  over 
fifty,  are  not  to  use  the  Muses,  but  how  are  they  to  use  them. 
And  the  considerations  which  we  have  urged  seem  to  show  in 
what  way  these  fifty  years'  old  choristers  who  are  to  sing,  may 
be  expected  to  be  better  trained.  For  they  need  to  have  a 
quick  perception  and  knowledge  of  harmonies  and  rhythms ; 
otherwise,  how  will  they  ever  know  which  melodies  would  be 
rightly  sung  to  the  Dorian  mode,  or  to  the  rhythm  which  the 
poet  has  assigned  to  them  ?  —  Laws,  iv.  199. 
Christ,  unconsciously  described.  See  Just  man. 
Cities,  maritime,  evil  of, 

Ath.  Str.  And  now,  what  will    this   city  be  ?     I   do  not 

mean  to  ask  what  is  or  will  be  the  name  of  the  place  ;  that 
may  be  determined  by  the  accident  of  locality  or  of  the  origi- 
nal settlement,  —  a  river  or  fountain,  or  some  local  deity  may- 
give  the  sanction  of  a  name  to  the  newly  founded  city  ;  but  I 
do  want  to  know  what  the  situation  is;  whether  maritime  or 
inland  ? 

Cleinias.  I  should  imagine,  Stranger,  that  the  city  of  which 
we  are  speaking  is  about  eighty  stadia  distant  from  the  sea. 

Ath.  And  are  there  harbors  on  the  seaboard  ? 

die.  Excellent  harbors,  Stranger  ;  there  could  not  be  better. 

Ath.  You  don't  say  so  !     And   is   the    surrounding  country 
productive,  or  in  need  of  importations  ? 

Cle.  Hardly  iu  need  of  anything. 

Ath.  And  is  there  any  neighboring  State  ? 

Cle.  None  whatever,  and  that  is  the  reason  for  selecting  the 
place;  in   days  of  old,  there  ^as  a   migration  of   the   inhab- 


63  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

itants,  and  the  region  has  been  deserted  from  time  immemo- 
rial. 

Ath.  And  has  the  place  a  fair  proportion  of  hill,  and  plain, 
and  wood  ? 

Cle.   Like  the  rest  of  Crete  in  that. 

Ath.  You  mean  to  say  that  there  is  more  rock  than  plain  ? 

Qle.  Exactly. 

Ath.  Then  there  is  some  hope  that  your  citizens  may  be 
virtuous ;  had  you  been  on  the  sea,  and  well  provided  with 
harbors,  and  an  importing  rather  than  a  producing  country, 
some  mighty  saviour  would  have  been  needed,  and  lawgivers 
more  than  mortal,  if  you  were  ever  to  have  a  chance  of  pre- 
serving your  state  from  degeneracy  and  discordance  of  manners. 
But  there  is  comfort  in  the  eighty  stadia ;  although  the  sea  is 
too  near,  especially  if,  as  you  say,  the  harbors  are  so  good. 
Still  we  must  be  satisfied.  The  sea  is  pleasant  enough  as  a 
daily  companion,  but  has  also  a  bitter  and  brackish  quality  ; 
filling  the  streets  with  merchants  and  shopkeepers,  and  beget- 
ting in  the  souls  of  men  uncertain  and  unfaithful  ways  —  mak- 
ing the  State  unfriendly  and  unfaithful  both  to  her  own  citizens, 
and  also  to  other  nations.  There  is  a  consolation,  therefore,  in 
the  country  producing  all  things  at  home  ;  and  yet,  owing  to 
the  ruggedness  of  the  soil,  not  providing  anything  in  great 
abundance.  Had  there  been  abundance  there  might  have  been 
a  great  export  trade,  and  a  great  return  of  gold  and  silver , 
which,  as  we  may  safely  affirm,  has  the  most  fatal  result  on  a 
state  whose  aim  is  the  attainment  of  just  and  noble  sentiments ; 
this  was  said  by  us,  if  you  remember,  in  the  previous  discussion. 
—  Laws,  iv.  233. 
Cities  need  faithful  watchers. 

Thus,  0  my  friends,  and  for  the  reasons  given,  should  a 

state  act  which  would  endure  and  be  saved.  But  as  a  ship  sail- 
ing on  the  sea  has  to  be  watched  night  and  day,  in  like  manner 
a  city  also  is  sailing  on  a  sea  of  politics,  and  is  liable  to  all  sorts 
of  insidious  assaults ;  and  therefore  from  morning  to  night,  and 
from  night  to  morning,  rulers  must  join  hands  with  rulers,  and 
catchers  succeed  watchers,  receiving  and  giving  up  their  trust 
in  a  perpetual  order.  A  multitude  can  never  fullfil  a  duty  of 
this  sort  with  anything  like  energy  ;  moreover,  the  greater 
number  of  the  senators  will  have  to  be  left  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  year  to  order  their  concerns  at  their  own  homes. 
They  must  be  arranged  in  twelve  portions,  answering  to  twelve 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  07 

months,  and  serve  as  guardians  each  portion  for  a  single  month. 
Their  business  is  to  be  at  hand  and  receive  any  foreigner  01 
citizen  who  comes  to  them,  whether  to  give  information,  or  to 
put  questions  of  which  other  states  are  to  receive  the  answers ; 
or  when  the  city  desires  to  ask  a  question  and  receive  an  an- 
swer, or  again,  when  there  is  a  likelihood  of  internal  commo- 
tions, which  are  always  liable  to  happen  in  some  form  or  other, 
they  will,  if  they  can,  prevent  their  occurring ;  or  if  they  havt 
already  occurred,  will  lose  no  time  in  making  them  known  to  the 
city,  and  healing  the  evil.  Wherefore,  also,  this  which  is  the 
presiding  body  of  the  State,  ought  always  to  have  the  control  ol 
their  assemblies,  and  the  dissolutions  of  them,  regular  as  well 
rs  occasional.  All  this  is  to  be  ordered  by  the  twelfth  part  of 
the  council,  which  is  always  to  keep  watch  together  with  the 
officers  of  the  State  during  one  portion  of  the  year  and  to  rest 
during  the  remaining  eleven  portions. 

Thus  will  the  city  be  fairly  ordered.  —  Laws,  iv.  280. 
Citizen,  right  of  the  State  to  the.     See  Authority. 
Citizen,  obligation  of  the. 

Soc.  Then    the   laws  will   say :    "  Consider,    Socrates,  if 

we  are  speaking  truly,  that  in  your  present  attempt  you  are 
going  to  do  us  an  injury.  For,  after  having  brought  you  into 
the  world,  and  nurtured  and  educated  you,  and  given  you  and 
every  other  citizen  ?,  share  in  every  good  which  we  had  to  give, 
we  further  proclaim  to  every  Athenian,  that  if  he  does  not 
like  us  when  he  has  come  of  age  and  has  seen  the  ways  of 
the  city,  and  made  our  acquaintance,  he  may  go  where  he 
pleases  and  take  his  goods  with  him ;  and  none  of  us  laws  will 
forbid  him  or  interfere  with  him.  Any  of  you  who  does  not 
like  us  and  the  city,  and  who  wants  to  emigrate  to  a  colony  or 
to  any  other  city,  may  go  where  he  likes,  and  take  his  goods 
with  him.  But  he  who  has  experience  of  the  manner  in  which 
we  order  justice  and  administer  the  State,  and  still  remains, 
has  entered  into  an  implied  contract  that  he  will  do  as  we 
command  him.  And  he  who  disobeys  us  is,  as  ^e  maintain, 
thrice  wrong :  first,  because  in  disobeying  us  he  is  disobeying 
his  parents  ;  secondly,  because  we  are  the  authors  of  his  educa- 
tion ;  thirdly  because  he  has  made  an  agreement  with  us  that 
he  will  duly  obey  our  commands ;  and  he  neither  obeys  them 
nor  convinces  us  that  our  commands  are  unjust ;  and  we  do  not 
rudely  impose  them,  but  give  him  the  alternative  of  obeying  or 
convincing  us ;  that  is  what  we  offer,  and  he  does  neither 


68  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHT* 

These  are  the  sort  of  accusations  to  which,  as  we  were  saying 
you,  Socrates,  will  be  exposed  if  you  accomplish  your  iuten 
tions ;  you,  above  all  other  Athenians."  Suppose  I  ask,  why  i; 
this  ?  they  will  justly  retort  upon  me  that  I  above  all  other  men 
have  acknowledged  the  agreement.  "  There  is  clear  proof," 
they  will  say,  "  Socrates,  that  we  and  the  city  were  not  dicpleas- 
ing  to  you.  Of  all  Athenians  you  have  been  the  most  con- 
stant resident  in  the  city,  which,  as  you  never  leave,  you  may 
be  supposed  to  love.  For  you  never  went  out  of  the  city 
either  to  see  the  games,  except  once  when  you  went  to  the  Isth- 
mus, or  to  any  other  place  unless  when  you  were  on  military 
service  ;  nor  did  you  travel  as  other  men  do.  Nor  had  you  any 
curiosity  to  know  other  states  or  their  laws  :  your  affections  di; 
not  go  beyond  us  and  our  State  ;  we  were  your  special  favorite 
and  you  acquiesced  in  our  government  of  you ;  and  here  in 
this  city  you  begat  your  children,  which  is  a  proof  of  your 
satisfaction.  Moreover,  you  might,  if  you  had  liked,  have 
fixed  the  penalty  at  banishment  in  the  course  of  the  trial  — the 
State  which  refuses  to  let  you  go  now  would  have  let  you  go 
then.  But  you  pretended  that  you  preferred  death  to  exile, 
and  that  you  were  not  grieved  at  death.  And  now  you  have 
forgotten  these  fine  sentiments,  and  pay  no  respect  to  us  the 
laws,  of  whom  you  are  the  destroyer ;  and  are  doing  what  only 
a  miserable  slave  would  do,  running  away  and  turning  your 
back  upon  the  compacts  and  agreements  which  you  made  as  a 
citizen.  And  first  of  all  answer  this  very  question  :  Are  we  right 
in  saying  that  you  agreed  to  be  governed  according  to  us  in 
deed,  and  not  in  word  only  ?  Is  that  true  or  not  ?  "  How  shall 
we  answer  that,  Crito  ?  Must  we  not  assent  ? 

Cr.  There  is  no  help,  Socrates.  —  Orito,  i.  356. 
Citizen,  improvement  of  the. 

Soc.    And  now,  my  friend,  as  you  are  already  beginning 

to  be  a  public  character,  and  are  admonishing  and  reproaching 
me  for  not  being  one,  suppose  that  we  ask  a  few  questions  of 
one  another.  Tell  me,  then,  Callicles,  how  about  making  any 
of  the  citizens  better?  Was  there  ever  a  man  who  was  once 
vicious,  or  unjust,  or  intemperate,  or  foolbh,  and  became  by  the 
help  of  Callicles  good  and  noble  ?  Was  there  ever  such  a  man, 
whether  citizen  or  stranger,  slave  or  freeman  ?  Tell  me,  Cal- 
licles, if  a  person  were  to  ask  these  questions  of  you,  what 
would  you  answer  ?  Whom  would  you  say  that  you  had  im- 
proved by  your  conversation?  There  may  have  been  good 


PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS.  59 

deeds  of  this  sort  which  were  done  by  you  as  a  private  person, 
before  you  came  forward  in  public.  Why  will  you  not  answer  ? 

Cal.  You  are  contentious,  Socrates. 

Soc.  Nay,  I  ask  you,  not  from  a  love  of  contention,  but 
because  I  really  want  to  know  in  what  way  you  think  that 
affairs  should  be  administered  among  us  —  whether,  when  you 
come  to  the  administration  of  them,  you  have  any  other  aim 
but  the  improvement  of  the  citizens  ?  Have  we  not  already 
admitted  many  times  over  that  such  is  the  duty  of  a  public 
man  ?  Nay,  we  have  surely  said  so ;  for  if  you  will  not  answer 
for  yourself  I  must  answer  for  you.  But  if  this  is  what  the 
good  man  ought  to  effect  for  the  benefit  of  his  own  State,  allow 
me  to  recall  to  you  the  names  of  those  whom  you  were  just 
now  mentioning,  Pericles,  and  Cimon,  and  Miltiades,  and  The- 
mistocles,  and  ask  whether  you  still  think  that  they  were  good 
citizens. 

Cal.  I  do.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  106. 
City,  heavenly.     See  Heavenly  idea  of  the  earth. 
City  —  the  mother  of  her  citizens.     See  State,  a  parent,  etc. 
Clever  unjust,  the. 

Look  at  things  as  they  really  are  and  you  will  see  that 

the  clever  unjust  are  in  the  case  of  runners,  who  run  well  from 
the  starting-place  to  the  goal,  but  not  back  again  from  the 
goal :  they  go  off  at  a  great  pace,  but  in  the  end  only  look 
foolish,  slinking  away  with  their  ears  down  on  their  shoulders, 
and  without  a  crown  ;  but  the  true  runner  comes  to  the  finish 
and  receives  the  prize  and  is  crowned.  And  this  is  the  way 
with  the  just ;  he  who  endures  to  the  end  of  every  action  and 
occasion  of  his  entire  life  has  a  good  report  and  carries  off  the 
prize  which  men  bestow. 

True. 

And  now  you  must  allow  me  to  repeat  the  blessings  which 
you  attributed  to  the  fortunate  unjust.  I  shall  say  of  the  just 
as  you  were  saying  of  them,  that  as  they  grow  older,  if  that  is 
their  desire,  they  become  rulers  in  their  own  city,  if  they  care 
to  be ;  they  marry  whom  they  like  and  give  in  marriage  to 
whomsoever  they  like ;  all  that  you  said  of  the  others  I  now 
say  of  these.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  I  say  of  the  unjust  that 
the  greater  number,  even  though  they  escape  in  their  vouth, 
are  found  out  at  last  and  look  foolish  at  the  end  of  their 
course,  and  when  they  come  to  be  old  and  miserable  are 
flouted  alike  by  stranger  and  citizen  ;  they  are  beaten  and 


70  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

then  come  those  things  unfit  for  ears  polite,  as  you  tru,y  term 
them  ;  they  will  be  racked  and  burned,  as  you  were  saying  — 
but  I  shall  ask  you  to  imagine  that  I  have  repeated  your  tale 
of  horrors.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  445. 
Cognitions,  ideas  that  are. 

But  may  not  the  ideas,  asked  Socrates,  be  thoughts  only 

and  have  no  proper  existence  except  in  our  minds,  Parmen- 
ides  ?  For  in  that  case  each  idea  may  still  be  one,  and  not 
experience  this  infinite  subdivision. 

And  can  there  be  individual  thoughts  which  are  thoughts  of 
nothing  ? 

That  is  impossible,  he  said. 

The  thought  must  be  of  something  ? 

Yes. 

Of  something  that  is  or  is  not  ? 

Of  something  that  is. 

Must  it  not  be  of  a  single  something,  which  the  thought  rec- 
ognizes as  attaching  to  all,  being  a  single  form  or  nature  ? 

Yes. 

And  will  not  this  something,  so  apprehended  which  is  al- 
ways the  same  in  all,  be  an  idea  ? 

From  that,  againi  there  is  uo  escape. 

Then,  said  Parmenides,  if  you  say  that  everything  else  par- 
ticipates in  the  ideas,  must  you  not  say  either  that  everything 
is  made  up  of  thoughts  and  that  all  things  think ;  or  that  they 
arc  thoughts  having  no  thought  ? 

But  that,  Parmenides,  is  no  more  rational  than  the  other. 
The  more  probable  view  is,  that  the  ideas  are,  as  it  were,  pat- 
terns fixed  in  nature,  and  that  other  things  are  like  them,  and 
resemblances  of  them  ;  and  that  what  is  meant  by  the  partici- 
pation of  other  things  in  the  ideas,  is  really  assimilation  to 
them.  —  Parmenides,  iii.  249. 

Colonization,  a  means  of  purification.     Soe  Purification. 
Colonization,  the  best  kind  of. 

Cities  find  colonization  in  some  respects  easier  when  the 

colonists  are  of  one  race,  which  like  a  swarm  of  bees  is  sect 
out  from  a  single  country,  friends  from  friends,  owing  to  some 
pressure  of  population,  or  other  similar  necessity,  or  because 
a  portion  of  a  state  is  driven  by  factions  to  emigrate.  And 
there  have  been  whole  cities  which  have  taken  flight,  when 
utterly  conquered  by  a  superior  power  in  war.  This,  however, 
which  is  in  one  way  an  advantage  10  the  colonist  or  legislator, 


PLATO'S   BES'I    THOUGHTS.  71 

in  another  point  of  view  creates  a  difficulty.  There  is  an  ele- 
ment of  friendship  in  the  community  of  race,  and  language, 
and  laws,  and  in  common  sacrifices,  and  the  like  ;  but  colonies 
which  are  of  this  homogeneous  sort  are  apt  to  kick  against 
any  laws  different  from  their  own ;  and  although  the  badness 
of  their  own  laws  has  undone  them,  yet  because  of  the  force  of 
htbit  they  would  fain  preserve  the  very  customs  which  were 
d'.air  ruin  ;  and  the  leader  of  the  colony,  who  is  their  legisla- 
tor, finds  them  troublesome  and  rebellious.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  conflux  of  several  populations  might  be  more  disposed  to 
listen  to  new  laws;  but  then,  to  make  them  combine  and  pull 
together,  as  they  say  of  horses,  is  a  most  difficult  task,  and  the 
work  of  years.  And  yet  there  is  nothing  which  perfects  the 
virtue  of  men  like  legislation  and  colonization.  —  Laws,  iv. 
235. 
Color  what  is  it? 

Soc.  And  now,  as   Pindar  says,  "Read    my  meaning:" 

color  is  an  effluence  of  form,  commensurate  with  sight,  and 
sensible. 

Theaet.  I  believe,  Socrates,  that  you  have  truly  explained 
his  meaning. 

Soc.  Then  apply  his  doctrine  to  perception,  my  good  friend, 
and  first  of  all  to  vision ;  that  which  you  call  white  color 
is  not  in  your  eyes,  and  is  not  a  distinct  thing  which  exists 
out  of  them,  nor  can  you  assign  any  place  to  it ;  for  if  it  had 
position  it  would  be  and  be  at  rest,  and  there  would  be  no 
process  of  becoming. 

Theaet.  Then  what  is  color  ? 

Soc.  Let  us  carry  out  the  principle  which  has  just  been 
affirmed,  that  nothing  is  self-existent,  and  then  we  shall  see 
that  every  color,  white,  black,  and  every  other  color,  arises  out 
of  the  eye  meeting  the  appropriate  motion,  and  that  what  we 
term  the  substance  of  each  color  is  neither  the  active  nor  the 
passive  element,  but  something  which  passes  between  them, 
and  is  peculiar  to  each  percipient ;  are  you  certain  that  the 
several  colors  appear  to  every  animal  —  say  to  a  dog  —  as  they 
appear  to  yov,  ? 

Theaet.  Indeed  I  am  not. 

Soc.  Or  that  anything  appears  the  same  to  you  as  to  an 
other  man  ?  Would  you  not  rather  question  whether  you 
yourself  see  the  same  thing  at  different  times,  because  you  are 
never  exactly  the  same  ? 


72  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Theaet.  I  should. 

Soc.  And  if  that  with  which  I  compare  myself  in  siz.,,  or 
which  I  apprehend,  were  great  or  white  or  hot,  it  could  not 
without  actually  changing  become  different  by  mere  contact 
with  another ;  nor  again,  if  the  apprehending  or  comparing 
subject  were  great  or  white  or  hot,  could  this,  when  unchanged 
from  within,  become  changed  by  any  approximation  or  affec- 
tion of  any  other  thing.  For  in  our  ordinary  way  of  speaking 
we  allow  ourselves  to  be  driven  into  most  ridiculous  and  won- 
derful contradictions,  as  Protagoras  and  all  who  take  his  line 
of  thought  would  remark.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  354. 
Colors. 

There  is  a  fourth  class  of  sensible  things,  having  many 

varieties,  which  have  now  to  be  distinguished.  They  are 
called  bv  the  general  name  of  colors,  and  are  a  flame  which 
emanates  from  all  bodies  and  has  particles  corresponding  to 
the  sense  of  sight.  I  have  spoken  already,  in  what  has  pre- 
ceded, of  the  generation  of  sight,  and  this  will  be  a  natural 
and  suitable  place  in  which  to  give  some  account  of  colors. 

Of  the  particles  coming  from  other  bodies  which  fall  upon 
the  sight,  some  are  less  and  some  are  larger,  and  some  are 
equal  to  the  parts  of  the  sight  itself.  Those  which  are  equal 
are  imperceptible,  or  transparent,  as  they  are  called  by  us : 
whereas  the  larger  produce  contraction,  the  smaller  dilation,  in 
the  sight,  by  the  exercise  of  a  power  akin  to  that  of  hot  and 
cold  bodies  on  the  flesh,  or  of  astringent  bodies  on  the  tongue, 
or  of  those  heating  bodies  which  are  termed  pungent  by  us. 
White  and  black,  although  they  are  found  in  another  class  of 
objects,  and  for  this  reason  are  imagined  to  be  different,  are 
affections  of  the  same  kind.  Wherefore,  we  ought  to  term 
white  that  which  dilates  the  visual  ray,  and  the  opposite  of 
this  black.  There  is  also  a  swifter  motion  and  impact  of  an- 
other sort  of  fire  which  dilates  the  ray  of  sight  and  reaches 
the  eyes,  forcing  a  way  through  their  passages  and  melting 
them,  and  elicitin^  from  them  a  union  of  fire  and  water  which 

O 

we  call  tears,  being  itself  an  opposite  fire  which  comes  to  them 
from  without  —  the  inner  fire  flashes  forth  like  lightning,  and 
the  outer  finds  a  way  in  and  is  extinguished  in  the  tear-drop, 
and  all  sorts  of  colors  are  generated  by  the  mixture.  This 
affection  is  termed  dazzling,  and  the  object  which  produces  it 
is  called  bright  and  flashing.  There  is  another  sort  of  fire 
which  is  intermediate,  and  which  reaches  and  mingles  with  the 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  75 

aaoisture  of  the  eye  witl.out  flashing ;  and  in  this  the  fire 
mingling  with  the  ray  of  the  tear-drop  produces  a  color  like 
blood,  to  which  we  give  the  name  of  red.  A  bright  hue 
mingled  with  red  and  white  gives  the  color  called  auburn 
(j;a.v66v}.  The  law  of  proportion,  however,  according  to  whicL. 
the  several  colors  are  formed,  even  if  a  man  knew  he  would 
be  foolish  if  he  attempted  to  tell,  as  he  could  not  give  any 
necessary  reason,  nor  even  any  tolerable  or  probable  account 
of  them.  Again,  red,  when  mingled  with  black  and  white, 
gives  a  purple  hue,  which  becomes  umber  (op<£vu'or)  when  the 
colors  are  burnt  as  well  as  mingled  and  the  black  is  more  thor- 
oughly mixed  with  them.  Flame  color  (Cupper)  is  produced 
by  a  union  of  auburn  and  dun  (c^atoi/)  and  dun  by  an  admix- 
ture of  black  and  white  ;  yellow  (a>xpov)  by  an  admixture 
of  white  and  auburn.  White  and  bright  meeting,  and  falling 
upon  a  full  black,  become  dark  blue  (KVO.VOVV),  and  when  dark 
blue  mingles  with  white,  light  blue  (yAav/cov)  color  is  formed, 
as  leek  green  (Trpdo-iov)  is  formed  also  out  of  the  union  of 
flame  color  and  black.  There  will  be  no  difficulty  in  seeing 
how  the  colors  derived  from  these  are  mingled  and  assimi- 
lated in  accordance  with  probability.  He,  however,  who 
should  attempt  to  verify  all  this  by  experiment,  would  forget 
the  difference  of  the  human  and  divine  nature.  For  God  only 
has  the  knowledfe  and  also  the  power  which  are  able  to  com- 
bine many  things  into  one  and  again  dissolve  the  one  into 
many.  But  no  man  either  is  or  ever  will  be  able  to  accom- 
plish either  the  one  or  the  other  operation.  —  Timaeus,  ii.  559. 
Community  of  wives. 

Here,  then,  is  one  difficulty  in  our  law  about  women  which 

we  have  escaped  ;  the  wave  has  not  swallowed  us  up  alive  for 
enacting  that  the  guardians  of  either  sex  should  have  all  their 
pursuits  in  common  ;  to  the  utility  and  possibility  of  this  the 
argument  is  its  own  witness. 

Yes,  that  was  a  mighty  wave  which  you  have  escaped. 

Yes,  I  said,  but  a  much  greater  is  coming  ;  you  will  not 
think  much  of  this  when  you  see  the  next. 

Go  on,  let  me  see. 

The  law,  I  said,  which  is  the  sequel  of  this  and  of  all  that 
has  preceded,  is  to  the  following  effect.  —  "  that  the  wives  of 
these  guardians  are  to  be  common,  and  their  children  also  com- 
mon, and  no  parent  is  to  know  his  own  child,  nor  any  child  his 
narent." 


f4  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Yes,  he  sajd,  that  is  a  much  greater  wave  than  the  other  ; 
and  the  utility  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  such  a  law  is  far 
more  doubtful. 

I  do  not  think,  I  said,  that  there  cac  be  any  dispute  about 
the  very  great  utility  of  having  wives  and  children  in  common ; 
the  possibility  is  quite  another  matter,  and  will  be  very  much 
disputed.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  282. 
Community,  the  first  form  of  government. 

The  first  and  highest  form  of  the  State  and  of  the  govern- 
ment and  of  the  law  is  that  in  which  there  prevails  most  widely 
the  ancient  saying,  that  "  Friends  have  all  things  in  common." 
Whether  there  is  now,  or  ever  will  be,  this  communion  of 
women  and  children  and  of  property,  in  which  the  private  and 
individual  is  altogether  banished  from  life,  and  things  which 
are  by  nature  private,  such  as  eyes  and  ears  and  hands,  have 
become  common,  and  in  some  way  see  and  hear  and  act  in 
common,  and  all  men  express  praise  and  blame,  and  feel  joy 
and  sorrow,  on  the  same  occasions,  and  the  laws  unite  the  city 
to  the  utmost,  —  whether  all  this  is  possible  or  not,  I  say  that 
no  man,  acting  upon  any  other  principle,  will  ever  constitute  a 
state  more  exalted  in  virtue,  or  truer  or  better  than  this.  Such 
a  state,  whether  inhabited  by  Gods  or  sons  of  Gods,  will  make 
them  blessed  who  dwell  therein  ;  and  therefore  to  this  we  are 
to  look  for  the  pattern  of  the  State,  and  to  cling  to  this,  and,  as 
far  as  possible,  to  seek  for  one  which  is  like  this.  The  State 
which  we  have  now  in  hand,  when  created,  will  be  nearest  im- 
mortality and  unity  in  the  next  degree  ;  and,  after  that,  by  the 
grace  of  God,  we  will  complete  the  third  one.  And,  we  will 
begin  by  speaking  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  the  second. 

Let  them  at  once  distribute  their  land  and  houses,  and  not 
till  the  land  in  common,  since  a  community  of  goods  goes  be- 
yond their  proposed  origin,  and  nurture,  and  education.  But 
in  making  the  distribution,  let  the  several  possessors  feel  that 
their  particular  lots  also  belong  to  the  whole  city ;  and  seeing 
that  the  earth  is  their  parent,  let  them  tend  her  more  carefully 
than  children  do  their  mother.  For  she  is  a  goddess  and  theii 
queen,  and  they  are  her  mortal  subjects.  — Laws,  iv.  264. 
Comparatives. 

Soc.  Ever,  as  we  say,  into  the  hotter  and  the  colder  there 

enters  a  more  and  a  less. 

Pro.  True. 

Soc.  Then,  says  the  argument,  they  have  never  any  end, 
and  being  endless  must  also  be  infinite. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  li 

Pro.  "Yes,  Socrates,  that  is  exceedingly  true. 

Soc.  Yes,  my  dear  Protarchus,  and  the  word  which  you 
have  just  uttered  suggests  to  me  that  such  expressions  as  "  ex- 
ceedingly "  and  also  the  term  "  mildly  "  mean  the  same  as 
more  or  less ;  for  whenever  they  occur  they  do  not  allow  of 
the  existence  of  quantity  —  they  are  always  introducing  de- 
grees into  actions,  instituting  a  comparison  of  the  more  or  less 
violent  or  more  or  less  mild,  and  at  each  creation  of  more  or 
less,  quantity  disappears.  For,  as  I  was  just  now  saying,  if 
quantity  and  measure  did  not  disappear,  but  were  allowed  to 
intrude  in  the  sphere  of  more  and  less  and  the  other  compara- 
tives, these  last  would  themselves  he  driven  out  of  their  own 
domain.  When  definite  quantity  is  once  admitted,  there  can 
be  no  longer  a  "  hotter  "  or  a  "  colder  "  (for  these  are  always 
progressing,  and  are  never  in  one  stay)  ;  but  definite  quantity 
is  at  rest,  and  progresses  not.  Which  proves  that  compara- 
tives, such  as  the  hotter  and  the  colder,  are  to  be  ranked  in 
the  class  of  the  infinite. — Philebus,  iii.  159. 

Compulsory  and  voluntary  care  of  men.     See  Education,    compul- 
fion  in. 

Str.  Our  first  duty,  as  we  were  saying,  was  to  remodel  the 

name,  so  as  to  have  the  notion  of  care  rather  than  of  feeding, 
and  then  to  divide,  for  there  may  be  still  considerable  divisions. 

Y.  Soc.  How  can  they  be  made  ? 

Str.  First  by  separating  the  divine  shepherd  from  the  human 
guardian  or  manager. 

T.  Soc.  True. 

Str.  And  the  art  of  management  which  is  assigned  to  man 
would  again  have  to  be  subdivided. 

T.  Soc.  On  what  principle  ? 

Str.  On  the  principle  of  voluntary  and  compulsory. 

T.  Soc.  Why  ? 

Str.  Because,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  there  has  been  an  error 
nere ;  for  our  simplicity  led  us  to  rank  them  together,  whereas 
they  are  utterly  different,  and  their  modes  of  government  are 
different. 

T.  Soc.  True. 

Str.  Then,  now,  as  I  said,  let  us  make  the  correction  and 
divide  human  care  into  two  parts,  on  the  prir  ciple  of  voluntary 
and  compulsory. 

Y.  Soc.  Certainly. 

Str.  And  if  we  call  the  management  of  violent  rulers  tyr- 


76  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

army,  and  the  volumary  management  of  voluntary  bipeds  poli- 
tics, may  we  not  further  assert  that  he  who  has  this  latter  art 
of  management  is  the  true  king  and  statesman  ? 

T.   Soc.  I  think,  Stranger,  that  we  have  now  completed  the 
account  of  the  Statesman.  —  Statesman,  iii.  560. 
Concealment  of  evil. 

Probably  the  youth  will   say  to   himself  in   the  words   <H 

Pindar :  — 

"  Can  I  by  justice  or  by  crooked  ways  of  deceit  ascend  a  loftier 
tower,  which  may  be  a  fortress  to  me  all  my  life  ?  " 

For  what  men  say  is  that,  if  I  am  really  just  without  being 
thought  just,  this  is  no  profit,  but  evident  pain  and  loss.  But 
if,  though  unjust,  I  acquire  the  character  of  justice,  a  heavenly 
life  is  to  be  mine.  Since  then,  as  philosophers  say,  appearance 
tyrannizes  over  truth  and  is  the  lord  of  happiness,  to  appearance 
I  must  wholly  devote  myself.  I  will  have  in  front  of  me  the 
painted  form  and  figure  of  virtue  ;  behind  I  will  trail  the  subtle 
and  crafty  fox,  as  Archilochus,  first  of  sages,  counsels.  But  I 
hear  some  one  exclaiming  that  wickedness  is  not  easily  con- 
cealed ;  to  which  I  answer,  —  Nothing  great  is  easy.  Never- 
theless, this  must  be  the  way  to  happiness,  and  the  way  by 
which  we  must  go,  if  we  follow  in  the  steps  of  the  argument. 
As  to  concealment,  that  may  be  secured  by  the  formation  of 
societies  and  political  clubs.  And  there  are  professors  of 
rhetoric  who  teach  the  philosophy  of  persuading  courts  and 
assemblies  ;  and  so,  partly  by  persuasion  and  partly  by  force, 
I  shall  make  unlawful  gains  and  not  be  punished.  Still  I  hear 
a  voice  saying  that  the  gods  cannot  be  deceived,  neither  can 
they  be  compelled.  But  what  if  there  are  no  gods  ?  or,  sup- 
pose that  the  gods  have  no  care  about  human  things  —  why  in 
either  case  should  we  care  about  concealment?  And  even  if 
there  are  gods,  and  they  have  a  care  of  us,  yet  we  know  about 
them  only  from  tradition  and  the  genealogies  of  the  poets  ; 
and  the  poets  are  the  persons  who  say  that  they  may  be  influ- 
enced and  turned  by  "  sacrifices  and  soothing  entreaties."  Let 
us  be  consistent  then,  and  either  believe  both  or  neither.  And 
if  we  believe  them,  why  then  we  had  better  be  unjust,  and  offer 
of  the  fruits  of  injustice  ;  for  if  we  are  just  we  shall  indeed 
escape  the  vengeance  of  heaven,  but  we  shall  lose  the  gains  of 
injustice  ;  whereas,  if  we  are  unjust,  we  shall  keep  the  gains, 
»nd  by  our  sinning  and  praying,  and  praying  and  sinning,  the 


PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS.  77 

cods  will  be  propitiated,  and  we  shall  be  forgiven.  "  But  there 
is  a  world  below  in  which  either  we  or  our  children  will  suffer 
for  our  deeds."  Yes,  my  friend,  will  be  the  reply,  but  there 
are  mysteries  and  atoning  deities,  and  these  have  great  power. 
That  is  what  mighty  cities  declare ;  and  the  children  of  the 
gods,  who  were  their  poets  and  prophets,  affirm  the  same.  — 
The  Republic,  ii.  187. 
Conception  and  generation,  divine  nature  of. 

"There  is  a  certain  age  at  which  human  nature  is  desirous 

of  procreation  —  procreation  which  must  be  in  beauty  and  not 
in  deformity ;  and  this  procreation  is  the  union  of  man  and 
woman,  and  is  a  divine  thing  ;  for  conception  and  generation 
are  an  immortal  principle  in  the  mortal  creature,  and  in  the 
inharmonious  they  can  never  be.  But  the  deformed  is  always 
inharmonious  with  the  divine,  and  the  beautiful  harmonious. 
Beauty,  then,  is  the  destiny  or  goddess  of  parturition  who  pre- 
sides at  birth,  and  therefore  when  approaching  beauty  the  con- 
ceiving power  is  propitious,  and  diffuse,  and  benign,  and  begets 
and  bears  fruit  :  at  the  sight  of  ugliness  it  frowns  and  con- 
tracts in  pain,  and  is  averted  and  morose,  and  shrinks  up,  and 
not  without  a  pang  refrains  from  conception.  And  this  is  the 
reason  why,  when  the  hour  of  conception  arrives,  and  the 
teeming  nature  is  full,  there  is  such  a  flutter  and  ecstasy  about 
beauty  whose  approach  is  the  alleviation  of  the  pain  of  travail. 
For  love,  Socrates,  is  not,  as  you  imagine,  the  love  of  the  beau- 
tiful only."  "  What  then  ?  "  "  The  love  of  generation  and  of 
birth  in  beauty."  "  Yes,"  I  said.  "  Yes,  indeed,"  she  replied. 
"  But  why  of  generation  ?  "  I  said.  "  Because  to  the  mortal, 
generation  is  a  sort  of  eternity  and  immortality,"  she  replied ; 
"  and  if  as  has  been  already  admitted,  love  is  of  the  ever- 
lasting possession  of  the  good,  all  men  will  necessarily  desire 
immortality  together  with  good,  wherefore  love  is  of  immor- 
tality." 

All  this  she  taught  me  at  various  times  when  she  spoke  of 
love.  And  I  remember  that  she  once  said  to  me,  ''  What  is 
the  cause,  Socrates,  of  love,  and  the  attendant  desire  ?  See 
you  not  how  all  animals,  birds  as  well  as  beasts,  in  their  desire 
of  procreation,  are  in  asony  when  they  take  the  infection  of 
love  ;  this  begins  with  the  desire  of  union ;  whereto  is  added 
the  care  of  offspring,  on  behalf  of  whom  the  weakest  are  ready 
to  battle  against  the  strongest  even  to  the  uttermost,  and  to  die 
for  them,  and  will  let  themselves  be  tormented  with  hunger  or 


78  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

suffer  anything  in   order  to  maintain  theur  offspring."  —  The 
Symposium,  i.  498. 
Concupiscent  nature  ruled. 

Ought  not  the  rational  principle,  which  is  wise,  and  ha: 

the   care  of  the  whole   soul,  to   rule,  and  the   passionate   or 
spirited  principle  to  be  the  subject  and  ally  ? 

Certainly. 

And,  as  we  were  saying,  the  united  influence  of  music  au^ 
gymnastic  will  bring  them  into  accord,  nerving  and  sustaining 
the  reason  with  noble  words  and  lessons,  and  moderating  and 
soothing  and  civilizing  the  wildness  of  passion  by  harmony  and 
rhythm  ? 

Quite  true,  he  said. 

And  these  two,  thus  nurtured  and  educated,  and  having 
learned  truly  to  know  their  own  functions,  will  rule  over  the 
concupiscent  part  of  every  man,  which  is  the  largest  and  of  all 
things  most  insatiable  ;  over  this  they  will  keep  guard,  lest, 
waxing  great  with  the  fullness  of  bodily  pleasures,  as  they  are 
termed,  and  no  longer  confined  to  her  own  sphere,  the  concu- 
piscent soul  should  attempt  to  enslave  and  rule  those  who  arc 
not  her  natural-born  subjects,  and  overturn  the  whole  life  of 
man  ? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

The  two  will  be  the  defenders  of  the  whole  soul  and  the 
whole  body  against  attacks  from  without ;  the  one  counseling, 
and  the  other  fighting  under  his  leader,  and  courageously  exe- 
cuting his  commands  and  counsels.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  268. 
Confidence  and  courage.     See  Ability,  etc. 
Conjecture  in  art. 

Soc.  I  mean  to  say,  that  if  arithmetic,  mensuration,  an-.. 

weighing  be  taken  away  from  any  art,  that  which  remains  will 
not  be  much. 

Pro.  Not  much,  certainly. 

Soc.  The  rest  will  be  only  conjecture,  and  the  better  use  of 
the  senses,  which  is  given  by  experience  and  exercise  in  addi- 
tion to  a  certain  power  of  guessing,  which  is  commonly  called 
art,  and  is  perfected  by  attention  and  practice. 

Pro.  Nothing  more  assuredly. 

Soc.  Music,  for  instance,  is  full  of  this  empiricism  ;  as  is 
gceu  in  the  harmonizing  of  sounds,  not  by  rule,  but  by  conject- 
ure ;  the  music  of  the  flute  is  always  trying  to  guess  the 
pitch  of  each  vibrating  note,  and  is  therefore  mixed  r.p  with 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  79 

much  that  is  doubtful  and  has  very  little  certainty.  —  Philebut, 

iii.  196. 

Consonances  and  harmonies. 

I  conceive  that  as  the  eyes  are  designed  to  look  up  at  the 

stars,  so  are  the  ears  to  hear  harmonious  motions,  and  these 
are  sister  sciences  —  as  the  Pythagoreans  say,  and  we,  Glau- 
con,  agree  with  them  ? 

Yes,  he  replied. 

But  this,  I  said,  is  a  laborious  study,  and  therefore  we  had 
better  go  and  learn  of  them  ;  and  they  will  tell  us  whether 
there  are  any  other  applications  of  these  sciences.  At  the 
same  time,  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  our  own  higher  object. 

What  is  that  ? 

There  is  a  perfection  which  all  knowledge  ought  to  reach, 
and  which  our  pupils  ought  also  to  attain,  and  not  to  fall  short 
of,  as  I  was  saying  that  they  did  in  astronomy.  For  in  the 
science  of  harmony,  as  you  probably  know,  they  are  equally 
empirical.  The  sounds  and  consonances  which  they  compare 
are  those  which  are  heard  only,  and  their  labor,  like  that  of 
the  astronomers,  is  in  vain. 

Yes,  by  heaven  !  he  said ;  and  'tis  as  good  as  a  play  to 
hear  them  talking  about  their  condensed  notes,  as  they  call 
them  ;  they  put  their  ears  alongside  of  their  neighbors  as  if  to 
get  a  sound  out  of  them  —  one  set  of  them  declaring  that  they 
catch  an  intermediate  note  and  have  found  the  least  interval 
which  should  be  the  unit  of  measurement ;  the  others  main- 
taining the  opposite  theory  that  the  two  sounds  have  passed 
into  the  same  —  either  party  setting  their  ears  before  their  un- 
derstanding. 

You  mean,  I  said,  those  gentlemen  who  tease  and  torture 
the  strings  and  rack  them  on  the  pegs  of  the  instrument :  I 
might  carry  on  the  metaphor  and  speak  after  their  manner  of 
the  blows  which  the  plectrum  gives,  and  make  accusations 
against  the  strings,  both  of  backwardness  and  forwardness  to 
sound ;  but  this  would  be  tedious,  and  therefore  I  will  only  say 
that  these  are  not  the  men,  but  that  I  am  speaking  of  the 
Pythagoreans,  of  whom  I  was  just  now  proposing  to  inquire 
about  harmony.  For  they  too  are  in  error,  like  the  astrono- 
mers ;  they  investigate  the  numbers  of  the  harmonies  which 
are  heard,  but  they  never  attain  to  problems  —  that  is  to  say, 
they  never  reach  the  natural  harmonies  of  number,  or  reflect 
why  some  numbers  are  harmonious  and  others  not.  —  The  Re 
public,  ii.  358. 


80  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Conspirators  and  traitors. 

Whoever   by  promoting   a   mail    to    power   enslaves   the 

laws,  and  subjects  the  city  to  factions,  using  violence  and  stir- 
ring up  sedition  contrary  to  law,  him  we  will  deem  the  greatest 
enemy  of  the  whole  State.  But  he  who  takes  no  part  in  such 
proceedings,  and  yet  being  the  chief  magistrate  of  the  State, 
knowing  of  them  or  not  knowing  of  them,  by  reason  of  cow- 
ardice does  not  interfere  on  behalf  of  his  country,  such  an  one 
we  must  consider  nearly  as  bad.  Every  man  who  is  worth 
anything  will  inform  the  magistrates,  and  bring  the  conspirator 
to  trial  for  making  a  violent  and  illegal  attempt  to  change  the 
government.  The  judges  of  the  traitor  shall  be  the  same  as 
of  the  robbers  of  temples ;  and  let  the  whole  proceeding  be 
carried  on  in  the  same  way,  and  the  vote  of  the  majority  con- 
demn to  death.  But  let  there  be  a  general  rule,  that  the  dis- 
grace and  punishment  of  the  father  is  not  to  be  visited  on  the 
children,  except  in  the  case  of  some  one  whose  father,  grand- 
father, and  great-grandfather  have  successively  undergone  the 
penalty  of  death.  Such  persons  the  city  shall  send  away  with 
all  their  possessions,  reserving  only  and  wholly  their  appointed 
lot  to  their  original  city  and  country.  And  out  of  the  citizens 
who  have  more  than  one  son  of  not  less  than  ten  years  of  age, 
they  shall  select  ten  whom  their  father  or  grandfather  by  the 
mother's  or  father's  side  shall  appoint,  and  let  them  send  to 
Delphi  the  names  of  those  who  are  selected,  and  him  whom 
the  God  appoints  they  shall  establish  as  heir  of  the  house 
which  has  failed ;  and  may  he  have  better  fortune  than  his 
p-edecessors  !  —  Laws,  iv.  369. 
Constituency,  legislators  not  always  to  obey  their. 

Str.  They  say,  that  if  any  one  knows  how  the  ancient  laws 

may  be  improved,  he  must  first  persuade  his  own  State  of  the 
improvement,  and  then  he  may  legislate,  but  not  otherwise. 

T.  Soc.  And  are  they  not  right  ? 

Str.  I  dare  say.  But  supposing  that  he  does  use  some  gen- 
tle violence  for  their  good,  what  is  this  violence  to  be  called? 
Or  rather,  before  you  answer,  let  me  ask  the  same  question  in 
reference  to  our  previous  instance. 

Y.  Soc.  What  do  you  mean  ? 

Str.  Suppose  that  a  skillful  physician  has  a  patient,  of  what- 
ever sex  or  age,  whom  he  compels  against  his  will  to  do  some- 
thing for  his  good  which  is  contrary  to  the  written  rules,  what 
is  this  compulsion  to  be  called  ?  Would  you  ever  dream  of 


PLATO'S  BE.ST  THOUGHTS.  81 

calling  it  a  violation  of  the  art,  or  breach  of  the  laws  of  health? 
Nothing  could  be  more  unjust  than  for  the  patient  to  whom  such 
a  gentle  violence  is  applied,  to  charge  the  physician  who  prac- 
tices the  violence  with  wanting  skill  or  aggravating  his  disease. 

Y.  Soc.  Most  true. 

•  •itr.  In  the  political  art  the  error  is  not  called  disease,  but 
evi.,  or  disgrace,  or  injustice. 

Y.  Soc.   Quite  true. 

•  3tr.  And  when  the  citizen,  contrary  to  law  and  custom,  is 
compelled  to  do  what  is  juster  and  better  and  nobler  than  he 
did  before,  and  this  sort  of  violence  is  blamed,  the  last  and 
most  absurd  thing  which  he  could  say,  is  that  he  has  incurred 
disgrace  or  evil  or  injustice  at  the  hands  of  the  legislator  who 
uses  the  violence. 

Y.  Soc.  That  is  very  true. 

Str.  And  shall  we  say  that  the  violence,  if  exercised  by  a 
rich  man,  is  just,  and  if  by  a  poor  man,  unjust  ?  May  not  any 
man,  rich  or  poor,  with  or  without  written  laws,  with  the  will 
of  the  citizens  or  against  the  will  of  the  citizens,  do  what  is 
for  their  interest  ?  Is  not  this  the  true  principle  of  govern- 
ment, in  accordance  with  which  the  wise  and  good  man  will 
order  the  affairs  of  his  subjects  ?  As  the  pilot  watches  over 
the  interests  of  the  ship,  or  of  the  crew,  and  preserves  the 
lives  of  his  fellow-sailors,  not  by  laying  down  rules,  but  by 
making  his  art  a  law  —  even  so,  and  in  the  self-same  way,  may 
there  not  be  a  true  form  of  polity  created  by  those  who  are 
able  to  govern  in  a  similar  spirit,  and  who  show  a  strength  of 
art  which  is  superior  to  the  law  ?  Nor  can  wise  rulers  ever 
err  while  they  regard  the  one  great  rule  of  distributing  justice 
to  the  citizens  with  intelligence  and  art,  and  are  able  to  pre- 
serve, and,  so  far  as  that  is  possible,  to  improve  them.  — 
Statesman,  iii.  582. 
Contradiction,  the  art  of. 

Verily,  Glaucon,  I  said,  glorious  is  the  power  of  the  art 

of  contradiction  ! 

Why  do  you  say  so  ? 

Because  I  think  that  many  a  man  tails  into  the  practice 
against  his  will.  When  he  thinks  that  he  is  reasoning  he  is 
really  disputing,  just  because  he  cannot  define  and  divide,  and 
so  know  that  of  which  he  is  speaking  ;  and  he  will  pursue  a 
merely  verbal  opposition  in  the  spirit  of  contention  and  not  of 
fair  discussion. 

6 


82  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Yes,  he  replied,  such  is  very  often  the  case  ;  but  what  has 
that  to  do  with  us  and  our  argument  ? 

A  great  deal ;  for  there  is  certainly  a  danger  of  our  getting 
unintentionally  into  a  verbal  opposition. 

In  what  way  ? 

Why  we  valiantly  and  pugnaciously  insist  upon  the  verbal 
truth,  that  different  natures  ought  to  have  different  pursuits, 
but  we  never  considered  at  all  what  was  the  meaning  of  same- 
ness or  difference  of  nature  or  why  we  distinguished  them  when 
we  assigned  different  pursuits  to  different  natures.  —  The  Re 
public,  ii.  278. 
Controversy. 

Sir.  Let  us  consider  once  more  whether  there  may  not  be 

another  aspect  of  sophistry  ? 

Theaet.  What  is  that  ? 

Str.  In  the  acquisitive  there  was  a  subdivision  of  the  com- 
bative or  fighting  art. 

Theaet.  There  was. 

Str.  Perhaps  we  had  better  divide  it. 

Theaet.  What  shall  be  the  divisions  ? 

Str.  There  shall  be  one  division  of  the  competitive,  and  the 
other  of  the  pugnacious. 

Theaet.  Very  good. 

Str.  That  part  of  the  pugnacious  which  is  a  contest  of  bodily 
strength  may  be  properly  called  by  some  such  name  as  violent. 

Theaet.  True. 

Str.  And  when  the  war  is  one  of  words,  that  may  be  termed 
controversy  ? 

Theaet.  Yes. 

Str.  And  controversy  may  be  of  two  kinds. 

Theaet.  What  are  they  ? 

Str.  When  long  speeches  are  answered  by  long  speeches, 
and  there  is  public  discussion  about  the  just  and  unjust,  that  is 
forensic  controversy. 

Theaet.  Yes. 

Str.  And  there  is  a  private  sort  of  controversy,  which  is  cut 
up  into  questions  and  answers,  and  this  «j  commonly  called  dis- 
putation ? 

Theaet.  Yes,  that  is  the  name. 

Str.  And  of  disputation,  that  sort  which  is  only  a  discussion 
nbout  contract?,  and  is  carried  on  at  random,  and  without  rules 
-•»£  art,  is  recognized  by  dialectic  to  be  a  distinct  class,  but  haa 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  83 

hitherto  had  no  distinctive  name,  and  does  not  Deserve  to  re 
ceive  one  at  our  hands. 

Theaet.  No  ;  for  the  different  species  are  too  minute  and 
heterogeneous. 

Str.  But  that  which  proceeds  by  rules  of  art  to  dispute 
about  justice  and  injustice  in  their  own  nature  and  about  things 
in  general,  have  we  not  been  accustomed  to  call  argumentation 
(Eristic)  ? 

Theaet.  Very  true.  —  Sophist,  iii.  459. 
Conventional  notions  of  right. 

Soc.  I  declare,  O  Callicles,  that  Callicles  will  never  be  at  one 

with  himself,  but  that  his  whole  life  will  be  a  discord.  And 
yet,  my  friend,  I  would  rather  that  my  lyre  should  be  inharmo- 
nious, and  that  there  should  be  no  music  in  the  chorus  which  I 
provided  ;  aye,  or  that  the  whole  world  should  be  at  odds  with 
me,  and  oppose  me,  rather  than  that  I  myself  should  be  at  odds 
with  myself,  and  contradict  myself. 

Gal.  0,  Socrates,  you  are  a  regular  declairner,  and  are  man- 
ifestly running  riot  in  the  argument.  And  now  you  are  de- 
claiming in  this  way  because  Polus  has  met  with  the  same  evil 
fate  himself  which  he  accused  you  of  bringing  upon  Gorgias : 
he  said,  if  I  remember  rightly,  that  when  Gorgias  was  asked 
by  you,  whether,  if  some  one  came  to  him  who  wanted  to  learn 
rhetoric,  and  did  not  know  justice,  he  would  teach  him  justice  ? 
And  Gorgias  in  his  modesty  replied  that  he  would,  because  he 
thought  that  mankind  in  general  would  expect  this  of  him,  and 
would  be  displeased  if  he  said  "  No  ;  "  in  consequence  of  this 
admission,  Gorgias  was  compelled  to  contradict  himself,  and 
you  were  delighted ;  Polus  laughed  at  you  at  the  time,  deserv- 
edly, as  I  think  ;  and  now  he  has  himself  experienced  the  same 
misfortune.  I  cannot  say  very  much  for  his  wit  when  he  con- 
ceded to  you,  that  to  do  is  more  dishonorable  than  to  suffer 
injustice,  for  this  was  what  led  to  his  being  entangled  by  you  ; 
and  because  he  was  too  modest  to  s;iy  what  he  thought,  he  had 
his  mouth  stopped.  For  the  truth  is,  Socrates,  that  you,  who 
pretend  to  be  engaged  in  the  pursuit  of  truth,  are  appealing 
now  to  the  popular  and  vulgar  notions  of  right,  which  are  not 
natural,  but  only  conventional.  Convention  and  nature  are 
generally  at  variance  with  one  another  :  and  hence,  if  a  person 
is  too  modest  to  say  what  he  thinks,  he  is  compelled  to  contra- 
dict himself ;  and  you,  in  your  ingenuity,  perceiving  the  advan 
tage  to  be  hereby  gained,  slyly  ask  of  him  who  is  arguing  con- 


84  PLATO'S  JBEST  FHOUGHTS. 

ventionally  a  question  which  is  to  be  determined  by  the  rule  of 
nature  ;  and  if  he  is  talking  of  the  rule  of  nature,  you  slip  away 
to  custom  •  as  you  did  in  this  very  discussion  about  doing  and 
suffering  injustice.  When  Polus  was  speaking  of  the  conven- 
tionally dishonorable,  you  assailed  him  from  the  point  of  view 
of  nature  ;  for  by  the  rule  of  nature,  to  suffer  injustice  is  the 
greater  disgrace,  because  the  greater  evil  ;  but  conventionally, 
to  do  evil  is  the  more  disgraceful.  For  the  suffering  of  injus- 
tice is  not  the  part  of  a  man,  but  of  a  slave,  who  indeed  had 
better  die  than  live ;  since  when  he  is  wronged  and  trampled 
upon,  he  is  unable  to  help  himself,  or  any  other  about  whom 
he  cares. 

The  reason,  as  I  conceive,  is  that  the  makers  of  laws  are  the 
majority  who  are   weak ;  and  they  make  laws  and  distribute 
praises  and  censures  with  a  view  to  themselves  and  to  their  own 
interests ;  and  they  terrify  the  stronger  sort  of  men,  and  those 
who  are  able  to  get  the  better  of  them,  in  order  that  they  may 
not  get  the  better  of  them ;  and  they  say,  that  dishonesty  is 
ehameful  and  unjust ;  meaning,  by  the  word  injustice,  the  de- 
sire of  a  man  to  have  more  than  his  neighbors ;  for  knowing 
their  own  inferiority  I  suspect  they  are  too  glad  of  equality. 
And  therefore  the  endeavor  to  have  more  than  the  many,  is 
conventionally  said  to  be  shameful  and  unjust,  and  is  called  in- 
justice, whereas  nature  herself  intimates  that  it  is  just  for  the 
better  to  have  more  than  the  worse,  the  more  powerful  than 
the  weaker  ;  and  in  many  ways  she  shows,  among  men  as  well 
as  among  animals,  and  indeed  among  whole  cities  and  races, 
that  justice  consists  in  the  superior  ruling  over  and  having  more 
than  the  inferior.      For  on  what  principle  of  justice  did  Xerxes 
invade  Hellas,  or  his  father  the  Scythians  (not  to  speak  of 
numberless  other  examples)  ?     These  are  men  who  act  accord- 
ing to  nature  ;  yes,  by  Heaven,  and  according  to  the  law  of 
nature  :   not,  perhaps,  according  to  that  artificial  law,  which  we 
forge  and  impose  upon  our  fellows  of  whom  we  take  the  best 
and  strongest  from  their  youth  upwards,  and  tame  them  like 
young  lions,  charming  them  with  the  sound  of  the  voice,  and 
saying  to  them,  that  with  equality  they  must  be  content,  and 
"hat  the  equal  is  the  honorable  and  the  just.     But  if  there 
were  a  man  who  had  sufficient  force,  he  would  shake  off  and 
break  through,  and  escape  from  all  this  ;  he  would  trample 
under  foot  all  our  formulas  and  spells  and  charms,  and  all  our 
laws,  sinning  against  nature :  the  slave  would  rise  in  rebellion 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  85 

and  be  Icrd  over  us,  and  the  light  of  natural  justice  would 
shine  forth.  And  this  I  take  to  be  the  sentiment  of  Pindar,  in 
the  poem  in  which  he  says  that  — 

"  Law  is  the  king  of  all,  mortals  as  well  as  immortals." 

—  Gorgias,  iii.  71. 
Conversion,  the  process  of. 

Whether  I  am  right  or  not  God  only  knows.    But,  whether 

true  or  false,  my  opinion  is  that  in  the  world  of  knowledge  the 
idea  of  good  appears  last  of  all,  and  is  seen  only  with  an  eliort ; 
and,  when  seen,  is  also  inferred  to  be  the  universal  author  oi 
all  things  beautiful  and  right,  parent  of  light  and  of  the  lord  of 
light  in  this  world,  and  the  source  of  truth  and  reason  in  tho 
other ;  and  is  the  power  upon  which  he  who  would  act  ration- 
ally either  in  public  or  private  life  must  have  his  eye  fixed. 

I  agree,  he  said,  as  far  as  I  am  able  to  understand  you. 

Moreover,  you  must  not  wonder  that  those  who  attain  to  this 
beatific  vision  are  unwilling  to  descend  to  human  affairs ;  for 
their  souls  are  ever  hastening  into  the  upper  world  where  they 
desire  to  dwell ;  and  this  desire  of  theirs  is  very  natural,  if  our 
allegory  may  be  trusted. 

Yes,  very  natural. 

And  is  there  anything  surprising  in  one  who  passes  from 
divine  contemplations  to  the  evil  state  of  man,  misbehaving 
himself  in  a  ridiculous  manner  ;  if,  while  his  eyes  are  blinking 
and  before  he  has  become  accustomed  to  the  surrounding  dark- 
ness, he  is  compelled  to  fight  in  courts  of  law,  or  in  other  places, 
about  the  images  or  shadows  of  images  of  justice,  and  is  en- 
deavoring to  meet  the  conceptions  of  those  who  have  never  yet 
seen  the  absolute  justice? 

Anything  but  surprising,  he  replied. 

Any  one  who  has  common  sense  will  remember  that  the  be- 
wilderments of  the  eyes  are  of  two  kinds,  and  arise  from  two 
causes,  either  from  coming  out  of  the  light  or  from  going  into 
the  light,  which  is  true  of  the  mind's  eye,  quite  as  much  as  of 
the  bodily  eye ;  and  he  who  remembers  this  when  he  sees  any 
one  whose  vision  is  perplexed  and  weak,  will  not  be  too  ready 
o  laugh  ;  he  will  first  ask  whether  that  soul  of  man  has  come 
out  of  the  brighter  life,  and  is  unable  to  see  because  unaccus- 
tomed to  the  dark,  or  having  turned  from  darkness  to  the  day 
is  dazzled  by  excess  of  light.  And  he  will  count  the  one  happy 
in  his  condition  and  state  of  beingj  and  he  will  pity  the  other ; 
or,  if  he  have  a  mind  to  laugh  at  the  soul  which  comes  from 


86  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

below  into  the  light,  here  will  be  more  reason  in  this  than  in 
the  laugh  which  greets  the  other  coming  from  above  into  the 
den. 

That,  he  said,  is  a  very  just  remark. 

But  if  I  am  right,  then  certain  professors  of  education  must 
be  mistaken  in  saying  that  they  can  put  a  knowledge  into  the 
soul  which  was  not  there  before,  like  sight  into  blind  eyes. 

Nevertheless,  they  do  say  so,  he  replied. 

Whereas,  I  said,  our  argument  shows  that  the  power  is 
already  in  the  soul ;  and  that  as  the  eye  may  be  imagined  un- 
able to  turn  from  darkness  to  light  without  the  whole  body,  so 
too,  when  the  eye  of  the  soul  is  turned  round,  the  whole  soul 
must  be  turned  round  from  the  world  of  becoming  into  that  of 
being,  and  learn  by  degrees  to  endure  the  sight  of  being,  and 
of  the  brightest  and  best  of  bt'iiig  —  or  in  other  words,  of  the 
good. 

Very  true. 

And  there  must  be  some  art  which  will  affect  conversion 
in  the  easiest,  quickest  manner  ;  not  implanting  eyes,  for  they 
exist  already,  but  giving  them  a  right  direction,  which   they 
have  not.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  344. 
Cookery,  not  an  art. 

Soc.  Let  me  now  remind  you  of  what  I  was  saying  to 

Gorgias  and  Polus ;  I  was  saying,  as  you  will  not  have  for- 
gotten, that  there  were  some  processes  which  aim  at  pleasure, 
and  at  pleasure  only,  and  know  nothing  of  good  and  evil,  and 
there  are  other  processes  which  know  good  and  evil.  And  I 
considered  that  cookery,  which  I  do  not  call  art,  but  only  an 
experience,  was  of  the  former  class,  which  is  concerned  with 
pleasure,  and  the  art  of  medicine  was  of  the  class  which  is  con- 
cerned with  the  good.  And  now,  by  the  god  of  friendship,  I 
must  beg  you,  Callicles,  not  to  jest,  or  to  imagine  that  I  am 
jesting  with  you  ;  do  not  answer  at  random  what  is  not  your 
real  opinion  ;  for  you  will  observe  that  we  are  arguing  about 
the  way  of  human  life ;  and  to  a  man  who  has  any  sense  at  all 
what  question  can  be  more  serious  than  this  ?  whether  he  should 
follow  after  that  way  of  life  to  which  you  exhort  me,  and  act 
what  you  call  the  manly  part  of  speaking  in  the  assembly,  and 
cultivating  rhetoric,  and  engaging  in  public  affairs,  after  your 
manner  ;  or  whether  he  should  pursue  the  life  of  philosophy ; 
and  in  what  the  latter  wa'y  of  life  differs  from  the  former. 
But  perhaps  we  had  better  distinguish  them  first,  as  I  attempted 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  87 

to  do  before,  and  when  we  come  to  an  agreement  that  they 
are  distinct,  we  may  proceed  to  consider  in  what  they  differ 
from  one  another,  and  which  of  them  we  should  choose.  Per- 
haps, however,  you  do  not  even  now  understand  what  I  mean  ? 

CaL  No,  I  do  not. 

Soc.  Then  I  will  explain  myself  more  clearly  :  seeing  that 
you  and  I  have  agreed  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  good,  and 
that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  pleasure,  and  that  pleasure  is  not 
the  same  as  good,  and  that  the  pursuit  and  process  of  acquisi- 
tion of  the  one,  that  is  pleasure,  is  different  from  the  pursuit 
and  process  of  acquisition  of  the  other,  which  is  good  —  I  wish 
that  you  would  tell  me  whether  you  agree  thus  far  or  not  ? 

Cal.  Yes,  I  agree. 

Soc.  Then  I  will  proceed,  and  ask  whether  you  also  agree 
with  me,  and  whether  you  think  that  I  spoke  the  truth  when 
I  further  said  to  Gorgias  and  Polus  —  that  cookery  in  my 
opinion  is  only  an  experience,  not  an  art  at  all ;  and  that 
whereas  medicine  is  an  art,  and  attends  to  the  nature  and  con- 
stitution of  the  patient,  and  has  principles  of  action  and  reason 
in  each  case,  cookery,  in  attending  upon  pleasure,  never  regards 
either  the  nature  or  the  reason  of  that  pleasure  to  which  she 
devotes  herself,  nor  ever  considers  or  calculates  anything,  but 
works  by  experience  and  routine,  and  just  preserves  the  recol- 
lection of  what  she  had  usually  done  when  producing  pleasure. 
And  first  I  would  have  you  consider  whether  I  have  proved 
what  I  was  saying,  and  then  whether  there  are  not  other  simi- 
lar processes  which  have  to  do  with  the  soul  —  some  of  them 
processes  of  art,  making  a  provision  for  the  soul's  highest  inter- 
est —  others  despising  the  interest,  and,  as  in  the  previous  case, 
considering  only  the  pleasure  of  the  soul,  and  how  this  may  be 
acquired,  but  not  considering  what  pleasures  are  good  or  bad, 
and  having  no  other  aim  but  to  afford  gratification,  whether 
good  or  bad.  In  my  opinion,  Callicles,  there  are  such  processes, 
and  this  is  the  sort  of  thing  which  I  term  flattery,  whether 
concerned  with  the  body  or  the  soul,  or  whenever  employed 
with  a  view  to  pleasure,  and  without  any  consideration  of  good 
and  evil.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  91. 
Cookery,  medicine,  etc. 

Now,  seeing   that   there  are  these  four  arts  which  are 

ever  ministering  to  the  body  and  the  soul  for  their  highest 
good ;  flattery  knowing  or  rather  guessing  their  natures,  has 
distributed  herself  into  four  shams  or  simulations  of  them  ; 


88  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

she  puts  on  the  likeness  of  one  or  other  of  them,  and  pretends 
to  be  that  which  she  simulates,  and  has  no  regard  for  men'c 
highest  interests,  but  is  ever  making  pleasure  the  bait  of  the 
unwary,  and  deceiving  them  into  the  belief  that  she  is  of  the 
highest  value  to  them.  Cookery  simulates  the  disguise  of 
medicine,  and  pretends  to  know  what  food  is  the  best  for  the 
body ;  and  if  the  physician  and  the  cook  had  to  enter  into  a 
competition  in  which  children  were  the  judges,  or  men  who 
had  no  more  sense  than  children,  as  to  which  of  them  best  un- 
derstands the  goodness  or  badness  of  food,  the  physician  would 
be  starved  to  death.  A  flattery  I  deem  this  and  an  ignoble 
sort  of  thing,  Polus,  for  to  you  I  am  now  addressing  myself, 
because  it  aims  at  pleasure  instead  of  good.  An  art  I  do  not 
call  it  but  only  an  experience  because  it  is  unable  to  explain 
or  to  give  a  reason  of  the  nature  of  its  own  applications.  And 
I  do  not  call  any  irrational  thing  an  art ;  if  you  dispute  my 
words,  I  am  prepared  to  argue  in  defense  of  them. 

Cookery,  then,  as  I  maintain,  is  a  flattery  which  takes  the 
form  of  medicine,  and  dressing  up,  in  like  manner,  is  a  flattery 
which  takes  the  form  of  gymnastic,  and  is  knavish,  false,  igno- 
ble, illiberal,  working  deceitfully  by  the  help  of  lines,  and 
colors,  and  enamels,  and  garments,  and  making  men  affect  a 
spurious  beauty  to  the  neglect  of  the  true  beauty  which  is 
given  by  gymnastic. 

I  would  rather  not  be  tedious,  and  therefore  I  will  only  say, 
after  the  manner  of  the  geometricians  (for  I  think  that  by  this 
time  you  will  be  able  to  follow), 

As  dressing  up  :  gymnastic  :  :  cookery  :  medicine ; 
or  rather  — 

As  dressing  up  :  gymnastic  :  :  sophistry  :  legislation  ; 
and  — 

As  cookery  :  medicine  :  :  rhetoric  :  justice. 
And  this,  I  say,  is  the  natural  difference  between  the  rhetori- 
cian and  the  sophist,  but  by  reason  of  their  near  connection, 
they  are  apt  to  be  jumbled  up  together  neither  do  they  know 
what  to  make  of  themselves,  nor  do  other  men  know  what  to 
make  of  them.  For  if  the  body  presided  over  itself,  and 
were  not  under  the  guidance  of  the  soul,  and  the  soul  did  not 
discern  and  discriminate  between  cookery  and  medicine,  but 
the  body  was  made  the  judge  of  them,  and  the  rule  of  judg- 
ment was  the  bodily  delight  which  was  given  by  them,  then 
the  word  of  Anaxagoras,  that  word  with  flrhich  you,  friend 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  89 

Polus,  are  so  well  acquainted,  would  come  true  ;  Chaos  would 
return,  and  cookery,  health,  and  medicine  would  mingle  in  an 
indiscriminate  mass.  And  now  I  have  told  you  my  notion  of 
rhetoric,  which  is  in  relation  to  the  soul  what  cookery  is  tc 
the  body.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  51. 
Corporeal,  and  spiritual  essence. 

Now  God  did  not  make  the  soul  after  the  body,  although 

we  have  spoken  of  them  in  this  order  ;  for  when  he  put  them 
together  he  would  never  have  allowed  that  the  elder  should 

O 

serve  the  vounger,  but  this  is  a  random  manner  of  speaking 
which  we  uave,  because  we  ourselves  too  are  very  largely  af- 
fected by  chance.  Whereas  he  made  the  soul  in  origin  and 
excellence  prior  to  and  older  than  the  body,  to  be  the  ruler 
and  mistress,  of  whom  the  body  was  to  be  the  subject.  And 
he  made  her  out  of  the  following  elements  and  on  this  man- 
ner :  of  the  unchangeable  and  indivisible,  and  also  of  the 
divisible  and  corporeal  he  made  a  third  sort  of  intermediate 
essence,  partaking  of  the  same  and  of  the  other  or  diverse, 
and  this  compound  in  like  manner  he  placed  in  a  mean  be- 
tween the  indivisible  and  the  divisible  or  corporeal.  He  took 
the  three  elements  of  the  same,  the  other,  and  the  essence,  and 
mingled  them  all  together,  compressing  the  reluctant  and  un- 
sociable nature  of  the  other  into  the  same.  And  when  he  had 
mixed  them  and  out  of  all  the  three  made  one,  he  again  di- 
vided this  whole  into  as  many  portions  as  was  fitting,  each  of 
them  containing  an  admixture  of  all  three. —  Timaeus,  iii.  528. 
Counterparts  and  antagonisms  in  nature  making  harmony.  See 

Ar>tayonisms. 

Country,  motherhood  of.     See  Motherhood. 
Courage,  a  man  of. 

Soc.  Laches,  suppose  that  we  first  set  about  deter- 
mining the  nature  of  courage,  and  in  the  second  place  pro- 
ceed to  inquire  how  the  young  men  may  attain  this  quality  by 
the  help  of  studies  and  pursuits.  Try,  and  see  whether  you 
can  tell  me  what  is  courage. 

La.  Indeed,  Socrates,  that  is  soon  answered :  he  is  a  man 
of  courage  who  remains  at  his  post,  and  does  not  run  away, 
but  fights  agamst  the  enemy  ;  of  that  you  may  be  very  cer- 
*.?.m. 

iSoc.  That  is  good,  Laches ;  and  yet  I  fear  that  I  did  not 
express  myself  clearly ;  and  therefore  you  have  answered  not 
the  question  which  I  intended  to  ask,  but  another. 


90  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

La.  Wh  at  do  you  mean,  Socrates  ? 

Soc.  I  will    endeavor  to  explain ;    you  would    call  a 
courageous,  who    remains    at   his    post,  and    fights    with    the 
enemy  ? 

La.  Certainly  I  should. 

Soc.  And  so  should  I ;  but  what  would  you  say  of  another 
man  who  fights  flying,  instead  of  remaining  ? 

La.  How  flying? 

Soc.  Why,  as  the  Scythians  are  said  to  fight,  flying  as  well 
as  pursuing  ;  and  as  Homer  says  in  praise  of  the  horses  of 
Aeneas,  that  they  knew  "  how  to  pursue,  and  fly  quickly  hither 
and  thither ; "  and  he  passes  an  encomium  on  Aeneas  himself, 
as  having  a  knowledge  of  fear  or  flight,  and  calls  him  "  an  au- 
thor of  fear  or  flight." 

La.  Yes,  Socrates,  and  there  Homer  is  right ;  for  he  was 
speaking  of  chariots,  as  you  were  speaking  of  the  Scythian 
cavalry,  who  have  that  way  of  fighting ;  but  the  heavy-armed 
Greek  fights,  as  I  say,  remaining  in  his  rank. 

Soc.  And  yet,  Laches,  you  must  except  the  Lacedaemonians 
at  Plataea,  who,  when  they  came  upon  the  light  shields  of  the 
Persians,  are  said  not  to  have  been  willing  to  stand  and  fight, 
and  to  have  fled  ;  but  when  the  ranks  of  the  Persians  were 
broken,  they  turned  upon  them  like  cavalry,  and  won  the  bat- 
tle. 

La.  That  is  true. 

Soc.  That  was  my  meaning  when  I  said  that  I  was  to 
blame  in  having  put  my  question  badly,  and  that  this  was  the 
reason  of  your  answering  badly.  For  I  meant  to  ask  you  not 
only  about  the  courage  of  heavy-armed  soldiers,  but  about  the 
courage  of  cavalry  and  every  other  style  of  soldier ;  and  not 
only  who  are  courageous  in  war,  but  who  are  courageous  in 
perils  by  sea,  and  who  in  disease,  or  in  poverty,  or  again  in  poli- 
tics, are  courageous ;  and  not  only  who  are  courageous  against 
Main  or  fear,  but  mighty  to  contend  against  desires  and  pleas- 
ures, either  fixed  in  their  rank  or  turning  upon  their  enemy. 
There  is  this  sort  of  courage,  is  there  not,  Laches  ? 

La.   Certainly,  Socrates. 

Soc.  And  all  these  are  courageous,  but  some  have  courage 
in  pleasures,  ?.nd  some  in  pains  ;  some  in  desires,  and  some  in 
fears ;  and  some  are  cowards  under  the  same  conditions,  as  I 
^hould  imagine. 

La.  Very  true.  —  Laches,  i.  83. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  91 

Courage,  generic. 

. Soc.  Now  I  was  asking  about  courage  and  cowardice  in 

general.  And  I  will  begin  with  courage,  and  once  more  ask, 
What  is  that  common  quality,  which  is  the  same  in  all  these 
cases,  and  which  is  called  courage  ?  Do  you  understand  now 
what  I  mean  ? 

La.  Not  over  well. 

Soc.  I  mean  this :  As  I  might  ask  what  is  that  quality 
which  is  called  quickness,  and  wbich  is  found  in  running,  play- 
ing the  lyre,  in  speaking,  in  learning,  and  in  many  other  similar 
actions,  or  rather  which  we  possess  in  nearly  every  action  that 
is  worth  mentioning  of  arms,  legs,  mouth,  voice,  mind ;  would 
you  not  apply  the  term  quickness  to  all  of  them  ? 

La.   Quite  true. 

Soc.  And  suppose  I  were  to  be  asked  by  some  one :  What 
is  that  common  quality,  Socrates,  which,  in  all  these  uses  of  the 
word,  you  call  quickness  ?  I  should  say  that  which  accom- 
plishes much  in  a  little  time  —  that  I  call  quickness  in  running, 
speaking,  and  every  other  sort  of  action. 

La.  You  would  be  quite  correct. 

Soc.  And  now,  Laches,  do  you  try  and  tell  me,  What  ie 
that  common  quality  which  is  called  courage,  and  which  includes 
all  the  various  uses  of  the  term  when  applied  both  to  pleasure 
and  pain,  and  in  all  the  cases  which  I  was  just  now  mention- 
ing ? 

La.  I  should  say  that  courage  is  a  sort  of  endurance  of  the 
soul,  if  I  am  to  speak  of  the  universal  nature  which  pervades 
them  all. 

Soc.  But  that  is  what  we  must  do  if  we  are  to  answer  the 
question.  And  yet  I  cannot  say  that  every  kind  of  endurance 
is,  in  my  opinion,  to  be  deemed  courage.  Hear  my  reason  :  I 
am  sure,  Laches,  that  you  would  consider  courage  to  be  a  very 
noble  quality. 

La.  Most  noble,  certainly. 

Soc.  And  you  would  say  that  a  wise  endurance  is  also  good 
and  noble? 

La.  Very  noble. 

Soc.  But  what  would  you  say  of  a  foolish  endurance  ? 
Is  not  that,  on  the  other  hand,  to  be  regarded  as  evil  and 
hurtful  ? 

La.  True. 

Soc.  And  is  anything  noble  which  is  evil  and  hurtful  ? 


92  PLATO'S  BEST  THuuGHTS. 

La.  I  ought  not  to  say  that,  Socrates. 

Soc.  Then  you  would  not  admit  that  sort  of  enduranc3  tj 
be  courage  —  for  that  is  not  noble,  but  courage  is  noble  ? 

La.  You  are  right. 

Soc.  Then,  according  to  you,  only  the  wise  endurance  is 
courage  ? 

La.  True. 

Soc.  But  as  to  the  epithet  "  wise,"  —  wise  in  what  ?  In 
all  things  small  as  well  as  great  ?  For  example,  if  a  man  en- 
dures in  spending  his  money  wisely,  knowing  that  by  spend- 
ing he  will  acquire  more  in  the  end,  do  you  call  him  coura- 
geous ? 

La.  Assuredly  not. 

Soc.  Or,  for  example,  if  a  man  is  a  physician,  and  his  son, 
or  some  patient  of  his,  has  inflammation  of  the  lungs,  and  begs 
that  he  may  be  allowed  to  eat  or  drink  something,  and  the 
other  refuses  ;  is  that  courage  ? 

La.  No;  that  is  not  courage  at  all,  any  more  than  the  last. 

Soc.  Again,  take  the  case  of  one  who  endures  in  war,  and 
is  willing  to  fight,  and  wisely  calculates  and  knows  that  others 
will  help  him,  and  that  there  will  be  fewer  and  inferior  men 
against  him  than  there  are  with  him  ;  and  suppose  that  he  hat 
also  advantages  of  position ;  would  you  say  of  such  an  one 
who  endures  with  all  this  wisdom  and  preparation,  that  he,  or 
some  man  in  the  opposing  army  who  is  in  the  opposite  circum- 
stances to  these  and  yet  endures  and  remains  at  his  post,  is  the 
braver  ? 

La.  I  should  say  that  the  latter,  Socrates,  was  the  braver. 

Soc.  But,  surely,  this  is  a  foolish  endurance  in  comparison 
with  the  other  ? 

La.  That  is  true. 

Soc.  And  you  would  say  that  he  who  in  an  engagement  of 
cavalry  endures,  having  the  knowledge  of  horsemanship,  is  not 
so  courageous  as  he  who  endures,  having  no  knowledge  of 
horsemanship  ? 

La.  That  is  my  view. 

Soc.  And  he  who  endures,  having  a  knowledge  of  the  use 
of  the  sling,  or  the  bow,  or  any  other  art,  is  not  so  courageous 
as  he  who  endures,  not  having  such  a  knowledge  ? 

La.  True. 

Soc.  And  he  who  descends  into  a  well,  and  dives,  and  holds 
out  in  this  or  any  similar  action,  having  no  knowledge  of  div- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  93 

ing,  or  the  like,  is,  as  you  would  say,  more  courageous  than 
those  who  have  this  knowledge? 

La.  Why,  Socrates,  what  else  can  a  man  say  ? 

Soc.  Nothing,  if  that  is  what  he  thinks. 

La.  But  that  is  what  I  do  think. 

Soc.  And  yet  men  who  thus  run  risks  and  endure  are  fool- 
ish, Laches,  in  comparison  of  those  who  do  the  same  things, 
'..Tviug  the  skill  to  do  them. 

La.  That  is  true. 

Soc.  But  foolish  boldness  and  endurance  appeared  before  to 
be  base  and  hurtful  to  us. 

La.   Quite  true. 

Soc.  Whereas  courage  was  acknowledged  to  be  a  noble 
quality. 

La.  True. 

Soc.  And  now  on  the  contrary  we  are  saying  that  the  fool- 
ish endurance,  which  was  before  held  in  dishonor,  is  cour- 
age. 

La.  Very  true. 

Soc.  And  are  we  right  in  saying  that  ? 

La.  Indeed,  Socrates,  I  am  sure  we  that  are  not  right. 

Soc.  Then  according  to  your  statement,  you  and  I,  Laches, 
are  not  attuned  to  the  Dorian  mode,  which  is  a  harmony  of 
words  and  deeds ;  for  our  deeds  are  not  in  accordance  with  our 
words.  Any  one  would  say  that  we  had  courage  who  saw  us 
in  action,  but  not,  I  imagine,  he  who  heard  us  talking  about 
courage  just  now. 

La.  That  is  most  true. 

Soc.  And  is  this  condition  of  ours  satisfactory  ? 

La.   Quite  the  reverse. 

Soc.  Suppose,  however,  that  we  admit  the  principle  to  a 
certain  extent 

La.  What  principle  ?     And  to  what  extent? 

Soc.  The  principle  of  endurance.  We  too  must  endure 
and  persevere  in  the  inquiry,  and  then  courage  will  not  laugh 
at  our  faint-heartedness  in  searching  for  courage ;  which  after 
all  may,  very  likely,  be  endurance. 

La.  I  am  ready  to  go  on,  Socrates ;  and  yet  I  am  unused  to 
investigations  of  this  sort.  But  the  spirit  of  controversy  has 
been  aroused  in  me  by  what  has  been  said ;  and  I  am  really 
grieved  at  being  thus  unable  to  express  my  meaning.  For  I 
fancy  that  I  do  know  the  nature  of  courage  ;  but,  somehow  or 


94  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

otheu  she  has  slipped  away  from  me,  and  I  cannot  get  hold  of 

her  and  tell  her  nature.  —  Laches,  i.  84. 

Courage,  a  special  trait  of  the  philosopher.     See  Calmness. 

The  true  philosophers,  and   they  only,  are  ever  seeking 

to  release  the  soul.     Is  not   the  separation  and  release  of  the 
soul  from  the  body  their  especial  study  ? 

That  is  true. 

And,  as  I  was  saying  at  first,  there  would  be  a  ridiculous 
contradiction  in  men  studying  to  live  as  nearly  as  they  can  in 
a  state  of  death,  and  yet  repining  when  death  comes. 

Certainly. 

Then,  Simmias,  as  the  true  philosophers  are  ever  studying 
death  ;  to  them,  of  all  men,  death  is  the  least  terrible.  Look  at 
the  matter  in  this  way  ;  if  they  have  always  been  enemies  of 
the  body,  and  wanting  to  have  the  soul  alone,  when  this  is 
granted  to  them,  how  inconsistent  would  they  be,  to  be  trem- 
bling and  repining ;  instead  of  rejoicing  at  their  departing  to 
that  place  where,  when  they  arrive,  they  hope  to  gain  that 
which  in  life  they  loved  (and  this  was  wisdom),  and  at  the 
same  time  to  be  rid  of  the  company  of  their  enemy.  Many  a 
man  has  been  willing  to  go  to  the  world  below  in  the  hope  oi 
seeing  there  an  earthly  love,  or  wife,  or  son,  and  conversing 
with  them.  And  will  he  who  is  a  true  lover  of  wisdom,  and 
is  strongly  persuaded  in  like  manner  that  only  in  the  world 
below  he  can  worthily  enjoy  her,  still  repine  at  death  ?  Will 
he  not  depart  with  joy  ?  Surely,  he  will,  my  friend,  if  he  be  a 
true  philosopher.  For  he  will  have  a  firm  conviction  that 
there  only,  and  nowhere  else,  he  can  find  wisdom  in  her  purity. 
And  if  this  be  true,  he  would  be  very  absurd,  as  I  was  saying, 
if  he  were  to  fear  death. 

He  would  indeed,  replied  Simmias. 

And  when  you  see  a  man  who  is  repining  at  the  approach 
of  death,  is  not  his  reluctance  a  sufficient  proof  that  he  is  not 
a  lover  of  wisdom,  but  a  lover  of  the  body,  and  probably  at 
the  same  time  a  lover  of  either  money  or  power,  or  both  ? 

That  is  very  true,  he  replied. 

There  is  a  virtue,  Simmias,  which  is  named  courage.  Is 
not  that  a  characteristic  of  the  philosopher  ? 

Certainly.  —  Phaedo,  i.  394. 
Courage  improved  by  love. 

I  say  that  a  lover  who  is  detected  in  doing  any  dishonor- 
able act,  or  submitting  through  cowardice  when   any  dishonor 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  95 

is  done  him  by  another,  will  be  more  pained  at  bein^r  detected 
by  his  beloved  than  at  being  seen  by  his  father,  or  by  his  com- 
panions, or  by  any  one  else.  The  beloved,  too,  when  he  is 
seen  in  any  disgraceful  situation,  has  the  same  feeling  about 
his  lover.  And  if  there  were  only  some  way  of  contriving 
that  a  state  or  an  army  should  be  made  up  of  lovers  and  their 
loves,  they  would  be  the  very  best  governors  of  their  own 
city,  abstaining  from  all  dishonor,  and  emulating  one  another  in 
honor  ;  and  when  fighting  at  one  another's  side,  although  a 
mere  handful,  they  would  overcome  the  world.  For  what 
lover  would  not  choose  rather  to  be  seen  by  all  mankind  than 
by  his  beloved,  either  when  abandoning  his  post  or  throwing 
away  his  arms  ?  He  would  be  ready  to  die  a  thousand  deaths 
rather  than  endure  this.  Or  who  would  desert  his  beloved  or 
fail  him  in  the  hour  of  danger  ?  The  veriest  coward  would 
become  an  inspired  hero,  equal  to  the  bravest,  at  such  a  time  ; 
Love  would  inspire  him.  That  courage  which,  as  Homer  says, 
the  God  breathes  into  the  soul  of  heroes,  Love  of  his  own  nat- 
ure infuses  into  the  lover. 

Love  will  make  men  dare  to  die  for  their  beloved  —  love 
alone ;  and  women  as  well  as  men.  Of  this  Alcestis  the 
daughter  of  Pelias  is  a  monument  to  all  Hellas  ;  for  she  was 
willing  to  lay  down  her  life  on  behalf  of  her  husband,  when 
no  one  else  would,  although  he  had  a  father  and  mother ;  but 
the  tenderness  of  her  love  so  far  exceeded  theirs,  that  she 
made  them  seem  to  be  as  strangers  in  blood  to  their  own  son, 
and  in  name  only  related  to  him ;  and  so  noble  did  this  action 
of  hers  appear  to  the  gods,  as  well  as  to  men,  that  among  the 
many  who  have  done  virtuously  she  was  one  of  the  very  few 
to  whom  the  gods  have  granted  the  privilege  of  returning  to 
earth,  in  admiration  of  her  virtue  ;  such  exceeding  honor  is 
paid  by  them  to  the  devotion  and  virtue  of  love.  But  Or- 
pheus, the  son  of  Oeagrus,  the  harper,  they  sent  empty  away, 
and  showed  him  an  apparition  only  of  her  whom  he  sought, 
but  herself  they  would  not  give  up  ;  because  he  appeared  to 
them  to  be  enervated  by  his  art  and  not  daring  like  Alcestis 
to  die  for  love,  to  have  been  contriving  how  he  might  enter 
Hades  alive  ;  moreover,  they  afterward  caused  him  to  suffer 
death  at  the  hands  of  women,  as  the  punishment  of  his  coward- 
liness. —  The  Symposium,  i.  473. 
Courage  in  the  State. 
Again,  I  said,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  seeing  the  nature 


96  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

of  courage,  and  in  what  part  that  quality  resides  which  gives 
the  name  of  courageous  to  the  State. 

How  do  you  mean  ? 

Why,  I  said,  every  one  who  calls  any  State  courageous  or 
cowardly,  will  be  thinking  of  the  part  which  fights  and  goes 
out  to  battle  on  the  State's  behalf. 

No  one,  he  replied,  would  ever  think  of  any  other. 

The  rest  of  the  citizens  may  be  courageous  or  may  be 
cowardly,  but  their  courage  or  cowardice  will  not,  as  I  con- 
ceive, have  the  effect  of  making  the  city  either  one  or  the 
other. 

Certainly  not. 

The  city  will  be  courageous  in  virtue  of  a  portion  of  the 
citizens  in  whom  resides  a  never-failing  quality  preservative  of 
that  opinion  about  things  to  be  feared  and  not  to  be  feared, 
in  which  the  legislator  educated  them ;  and  this  is  what  you 
term  courage. 

I  should  like  to  hear  what  you  are  saying  once  more,  for  I 
do  not  think  that  I  perfectly  understand  you. 

I  mean  that  courage  is  a  kind  of  salvation. 

Salvation  of  what  ? 

The  salvation,  I  said,  of  the  opinion  about  proper  objects  of 
fear  which  the  law  implants  through  education  ;  and  I  mean  by 
the  word   "  never-failing,"   to    intimate  that  in   pleasure  or  in 
pain,  or  under  the  influence  of  desire  or  fear,  a  man  preserves, 
and  does  not  lose  this  opinion.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  254. 
Courage  and  confidence.     See  Ability,  etc. 
Courage  and  cowardice. 

Al.  I  rather  think,  Socrates,  that  some  honorable  things  are 

evil, 

Soc.  And  are  some  dishonorable  things  good  ? 

Al  Yes. 

Soc.  You  mean  in  such  a  case  as  the  following :  In  time  of 
war,  men  have  been  wounded  or  have  died  in  rescuing  a  com- 
panion or  kinsman,  when  others  who  have  neglected  the  duty 
of  rescuing  them  have  escaped  in  safety  ? 

Al.  True. 

Soc.  And  to  rescue  another  under  such  circumstances  is  hon- 
orable, because  of  the  attempt  to  save  those  whom  we  ought  to 
save  ;  and  this  is  courage  ? 

AL  True. 

Soc.  But  evil  because  of  death  and  wounds  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  9T 

AL  Yes. 

Soc.  And  the  courage  which  is  shown  in  the  rescue  is  one 
thing,  and  the  death  another. 

AL   Certainly. 

Soc.  Then  the  rescue  of  one's  friends  is  honorable  in  one 
point  of  view,  but  evil  in  another  ? 

AL  True. 

Soc.  And  if  honorable,  then  also  good  :  Will  you  consider 
now  whether  I  may  not  be  right,  for  you  were  acknowledging 
that  the  courage  which  is  shown  in  the  rescue  is  honorable  ? 
Now  is  this  courage  good  or  evil  ?  Look  at  the  matter  thus  : 
which  would  you  rather  choose,  good  or  evil  ? 

AL  Good. 

Soc.  And  the  greatest  goods  you  would  be  most  ready  to 
choose,  and  would  least  like  to  be  deprived  of  them  ? 

AL  Certainly. 

Soc.  What  would  you  say  of  courage  ?  At  what  price  would 
you  be  willing  to  be  deprived  of  courage  ? 

AL  I  would  rather  die  than  be  a  coward. 

Soc.  Then  you  think  that  cowardice  is  the  worst  of  evils  ? 

AL  I  do. 

Soc.  As  bad  as  death,  I  suppose  ? 

AL  Yes. 

Soc.  And  life  and  courage  are  the  extreme  opposites  of 
death  and  cowardice  ? 

AL  Yes. 

Soc.  And  they  are  what  you  would  most  desire  to  have,  and 
the  opposites  you  would  least  desire  ? 

AL  Yes. 

Soc.  Is  this  because  you  think  life  and  courage  the  best,  and 
death  and  cowardice  the  worst? 

AL  Yes. 

/>oc.  And  you  would  regard  trie  rescue  of  a  friend  in  battle 
as  good,  because  of  the  courage  which  is  there  shown  ? 

AL  I  should. 

Soc.  But  evil  because  of  tne  death  which  ensues  ? 

AL  Yes. 

Soc.  Might  we  not  describe  their  different  effects  as  follows  : 
You  may  call  either  of  them  evil  in  respect  of  the  evil  which 
is  the  effect,  and  good  in  respect  of  the  good  which  is  the  effect 
of  either  of  them  ? 

AL  Yes. 


98  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Soc.  And  they  are  honorable  in  so  far  as  they  are  good,  and 
dishonorable  in  so  far  as  they  are  evil  ? 

Af.  True. 

Soc.  Then  when  you  say  that  the  rescue  o±  a  friend  in  battle 
is  honorable  and  yet  evil,  that  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  the 
rescue  is  good  and  yet  evil  ? 

Al.  I  believe  that  you  are  right,  Socrates. 

Soc.  Nothing  honorable,  regarded  as  honorable,  is  evil ;  nor 
anything  base,  regarded  as  base,  good. 

AL  Clearly  not.  —  Alcibiades  I.  iv.  530. 
Courage  untempered. 

Str.  Courage,  when  untempered  by  the  gentler  nature 

during  many  generations,  may  at  first  bloom  and  strengthen, 
but  at  last  bursts  forth  into  every  sort  of  madness. 

Y.  Soc.  Like  enough. 

Str.  And  then,  again,  the  soul  which  is  over-full  of  modesty 
and  has  no  element  of  courage  in  many  successive  generations, 
is  apt  to  grow  very  indolent,  and  at  last  to  become  utterly 
paralyzed  and  useless. 

Y.  Soc.  That,  again,  is  quite  likely. 

Str.  It  was  of  these  bonds  I  said  that  there  would  be  no 
difficulty  in  creating  them,  if  only  both  classes  originally  held 
the  same  opinion  about  the  honorable  and  good  ;  indeed,  in 
this  single  word,  the  whole  process  of  royal  weaving  is  com- 
prised —  never  to  allow  temperate  natures  to  be  separated  from 
the  brave,  but  to  weave  them  together,  like  the  warp  and  the 
woof,  by  common  sentiments  and  honors  and  opinions,  and  by 
the  giving  of  pledges  to  one  another  ;  and  out  of  them  form- 
ing one  smooth  and  even  web,  to  intrust  to  them  the  offices  of 
State. 

Y.  Soc.  How  do  you  mean  ? 

Str.  Where  one  officer  only  is  needed,  you  must  choose  a 
ruler  who  has  both  these  qualities ;  when  many,  you  must 
mingle  some  of  each,  for  the  temperate  ruler  is  very  careful 
and  just  and  safe,  but  is  wanting  in  thoroughness  and  go. 

Y.  Soc.  Certainly,  that  is  very  true. 

Str.  The  character  of  the  courageous,  on  the  other  hand, 
falls  short  of  the  former  in  justice  and  caution,  but  has  the 
power  of  action  in  a  remarkable  degree,  and  where  either  of 
these  two  qualities  is  wanting,  there  cities  camaot  altogether 
prosper  either  in  their  public  or  private  life.  —  Statesman,  iii. 
598. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  99 

Courts  of  Law  and  lawyers. 

In   courts  of  law  men  literally  care  nothing  about  truth, 

but  only  about  conviction  :  and  this  is  based  on  probability,  to 
which  he  who  would  be  a  skillful  orator  should  therefore  give 
his  whole  attention.  And  they  say  also  that  there  are  cases  in 
which  the  actual  facts  ought  to  be  withheld,  and  only  the  prob- 
abilities should  be  told  either  in  accusation  or  defense,  and  that 
always  in  speaking  the  orator  should  keep  probability  in  view, 
and  say  good-bye  to  the  truth.  And  the  observance  of  this 
principle  throughout  a  speech  furnishes  the  whole  art. 

Phaedr.  That  is  what  the  professors  of  rhetoric  do  actually 
say,  Socrates.  I  remember  that  we  have  touched  lightly  upon 
this  matter  already,  but  with  them  the  point  is  all-important. 

Soc.  I  dare  say  that  you  are  familiar  with  Tisias.  Does  he 
not  define  probability  to  be  that  which  the  many  think  ? 

Phaedr.   Certainly  he  does. 

Soc.  I  believe  that  he  has  a  clever  and  ingenious  case  of  this 
sort :  He  supposes  a  feeble  and  valiant  man  to  have  assaulted 
a  strong  and  cowardly  one,  and  to  have  robbed  him  of  his  coat 
or  of  something  or  other  ;  he  is  brought  into  court,  and  then 
Tisias  says  that  both  parties  should  tell  lies  :  the  coward  should 
say  that  he  was  assaulted  by  more  men  than  one ;  the  other 
should  prove  that  they  were  alone,  and  should  use  this  argu- 
ment :  "  How  could  a  man  like  me  have  assaulted  a  man  like 
him  ?  "  The  complainant  will  not  l:ke  to  confess  his  own  cow- 
ardice, and  will  therefore  invent  some  other  lie  which  his  adver- 
sary will  thus  gain  an  opportunity  of  refuting  And  there  are 
other  devices  of  the  same  kind  which  have  a  place  in  the  sys- 
tem. Am  I  not  right,  Phaedrus  ? 

Phaedr.   Certainly.  —  Phaedrus,  i.  578. 
Courts  of  justice,  establishment  of. 

A  city  which  has  no  regular  courts  of  law  ceases  to  be  a 

city  ;  and  again,  if  a  judge  is  silent  and  says  no  more  than  the 
litigants  in  preliminary  trials  and  in  private  arbitrations,  he  will 
never  be  able  to  decide  justly  ;  wherefore  a  multitude  of  judges 
will  not  easily  judge  well,  nor  a  few  if  they  are  not  good  judges. 
The  point  in  dispute  should  be  made  clear  by  both  parties,  and 
time,  and  deliberation,  and  repeated  examination,  greatly  teed 
to  clear  up  doubts.  For  this  reason,  he  who  goes  to  law  with 
another,  should  go  first  of  all  to  his  neighbors  and  friends  who 
know  best  the  questions  at  issue.  '  And  if  he  be  unable  to  ob- 
tain from  there  a  satisfactory  decision,  let  him  have  recourse 


100  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS 

to  another  court  ;  and  if  the  two  courts  cannot  settle  the  mat- 
ter, let  the  third  put  an  end  to  the  suit. 

Now  the  establishment  of  courts  of  justice  may  be  regarded 
as  a  choice  of  magistrates,  for  every  magistrate  must  also  be  a 
judge  of  some  things  ;  and  the  judge,  though  he  be  not  a  mag- 
istrate, yet  in  certain  respects  is  a  very  important  magistrate 
on  the  day  on  which  he  is  determining  a  suit.  Regarding  then 
the  judges  also  as  magistrates,  let  us  say  who  are  fit  to  be 
judges,  and  of  what  they  are  to  be  judges,  and  how  many  of 
them  are  to  judge  in  each  suit.  Let  that  be  the  supreme  tri- 
bunal which  the  ligitants  agree  to  appoint  in  common  for  them- 
selves. And  let  there  be  two  other  tribunals  :  one  for  private 
individuals,  who  desire  to  have  causes  of  action  decided  against 
one  another  ;  the  other  for  public  causes,  in  which  some  citizen 
is  of  opinion  that  the  public  has  been  wronged  by  an  individ- 
ual, and  is  willing  to  vindicate  the  common  interests.  —  Laws, 
iv.  288. 

Cowards,  children  made.     See  Courage. 
-  I  said,  my  dear  friend,  let  none  of  the  poets  tell  us  that 

"  The  gods,  taking  the  disguise  of  strangers,  haunt  cities  in  all  sorts  of  forms  ;  " 

and  let  no  one  slander  Proteus  and  Thetis,  neither  let  any  one, 
either  in  tragedy  or  any  other  kind  of  poetry,  introduce  Here 
disguised  in  the  likeness  of  a  priestess,  — 

"  Asking  an  alma  for  the  life-giving  daughters  of  the  river  Inachus  ;  " 

let  us  have  no  more  lies  of  that  sort.  Neither  must  we  have 
mothers  under  the  influence  of  the  poets  scaring  their  children 
with  abominable  tales  of  certain  gods  who,  as  they  say, 

"  Go  about  by  night  in  the  likeness  of  strangers  from  every  land;  " 

let  them  beware  lest  they  blaspheme  against  the  gods  and  at 
the  same  time  make  cowards  of  their  children.  —  The  Repub- 
lic, ii.  204. 
Creation,  beginning  and  reason  of  the. 

If  the  world  be  indeed  fair  and  the  artificer  good,  then, 


as  is  pikin,  he  must  have  looked  to  that  which  is  eternal.  But 
if  what  cannot  be  said  without  blasphemy  is  true,  then  he 
looked  to  the  created  pattern.  Every  one  will  see  that  he 
must  have  looked  to  the  eternal,  for  the  world  is  the  fairest  of 
creations  and  He  is  the  best  of  causes.  And  having  been  cre- 
ated in  this  way  the  world  has  been  framed  with  a  view  to 
that  which  is  apprehended  by  reason  and  mind  and  is  un- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  101 

changeable,  and  must,  if  this  be  admitted,  of  necessity  be  the 
copy  of  something.  Xow  that  the  beginning  of  everything 
should  be  according  to  nature  is  a  great  matter.  And  in 
speaking  of  the  copy  and  original  we  may  assume  that  words 
are  akin  to  the  matter  which  they  describe,  when  they  relate 
to  the  lasting  and  permanent  and  intelligible,  they  ought  to  be 
lasting  and  unfailing,  and  as  far  as  is  in  their  nature  irrefut- 
able and  immovable  —  nothing  less.  But  when  they  express 
only  the  copy  or  image  and  not  the  eternal  things  themselves, 
they  need  only  be  probable  and  analogous  to  the  real  words. 
As  being  is  to  becoming,  so  is  truth  to  belief.  If  then,  Soc- 
rates, amid  the  many  opinions  about  the  gods  and  the  genera- 
tion of  the  universe,  we  are  not  able  to  give  notions  which  are 
in  every  way  exact  and  consistent  with  one  another,  do  not  be 
surprised  Enough,  if  we  adduce  probabilities  as  likely  as  any 
others,  for  we  must  remember  that  I  who  am  the  speaker,  and 
you  who  are  the  judges,  are  only  mortal  men,  and  we  ought  to 
accept  the  tale  which  is  probable  and  not  inquire  further.  — 
Timaeus,  ii.  524. 
Creations  of  God  indissoluble. 

Oceanus  and    Tethys  were    the    children  of   Earth  and 

Heaven,  and  from  these  sprang  Phorcys  and  Cronos  and  Rhea, 
and  many  more  with  them ;  and  from  Cronos  and  Rhea  sprang 
Zeus  and  Here,  and  all  those  whom  we  know  as  their  brethren, 
and  others  who  were  their  children. 

Xow,  when  all  of  them,  both  those  who  visibly  appear  in 
their  revolutions  as  well  as  those  other  gods  who  are  of  a 
more  retiring  nature,  had  come  into  being,  the  Creator  of 
the  universe  spoke  to  them  as  follows  :  Gods  and  sons  of  gods 
who  are  my  works,  and  of  whom  I  am  the  artificer  and  father, 
my  creations  are  indissoluble,  if  so  I  will.  All  that  is  bound 
may  be  dissolved,  but  only  an  evil  being  would  wish  to  dis- 
solve that  which  is  harmonious  and  happy.  And  although 
being  created,  ye  are  not  altogether  immortal  and  indissoluble, 
ye  shall  certainly  not  be  dissolved,  nor  be  liable  to  the  fate  of 
death  ;  having  in  my  will  a  greater  and  mightier  bond  than 
those  which  bound  you  at  the  time  of  creation.  —  Timaeus,  ii. 
533. 
Creator,  artist. 

—  There  is  another  artist,  —  I  should    like  to  know  what 
you  would  say  of  him. 

Who  is  he  ? 


102  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Cne  who  is  the  maker  of  all  the  works  of  all  other  work- 
men. 

What  an  extraordinary  man  ! 

Wait  a  little,  and  there  will  be  more  reason  for  your  saying 
BO.  For  this  is  he  who  makes  not  only  vessels  of  every  kind, 
but  plants  and  animals,  himself  and  all  other  things  —  the 
earth  and  heaven,  and  the  things  which  are  in  heaven,  or  un- 
der the  earth ;  he  makes  the  gods  also. 

He  must  be  a  rare  master  of  his  art. 

Oh !  you  are  unbelieving,  are  you?  Do  you  mean  that  there 
is  no  such  maker  or  creator,  or  that  in  one  sense  there  might 
be  a  maker  of  all  these  things  but  not  in  another  ?  Do  you 
not  see  that  there  is  a  way  in  which  you  could  make  them 
yourself  ? 

What  way? 

An  easy  way  enough ;  or  rather,  there  are  many  ways  in 
which  the  feat  might  be  accomplished,  none  quicker  than  that 
of  turning  a  mirror  round  and  round,  you  would  soon  make 
the  sun  and  the  heavens,  and  the  earth  and  yourself,  and  other 
animals  and  plants,  and  all  the  other  creations  of  art  as  well 
as  nature,  in  the  mirror. 

Yes,  he  said,  but  that  is  an  appearance  only. 

Very  good,  I  said,  you  are  coming  to  the  point  now ;  and 
the  painter,  as  I  conceive,  is  just  a  creator  of  this  sort,  is  he 
not? 

Of  course. —  The  Republic,  ii.  426. 
Crimes  and  criminals  —  treatment  of. 

There  is   a  sense  of   disgrace  in  legislating,  as  we    are 

about  to  do,  for  all  the  details  of  crime  in  a  state  which,  as  we 
say,  is  to  be  well  regulated  and  will  be  perfectly  adapted  to 
the  practice  of  virtue.  To  assume  that  in  such  a  state  there 
will  arise  some  accomplice  in  crimes  as  great  as  any  which  are 
ever  perpetrated  in  other  states,  and  that  we  must  legislate  for 
him  by  anticipation,  and  threaten  and  make  laws  against  him 
if  he  should  arise ;  in  order  to  deter  him,  and  punish  his  acts, 
under  the  idea  that  he  will  arise  —  this,  as  I  was  saying,  is  in 
a  manner  disgraceful.  But  seeing  that  we  are  not  like  the  an- 
cient legislators,  who  gave  laws  to  demi-gods  and  sons  of  Gods, 
being  themselves,  according  to  the  popular  belief,  the  offspring 
of  the  gods,  and  legislating  for  others,  who  were  also  the  chil- 
dren of  divine  parents,  whereas  we  are  only  men  who  are  leg- 
islating for  the  sons  of  men,  there  is  no  uncharitableness  in  ap- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  103 

prehending  that  some  one  of  our  citizens  may  be  like  a  seed 
which  has  touched  the  ox's  horn,  and  have  a  heart  which  cannot 
be  softened  any  more  than  those  seeds  can  be  softened  by  fire. 

Among  our  citizens  there  may  be  those  who  cannot  be  sub- 
dued by  all  the  strength  of  the  laws  ;  and  for  their  sake, 
though  an  ungracious  task,  I  will  proclaim  my  first  law  about 
the  robbing  of  temples,  in  case  such  a  crime  should  ever  be 
committed.  I  do  not  expect  or  imagine  that  any  well-brought- 
up  citizen  will  ever  take  the  infection,  but  their  servants,  and 
strangers,  and  strangers'  servants,  may  be  guilty  of  many  im- 
pieties. And  with  a  view  to  them  especially,  and  yet  not  with- 
out a  provident  eye  to  the  weakness  of  human  nature  generally, 
I  will  proclaim  the  law  about  robbers  of  temples  and  similar 
incurable,  or  almost  incurable  criminals.  Having  already 
agreed  that  such  enactments  ought  always  to  have  a  short  pre- 
lude, we  may  speak  to  the  criminal  whom  some  tormenting  de- 
sire by  night  and  by  day  tempts  to  go  and  rob  a  temple,  in 
words  of  admonition  and  exhortation  :  O  sir,  we  will  say  to 
him,  the  impulse  which  moves  you  to  rob  temples  is  not  an  or- 
dinary human  malady,  nor  yet  a  visitation  of  Heaven,  but  a 
madness  which  is  begotten  in  men  from  ancient  and  unexpi- 
ated  crimes  of  his  race,  destroying  him  when  his  time  is  come ; 
against  this  you  must  guard  as  well  as  you  can.  and  how  you 
are  to  guard  I  will  explain  to  you.  When  any  such  thought 
comes  into  your  mind,  go  and  perform  expiations,  go  as  a  supli- 
ant  to  the  temples  of  the  Gods  who  avert  evils,  go  to  the  society 
of  those  who  are  called  good  men  among  you  ;  hear  them  tell 
and  yourself  try  to  repeat  after  them,  that  every  man  should 
honor  the  nobl  ~i  and  the  just.  Fly  from  the  company  of  the 
wicked  —  fly,  and  turn  not  back ;  and  if  thy  disorder  is  light- 
ened sensibly  by  these  remedies,  well  and  good,  but  if  not,  theo 
acknowledge  death  to  be  nobler  than  life,  and  depart  hence. 

Such  are  the  preludes  which  we  sing  to  all  who  have 
thoughts  of  unholy  and  treasonable  actions,  and  to  him  who 
he?.rkens  to  them  the  law  has  nothing  more  to  say.  But  to  him 
who  is  disobedient  when  the  prelude  is  over,  cry  with  a  loud 
voice,  —  He  who  is  taken  in  the  act  of  robbing  temples,  if  he 
be  a  slave  or  stranger,  shall  have  his  evil  deed  engraven  on  his 
face  and  hands,  and  shall  be  beaten  with  as  many  stripes  as 
may  seem  good  to  the  judges,  and  be  cast  naked  beyond  the 
borders  of  the  land.  And  if  he  suffers  this  punishment  he  will 
probably  be  corrected  and  improved  ;  for  no  penalty  which  the 


104  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

law  inflicts  is  designed  for  evil,  but  always  makes  him  who 
suffers  either  better  or  not  so  bad.  But  if  any  citizen  be 
found  guilty  of  any  great  or  unmentionable  wrong,  either  in 
relation  to  the  Gods  or  his  parents,  or  the  State,  let  the  judge 
deem  him  to  be  incurable,  remembering  what  an  education  and 
training  he  has  had  from  youth,  upward,  and  yet  has  not  ab- 
stained from  the  greatest  of  crimes.  The  penalty  of  death  is 
to  him  the  least  of  evils ;  and  others  will  be  benefited  by  his 
example,  if  he  be  put  away  out  of  the  land  with  infamy. — 
Laws,  iv.  366. 
Crimnality  and  punishment  of  bad  public  men. 

Of  these  fearful  examples,  most,  as  I  believe,  are  taken 

from  the  class  of  tyrants  and  kings  and  potentates  and  public 
men,  for  they  are  the  authors  of  the  greatest  and  most  impious 
crimes,  because  they  have  the  power.  And  Homer  witnesses 
to  the  truth  of  this  ;  for  they  are  always  kings  and  potentates 
whom  he  has  described  as  suffering  everlasting  punishment  in  the 
world  below  ;  —  such  were  Tantalus,  and  Sisyphus,  and  Tityus. 
But  no  one  ever  described  Thersites,  or  any  priv'«te  person  who 
was  a  villain,  as  suffering  everlasting  punishment  or  as  incura- 
ble. For  to  commit  the  worst  crimes,  as  I  am  inclined  to 
think,  was  not  in  lio  power,  and  he  was  happier  than  those 
who  had  the  power.  Yes,  Callicles,  the  very  bad  men  come 
from  the  class  of  those  who  have  power.  And  yet  in  that 
very  class  thera  may  arise  good  men,  and  worthy  of  all  ad- 
miration they  are,  for  whei-e  there  is  a  great  power  to  do 
wrong,  to  live  and  to  die  justly  is  a  hard  thing,  and  greatly  to 
be  praised,  and  few  there  are  who  attain  this.  Such  good  and 
true  men,  however,  there  have  been,  and  will  be  again,  in 
Athens  and  in  other  states,  who  have  fulfilled  their  trust  right- 
eously ;  and  there  is  one  who  is  quite  famous  all  over  Hellas, 
Aristides,  the  son  of  Lysimachus.  But,  in  general,  great  men 
are  also  bad,  my  friend. 

And,  as  I  was  saying,  Rhadamanthus,  when  he  gets  a  soul  of 
the  bad  kind,  knows  nothing  about  him,  neither  who  he  is,  ncr 
who  his  parents  are  ;  he  knows  only  that  he  has  got  hold  of  a 
villain  ;  and  seeing  this,  he  stamps  him  as  curable  or  incurable, 
and  sends  him  away  to  Tartarus,  whither  he  goes  and  receives 
his  recompense.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  117. 
Criminals  co-existing  with  paupers. 

God  has  made   the  flying  drones,  Adeimantus,  all   without 

stings,  whereas  of  the  walking  drones  he  has  made  some  with- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  105 

out  stings  and  others  with  dreadful  stings ;  of  the  stingless  class 
are  those  T^ho  in  their  old  age  end  as  paupers ;  of  the  stingers 
come  all  the  criminal  class,  as  they  are  termed. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

Clearly  then,  whenever  you  see  paupers  in  a  state,  some- 
where in  that  neighborhood  there  are  hidden  away  thieves  and 
cut-purses,  and  robbers  of  temples,  and  other  malefactors. 

Clearly. 

Well,  I  said,  and  in  oligarchical  states  do  you  not  find  pau- 
pers ? 

Yes,  he  said  ;  nearly  everybody  is  a  pauper  who  is  not  a 
ruler. 

And  may  we  be  so  bold  as  to  suppose  that  there  are  also 
many  criminals  to  be  found  in  them,  rogues  who  have  stings, 
and  whom  the  authorities  are  careful  to  restra:n  by  force  ? 

Certainly,  we  may  be  so  bold. 

The  existence  of  such  persons  is  to  be  attributed  to  wane  of 
education,  ill-training,  and  an  evil  constitution  of  the  State  ? 

True.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  380. 
Cures,  why  unknown  to  physicians. 

This  Thracian  told  me  that  in  these    notions  of    theirs, 

which  I  was  mentioning,  the  Greek  physicians  are  quite  right 
as  far  as  they  go ;  but  Zamolxis,  he  added,  our  king,  who  is 
also  a  god,  says  further,  "  that  as  you  ought  not  to  attempt  to 
cure  the  eyes  without  the  head,  or  the  head  without  the  eyes, 
so  neither  ought  you  to  attempt  to  cure  the  body  without  the 
soul ;  and  this,"  he  said,  "  is  the  reason  why  the  cure  of  many 
diseases  is  unknown  to  the  physicians  of  Hellas,  because  they 
are  ignorant  of  the  whole,  which  ought  to  be  studied  also ;  for 
the  part  can  never  be  well  unless  the  whole  is  well."  For  all 
good  and  evil,  whether  in  the  body  or  in  human  nature,  origi- 
nates, as  he  declared,  in  the  soul,  and  overflows  from  thence,  as 
from  the  head  into  the  eyes.  And  therefore  if  the  head  and 
the  body  are  to  be  well,  you  must  begin  by  curing  the  soul ; 
that  is  the  first  thing.  And  the  cure,  my  dear  youth,  has  to  be 
effected  by  the  MSB  of  certain  charms,  and  these  charms  are 
fair  words;  and  by  them  temperance  is  implanted  in  the  soul, 
and  where  temperance  is,  there  health  is  speedily  imparted,  not 
only  to  the  head,  but  to  the  whole  body.  And  he  who  taught 
r^e  the  cure  and  the  charm  at  the  same  time  added  a  special  di- 
rection :  •'  Let  no  one,"  he  said,  "  persuade  you  to  cure  the 
head,  until  he  has  first  given  you  his  soul  to  be  cured  by  the 


106  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

charm.     For  this,"  he  said,  "  is  the  great  error  of  our  day  in 
the  treatment  of  the  human  body,  that  physiciars  separate  the 
soul  from  the  body."  —  Charmides,  i.  10. 
Curiosity  does  not  make  a  philosopher. 

May  we  not  say  of  the  philosopher  that  he  is  a  lover,  not 

of  a  part  of  wisdom  only,  but  of  the  whole  ? 

True. 

Then  he  who  dislikes  knowledge,  especially  in  youth,  when 
he  has  no  power  of  judging  what  is  good  and  what  is  not, 
such  an  one  we  maintain  not  to  be  a  philosopher  or  a  lover  of 
knowledge,  just  as  he  who  refuses  his  food  is  not  hungry,  and 
may  be  said  to  have  a  bad  appetite,  and  not  a  good  one  ? 

There  we  are  right,  he  said. 

Whereas  he  who  has  a  taste  for  every  sort  of  knowledge  and 
who  is  curious  to  learn  and  is  never  satisfied,  may  be  justly 
termed  a  philosopher  ?  Am  I  not  right  ? 

Glaucon  said  :  If  curiosity  makes  a  philosopher,  you  will 
find  many  a  strange  being  claiming  the  name.  For  all  the 
lovers  of  sights  have  a  delight  in  learning,  and  will  therefore 
have  to  be  included.  Musical  amateurs,  too,  are  a  folk  won- 
derfully out  of  place  among  philosophers,  for  they  are  the  last 
persons  in  the  world  who  would  come  to  anything  like  a  philo- 
sophical discussion,  if  they  could  help,  while  they  run  about  at 
the  Dionysiac  festivals  as  if  they  had  let  out  their  ears  to  hear 
every  chorus ;  whether  the  performance  is  in  town  or  country 
—  that  makes  no  difference  —  they  are  there.  Now  are  we  to 
maintain  that  all  these  and  any  who  have  similar  tastes,  as  well 
as  the  professors  of  minor  arts,  are  philosophers  ? 

Certainly  not,  I  replied,  they  are  only  an  imitation.  —  The 
Republic,  ii.  303. 
Custom  and  Lav/.     See  Colonization,  etc. 

Dancing,  natural. 

—  The  Gods,  pitying  the  toils  which  our  race  is  born  to  un- 
dergo, have  appointed  holy  festivals,  in  which  men  alternate 
rest  with  labor  ;  and  have  given  them  the  Muses,  and  Apollo 
the  leader  of  the  Muses,  and  Dionysus,  to  be  partners  in  their 
revels,  that  they  may  improve  what  education  they  have,  at  the 
festivals  of  the  gods,  and  by  their  aid.  I  should  like  to  know 
whether  a  common  saying  is  true  to  nature  or  not.  For  what 
men  say  is  that  the  young  of  all  creatures  cannot  be  quiet  in 
their  bodies  or  in  their  voices  ;  they  are  always  wanting  to 


PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS.  107 

rr.ove,  and  cry  out ;  at  one  time  leaping  and  skipping,  and  over- 
flowing with  sportiveness  and  delight  at  something,  and  then 
again  uttering  all  sorts  of  cries.  But,  whereas  other  animals 
have  no  perception  of  order  or  disorder  in  their  movements, 
that  is,  of  rhythm  or  harmony,  as  they  are  called,  to  us  the 
Gods,  who,  as  we  say,  have  been  appointed  to  he  our  partners 
in  the  dance,  have  given  the  pleasurable  sense  of  harmony  and 
rhythm ;  and  so  they  stir  us  into  life,  and  we  follow  them  and 
join  hands  with  one  another  in  dances  and  songs ;  and  theso 
they  call  choruses,  which  is  a  term  naturally  expressive  of  cheer- 
fulness. Shall  we  begin,  then,  with  the  acknowledgment  that 
education  is  first  given  through  Apollo  and  the  Muses  ?  What 
do  you  say  ? 

Cle.  I  assent.  —  Laws,  iv.  183. 

Dead,  burial  and  remembrance  of  the.     See  Burial,  etc. 
Dead,  they  are  our  shades  and  images. 

Now  we  must  believe  the  legislator  when  he  tells  us  thae 

the  soul  is  in  all  respects  superior  to  the  body,  and  that  even 
in  life  what  makes  each  one  of  us  to  be  what  we  are  is  only 
the  soul ;  and  that  the  body  follows  us  about  in  the  likeness  of 
each  of  us,  and  therefore,  when  we  are  dead,  the  bodies  of  the 
dead  are  rightly  said  to  be  our  shades  or  images  ;  for  that  the 
true  and  immortal  being  of  each  one  cf  us  which  is  called  the 
soul  goes  on  her  way  to  other  gods  —  that  before  them  she  may 
give  an  account  —  an  inspiring  hope  to  the  good,  but  very  ter- 
rible to  the  bad,  as  the  laws  of  our  fathers  tell  us,  which  also 
say  that  not  much  can  be  done  in  the  way  of  helping  a  man 
after  he  is  dead.  But  the  living  —  he  chould  be  helped  by 
all  his  kindred,  that  while  in  life  he  may  be  the  holiest  and 
justest  of  men,  and  after  death  may  have  no  great  sins  to  be 
punished  in  the  world  below.  If  this  be  true,  a  man  ought  not 
to  waste  his  substance  under  the  idea  that  all  th*s  lifeless  mass 
of  llesh  which  is  in  process  of  burial  is  connected  with  him  ;  he 
should  consider  that  the  son,  or  brother,  or  the  beloved  one, 
~hoever  he  may  be,  whom  he  thinks  he  is  laying  in  the  earth, 
has  gone  away  to  complete  and  fulfill  his  own  destiny,  and  that 
his  duty  is  rightly  to  order  the  present,  and  to  spend  moder- 
ately on  the  lifeless  altar  of  the  Gods  below. —  Laws,  iv.  468. 
Dead ;  heroic.  See  Battle,  death  in. 
Death,  escape  from,  not  always  right. 

Not  much  time  will  be  gained,  O  Athenians,  in  return  for 

the  evil   rame  which   you  will  get  from  the  detractors  cf  the 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS 

city,  wh  3  will  say  that  you  killed  Socrates,  a  wise  man ;  fof 
they  will  call  me  wise  even  although  I  am  not  wise,  when  they 
want  to  reproach  you.  If  you  had  waited  a  little  while,  your 
desire  would  have  been  fulfilled  in  the  course  of  nature.  For 
I  am  far  advanced  in  years,  as  you  may  perceive,  and  not  far 
from  death.  I  am  speaking  now  only  to  those  of  you  who  have 
condemned  me  to  death.  And  I  have  another  thing  to  say  to 
them :  You  think  that  I  was  convicted  because  I  had  no  words 
of  the  sort  which  would  have  procured  my  acquittal  —  I  mean, 
if  I  had  thought  fit  to  leave  nothing  undone  or  unsaid.  Not 
so  ;  the  deficiency  which  led  to  my  conviction  was  not  of  words 
—  certainly  not.  But  I  had  not  the  boldness  or  impudence  or 
inclination  to  address  you  as  you  would  have  liked  me  to  ad- 
dress you,  weeping  and  wailing  and  lamenting,  and  saying  and 
doing  many  things  which  you  have  been  accustomed  to  hear 
from  others,  and  which,  as  I  maintain,  are  unworthy  of  me.  I 
thought  at  the  time  that  I  ought  not  to  do  anything  common 
or  mean  when  in  danger :  nor  do  I  now  repent  of  the  manner 
of  my  defense,  and  I  would  rather  die  having  spoken  after  my 
wanner,  than  speak  in  your  manner  and  live.  For  neither  in 
war  nor  yet  at  law  ought  any  man  to  use  every  way  of  escap- 
ing death.  Often  in  battle  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  if  a  man 
will  throw  away  his  arms,  and  fall  on  his  knees  before  his  pur- 
suers, he  may  escape  death  ;  and  in  other  dangers  there  are 
other  ways  of  escaping  death,  if  a  man  is  willing  to  say  and  do 
anything.  The  difficulty,  my  friends,  is  not  in  avoiding  death, 
but  in  avoiding  unrighteousness  ;  for  that  runs  faster  than  death. 
I  am  old  and  move  slowly,  and  the  slower  runner  has  overtaken 
me,  and  my  accusers  are  keen  and  quick,  and  the  faster  runner, 
who  is  unrighteousness,  has  overtaken  them.  And  now  I  de- 
part hence  condemned  by  you  to  suffer  the  penalty  of  death, 
and  they  too  go  their  ways  condemned  by  the  truth  to  suffer 
the  penalty  of  villainy  and  wrong;  and  I  must  abide  by  my 
award  —  let  them  abide  by  theirs.  I  suppose  that  these  things 
may  be  regarded  as  fated,  —  and  I  think  that  they  are  well.  — 
Apology,  i.  336. 
Death  and  life,  chances  of,  not  to  be  calculated. 

Some  one  will  say :  And  are  you  not  ashamed,  Socrates, 

of  a  course  of  life  which  is  likely  to  bring  you  to  an  untimely 
end  ?  To  him  I  may  fairly  answer:  There  you  are  mistaken: 
a  man  who  is  good  for  anything  ought  not  to  calculate  the 
chance  of  living  or  dying ;  he  ought  only  to  consider  whether 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  109 

in  doing  anything  he  is  doing  right  or  wrong  —  acting  the  part 
of  a  good  man  or  of  a  bad.  Whereas,  according  to  your  view, 
the  heroes  who  fell  at  Tro;  were  not  good  for  much,  aj? -"  fhe 
son  of  Thetis  «,bove  all,  who  altogether  despised  danger  in  com- 
parison with  disgrace  ;  and  when  his  goddess  mother  said  to  him, 
in  his  eagerness  to  slay  Hector,  that  if  he  avenged  his  com- 
panion Patroclus,  and  slew  Hector,  he  would  die  himself,  — 

*  Fate,"  as  she  said,  "  waits  upon  you  next  after  Hector ; "  he, 
hearing   this,  utterly  despised  danger  and  death,  and  instead  of 
fearing    them,  feared   rather   to   live    in   dishonor,  and  not  to 
avenge  his   friend.     "  Let  me  die  next,"  he  replies,  "  and  be 
avenged  of  my  enemy,  rather  than  abide  here  by  the  beaked 
ships,  a  scorn  and  a  burden  of  the  earth."      Had  Achilles  any 
any  thought  of  death  and   danger :      For    wherever  a  man's 
place  is,  whether  the  place  which  he  has  chosen  or  that  in  which 
he  has  been  placed  by  a  commander,  there  he  ought  to  remain 
in  the  hour  of  danger  :  he  should  not  think  of  death  or  of  any- 
thing, but  of  disgrace.     And  this,  O  men  of  Athens,  is  a  true 
saying.  —  Apology,  i.  326. 

Death,  fear  of,  no  wisdom. 

Strange,  indeed,  would  be  my  conduct,  0  men  of  Athens, 

if  I  who,  when  I  was  ordered  by  the  generals  whom  you  chose 
to  command  me  at  Fotidaea  and  Amphipolis  and  Delium,  re- 
mained  where   they  placed  me,  like    any  other    man,  facing 
death,  —  if,  I  say,  now,   when,  as  I  conceive  and  imagine,  God 
orders  me  to  fulfill  the  philosopher's  mission  of  searching  into 
myself  and  other  men,  I  were  to  desert  my  post  through  fear 
of  death,  or  any  other  fear ;  that  would  indeed  be  strange,  and 
I  might  justly  be  arraigned  in  court  for  denying  the  existence 
of  the  Gods,  if  I  disobeyed  the  oracle  because  I  was  afraid  of 
death  :  then  I  should  be  fancying  that  I  was  wise  when  I  was 
not  wise.      For  the  fear  of  death  is  indeed  the  pretense  of  wis- 
dom, and  not  real   wisdom,  being  a  pretended  knowledge  of 
the  unknown ;  and  no  one  knows  whether  death,  which  men  in 
their  fear  apprehend  to  be   the  greatest  evil,  may  not  be  the 
greatest  good.     Is  there  not  here  conceit  of  knowledge,  which 
is  a  disgraceful   sort  of  ignorance  ?     And  this  is  the  point  in 
which,  as  I  think,  I  differ  from  others  and  in  which  I  might  per- 
haps fancy  myself  wiser  than  men  in  general,  —  that  whereas 
I  know  but  little  of  the  world  below,  I  do  not  suppose  that  I 
know :  but  I  do  know  that  injustice  and  disobedience  to  a  bet- 
ter, whether  God  or  man,  is  evil  and  dishonorable,  and  I  will 


110  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

never  fear  or  avoid  a  possible  good  rather  than  a  certain  evil. 
And  therefore  if  you  let  me  go  now,  and  reject  the  counsels  of 
Anytus,  who  said  that  if  I  were  not  put  to  death  I  ought  not 
to  have  been  prosecuted,  and  that  if  I  escape  now,  your  sons 
will  all  be  utterly  ruined  by  listening  to  my  words,  —  if  you 
say  to  me,  Socrates,  this  time  we  will  not  mind  Anytus,  and 
will  let  you  off,  but  upon  one  condition,  that  you  are  not  to  in- 
quire and  speculate  in  this  way  any  more,  and  that  if  you  are 
caught  doing  this  again  you  shall  die  ;  —  if  this  was  the  condi- 
tion on  which  you  let  me  go,  I  should  reply  :  Men  of  Athens, 
I  honor  and  love  you ;  but  I  shall  obey  God  rather  than  you, 
and  while  I  have  life  and  strength  I  shall  never  cease  from 
the  practice  and  teaching  of  philosophy,  exhorting  any  one 
whom  I  meet  after  my  manner,  and  convincing  him.  -  Apol- 
ogy, i.  327. 

Death,  calmness  in  view  of.     See  Calmness,  etc. 
Death  and  life  not  to  be  considered  in  questions  of  duty. 

I  proceed  to  argue  the  question  whether  I  ought  or  ought 

not  to  try  and  escape  without  the  consent  of  the  Athenians  : 
and  if  I  am  clearly  right  in  escaping,  then  I  will  make  the  at- 
tempt ;  but  if  not,  I  will  abstain.  The  other  considerations 
which  you  mention,  of  money  and  loss  of  character  and  the 
dut}r  of  educating  one's  children,  are,  as  I  fear,  only  the  doc- 
trines of  the  multitude,  who  would  be  as  ready  to  call  people 
to  life,  if  they  were  able,  as  they  are  to  put  them  to  death  — 
and  with  as  little  reason.  But  nov/.,  since  the  argument  has 
thus  far  prevailed,  the  only  question  which  remains  to  be  con- 
sidered is,  whether  we  shall  do  rightly  either  in  escaping  or  in 
suffering  others  to  aid  in  our  escape  and  paying  them  in 
money  and  thanks,  or  whether  we  shall  not  do  rightly ;  and  if 
the  latter,  then  death  or  any  other  calamity  which  may  ensue 
on  my  remaining  here  must  not  be  allowed  to  enter  into  the 
calculation.  —  Grito,  i.  353. 

Death,  presentiment  of  in  Socrates.     See  Presentiment. 
Death,  life  from. 

Here  is  a  new  way  in  which  we   arrive  at  the  inference 

that  the  living  come  from  the  dead,  just  as  the  dead  come  from 
the  living ;  and  this,  if  true,  affords  the  satisfactory  proof  that 
the  souls  of  the  dead  must  exist  in  some  place  out  of  which 
they  come  again. 

Yes,  Socrates,  he  said ;  the  conclusion  seems  to  flow  nece;- 
eerily  out  of  our  previous  admissions. 


PLATO'S   BEST    rHOUGHTS.  Ill 

And  that  these  admissions  were  not  unfair,  Cebes,  he  said, 
may  be  shown,  I  think,  as  follows :  If  generation  were  in  a 
straight  line  only,  and  there  were  no  compensation  or  circle  in 
nature,  no  turn  or  return  of  elements  into  one  another,  then 
you  know  that  all  things  would  at  last  have  the  same  form  and 
pass  into  the  same  state,  and  there  would  be  no  more  genera- 
tion of  them. 

What  do  you  mean  ?  he  said. 

A  simple  thing  enough,  which  I  will  illustrate  by  the  case 
of  sleep,  he  replied.  You  know  that  if  there  were  no  alter- 
nation of  sleeping  and  waking,  the  story  of  the  sleeping  En- 
dymion  would  in  the  end  have  no  meaning,  because  all  other 
things  would  be  asleep  too,  and  he  would  not  be  distinguishable 
from  the  rest.  Or  if  there  were  composition  only,  and  no  di- 
vision of  substances,  then  the  chaos  of  Anaxagoras  would 
come  again.  And  in  like  manner,  my  dear  Cebes,  if  all  things 
which  partook  of  life  were  to  die,  and  after  they  were  dead 
remained  in  the  form  of  death,  and  did  not  come  to  life  again, 
all  would  at  last  die,  and  nothing  would  be  alive  — how  could 
this  be  otherwise  ?  For  if  the  living  spring  from  any  others 
who  are  not  the  dead,  and  they  die,  must  not  all  things  at  last 
be  swallowed  up  in  death  ? 

There  is  no  escape  from  that,  Socrates,  said  Cebes ;  and  I 
think  that  what  you  say  is  entirely  true. 

Yes,  he  said,  Cebes,  I  entirely  think  so  too ;  nor  is  this  a 
delusion  in  which  we  are  agreeing:  but  I  am  confident  in  the 
belief  that  there  truly  is  such  a  thing  as  living  again,  and  that 
the  living  spring  from  the  dead,  and  that  the  souls  of  the  dead 
are  in  existence,  and  that  the  good  souls  have  a  better  portion 
than  the  evil.  —  Phaedo,  i.  399. 

Death  in  age;  nearness  of.     See  Age,  as  viewing  eternity. 
Death,  willingness  for,  how  consistent. 

There  may  be  reason  in  saying  that  a  man  should  wait, 

and  not  take  his  own  life  until   God  summons  him,  as  he  is 
now  summoning  me.       • 

Yes,  Socrates,  said  Cebes,  there  is  surely  reason  in  that. 
And  yet  how  can  you  reconcile  the  seemingly  true  belief  that 
God  is  our  guardian  and  we  his  possessions,  with  this  willing- 
ness to  die  which  we  were  attributing  to  the  philosopher  ?  That 
*he  wisest  of  men  should  be  willing  to  leave  a  service  in  which 
they  are  ruled  by  the  Gods  who  are  the  best  of  rulers,  is  not 
reasonable,  for  surely  no  wise  man  thinks  that  when  set  at  lib- 


112  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

erty  he  /an  take  better  care  of  himself  than  the  Gods  take  of 
him.  A  fool  may  perhaps  think  so  —  he  may  argue  that  he  had 
better  run  away  from  his  master,  not  considering  that  his  duty 
is  to  remain  to  the  end,  and  not  to  run  away  from  the  good, 
and  that  there  would  be  no  sense  in  his  running  away.  But 
the  wise  man  will  want  to  be  ever  with  him  who  is  better  than 
himself.  Now  this,  Socrates,  is  the  reverse  of  what  was  just  now 
said ;  for  upon  this  view  the  wise  man  should  sorrow  and  the 
fool  rejoice  at  passing  out  of  life.  —  Phaedo,  i.  388. 
Death,  fear  of,  contrary  to  courage.  See  Courage. 
Herodicus,  being  a  trainer,  and  himself  of  a  sickly  con- 
stitution, by  a  happy  combination  of  training  and  doctoring, 
found  out  a  way  of  torturing  first  and  chiefly  himself,  and  sec- 
ondly the  rest  of  the  world. 

How  was  that  ?  he  said. 

By  the  invention  of  lingering  death ;  for  he  had  a  mortal 
disease  which  he  perpetually  tended,  and  as  recovery  was  out 
of  the  question,  he  passed  his  entire  life  as  a  valetudinarian  ; 
he  could  do  nothing  but  attend  upon  himself,  and  he  was  in 
constant  torment  whenever  he  departed  in  anything  from  his 
usual  regimen,  and  so  dying  hard,  by  ths  help  of  science  he 
struggled  on  to  old  age. 

A  rare  reward  of  his  skill ! 

Yes,  I  said ;  such  a  reward  as  a  man  might  fairly  expect 
who  could  not  be  made  to  see  that  if  Asclepius  did  not  instruct 
his  descendants  in  valetudinarian  arts,  the  omission  arose  not 
from  ignorance  or  inexperience  of  such  a  department  of  medi- 
cine, but  because  he  knew  that  in  all  well-ordered  states  every 
individual  had  an  occupation  to  which  he  must  attend,  and 
therefore  has  no  leisure  to  spend  in  continually  being  ill.  This 
we  remark  in  the  case  of  the  artisan,  but,  ludicrously  enough, 
do  not  apply  the  same  rule  to  people  of  the  richer  sort.  —  The 
Republic,  ii.  230. 

Death,  welcome  to  the   philosopher.      See  Philosopher,  and  Bold- 
ness. . 
Death  may  be  life.. 

Soc.  But  surely  according  to  you,  life  is  an  awful  thing ; 

and  indeed  I  think  that  Euripides  may  have  been  right  in  say- 
ing,— 

"  Who  knows  if  life  be  not  death  and  death  life;  " 

and  that  we  are  very  likely  dead  ;  I  have  heard  a  philosopher 
say  that  at  this  very  moment  we  are  dead,  and   that  the  body 


"LA'IO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS.  113 


(o-a>/ua)  is  t  £jmb  (o-T/jua),  and  that  the  part  of  the  soul  which 
is  the  seat  of  the  desires  is  liable  to  be  blown  and  tossed  about  ; 
and  some  ingenious  man,  probably  a  Sicilian  or  Italian,  playing 
with  the  word,  invented  a  tale  ;  in  which  he  called  the  soul  a 
vessel  (TTI'$OS),  meaning  a  believing  vessel  (TTKTTIKOS),  and  the 
ignorant  he  called*  the  uninitiated  or  leaky,  and  the  place  in  the 
souls  of  the  uninitiated  in  which  the  desires  are  seated,  being 
the  intemperate  and  incontinent  part,  he  compared  to  a  vessel 
full  of  holes,  because  they  can  never  be  satisfied.  He  is  not  of 
your  way  of  thinking,  Callicles,  for  he  declares,  that  of  all  the 
souls  in  Hades,  meaning  the  invisible  world  (deiSes),  these  un- 
initiated or  leaky  persons  are  the  most  miserable,  and  that  they 
carry  water  to  a  vessel  which  is  full  of  holes  in  a  similarly  holey 
colander.  The  colander,  as  he  declares,  is  the  soul,  and  the  soul 
which  he  compares  to  a  colander  is  the  soul  of  the  ignorant, 
which  is  full  of  holes,  and  therefore  incontinent,  owing  to  a 
bad  memory  and  want  of  faith.  These  are  strange  words,  but 
still  they  show  what,  if  I  can,  I  desire  to  prove  to  you  ;  that 
you  should  change  your  mind,  and,  instead,  of  the  intemperate 
and  insatiate  life,  you  should  choose  that  which  is  orderly  and 
sufficient,  and  has  a  due  provision  for  daily  needs.  —  Gorgias, 
iii.  81. 

Death  in  battle.     See  Battle. 
Deceit  and  falsehood. 

-  Str.  Not-being  has  been  acknowledged  by  us  to  be  one 
among  many  classes  of  being,  diffused  over  all  being. 

Theaet.  True. 

Str.  And  thence  arises  the  question,  whether  not-being  min- 
gles with  opinion  and  language. 

Theaet.  How  so  ? 

Str.  If  not-being  has  no  part  in  the  proposition,  then  all 
things  must  be  true  ;  but  if  not-being  has  a  part,  then  false 
opinion  and  false  speech  are  possible,  for  to  think  or  to  say 
what  is  not,  is  falsehood,  which  thus  arises  in  the  region  of 
thought  and  in  speech. 

Theaet.  That  is  quite  true. 

Str.  And  if  there  is  falsehood  there  is  deceit. 

Theaet.  Yes. 

Str.  And  if  there  is  deceit,  then  all  things  must  be  full  of 
idols  and  images  and  fancies. 

Theaet.  To  be  sure. 

Str.  Into  that  region  the  Sophist,  as  we  said,  made  his  e»- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS 

cape,  and  when  he  had  got  there,  denied  the  very  possibility  of 
falsehood ;  no    one,   he    argued,   either    conceived    or    uttered 
falsehood,  inasmuch  as  not-being  did  not  in  any  way  partake  of 
being.  — Sophist,  iii.  500. 
Deceiver  as  to  truth. 

To  know  and  to  declare  the  truth  in  matters  of  high  in- 
terest which  a  man  loves,  among  wise  men  who  love  him,  is  a 
safe  thing  and  gives  confidence ;  but  to  carry  on  an  argument 
when  you  are  yourself  only  a  doubting  inquirer,  which  is  my 
case,  is  a  dangerous  and  slippery  thing ;  and  the  danger  is  not 
that  I  shall  be  laughed  at  (of  which  the  fear  would  be  child- 
ish), but  that  I  shall  miss  the  truth  where  I  most  need  to  be 
sure  of  my  footing,  and  drag  my  friends  after  me  in  my  fall. 
And  I  pray  Nemesis  not  to  visit  upon  me  the  words  which  I 
am  going  to  utter.  For  I  do  indeed  believe  that  to  be  an  in- 
voluntary homicide  is  a  less  crime  than  to  be  a  deceiver  about 
the  beauty  or  goodness  or  justice  of  institutions.  And  that 
is  a  risk  which  I  would  rather  run  among  enemies  than  among 
friends,  and  therefore  you  do  well  to  console  me. 

Glaucon  laughed  and  said :  Well  then,  Socrates,  in  case  you 
and  your  argument  do  us  any  serious  injury  you  shall  be  ac- 
quitted beforehand  of  the  homicide,  and  shall  not  be  held  to 
be  a  deceiver ;  take  courage  then  and  s-peak. 

"Well,  I  said,  the  law  says  that  when  a  man  is  acquitted  he 
is  free  from  guilt,  and  what  holds  in  the  one  case  may  hold  in 
the  other.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  275. 
Deception.    See  Concealment  of  evil 
Deception,  how  practiced  and  avoided. 

Soc.  The  art  of  disputation,  then,  is  not  confined  to  the 

courts  and  the  assembly,  but  is  one  and  the  same  in  every  use 
of  language  ;  this  is  that  art,  if  such  an  art  there  be,  which 
finds  a  likeness  of  everything  to  which  a  likeness  can  be  found, 
and  draws  into  the  light  of  day  the  likenesses  and  disguises 
which  are  used  by  others  ? 

Phaedr.  How  do  you  mean  ? 

Soc.  Let  me  put  the  matter  thus  :  When  will  there  be 
more  chance  ol  deception  —  when  the  difference  is  large  or 
small  ? 

Phaedr.  When  the  difference  is  small. 

Soc.  And  you  will  be  less  likely  to  be  discovered  in  passing 
by  degrees  into  the  other  extreme  than  when  you  go  all  at 
once  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  115 

Phaedr.  Of  course. 

Soc.  He,  then,  who  would  deceive  others,  and  tot  be  de- 
ceived, must  exactly  know  the  real  likenesses  and  differences 
of  things  ? 

Phaedr.  Yes,  he  must. 

Soc.  And  if  he  is  ignorant  of  the  true  nature  of  anything, 
how  can  he  ever  distinguish  the  greater  or  less  degree  of  like- 
ness to  other  things  of  that  which  he  does  not  know  ? 

Phaedr.   He  cannot. 

Soc.  And  when  men  are  deceived,  and  their  notions  are  at 
variance  with  realities,  it  is  clear  that  the  error  slips  in  through 
some  resemblances  ? 

Phaedr.  Yes,  that  is  the  way. 

Soc.  Then  he  who  would  be  a  master  of  the  art  must  know 
the  real  nature  of  everything ;  or  he  will  never  know  either 
how  to  make  the  gradual  departure  from  truth  into  the  oppo- 
site of  truth  which  is  effected  by  the  help  of  resemblances,  or 
how  to  avoid  it  ? 

Phaedr.   He  will  not. 

Soc.  He  then,  who  being  ignorant  of  the  truth  aims  at  ap- 
pearances, will  only  attain  an  art  of  rhetoric  which  is  ridiculous 
and  is  not  an  art  at  all  ? 

Phaedr.  That  may  be  expected.  —  Phaedrus,  i.  566. 
Deception  in  the  soul,  detestable,  and  in  God  impossible. 

But  although  the  gods  are  themselves  unchangeable,  still 

by  witchcraft  and  deception  they  may  make  us  think  that  they 
appear  in  various  forms  ? 

Suppose  that,  he  replied. 

Well,  but  can  you  imagine  that  God  will  be  willing  to  lie,  or 
make  a  false  representation  of  himself  whether  in  word  or 
deed  ? 

I  cannot  say,  he  replied. 

Do  you  not  know,  I  said,  that  the  true  lie,  if  I  may  use  such 
an  expression,  is  hated  of  gods  and  men? 

What  do  you  mean  ?  he  said. 

I  mean  this,  I  said,  —  that  no  one  will  admit  falsehood  into 
that  which  is  the  truest  and  highest  part  of  himself,  01  About 
the  truest  and  highest  matters ;  there  he  is  most  afraid  of  a 
lie  having  possession  of  him. 

Still,  he  said,  I  do  not  comprehend  you. 

The  reason  is,  I  replied,  that  you  attribute  some  grand 
meaning  to  me  ;  I  am  but  saying  only  that  deception,  or  being 


116  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

deceived  01  uninformed  about  realities  in  the  highest  faculty, 
which  is  the  soul,  and  in  that  part  of  them  to  have  and  to  hold 
the  lie,  is  what  mankind  least  like,  —  that,  I  say,  is  what  they 
utterly  detest. 

There  is  nothing  more  hateful  to  them. 

And,  as  I  was  just  now  remarking,  this  ignorance  in  the 
soul  of  him  who  is  deceived  may  be  called  the  true  lie  ;  for  the 
lie  in  words  is  only  a  kind  of  imitation  and  shadowy  image  of 
.1  previous  affection  of  the  soul,  not  pure  unadulterated  false- 
hood. Am  I  not  right  ? 

Perfectly  right. 

The  true  lie  is  hated  not  only  by  the  gods,  but  also  by  men  ? 

Yes. 

"Whereas  the  lie  in  words  is  in  certain  cases  useful  and  not 
hateful ;  in  dealing  with  enemies  —  that  would  be  an  instance  ; 
or  again,  as  a  cure  or  preventive  of  the  madness  of  those  who 
are  called  your  friends  ;  also  in  the  tales  of  mythology,  of  which 
we  were  just  now  speaking  —  because  we  do  not  know  the 
truth  about  ancient  traditions,  we  make  falsehood  as  much  like 
truth  as  may  be,  and  so  of  use. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

But  can  any  of  these  reasons  apply  to  God?  Can  we  sup- 
pose that  he  is  ignorant  of  antiquity,  and  therefore  has  recourse 
to  invention  ? 

That  would  be  ridiculous,  he  said. 

The  lying  poet  then  has  no  place  in  our  idea  of  God  ? 

I  should  say  not. 

But  peradventure  again  he  may  tell  a  lie  because  he  it 
afraid  of  enemies  ? 

That  is  inconceivable. 

But  he  may  have  friends  who  are  senseless  or  mad  ? 

But  no  mad  or  senseless  person  can  be  a  friend  of  God. 

Then  no  motive  can  be  imagined  why  God  should  lie  ? 

None. 

Then  the  superhuman  and  divine  is  absolutely  incapable  oi 
falsehood  ? 

Yes. 

Then   is   God  perfectly  simple   and  true  both  in  deed  a&a 
wx>rd  ;  he   changes  not ;  he  deceives  not,  either  by  dream  or 
waking  vision,  by  sign  or  word. —  The  Republic,  ii.  205. 
Deeds  and  Words,  tribute  of. 
There  is  a  tribute  of  deeds  and  of  words.     The  departed 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  117 

have  al\eady  had  the  first,  when  going  forth  on  their  destined 
journey  they  were  attended  on  their  way  by  the  State  and  by 
their  friends  ;  the  tribute  of  words  remains  to  be  given  to  them, 
as  is  meet  and  by  law  ordained.  For  noble  words  are  a  me- 
morial and  a  crown  of  noble  actions,  which  are  given  to  the 
doers  of  them  by  the  hearers.  A  word  is  needed  which  will 
duly  praise  the  dead  and  gently  admonish  the  living,  exhorting 
the  brethren  and  descendants  of  the  departed  to  imitate  their 
virtue  and  consoling  their  fathers  and  mothers  and  the  surviv- 
ors, if  any,  who  may  chance  to  be  alive  of  the  previous  genera- 
tion. What  sort  of  a  word  will  this  be,  and  how  shall  we 
rightly  begin  the  praises  of  these  brave  men  ?  In  their  lifo 
they  rejoiced  their  own  friends  with  their  virtue,  and  their 
death  they  gave  in  exchange  for  the  salvation  of  the  living. 
And  I  think  that  we  should  praise  them  in  the  order  in  which 
nature  made  them  good,  for  they  were  good  because  they  were 
sprung  from  good  fathers.  Wherefore  let  us  first  of  all  praise 
the  goodness  of  their  birth ;  secondly,  their  nurture  and  educa- 
tion ;  and  then  let  us  set  forth  how  noble  their  actions  were, 
and  how  worthy  of  the  education  which  they  had  received.  — 
Menexenus,  iv.  567. 
Definition  needed  for  knowledge. 

Soc.  Methought  that  I  too  had  a  dream,  and  I  heard  in  my 

dream  that  the  primeval  letters  or  elements  out  of  which  you 
and  I  and  all  other  things  are  compounded,  have  no  reason  or 
explanation,  but  are  names  only,  of  which  not  even  existence 
or  non-existence  can  be  predicated  ;  you  cannot  say  of  them  that 
they  are  or  are  not,  for  either  of  the  two  implies  existence, 
which  must  not  be  added  on,  if  one  means  to  speak  of  this  or 
that  thing  taken  by  itself  alone.  You  may  not  say  itself,  or 
that,  or  each,  or  alone,  or  this,  or  the  like  ;  for  these  go  about 
everywhere  and  are  applied  to  all  things,  and  are  distinct  from 
them  ;  whereas,  if  the  first  elements  could  be  described,  and  had 
:i  definition  suitable  to  them,  they  would  be  spoken  of  apart 
from  all  else.  But  none  of  these  primeval  elements  can  be  de- 
fined ;  they  can  only  be  named,  for  they  have  nothing  but  a 
name,  and  the  things  which  are  compounded  of  them,  as  they 
are  complex,  are  expressed  by  a  combination  of  names,  for  the 
combination  of  names  is  the  essence  of  a  proposition.  Thus, 
then,  the  elements  or  letters  are  only  objects  of  perception,  and 
cannot  be  defined  or  known  ;  but  the  combinations  or  syllables 
of  them  are  known  and  expressed  and  apprehended  by  true 


118  PLATO'S   BEST  THOUGHTS. 

opinion.  When,  therefore,  any  one  forms  the  true  opinion  of 
anything  without  definition,  you  may  say  that  his  mind  is  truly 
exercised,  but  has  no  knowledge  ;  for  he  who  cannot  give  and 
receive  a  definition  of  a  thing,  has  no  knowledge  of  that  thing ; 
but  when  he  adds  the  definition,  then  he  is  perfected  in  knowl- 
edge, and  may  be  all  that  I  have  been  denying  of  him.  Was 
that  the  form  in  which  the  dream  appeared  to  you  ? 

Theaet.  Precisely. 

Soc.  And  you  allow  and  maintain  that  true  opinion,  com- 
bined with  definition,  is  knowledge  ? 

TJieaet.  Exactly. 

Soc.  Then  may  we  assume,  Theaetetus,  that  to-day,  and  in 
this  casual  manner,  we  have  found  a  truth  which  in  former 
times  many  wise  men  have  grown  old  and  have  not  found  ? 

Tlieaet.  At  any  rate,  Socrates,  I  am  satisfied  with  the  pres- 
ent statement. 

Soc.  Which  is  probably  correct,  —  for    how  can    there  be 
knowledge  apart  from  definition  and  true  opinion  ?  —  Theaet- 
etus, iii.  408. 
Definition,  how  attained 

Soc.  Understand  why;  — just  now  the  reason  is,  as  I  was 

saying,  that  if  you  get  at  the  difference  and  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  each  thing,  then,  as  many  persons  affirm,  you 
will  get  at  the  definition  or  explanation  of  it ;  but  while  you 
lay  hold  only  of  the  common  and  not  of  the  characteristic  no- 
tion, you  will  only  have  the  definition  of  those  things  to  which 
this  common  quality  belongs. 

Theaet.  I  understand  you,  and  your  account  of  definition  is, 
in  my  judgment,  correct. 

Soc.  But  he  who,  having  a  right  opinion  about  anything, 
ean  find  out  the  difference  which  distinguishes  it  from  other 
things,  will  know  that  of  which  before  he  had  only  an  opinion. 

Theaet.  Yes,  that  is  what  we  are  maintaining. 

Soc.  Nevertheless,  Theaetetus,  on  a  nearer  view,  I  find  my- 
self quite  disappointed  in  the  picture,  which  at  a  distance  was 
not  so  bad. 

Theaet.  What  do  you  mean  ? 

Soc.  I  will  endeavor  to  explain  :  I  will  suppose  myself  tc 
have  true  opinion  of  you,  and  if  to  this  I  add  your  definition, 
then  I  have  knowledge,  but  if  not,  opinion  only. 

Theaet.  Yes. 

Soc.  The  definition  was  assumed  to  be  the  interpretation  of 
your  difference. —  Theaetetus.  iii.  417. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  119 

Deluge,  tradition  and  effects  of  the. 

Aih.  Do  you  believe  that  there  is  any  truth  in  ancient 

traditions  ? 

die.  What  traditions  ? 

Ath.  The  traditions  about  the  many  destructions  of  mankind 
which  have  been  occasioned  by  deluges  and  diseases,  and  in 
many  other  ways,  and  of  the  preservation  of  a  remnant. 

Cle.  Every  one  is  disposed  to  believe  them. 

Ath.  Let  us  imagine  one  of  them :  I  will  take  the  famous 
one  which  was  caused  by  a  deluge. 

Cle.  What  is  to  be  remarked  in  them? 

Ath.  I  mean  to  say  that  those  who  then  escaped  would  only 
be  hill-shepherds,  —  small  sparks  of  the  human  race  preserved 
on  the  tops  of  mountains. 

Cle.  Clearly. 

Ath.  Such  survivors  would  necessarily  be  unacquainted  yjith 
the  arts  of  those  who  live  in  cities,  and  with  the  various  de- 
vices which  are  suggested  to  them  by  interest  or  ambition,  and 
all  the  wrongs  which  they  contrive  against  one  another  ? 

Cle.  Very  true. 

ith.  Let  us  suppose,  then,  that  the  cities  in  the  plain  and 
on  thb  sea-coast  were  utterly  destroyed  at  that  time. 

Cle.  Very  good. 

Ath.  Would  not  all  implements  perish  and  every  other  ex- 
cellent indention  of  political  or  any  other  sort  o*  wisdom  ut- 
terly fail  at.  that  time  ? 

Cle.  Why,  yes,  my  friend ;  and  if  things  had  always  con- 
tinued as  they  are  at  present  ordered,  how  could  any  discovery 
have  ever  been  nmde  even  in  the  least  particular  ?  For  it  is 
evident  that  the  arts  were  unknown  during  thousands  and 
thousands  of  years.  And  no  more  than  a  thousand  or  two 
thousand  years  have  elapsed  since  the  discoveries  of  Daedalus, 
Orpheus,  and  Palamades,  —  since  Marsyas  and  Olympus  in- 
vented music,  and  Amphion  the  lyre,  —  not  to  speak  of  num- 
berless other  inventions  which  are  but  of  yesterday.  —  Laws. 
\\.  205. 
Demons,  Hesiod's  use  of  the  term. 

Soc.  I  wish  that  you   would  consider  what  is  the   real 

meaning    of    this  word  "  demons."       I   wonder   whether  you 
would  think  my  view  right  ? 

Her.  Let  me  hear. 

Sor.  Y'.a  know  how  Hesiod  uses  the 'word? 


120  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Her.  Indeed  I  do  not. 

Soc.  Do  you  not  remember  that  he  speaks  of  a  golden  race 
of  men  who  came  first  ? 
Her.  Yes,  I  know  that. 
Soc.  He  says  of  them,  — 

•'  But  now  that  fate  has  closed  over  this  race, 
They  are  holy  demons  upon  the  earth, 
Beneficent,  averters  of  ills,  guardians  of  mortal  men." 

Hei.  What  of  that? 

Soc.  What  of  that !  Why,  I  suppose  that  he  means  by  the 
golden  men,  not  men  literally  made  of  gold,  but  good  and 
noble  ;  and  I  am  convinced  of  this,  because  he  further  says 
that  we  are  the  iron  race. 

Her.  That  is  true. 

Soc.  And  do  you  not  suppose  that  good  men  of  our  own  day 
would  by  him  be  said  to  be  of  that  golden  race  ? 

Her.  Very  likely. 

Soc.  And  are  not  the  good  wise  ? 

Her.  Yes,  they  are  wise. 

Soc.  And  therefore  I  have  the  most  entire  conviction  that 
he  called  them  demons,  because  they  were  8ar//xoves  (knowing 
or  wise),  and  in  the  ancient  Attic  dialect  this  is  the  very  form 
of  the  word.  Now  he  and  other  poets  say  truly,  that  when  a 
good  man  dies  he  has  honor  and  a  mighty  portion  among  the 
dead,  and  becomes  a  demon  ;  which  is  a  name  given  to  him 
signifying  wisdom.  And  I  say  too  that  every  wise  man  who 
happens  to  be  a  good  man  is  more  than  human  (ocu/xcwov) 
both  ?.n  life  and  death,  and  is  rightly  called  a  demon. —  Cra- 
tylus,  i.  636. 
Democracy. 

Next  comes  democracy  and   the   democratical   man  :  the 

origin  and  nature  of  them  we  have  still  to  learn,  that  we  may 
compare  the  individual  and  the  State,  and  so  pronounce  upon 
them. 

That,  he  said,  is  our  method. 

Well,  I  said,  and  how  does  i-he  change  from  oligarchy  into 
democracy  arise  ?  — Is  it  not  on  this  wise  ?  The  end  wiilok 
such  state  desires  is  to  become  as  rich  as  possible  ;  and  the 
rulers,  who  are  aware  that  their  own  power  rests  upon  prop- 
erty, refuse  to  curtail  by  law  the  extravagance  of  the  spend- 
thrift youth  becauce  they  will  gain  by  their  ruin  ;  they  Jsnd 
them  money,  and  buy  their  land,  and  grow  more  wealthy  and 
honorable  than  ever? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THObuHTS.  121 

Exactly. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  ye7.,  cannot  have  in  the  citizens 
of  the  same  state  the  love  of  wealth  and  the  spirit  of  moder- 
ation ;  one  or  the  other  will  have  to  be  disregarded. 

That  is  tolerably  clear 

Now  in  this  state  of  things  the  rulers  and  their  subjects 
come  in  one  another's  way,  whether  on  a  journey  or  sonre  other 
occasion  of  meeting,  or  on  a  pilgrimage  or  a  mai'ch  as  fellow- 
soldiers  or  fellow-sailors ;  they  observe  each  other  in  the  mo- 
ment of  danger  (and  where  danger  is  there  is  no  fear  that  the 
poor  will  be  despised  by  the  rich),  and  very  likely  the  wiry, 
sunburnt  poor  man,  may  be  placed  in  battJa  at  the  side  of  a 
wealthy  one  who  has  never  spoilt  his  complexion,  and  has 
plenty  of  superfluous  flesh  —  when  he  sees  such  an  one  puff- 
ing and  at  his  wits'-end,  can  he  avoid  drawing  the  conclusion  that 
men  like  him  are  only  rich  because  no  one  has  the  courage  to 
despoil  them  ?  And  when  they  meet  in  private  mil  not  people 
be  saying  to  one  another  that  our  "  warriors  are  noi  good  for 
much  ?  " 

Yes,  he  said,  I  am  quite  aware  that  this  is  their  way  of  talking. 

And,  as  where  a  body  is  weak  the  addition  of  a  touch  from 
without  may  bring  on  illness,  and  sometimes  even  when  there 
is  no  external  provocation  a  commotion  may  arise  within,  in 
the  same  way  where  there  is  weakness  in  the  Stato  there  is 
also  likely  to  be  illness,  of  which  the  occasion  m?j  be  very 
slight,  one  party  introducing  their  democratical,  the  other  their 
oligarchical  allies,  and  the  State  falls  sick,  and  is  at  war  with 
herself  ;  and  may  be  at  times  distracted,  even  when  there  is  no 
external  cause  ? 

Yes,  surely. 

And  then  democracy  comes  into  being  after  tho  poor  have 
conquered  their  opponents,  slaughtering  some  and  banishing 
some,  while  to  the  remainder  they  give  an  equal  share  of  free- 
dom and  power;  and  this  is  the  form  of  government  in  which 
the  magistrates  are  commonly  elected  by  lot. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  the  nature  of  democracy,  whether  the 
revolution  has  been  affected  by  arms  or  whether  fear  has 
caused  the  opposite  party  to  withdraw. 

And  now  what  is  their  manner  of  life,  and  what  sort  of  a 
government  have  they  ?  For  as  the  government  is,  such  will 
be  the  man. 

Clearly,  he  said. 


122  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

In  ths  first  place,  are  they  not  free  ?  and  the  city  is  full  of 
freedom  and  frankness  —  a  man  may  do  as  he  likes. 

They  say  so,  he  replied. 

And  where  freedom  is,  the  individual  is  clearly  able  to  o: 
der  his  own  life  as  he  pleases? 

Clearly. 

Then  in  this  kind  of  State  there  will  be  the  greatest  variety 
of  human  natures  ? 

There  will. 

This,  then,  is  likely  to  be  the  fairest  of  States  ;  and  will  appear 
the  fairest,  being  spangled  with  the  manners  and  characters  of 
mankind  like  an  embroidered  robe  which  is  spangled  with 
every  sort  of  flowers.  And  just  as  women  and  children  think 
variety  c'aarming,  so  there  are  many  men  who  will  deem  this 
to  be  the  fairest  of  States. 

Yes. 

Yes,  my  good  sir,  and  there  will  be  no  better  in  which  to 
look  for  a  government. 

Why? 

Because  of  the  liberty  which  reigns  there:  they  have  a 
complete  assortment  of  constitutions :  and  he  who  has  a  mind 
to  establish  a  State,  as  we  have  been  doing,  must  go  to  a  de- 
mocracy as  he  would  to  a  bazaar  at  which  they  sell  them,  and 
pick  out  one  that  suits  him ;  then  when  he  has  made  his  choice, 
he  may  found  his  State. 

He  will  be  sure  to  have  patterns  enough. 

And  there  being  no  necessity,  I  said,  for  you  to  govern  in 
this  State,  even  if  you  have  the  capacity,  or  to  be  governed 
unless  you  like,  or  to  go  to  war  when  the  others  go  to  war,  or 
to  be  at  peace  when  others  are  at  peace,  unless  you  are  dis- 
posed —  there  being  no  necessity  also  because  some  law  forbids 
you  *o  hold  office  or  be  a  dicast,  that  you  should  not  hold  office 
or  ba  a  dicast,  if  you  take  a  fancy  —  is  not  that  a  way  of  life 
which  for  the  moment  is  supremely  delightful  ? 

For  the  moment,  yes. 

And  is  not  their  humanity  to  the  condemned  often  charm- 
ing ?  Under  such  a  government  there  are  men  who,  when 
they  have  been  sentenced  to  death  or  exile,  stay  where  they 
are  and  walk  about  the  world  ;  the  gentleman  parades  like  a 
hero,  as  though  nobody  saw  or  cared. 

Yes,  he  replied,  many  and  many  a  one. 

See  too,  I  said,  the  forgiving  spirit  of  democracy,  and  the 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  123 

u  don't  care "  about  trifles,  and  the  disregard  which  she  shows 
of  all  the  fine  principles  which  we  were  solemnly  affirming  at  the 
foundation  of  the  city  —  as  when  we  said  that,  except  in  the 
case  of  some  rare  natures,  nezer  will  there  be  a  good  man  who 
in  his  early  youth  has  not  made  things  of  beauty  a  delight  and 
a  study  —  how  grandly  does  she  trample  our  words  under  her 
feet,  never  giving  a  thought  to  the  pursuits  which  make  a 
statesman,  and  promoting  to  honor  any  one  who  professes  to 
be  the  people's  friend. 

Yes,  she  is  of  a  noble  spirit. 

These  and  other  kindred  characteristics  are  proper  to  de- 
mocracy, which  is  a  charming  form    of    government,  full    of 
variety  and  disorder,  and  dispensing  equab'ty  to  equals  and  un- 
eqnals  alike.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  382. 
Despot.     See  King 
Dialectic,  what  is  it  ? 
Pro.  What  is  dialectic  ? 

Soc.  Clearly  the  science  which  knows  all  that  knowledge  of 
which  we  are  now  speaking ;  for  I  am  sure  that  all  men  who 
have  a  grain  of  intelligence  will  admit  that  the  knowledge 
which  has  to  do  with  being  and  reality,  and  sameness  and  un- 
changeableness,  is  by  far  the  truest  of  all.  And  would  you, 
Protarchus,  say  or  decide  otherwise? 

Pro.  I  have  often  heard  Gorgias  maintain,  Socrates,  that 
the  art  of  persuasion  far  surpassed  every  other  ;  this,  as  he 
says,  is  by  far  the  best  of  them  all,  for  to  it  all  things  submit, 
not  by  compulsion,  bi«t  of  their  own  free  will.  —  Philebus,  iii. 
198. 

Dialectic,  power  of.     See  Science,  etc. 
Dialectical  skill  of  Socrates. 

NIC.  You  do  not  seem  to  be  aware  that  any  one  who  has 

an  intellectual  affinity  to  Socrates,  and  enters  into  conversation 
with  him,  is  liable  to  be  drawn  into  an  argument ;  and  whatever 
subject  he  may  start  will  be  continually  carried  round  and 
round  by  him,  until  at  last  he  finds  that  he  has  to  give  an  ac- 
count both  of  his  present  and  past  life ;  and  when  he  is  once 
entangled,  Socrates  will  not  let  him  go  until  he  has  completely 
and  thoroughly  sifted  him.  Now  I  am  used  to  his  ways ;  and 
I  know  that  he  will  certainly  do  as  I  say  and  also  that  I  my- 
self will  be  the  sufferer ;  for  I  a"  fond  of  his  conversation, 
Lysimachus.  Neither  do  I  think  that  there  is  any  harm  in 
being  reminded  of  the  evil  which  we  are,  c"  have  been  doing 


124  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

he  who  does  not  fly  from  reproof  will  be  sure  to  take  more 
heed  of  his  after  life  ;  as  Solon  says,  he  will  wish  and  desire 
to  be  learning  so  long  as  he  lives,  and  will  not  think  that  old 
age  of  itself  brings  wisdom.  To  me,  to  be  cross-examined  by 
Socrates  is  neither  unusual  nor  unpleasant ;  indeed,  I  knew  all 
along  that  where  Socrates  was,  the  argument  would  soon  pass 
from  our  sons  to  ourselves ;  and  therefore,  as  I  say,  that  for 
my  part,  I  am  quite  willing  to  discourse  with  Socrates  in  his 
own  manner ;  but  you  had  better  ask  our  friend  Laches  what 
his  feeling  may  be. 

La.  I  have  but  one  feeling,  Nicias,  or  (shall  I  say  ?)  two 
feelings  about  discussions.  Some  would  think  that  I  am  a 
lover,  and  to  others  I  may  seem  to  be  a  hater  of  discourse ; 
for  when  I  hear  a  man  discoursing  of  virtue,  or  of  any  sort  of 
wisdom,  who  is  a  true  man  and  worthy  of  his  theme,  I  am 
delighted  beyond  measure :  and  I  compare  the  man  and  his 
words,  and  note  the  harmony  and  correspondence  of  them. — 
Laches,  i.  80. 

Dialecticians  and  Rhetoric.     See  Rhetoric. 
Dialectic  progress. 

But  do  you  imagine  that  men  who  are  unable  to  give  and 

take  a  reason  will  have  the  knowledge  which  we  require  of 
them  ? 

Neither  can  this  be  said  any  more  than  the  other. 

And  so,  Glaucon,  we  have  at  last  arrived  at  dialectic.  This 
is  that  strain  which  is  of  the  intellect  only,  but  which  the 
faculty  of  sight  will  nevertheless  be  found  to  imitate  ;  for 
sight,  as  you  may  remember,  was  finally  imagined  by  us  to 
behold  real  animals  and  the  stars,  and  last  of  all  the  sun  him- 
self;  and  so  with  dialectic;  when  a  person  starts  on  the  discov- 
ery of  the  absolute  by  the  light  of  reason  only,  and  without 
any  assistance  of  sense,  if  he  perseveres  by  pure  intelligence, 
he  attains  at  last  to  the  idea  of  good,  and  finds  himself  at  the 
end  of  the  intellectual  world,  as  in  the  other  case  at  the  end  of 
the  visible. 

Exactly,  he  said. 

Then  this  is  the  progress  which  you  call  dialectic  ? 

True.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  359. 
Differences  as  to  right  opinion. 

— —  Soc.  Then  right  opinion  implies  the  perception  of  differ 
ences  ? 

Theaet.   Clearly. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  125 

Soc.  What,  then,  shall  we  say  of  adding  reason  or  explana- 
tion to  right  opinion  ?  If  the  meaning  is  that  we  should  form 
an  opinion  of  the  way  in  which  something  differs  from  another 
thing,  the  proposal  is  ridiculous. 

Theaet.  How  so  ? 

Soc.  We  are  required  to  have  a  right  opinion  of  the  differ- 
ences which  distinguish  one  thing  from  another  when  we  have 
already  a  right  opinion  of  them,  and  so  we  go  round  and 
round ;  the  revolution  of  the  scytal,  or  pestle,  or  any  other 
rotatory  engine,  in  the  same  circles,  is  as  nothing  compared  to 
our  mode  of  proceeding ;  and  we  may  be  truly  described  as 
the  blind  directing  the  blind  ;  for  to  add  those  things  which  we 
already  have,  in  order  that  we  may  learn  what  we  already 
think,  implies  a  depth  of  darkness. 

Theaet.  Tell  me,  then ;  what  were  you  going  to  say  just 
now,  when  you  asked  the  question  ? 

Soc.  If,  my  boy,  the  argument,  when  speaVJng  of  adding 
the  definition,  had  used  the  word  to  "  know,"  and  not  merely 
"  have  an  opinion  "  of  the  difference,  this  which  is  the  most 
promising  of  all  the  definitions  of  knowledge  would  have  come 
to  a  pretty  end,  for  to  know  is  surely  to  get  knowledge.  — 
Theaetetus,  iii.  418. 
Discord  and  war. 

There  is  a  difference  in  the  names  "  discord  "  and  "  war," 

and  I  imagine  there  is  also  a  difference  in  their  natures ;  the 
one  is  expressive  of  what  is  internal  and  domestic,  the  other  of 
what  is  external  and  foreign ;  and  the  first  of  the  two  is  prop- 
erly termed  discord,  and  only  the  second,  war. 

That  is  a  very  just  distinction,  he  replied. 

Shall  I  further  add  that  the  Hellenic  race  is  all  united  to- 
gether by  ties  of  blood  and  friendship,  and  alien  and  strange 
to  the  barbarians  ? 

Very  good,  he  said. 

And  therefore  when  Hellenes  fight  with  barbarians  and  bar- 
barians with  Hellenes,  they  will  be  described  by  us  as  being  at 
war  when  they  fight,  and  by  nature  enemies,  and  this  kind  of 
antagonism  should  be  called  war  ;  but  when  Hellenes  fight  with 
one  another  we  shall  say  that  Hellas  is  then  in  a  state  of  dis- 
order and  discord,  and  such  enmity  is  to  bo  called  discord,  they 
being  by  nature  friends. 

I  agree. 

Consider  then,  I  said,  when  that  which  is  now  acknowledged 


126  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

by  us  to  be  discord  occurs,  and  a  city  is  divided,  if  both  partiea 
destroy  the  lands  and  burn  the  houses  of  one  another,  how 
wicked  does  the  strife  appear,  —  how  can  either  of  them  be  a 
lover  of  his  country  ?  for  no  true  lover  of  his  country  would 
tear  in  pieces  his  nurse  and  mother  ;  there  might  be  reason  in 
the  conqueror  depriving  the  conquered  of  their  harvest,  but  still 
they  would  have  the  idea  of  peace  in  their  hearts,  and  not  go 
on  fighting  forever. 

Yes,  he  said,  a  better  temper  than  the  other. 

And  when  you  found  a  State,  will  it  not  be  an  Hellenic 
State  ? 

It  ought  to  be,  he  replied. 

Then  will  not  the  citizens  be  good  and  civilized  ? 

To  be  sure. 

And  will  they  not  be  lovers  of  Hellas,  and  think  of  Hellas 
as  their  own  land,  and  share  in  the  common  temples  ? 

Most  certainly. 

And  any  difference  that  arises  among  Hellenes  will  be  re- 
garded by  them  as  discord  only,  —  a  quarrel  among  friends, 
which  is  not  to  be  Called  a  war  ? 

Certainly  not.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  297. 
Discord  and  disease. 
Sir.  In  the  soul  there  are  two  kinds  of  evil. 

Theaet.  What  are  they  ? 

Str.  The  one  may  be  compared  to  disease  in  the  body,  the 
other  to  deformity. 

Theaet.  I  do  not  understand. 

Str.  Perhaps  you  have  never  reflected  that  disease  and  dis- 
cord are  the  same. 

Theaet.  To  this,  again,  I  know  not  what  I  should  reply. 

Str.  Do  you  not  conceive  discord  to  be  a  dissolution  of 
kindred  elements  originating  in  some  disagreement  ? 

Theaet.  Just  that. 

Str.  And  is  deformity  anything  but  the  want  of  measure, 
which  is  always  unsightly  ? 

Theaet.  Exactly. 

Str.  And  do  we  not  see  that  opinion  is  opposed  to  desire, 
pleasure  to  anger,  reason  to  pain,  and  that  all  similar  elements 
are  opposed  to  one  another  in  the  souls  of  bad  men  ? 

Theaet.  Certainly. 

Str.  And  yet  they  must  all  be  akin  ? 

Theaet.  Of  course. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  127 

Str.  Then  we  shall  be  right  in  calling  vice  a  discord  and 
disease  of  the  soul  ?     Most  true.  —  Sophist,  iii.  462. 
Discourse,  Rhetoric  the  art  of.     See  Rhetoric. 
Discourses,  long  or  short. 

Str.  I  would  like  to  observe  that  you  and  I,  lemembering 

what  has  been  said,  would  praise  or  blame  the  shortness  of  dis- 
cussions, not  by  comparing  them  with  one  another,  but  accord- 
ing to  a  standard  of  measure,  having  in  view  what  is  fitting, 
which  as  we  were  saying,  must  be  borne  in  mind. 

Y.  Soc.  Very  true. 

Str.  And  yet,  not  everything  is  to  be  judged  even  with  a 
view  to  what  is  fitting  in  all  respects ;  for  we  do  not  want  such 
a  length  as  is  suited  to  give  pleasure  —  which  is  quite  a  sec- 
ondary matter  ;  and  reason  tells  us  that  we  should  be  contented 
to  make  the  ease  or  rapidity  with  which  an  inquiry  is  attained, 
not  the  first  but  the  second  object ;  the  first  and  highest  of  all 
being  to  assert  the  great  method  of  division  according  to  species, 
—  whether  the  discourse  be  shorter  or  longer  is  not  to  the  point. 
No  offense  should  be  taken  at  length,  but  the  longer  and  shorter 
are  to  be  employed  indifferently,  according  as  either  of  them  is 
better  calculated  to  sharpen  the  wits  of  the  auditors.  Reason 
would  also  say  to  him  who  censures  the  length  of  discourses 
and  cannot  away  with  their  circumlocution,  that  he  should  not 
at  once  lay  them  aside  or  censure  them  as  tedious,  but  he 
should  prove  that  if  they  had  been  shorter  they  would  have 
made  those  who  took  part  in  them  better  dialecticians,  and 
more  capable  of  expressing  the  truth  of  things,  —  about  any 
other  praise  and  blame,  he  need  not  trouble  himself ;  he  need 
not  be  supposed  to  hear  them.  —  Statesman,  iii.  571. 
Diseases,  cures  of,  why  unknown. 
Diseases.  See  Cures,  etc. 
Diseases,  how  originating. 

Now  every  one  can  see  whence  diseases  arise.     There  are 

four  natures  out  of  which  the  body  is  compacted  —  earth  and 
fire  and  water  and  air,  and  the  unnatural  excess  and  defect 
of  these,  or  the  change  of  any  one  of  them  from  their  own 
natural  place  into  another  (for  there  are  more  kinds  than  one), 
and  the  assumption  of  that  which  does  not  belong  to  them,  or 
any  similar  irregularity,  produces  diseases  and  disorders ;  for 
each  being  produced  or  changed  in  a  manner  contrary  to 
nature,  the  elements  which  were  previously  cool  grow  warm, 
and  those  which  were  dry  become  moist,  and  the  light  becomes 


128  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

heavy,  and  the  heavy  light ;  all  sorts  of  changes  occur.  For 
we  affirm  that  only  the  same,  in  the  same  and  like  manner  and 
proportion  added  or  subtracted  to  or  from  the  same,  will  allow 
the  body  to  remain  in  the  same  state,  whole  and  sound,  and 
that  whatever  comes  or  goes  away  m  violation  of  these  rules 
causes  all  manner  of  changes  and  infinite  diseases  and  disorders. 
—  Timaeus,  ii.  572. 
Disorders  and  excesses. 

— Cle.  The  probability  is  that  ignorance  will  be  a  more  preva- 
lent disorder  among  kings,  because  they  lead  a  proud  and  lux- 
urious life. 

Ath.  Is  it  not  palpable  that  the  kings  of  that  time  were  guilty 
of  trying  to  be  above  the  established  laws,  and  that  they  did  not 
consistently  observe  what  they  had  agreed  to  observe  by  word 
and  oath  ?  This  inconsistency  of  theirs  may  have  had  the  ap- 
pearance of  wisdom,  but  was  really,  as  we  assert,  the  greatest 
ignorance,  and  utterly  overthrew  the  whole  empire  through 
fatal  error  and  perversity. 

Cle.  Very  likely. 

Ath.  Good  ;  and  what  ought  the  then  legislator  to  have  done 
in  order  to  avert  this  calamity  ?  Truly  there  is  no  great  wis- 
dom in  knowing,  and  no  great  difficulty  in  telling,  after  the  evil 
has  happened  ;  but  to  have  foreseen  the  remedy  at  the  time 
would  have  taken  a  much  wiser  head  than  ours. 

Meg.  What  do  you  mean  ? 

Ath.  Any  one  who  looks  at  what  has  occurred  with  you,  Me- 
gillus,  may  easily  know  and  may  easily  say  what  ought  to  have 
been  done  at  that  time. 

Meg.  Speak  a  little  more  clearly. 

Ath.  Nothing  can  be  clearer  than  the  observation  which  I 
am  about  to  make. 

Meg.  What  is  it  ? 

Ath.  That  if  any  one  gives  too  great  a  power  to  anything, 
too  large  a  sail  to  a  vessel,  too  much  food  to  the  body,  too  much 
authority  to  the  mind,  and  is  regardless  of  the  mean,  everything 
is  overthrown,  and,  in  the  wantonness  of  excess,  runs  in  the 
one  case  to  disorder,  and  in  the  other  to  injustice,  which  is  the 
child  of  excess.  I  mean  to  say,  my  dear  friends,  that  there  is 
no  soul  of  man,  young  and  irresponsible,  who  will  be  able  to 
sustain  the  temptation  of  arbitrary  power — no  one  who  will 
not,  under  such  circumstances,  become  filled  with  folly,  that 
worst  o£  diseases,  and  be  hated  by  his  nearest  and  dearest 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  129 

friend.', :   when  this  happens  his  kingdom  is  undermined,  and  all 
his  power  vanishes  from  him.     And  great  legislators  who  know 
the  mean  should  take  heed  of  the  danger.  —  Laws,  iv.  220. 
Disorders  of  the  soul.     See  Mind. 
Disputers,  self-wise. 

1  was  led  on  by  you-  to  say  more   than  I  had  intended  ; 

but  the  point  of  comparison  was,  that  when  a  simple  man  who 
has  no  skill  in  dialectics  believes  an  argument  to  be  true  which 
he  afterward  imagines  to  be  false,  whether  really  false  or  not, 
and  then  another  and  another,  he  has  no  longer  any  faith  left, 
and  great  disputers,  as  you  know,  come  to  think  at  last  that 
they  have  grown  to  be  the  wisest  of  mankind ;  for  they  alone 
perceive  the  utter  unsoundness  and  instability  of  all  arguments, 
or  indeed,  of  all  things,  which,  like  the  currents  in  the  Euripus, 
are  going  up  and  down  in  never-ceasing  ebb  and  flow. 

That  is  quite  true,  I  said. 

Yes,  Phaedo,  he  replied,  and  very  melancholy  too,  if  there 
be  such  a  thing  as  truth  or  certainty  or  possibility  of  knowledge, 
that  a  man  should  have  lighted  upon  some  argument  or  other 
which  at  first  seemed  true  and  then  turned  out  to  be  false,  and 
instead  of  blaming  himself  and  his  own  want  of  wit,  because  he 
is  annoyed,  should  at  last  be  too  glad  to  transfer  the  blame 
from  himself  to  arguments  in  general ;  and  forever  afterwards 
should  hate  and  revile  them,  and  lose  truth  and  the  knowledge 
of  realities.  — Phaedo,  i.  419. 
Dissembler,  the. 

Str.  Let  us,  then,  examine  our  imitator  of   appearance, 

and  see  whether  he  is  all  of  a  piece,  or  whether  there  is  any 
cleft  in  him. 

Theaet.  Let  us  examine  him. 

Str.  Indeed,  there  is  a  very  considerable  cleft  in  him ;  for  if 
you  unfold  him  you  find  that  one  of  the  two  classes  of  imitators 
is  a  simple  being,  who  thinks  that  he  knows  that  which  he  only 
fancies ;  the  other  sort  has  knocked  about  among  arguments, 
until  he  suspects  and  fears  that  he  is  ignorant  of  that  which  to 
the  many  he  pretends  to  know. 

Theaet.  There  are  certainly  the  two  kinds  which  you  describe. 

Str.  Shall  we  regard  one  as  the  simple  imitator  —  the  other 
as  the  dissembling  or  ironical  imitator  ? 

Theaet.  That  is  good. 

Str.  And  shall  we  further  speak  of  this  latter  class  as  having 
one  or  two  members  ? 

9 


180  PLATO'S  BEST  1  NOUGHTS. 

Theaet.  Answer  yourself. 

Str.  Upon  consideration,  then,  there  appear  to  me  to  be  two  ; 
there  is  the  dissembler,  who  harangues  a  multitude  in  public  in 
a  long  speech,  and  the  dissembler,  who  in  private  and  in  short 
speeches  compels  the  person  who  is  conversing  with  him  to  con- 
tradict himself. 

Theaet.  What  you  say  is  most  true. 

Str.  And  who  is  the  maker  of  the  long  speeches  ?  Is  he  the 
statesman  or  the  public  orator? 

Theaet.  The  latter. 

Str.  And  what  shall  we  call  the  other  ?  Is  he  the  philoso 
pher  or  the  Sophist  ? 

TJieaet.  The  philosopher  he  cannot  be,  for  upon  our  view  he 
is  ignorant;  but  since  he  is  an  imitator  of  the  wise  he  will  have 
a  name  which  is  formed  by  an  adaptation  of  the  word  o-o^os. 
What  shall  we  name  him  ?  I  am  pretty  sure  that  I  cannot  be 
mistaken  in  terming  him  the  true  and  very  Sophist. 

Str.  Shall  we  bind  up  his  name  as  we  did  before,  making  a 
chain  from  one  end  to  the  other  ? 

Theaet.  By  all  means. 

Str.  He,  then,  who  traces  the  pedigree  of  his  art  as  follows  : 
He  who,  belonging  to  the  conscious  or  dissembling  section  of 
the  art  of  making  contradictions,  is  an  imitator  of  appearance 
and  has  divided  off  from  the  art  of  image-making  which  is  ?. 
branch  of  phantastic,  that  further  division  of  creative  art,  the 
juggling  of  words,  a  creation  human,  and  not  divine  —  any  one 
who  affirms  the  real  Sophist  to  be  of  this  blood  and  lineage 
will  say  the  very  truth. 

Theaet.  Undoubtedly.  —  Sophist,  iii.  509. 
Diversities  of  opinion. 

0  Euthydemus,  I  said,  I  have  but  a  dull  conception  of 

these  subtleties  and  excellent  devices  of  wisdom  ;  I  am  afraid 
that  I  hardly  understand  them,  and  you  must  forgive  me  there- 
fore if  I  ask  a  very  stupid  question  :  if  there  be  no  falsehood 
or  false  opinion  or  ignorance,  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as 
erroneous  action,  for  a  man  cannot  fail  of  acting  as  he  is  acting 
—  that  is  what  you  mean  ? 

Yes,  he  replied. 

And  now,  I  said,  I  will  ask  my  stupid  question  :  If  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  error  in  deed,  word,  or  thought,  then  what,  in 
the  name  of  goodness,  do  }7ou  come  hither  to  teach  ?  And  were 
you  not  just  now  saying  that  }7ou  could  teach  virtue,  n>est  of  all 
men,  to  any  one  who  could  learn  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOU  GUTS.  131 

And  are  you  such  an  old  fool,  Socrates,  rejoined  Dionyso- 
dorus,  that  you  bring  up  now  what  I  said  at  first  —  and  if  7 
had  said  anything  last  year,  I  suppose  that  you  would  bring 
that  up  —  but  are  nonplussed  at  the  words  I  have  just  ut- 
tered ? 

Why,  I  said,  they  are  not  easy  to  answer  ;  for  they  are  the 
words  of  wise  men :  and  indeed  I  know  not  what  to  make  of 
this  word  "  nonplussed  "  which  you  used  last.  What  do  you 
mean  by  that,  Dionysodorus  ?  You  must  mean  that  I  cannot 
^refute  your  argument.  Tell  me  if  thS  words  have  any  other 
sense. 

Certainly,  he  said ;  that  is  my  meaning ;  and  I  wish  that  you 
would  answer. 

What,  bofore  you,  Dionysodorus  ?  I  said. 

Answer,  said  he. 

And  is  that  fair? 

Yes,  quite  fair,  he  said. 

Upon  what  principle  ?  I  said.  I  can  only  suppose  that  you 
are  a  very  wise  man,  who  comes  to  us  in  the  character  of  a 
great  logician,  and  who  knows  when  to  answer  and  when  not 
to  answer  —  and  now  you  will  not  open  your  mouth  at  all,  be- 
cause you  know  that  you  ought  not. 

You  prate,  he  said,  instead  of  answering.  But  if,  my  good 
sir,  you  admit  that  I  am  wise,  answer  as  I  tell  you. 

I  suppose  that  I  must  obey,  for  you  are  master.  Put  the 
question. 

Are  the  things  which  have  sense  alive  or  lifeless  ? 

They  are  alive. 

And  do  you  know  of  any  word  which  is  alive? 

I  cannot  say  that  I  do. 

They  why  did  you  ask  me  what  sense  my  words  had  ? 

Why,  because  I  was  stupid  and  made  a  mistake.  And  yet, 
perhaps,  I  was  right  after  all  in  saying  that  words  have  a 
sense  ;  what  do  you  say,  wise  man  ?  If  I  was  not  in  error, 
you  will  not  refute  me,  and  all  your  wisdom  will  be  non- 
plussed ;  but  if  I  did  fall  into  error,  then  again  you  are  wrong 
in  saying  that  there  is  no  error,  —  and  this  remark  was  made 
by  you  not  quite  a  year  ago.  I  am  inclined  to  think,  however, 
Dionysodorus  and  Euthydemus,  that  this  argument  is  not  very 
likely  to  advance  ;  even  your  skill  in  the  subtleties  of  logic, 
which  is  really  amazing,  has  not  found  out  the  way  of  throw- 
ing another  and  not  falling  yourself. —  Euthydemus,  i.  1^0- 


132  PLATO'S  BE  SI    THOUGHTS. 

Diversities  of  pleasure. 

Soc.  The  awe  which  I  feel,  Protarchus,  about  the  names 

of  the  Gods  is  more  than  human,  and  now  I  would  not  sin 
against  Aphrodite  by  naming  her  amiss ;  of  her,  then,  I  say 
nothing.  But  I  will  begin  with  Pleasure  which  I  know  to  be 
diverse,  and  will  consider  and  ask  what  her  nature  is.  She 
has  one  name  and  therefore  you  will  imagine  that  she  is  one, 
and  yet  surely  she  takes  the  most  various  and  even  unlike 
forms.  For  do  we  not  say  that  the  intemperate  has  pleasure, 
and  that  the  temperate  has  pleasure  in  his  very  temperance,, 
and  that  the  fool  is  pleased  when  he  is  full  of  foolish  fancies 
and  hopes,  and  that  the  wise  man  has  pleasure  in  his  wisdom  ; 
and  how  foolish  would  any  one  be  who  affirmed  that  all  these 
opposite  pleasures  are  severally  alike. 

Pro.  Why,  Socrates,  they  are  opposed  in  so  far  as  they 
spring  from  opposite  causes,  but  they  are  not  in  themselves  op- 
posite, for  must  not  pleasure  be  of  all  things  most  absolutely 
like  pleasure,  —  that  is,  like  itself  ? 

Soc.  Yes,  my  good  friend,  just  as  color  is  like  color  ;  in  so 
far  as  they  are  colors,  there  is  no  difference  between  them  ; 
and  yet  we  all  know  that  black  is  not  only  unlike,  but  even 
absolutely  opposed  to  white ;  or  again,  as  figure  is  like  figure, 
for  they  are  all  comprehended  under  one  class  ;  and  yet  some 
figures  are  absolutely  opposed  to  one  another,  and  there  is  an 
infinite  diversity  of  them.  And  we  might  find  similar  examples 
in  many  other  things  ;  therefore  do  not  rely  upon  this  argu- 
ment, which  would  go  to  prove  the  unity  of  the  most  extreme 
opposites.  And  I  suspect  that  we  shall  find  a  similar  opposi- 
tion among  pleasures. 

Pro.  Very  likely;  but  how  will  this  invalidate  the  argu- 
ment? 

Soc.  Why,  I  shall  reply,  that  dissimilar  as  they  are,  you  ap- 
ply to  them  a  new  predicate,  for  you  say  that  all  pleasant 
things  are  good ;  now  although  no  one  can  argue  that  pleasure 
is  not  pleasure,  he  may  argue,  as  we  are  doing,  that  pleas- 
ures are  oftener  bad  than  good ;  but  you  call  them  all  good  (ho 
would  say),  and  at  the  same  time  are  compelled,  if  you  are 
pressed,  to  acknowledge  that  they  are  unlike.  And  he  will 
want  to  know  what  is  that  identical  quality  existing  alike  in 
good  and  bad  pleasures,  which  makes  you  designate  all  of  them 
as  good. 

Pro.    What  do  you  mean,  Socrates  ?     Do  you  think  that  any 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  133 

one  who  asserts  pleasure  to  be  the  good,  will  even  tolerate  the 
notion  that  some  pleasures  are  good  and  some  bad  ? 

Soc.  And  yet  you  will  acknowledge  that  they  are  different 
from  one  another,  and  even  opposite  to  one  another  ? 

Pro.  Not  in  so  far  as  they  are  pleasures. 

Soc.  That  is  a  return  to  the  old  position,  Protarchus,  and  so 
we  are  to  say  (are  we)  that  there  is  no  difference  in  pleasure;* 
but  that  they  are  all  alike  ;  and  the  examples  which  have  just 
been  cited  do  not  pierce  our  dull  minds,  but  we  go  on  argu- 
ing all  the  same,  like  the  weakest  and  most  inexperienced  ;<ea- 
souers  ? 

Pro.  What  do  you  mean  ? 

Soc.  Why,  I  mean  to  say,  that  in  self-defense  I  may,  if  I  like, 
follow  your  example,  and  assert  boldly  that  the  two  things 
most  unlike  are  most  absolutely  alike,  and  the  result  will  be 
that  you  and  I  will  prove  ourselves  to  be  very  tyros  in  the  art 
of  disputing ;  and  the  argument  will  be  blown  away  and  lost. 
—  Philebus,  iii.  146. 
Divination,  the  work  of.  . 

Furthermore    all    sacrifices    and   the  whole   province  of 

divination,  which  is  the  art  of  communion  between  Gods  and 
men,  —  these,  I  say,  are  concerned  only  with  the  preservation 
of  the  good  and  the  cure  of  the  evil  love.  For  all  impiety  is 
likely  to  ensue  if,  instead  of  accepting  and  honoring  and  rever- 
encing the  harmonious  love  in  all  his  actions,  a  man  honors  the 
other  love,  whether  in  his  feelings  towards  Gods  or  parents, 
towards  the  living  or  the  dead.  Wherefore  the  business  of  di- 
vination is  to  see  to  these  loves  and  to  heal  them,  and  divination 
is  the  peacemaker  of  Gods  and  men  working  by  a  knowledge 
of  the  religious  or  irreligious  tendencies  which  exist  in  human 
loves.  —  The  Symposium,  i.  482, 
Divine  power  of  the  poet. 

I  am  conscious  in  my  own  self  and  the  general  opinion  is 

that  I  do  not  speak  better  and  have  more  to  say  about  Homer 
than  any  other  man.  But  I  do  not  speak  equally  well  about 
others  —  tell  me  the  reason  of  this  ? 

Soc.  I  perceive,  Ion  ;  and  I  will  proceed  to  explain  to  you 
what  I  imagine  to  be  the  reason  of  this.  The  gift  which  you 
possess  of  speaking  excellently  about  Homer  is  not  an  art, 
but,  as  I  was  just  saying,  an  inspiration ;  there  is  a  divinity 
moving  you.  like  that  in  the  stone  which  Euripides  calls  a  mag- 
net, but  which  is  commonly  known  as  the  stone  of  Heraclea, 


134  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

For  that  stone  not  only  attracts  iron  rings,  but  also  imparts  to 
them  a  similar  power  of  attracting  other  rings ;  and  sometimes 
you  may  see  a  number  of  pieces  of  iron  and  rings  suspended 
from  one  another  so  as  to  form  quite  a  long  chain  ;  and  all  of 
them  derive  their  power  of  suspension  from  the  original  stone. 
Now  this  is  like  the  Muse,  who  first  of  all  inspires  men  her- 
self ;  and  from  these  inspired  persons  a  chain  of  other  persons 
is  suspended,  who  take  the  inspiration  from  them.  For  all 
good  poets,  epic  as  well  as  lyric,  compose  their  beautiful  poems 
not  as  works  of  art,  but  because  they  are  inspired  and  pos- 
sessed. And  as  the  Corybantian  revelers  when  they  dance  are 
not  in  their  right  mind,  so  the  lyric  poets  are  not  in  their  right 
mind  when  they  are  composing  their  beautiful  strains ;  but 
when  falling  under  the  power  of  music  and  metre  they  are  in- 
spired and  possessed ;  like  Bacchic  maidens  who  draw  milk 
and  honey  from  the  rivers,  when  they  are  under  the  influence 
of  Dionysus,  but  not  when  they  are  in  their  right  mind.  And 
the  soul  of  the  lyric  poet  does  the  same,  as  they  themselves 
tell  us  ;  for  they  tell  us  that  they  bring  songs  from  honeyed 
fountains,  culling  them  out  of  the  gardens  and  dells  of  the 
Muses ;  whither,  like  the  bees,  they  wing  their  way.  And 
this  is  true.  For  the  poet  is  a  light  and  winged  and  holy  thing, 
and  there  is  no  invention  in  him  until  he  has  been  inspired  and 
is  out  of  his  senses,  and  the  mind  is  no  longer  in  him  ;  when  he 
has  not  attained  to  this  state,  he  is  powerless  and  is  unable  to 
utter  his  oracles.  Many  are  the  noble  words  in  which  poets 
speak  of  the  actions  which  they  record,  like  your  own  words 
about  Homer  ;  but  they  do  not  speak  of  them  by  any  rules  of 
art ;  they  are  inspired  to  utter  that  to  which  the  Muse  impels 
them,  and  that  only ;  and  when  inspired,  one  of  them  will  make 
dithyrambs,  another  hymns  of  praise,  another  choral  strains, 
another  epic  or  iambic  verses  — and  he  who  is  good  at  one  is 
not  good  at  any  other  kind  of  verse  ;  for  not  by  art  does  the  poet 
sing,  but  by  power  divine.  Had  he  learned  by  rules  of  art,  he 
would  have  known  how  to  speak,  not  of  one  theme  only,  but  of 
all ;  and  therefore  God  takes  away  the  minds  of  poets,  and  uses 
them  as  his  ministers,  as  he  also  uses  diviners  and  holy  prophets, 
in  order  that  we  who  hear  them  may  know  that  they  speak  not 
of  themselves  who  utter  these  priceless  words  in  a  state  of  un- 
consciousness, but  that  God  is  the  speaker,  and  that  through 
them  he  is  conversing  with  us.  And  Tynnichus  the  Chalcidian 
affords  a  striking  instance  of  what  I  am  saying;  be  wrote 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  135 

nothing  that  any  one  would  care  to  remember  but  the  famous 
paean  which  is  in  every  one's  mouth,  and  is  one  of  the  finest 
poems  ever  written,  and  truly  an  invention  of  the  Muses,  as  he 
himself  says.  For  in  this  way  the  God  would  seem  to  indi- 
cate to  us  and  not  allow  us  to  doubt  that  these  beautiful  poems 
are  not  human  or  the  work  of  man,  but  divine  and  the  work  of 
God  ;  and  that  the  poets  are  only  the  interpreters  of  the  Gods 
by  whom  they  are  severally  possessed.  Was  not  this  the  les- 
son which  the  God  intended  to  teach  when  by  the  mouth  of 
the  worst  of  poets  he  sang  the  best  of  songs?  Am  I  not 
right,  Ion  ? 

Ion.  Yes,  indeed,  Socrates,  I  feel  that  you  are  ;  for  your 
words  touch  my  soul,  and  I  am  persuaded  somehow  that  good 
poets  are  the  inspired  interpreters  of  the  Gods.  —  Ion,  i.  223. 
Divine  mind,  good  in  the.     See  Mind. 
Divine,  the  soul  resembling  the. 

When  the  soul  and  the  body  are  united,  then  nature  or- 
ders the  soul  to  rule  and  govern,  and  the  body  to  obey  and 
serve.  Now  which  of  these  two  functions  is  akin  to  the  di- 
vine ?  and  which  to  the  mortal  ?  Does  not  the  divine  appear 
to  you  to  be  that  which  naturally  orders  and  rules,  and  the 
mortal  to  be  that  which  is  subject  and  servant  ? 

True. 

And  which  does  the  soul  resemble  ? 

The  soul  resembles  the  divine,  and  the  body  the  mortal,  — 
there  can  be  no  doubt  of  that,  Socrates. 

Then  reflect,   Cebes :  of  all  that  has  been  said  is  not  this 
the  conclusion,  —  that  the  soul  is  in   the  very  likeness  of  the 
divine  and  immortal,  and  intellectual,  and  uniform,  and  indis- 
soluble, and  unchangeable  ;   and  that  the  body  is  in  the  very 
likeness  of  the  human,  and  mortal,  and  unintellectual  and  mul- 
tiform, and  dissoluble,  and  changeable.  —  Phaedo,  i.  408. 
Divine  nature  of  generation  and  conception.     See  Conception. 
Divine  madness.     See  Madness,  etc. 
Divine,  Statesman  called.     See  Statesman. 
Divine  things  onlv  unchangeable. 

* 

Only  the  most  divine  things  of  all  are  unchangeable,  and 

body  is  not  included  in  this  class.  Heaven  and  the  universe, 
as  we  have  termed  them,  although  they  have  been  endowed  by 
the  Creator  with  many  glories,  partake  of  a  bodily  nature,  and 
therefore  cannot  be  entirely  free  from  perturbations.  But  the 
heavenly  motion  is,  as  far  as  possible,  single  and  in  the  same 


136  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

place,  and  in  relation  to  the  same ;  and  is  therefore  only  sub- 
ject to  a  reversal,  which  is  the  least  alteration  possible.  For 
the  lord  of  all  moving  things  is  alone  able  to  move  of  himself; 
and  to  think  that  he  can  go  at  one  time  in  one  direction  and  at 
another  time  in  another,  is  unlawful.  Hence  we  must  not  say 
that  the  world  is  either  self-moved  always,  or  all  made  to  go 
round  by  God  in  two  opposite  courses  ;  or  that  two  Gods,  hav- 
ing opposite  purposes,  make  it  move  round.  But  as  I  have  al- 
ready said  (and  this  is  the  only  remaining  alternative)  the 
world  is  governed  by  an  accompanying  divine  power,  and  re- 
ceives life  and  immortality  by  the  appointment  of  the  Creator, 
and  then,  when  let  go  again,  moves  spontaneously,  being  let  go 
at  such  a  time  as  to  have,  during  infinite  cycles  of  years,  a  re- 
verse movement :  this  is  due  to  exquisite  perfection  of  balance, 
and  the  size  of  the  universe,  which  is  the  greatest  of  bodies, 
and  turns  on  the  smallest  pivot.  —  Statesman,  iii.  554. 
Divine  bonds  in  the  State. 

Sir.  Can  we  say  that  such  a  connection  as  this  will  last- 
ingly unite  the  evil  with  one  another  or  with  the  good,  or 
that  there  is  any  science  which  would  seriously  think  of  using 
a  bond  of  this  kind  to  join  such  materials  ? 

Y.   Soc.  Impossible. 

Str.  But  in  those  which  were  originally  noble  natures,  and 
have  been  trained  accordingly,  in  those  only  may  we  not  say 
that  the  bond  of  union  is  implanted  by  law,  and  that  this  is 
the  medicine  which  art  prescribes  for  them,  and  the  divine 
bond,  which,  as  I  was  saying,  heals  and  unites  dissimilar  and 
contrary  parts  of  virtue  ? 

Y.  Soc.  Very  true. 

Str.  Where  this  divine  bond  exists  there  is  no  difficulty  in 
imagining,  or  when  you  have  imagined,  in  creating  the  other 
human  bonds. 

Y.  Soc.  How  is  that,  and  of  what  bonds  do  you  speak  ? 

Str.  Those  of  intermarriage,  and  those  which  are  formed 
between  States  by  giving  and  taking  children  in  marriage,  as 
well  as  by  private  betrothals  and  espousals.  For  many  per- 
sons form  unions  of  an  improper  kind,  with  a  view  to  the  pro- 
creation of  children. 

Y.  Soc.  In  what  way  ? 

Str.  They  seek  after  wealth  and  powei,  which  in  matrimony 
are  objects  not  worthy  even  of  a  serious  censure. 

Y.  Soc.  There  is  no  need  to  consider  them  at  all       ... 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  1 37 

Str.  It  was  of  these  bonds  I  said  that  there  would  be  no  dif- 
ficulty in  creating  them,  if  only  both  classes  originally  held  the 
same  opinion  about  the  honorable  and  the  good ;  indeed,  in  this 
single  word,  the  whole  process  of  royal  weaving  is  comprised  — 
never  to  allow  temperate  natures  to  be  separated  from  the 
brave,  but  to  weave  them  together,  like  the  warp  and  the  woof, 
by  common  sentiments  and  honors  and  opinions,  and  by  the  giv- 
ing of  pledges  to  one  another ;  and  out  of  them  forming  one 
smooth  and  even  web,  to  intrust  them  to  the  offices  of  state. — 
Statesman,  iii.  597. 

Divining  of  truth  instinctive.     See  distinctive. 
Doctors  and  patients. 

Ath.  Of  doctors,  as  you  doubtless  know,  there  are  two 

kinds,  a  gentler  and  a  ruder,  and  two  modes  of  cure ;  and  as 
children  ask  the  doctor  to  be  gentle  with  them,  so  we  will  ask 
the  legislator  to  cure  our  disorders  with  the  gentlest  remedies. 
What  I  mean  to  say  is,  that  besides  doctors,  there  are  tbeir 
assistants,  who  are  also  styled  doctors. 

Cle.  Very  true. 

Ath.  And  whether  they  are  slaves  or  freemen  makes  no  dif- 
ference ;  they  acquire  their  knowledge  of  medicine  by  obeying 
and  observing  their  masters,  empirically  and  not  rationally, 
as  the  manner  of  freemen  is,  who  have  learned  scientifically 
themselves  the  art  which  they  impart  to  their  pupils.  You  are 
aware  that  there  are  these  two  classes  of  doctors  ? 

Cle.  To  be  sure. 

Ath.  And  did  you  ever  observe  that  there  are  two  classes 
of  patients  in  States,  slaves  and  freemen  ;  and  the  slave  doctors 
run  about  and  cure  the  slaves,  and  wait  for  them  in  the  dispen- 
saries—  practitioners  of  this  sort  never  talk  to  their  patients 
individually,  or  let  them  talk  about  their  own  individual  com- 
plaints ?  The  doctor  prescribes  what  he  thinks  good,  out  of 
the  abundance  of  his  experience,  as  if  he  had  no  manner  of 
doubt  ;  and  when  he  has  given  his  orders,  like  a  tyrant,  he 
rushes  off  with  equal  assurance  to  some  other  servant  who  is 
ill  ;  and  so  he  relieves  the  master  of  the  house  of  the  care  of 
his  invalid  slaves.  But  the  other  doctor,  who  is  a  freeman,  at- 
tends and  practices  upon  freemen  ;  and  he  carries  his  inquiries 
far  back,  and  goes  into  the  nature  of  the  disorder  ;  he  enters 
into  discourse  with  the  patient  and  with  his  friends,  and  is  at 
once  getting  information  from  the  sick  man,  and  also  instruct- 
ing him  as  far  as  he  is  able,  and  he  will  not  prescribe  for  him 


13S  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

until  he  has  first  convinced  him  ;  at  last,  wl.  fen  he  has  brought 
the  patient  more  and  more  under  his  persuasive  influences  a  id 
set  him  on  the  road  to  health,  he  attempts  to  effect  a  cure. 
Now,  wbich  is  the  better  way  of  proceeding  in  a  physician  and 
in  a  trainer  ?  Is  he  the  better  who  accomplishes  his  ends  in  a 
Jouble  way,  or  he  who  works  in  one  way,  and  that  the  ruder 
and  inferior? 

Cle.  I  should  say,  Stranger,  that  the  double  way  is  far  bet- 
ter. —  Laws,  iv.  247. 
Dog,  —  a  true  philosopher. 

The  trait  of  which  I  am  speaking,  I  replied,  may  be  aLo 

seen  in  the  dog,  and  is  remarkable  in  an  animal. 

What  trait  ? 

Why  a  dog,  whenever  he  sees  a  stranger,  is  angry ;  when  an 
acquaintance,  he  welcomes  him,  although  the  one  has  never 
done  him  any  harm,  nor  the  other  any  good.  Did  this  never 
strike  you  as  curious  ? 

I  never  before  thought  of  it,  though  I  quite  recognize  the 
truth  of  your  remark. 

And  surely  this  instinct  of  the  dog  is  very  charming,  — 
your  dog  is  a  true  philosopher. 

Why  ? 

Why,  because  he  distinguishes  the  face  of  a  friend  and  of 
an  enemy  only  by  the  criterion  of  knowing  and  not  knowing. 
And  must  not  the  creature  be  fond  of  learning  who  deter- 
mines what  is  friendly  and  what  is  unfriendly  by  the  test  of 
knowledge  and  ignorance  ?  —  The  Republic,  ii.  1 98. 
Dorian  kings,  the  cause  of  their  ruin. 

I  remember,  and  you  will  remember  what  I  said  at  first, 

that  a  statesman  and  legislator  ought  to  ordain  laws  with  a 
view  to  wisdom ;  whereas  you  were  arguing  that  the  good  law- 
giver ought  to  order  all  with  a  view  to  war.  And  to  this  I 
replied  that  there  were  four  virtues,  whereas  your  regards  were 
fixed  on  one  of  the  four  only ;  but  that  you  ought  to  regard 
all  virtue,  and  especially  that  which  comes  first,  and  is  the  guide 
of  all  the  rest  —  I  mean  wisdom  and  mind  and  opinion,  united 
with  the  affection  and  desire  which  waits  upon  them.  And 
now  the  argument  returns  to  the  same  point,  and  I  say  once 
more,  in  jest  if  you  like,  or  in  earnest  if  you  like,  that  the 
prayer  of  a  fool  is  full  of  danger,  being  likely  to  end  in  the 
opposite  of  what  he  desires.  And  if  you  would  rather  receive 
my  words  in  earnest,  I  am  willing  that  you  si  ould ;  and  you 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  139 

will  find,  as  I  have  said  already,  that  not  cowardice  was  the 
cause  of  the  ruin  of  the  Dorian  kings  and  of  their  whoie  de- 
sign, nor  ignorance  of  military  matters,  either  on   the  part  of 
the  rulers  or  of  their  subjects ;  but  the  cause  was  the  corrupt 
ing  influence  of  the  other  vices,  and  especially  their  ignorance 
of  the  most  important  human  affairs.  —  Laws,  iv.  217. 
Dreams,  sleep  free  from  fanciful. 

Certain  of  the  unnecessary  pleasures  and  appetites  are 

deemed  to  be  unlawful ;  every  one  appears  to  have  them,  but 
in  some  persons  they  are  controlled  by  the  laws  and  by  rea- 
son, and  the  better  desires  prevail  over  them,  —  either  they  are 
wholly  banished  or  they  are  few  and  weak ;  while  in  the  case 
of  others  they  are  stronger,  and  there  are  more  of  them. 

Which  appetites  do  you  mean  ? 

I  mean  those  which  are  awake  when  the  reasoning  and  hu- 
man and  ruling  power  is  asleep ;  when  the  wild  beast  in  our 
nature,  gorged  with  meat  or  drink,  starts  up  and  leaps  about, 
and  seeks  to  go  and  satisfy  his  desires,  there  is  no  conceivable 
folly  or  crime,  however  shameless  or  unnatural  —  not  except- 
ing incest  or  parricide,  or  the  eating  of  forbidden  food  —  of 
which  at  such  a  time,  you  know,  a  man  may  not  believe  him- 
self to  be  capable. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

But  when  a  man's  pulse  is  healthy  and  temperate,  and  when 
before  going  to  sleep  he  has  awakened  his  rational  powers  and 
fed  them  on  noble  thoughts  and  inquiries,  collecting  himself  in 
meditation  after  having  first  indulged  his  appetites  neither  too 
much  nor  too  little,  bat  just  enough  to  lay  them  to  sleep,  and 
prevent  them  and  their  enjoyments  and  oains  from  interfering 
with  the  higher  principle  —  which  he  leaves  in  the  solitude  of 
pure  abstraction,  free  to  contemplate  and  aspire  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  unknown,  whether  in  past,  present,  or  future : 
when  again  he  has  allayed  the  passionate  element,  if  he  has 
a  quarrel  against  any  one — I  say,  when,  after  pacifying  the 
two  irrational  principles,  he  rouses  up  the  third,  which  is  reason, 
before  he  takes  his  rest,  then,  as  you  know,  he  attains  truth 
most  nearly,  and  is  least  likely  to  be  the  sport  of  fanciful  and 
lawless  visions. —  The  Republic,  ii.  400. 
Drinking  wine  condemned.  See  Wine  forbidden. 
Drunkenness  condemned  in  Sparta. 

Meg.  The  laws  of  Sparta,  in  as  far  as  they  relate  to  pleasure, 

appear  to  me  to  be  the  best  in  the  world ;  for  that  which  leads 


140  r>LATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

mankind  in  general  into  the  wildest  pleasure  and  license,  and 
every  other  folly,  the  law  has  clean  driven  out ;  and  neither  in 
the  country  nor  in  towns  which  are  under  the  control  of  Sparta, 
will  you  find  revelries  and  the  many  incitements  of  every  kind 
of  pleasure  which  accompany  them,  and  any  one  who  meets  a 
drunken  and  disorderly  person  will  immediately  have  him 
most  severely  punished,  and  will  not  let  him  off  on  any  pre- 
tense, not  even  at  the  time  of  a  Dionysiac  festival  ;  although  I 
have  remarked  that  this  may  happen  at  your  performances  "  on 
the  cart,"  as  they  are  called ;  and  among  our  Tarentine  colo- 
nists I  have  seen  the  whole  city  drunk  at  a  Diouysiac  festival ; 
but  nothing  of  that  sort  happens  among  us. 

Ath.  0  Lacedaemonian  Stranger,  these  festivities  are  praise- 
worthy where  there  is  a  spirit  of  endurance,  but  are  very 
senseless  when  they  are  under  no  regulations.  In  order  to  re- 
taliate, an  Athenian  has  only  to  point  out  the  license  which 
exists  among  your  women.  To  all  such  accusations,  whether 
they  are  brought  against  the  Tarentines,  or  us,  or  you,  there  is 
one  answer  which  exonerates  the  practice  in  question  from  im- 
propriety. When  a  stranger  expresses  wonder  at  the  singular- 
ity of  what  he  sees,  any  inhabitant  will  naturally  answer  him : 
Wonder  not,  O  stranger ;  this  is  our  custom,  and  you  may  very 
likely  have  some  other  custom  about  the  same  things.  Now 
we  are  speaking,  my  friends,  not  about  men  in  general,  but 
.about  the  merits  and  defects  of  the  lawgivers  themselves.  Let 
us  then  discourse  a  little  more  at  length  about  them,  and  about 
the  nature  of  intoxication  at  large,  which  is  a  very  important 
matter,  and  will  seriously  task  the  discrimination  of  the  legis- 
lator. I  am  not  talking  of  the  mere  practice  of  drinking  or 
not  drinking  wine  in  general,  but  about  downright  intoxica- 
tion :  are  we  to  follow  the  custom  of  the  Scythians,  and  Per- 
sians, and  Carthaginians,  and  Celts,  and  Iberians,  who  are  all 
warlike  nations,  or  that  of  your  countrymen  who,  as  you  say, 
wholly  abstain  ?  Whereas  the  Scythians  and  Thracians,  both 
men  and  women,  drink  unmixed  wine,  which  they  also  pour  on 
their  garments,  and  this  they  think  a  happy  and  glorious  insti- 
tution. The  Persians,  again,  are  much  given  to  other  practices 
of  luxury  which  you  reject,  but  they  have  more  moderation  in 
them  than  the  Thracians  and  Scythians.  —  Laws,  iv.  167. 
Dualism. 

You    have  to  imagine,  then,  that   there  are  two  ruling 

powers,  and  that  one  of  them  is  set  over  the  intellectual  ~vorld. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  141 

the  other  over  the  visible.  I  do  not  say  heaven,  lest  you 
should  fancy  that  I  am  playing  upon  the  name  (oi/>avo?,  oparos). 
May  I  suppose  that  you  have  this  distinction  of  the  visible  and 
intelligible  fixed  in  your  mind  ? 

I  have. 

Now  take  a  line  which  has  been  cut  into  two  unequal  parts, 
and  divide  each  of  them  again  in  the  same  proportion,  and  sup- 
pose the  two  main  divisions  w  answer,  one  to  the  visible  and 
the  other  to  the  intelligible,  and  then  compare  the  subdivisions 
as  to  their  relative  clearness  and  want  of  clearness,  and  you 
will  find  that  the  first  section  in  the  sphere  of  the  visible  con- 
sists of  images.  And  by  images  I  mean,  in  the  first  place, 
shadows,  and  in  the  second  place,  reflections  in  water  and  in 
solid,  smooth,  and  polished  bodies,  and  the  like :  do  you  under- 
stand ? 

Yes,  I  understand. 

Imagine,  now,  the  other  section,  of  which  this  is  only  the 
resemblance,  to  include  ourselves  and  the  animals,  and  every- 
thing in  nature  and  everything  in  art. 

Very  good. 

Would  you  not  admit  that  this  latter  section  has  a  different 
degree  of  truth,  and  that  the  copy  is  to  the  object  which  is 
copied  as  the  sphere  of  opinion  is  to  the  sphere  of  knowledge  ? 

Most  undoubtedly. 

Next  proceed  to  consider  the  manner  in  which  the  sphere  of 
the  intellectual  is  to  be  divided. 

In  what  manner  ? 

As  thus  :  there  are  two  subdivisions,  in  the  lower  of  which 
the  soul  uses  the  figures  given  by  the  former  divisions  as  im- 
ages ;  the  inquiry  can  only  be  hypothetical,  and  instead  of  go- 
ing upwards  to  a  principle,  descends  to  the  other  end ;  in  the 
higher  of  the  two,  the  soul  passes  out  of  hypotheses,  and  goes 
up  to  a  principle  which  is  above  hypotheses,  making  no  use  of 
images,  as  in  the  former  case,  but  proceeding  only  in  and  by 
the  ideas  themselves.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  337. 
Duty,  questions  of. 

Soc.  Are  we  to  say  that  we  are  never  intentionally  to  do 

wrong,  or  that  in  one  way  we  ought  and  in  another  way  we 
ought  not  to  do  wrong,  or  is  doing  wrong  always  evil  and  dis- 
honorable, as  I  was  just  now  saying,  and  as  has  been  alieady 
acknowledged  by  us  ?  Are  all  our  former  admissions  which 
were  made  within  a  few  days  to  be  thrown  away  ?  And  have 


142  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

we,  at  our  age,  been  earnestly  discoursing  with  one  another  all 
our  life  long  only  to  discover  that  we  are  no  better  than  chil- 
dren ?  Or,  in  spite  of  the  opinion  of  the  many,  and  in  spite  of 
consequences,  whether  better  or  worse,  shall  we  insist  on  the 
truth  of  what  was  then  said,  that  injustice  is  always  an  evil 
and  dishonor  to  him  who  acts  unjustly  ?  Shall  we  say  so  or 
not? 

Or.  Yes. 

Soc.  Then  we  must  do  no  wrong  ? 

Or.   Certainly  not. 

Soc.  Nor  when  injured  injure  in  return,  as  the  many  imag- 
ine ;  for  we  must  injure  no  one  at  all  ? 

Or.  Clearly  not. 

Soc.  Again,  Crito,  may  we  do  evil  ? 

Or.  Surely  not,  Socrates. 

Soc.  And  what  of  doing  evil  in  return  for  evil,  which  is  the 
morality  of  the  many  —  is  that  just  or  not  ? 

Or.  Not  just. 

Soc.   For  doing  evil  to  another  is  the  same  as  injuring  him  ? 

Or.  Very  true. 

Soc.  Then  we  ought  not  to  retaliate  or  render  evil  for  evil 
to  any  one,  whatever  evil  we  may  have  suffered  from  him. 
But  I  would  have  you  consider,  Crito,  whether  you  really 
mean  what  you  are  saying.  For  this  opinion  has  never  been 
held,  and  never  will  be  held,  by  any  considerable  number  of 
persons  ;  and  those  who  are  agreed  and  those  who  are  not 
agreed  upon  this  point  have  no  common  ground,  and  can  only 
despise  one  another  when  they  see  how  widely  they  differ. 
Tell  me,  then,  whether  you  agree  with  and  assent  to  my  first 
principle,  that  neither  injury  nor  retaliation  nor  warding  off 
evil  by  evil  is  ever  right.  And  shall  that  be  the  premise  of 
our  argument  ?  Or  do  you  decline  and  dissent  from  this  ? 
For  thus  have  I  ever  thought  and  still  think ;  but,  if  you  are  of 
another  opinion,  let  me  hear  what  you  have  you  to  say.  — 
Crito,  i.  353. 

Earth,  the  rotundity  of  the. 

I  may  describe  to  you,  however,  the  form  and  regions  :f 

the  earth  according  to  my  conception  of  them. 

That,  said  Simmias,  will  be  enough. 

Well  then,  he  said,  my  conviction  is,  that  the  earth  is  a 
round  body  in  the  centre  of  the  heavens,  and  therefore  has  no 
need  of  air  or  any  similar  force  as  a  support,  but  is  kept  there 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  143 

and  hindered  from  falling  or  inclining  any  way  by  the  equabil 
ity  of  the  surrounding  heaven  and  by  her  own  equipoise.  For 
that  which,  being  in  equipoise,  is  in  the  centre  of  that  which  io 
equably  diffused,  will  not  incline  any  way  in  any  degree,  but 
will  always  remain  in  the  same  state  and  not  deviate.1  — 
Phaedo,  I  439. 

Earth,  likeness  of  the.     See  Animals,  etc. 
Earth,  heavenly  idea  of. 

For  I  should  say  that  in  all  parts  of  the  earth  there  are 

hollows  of  various  forms  and  sizes,  into  which  the  water  and 
the  mist  and  the  lower  air  collect ;  and  that  the  true  earth  is 
pure  and  in  the  pure  heaven,  in  which  also  are  the  stars  —  that 
is  the  heaven  which  is  commonly  spoken  of  as  the  ether,  of 
which  this  is  but  the  sediment  gathering  in  the  hollows  of  the 
earth.  But  we  who  live  in  these  hollows  are  deceived  into  the 
notion  that  we  are  dwelling  above  on  the  surface  of  the  earth ; 
which  is  just  as  if  a  creature  who  was  at  the  bottom  of  the  sea 
were  to  fancy  that  he  was  on  the  surface  of  the  water,  and 
that  the  sea  was  the  heaven  through  which  he  saw  the  sun  and 
the  other  stars,  —  he  having  never  come  to  the  surface  by 
reason  of  his  feebleness  and  sluggishness,  and  having  never 
lifted  up  his  head  and  seen,  nor  ever  heard  from  one  who  had 
seen,  how  much  purer  and  fairer  the  world  above  is  than  his  own. 
And  such  is  exactly  our  case ;  for  we  are  dwelling  in  a  hollow 
of  the  earth,  and  fancy  that  we  are  on  the  surface ;  and  the  air 
we  call  the  heaven,  wherein  we  imagine  that  the  stars  move. 
But  this  again  is  owing  to  our  feebleness  and  sluggishness, 
which  prevent  our  reaching  the  surface  of  the  air ;  for  if  any 
man  could  arrive  at  the  exterior  limit,  or  take  the  wings  of  a 
u  bird  and  uy  upward,  then  like  a  fish  who  puts  his  head  out 
and  sees  this  world,  he  would  see  a  world  beyond  ;  and,  if  the 
nature  of  man  could  sustain  the  sight,  he  would  acknowledge 
that  this  other  world  was  the  place  of  the  true  heaven  and  ;he 
true  light  and  the  true  earth.  For  our  earth,  and  the  stones,  and 
the  entire  region  which  surrounds  us.  are  spoilt  and  corroded, 
as  in  the  sea  all  things  are  corroded  by  the  brine  ;  for  in  the 
sea  too  there  is  hardly  any  noble  or  perfect  growth,  but  clefts 
only,  and  sand,  and  an  endless  slough  of  mud :  and  even  the 
shore  is  not  to  be  compared  to  the  fairer  sights  of  this  world. 
—  Phaedo,  i.  439. 

1  Plato's  cosmogonic  ideas  are  largely  given  in  the  Dialogues  of  "  Phaedo"  *ud 
*  Timaeus." 


144  PLATO'S  JSEST  THOUGHTS. 

Earthly  and  sensual  soul. 

But  the  soul  which  has  been   polluted,  and  is  impure  at 

the  time  of  her  departure,  and  is  the  companion  and  servant  of 
the  body  always,  and  is  in  love  with  and  fascinated  by  the  body 
and  by  the  desires  and  pleasures  of  the  body,  until  she  is  led 
to  believe  that  the  truth  only  exists  in  a  bodily  form,  which  a 
man  may  touch  and  see  and  taste  and  use  for  the  purposes  of 
his  lusts,  —  the  soul,  I  mean,  accustomed  to  hate  and  fear  and 
avoid  the  intellectual  principle,  which  to  the  bodily  eye  is  dark 
and  invisible,  and  can  be  attained  only  by  philosophy  ;  —  do 
you  suppose  that  such  a  soul  will  depart  pure  and  unalloyed  ? 

That  is  impossible,  he  replied. 

She  is  held  fast  by  the  corporeal,  which  the  continual  asso- 
ciation and  constant  care  of  the  body  have  wrought  into  her 
nature. 

Very  true. 

And  this  corporeal  element,  my  friend,  is  heavy  and  weighty 
and  earthy,  and  is  that  element  of  sight  by  which  such  a  soul 
is  depressed  and  dragged  down  again  into  the  visible  world, 
because  she  is  afraid  of  the  invisible  and  of  the  world  below  — 
prowling  about  tombs  and  sepulchres,  in  the  neighborhood  of 
which,  as  they  tell  us,  are  seen  certain  ghostly  apparitions  of 
souls  which  have  net  departed  pure,  but  are  cloyed  with  sight 
and  therefore  visible. 

That  is  very  likely,  Socrates. 

Yes,  that  is  very  likely,  Cebes  ;  and  these  must  be  the  souls, 
not  of  the  good,  but  of  the  evil,  who  are  compelled  to  wander 
about  such  places  in  payment  of  the  penalty  of  their  former 
evil  way  of  life ;  and  they  continue  to  wander  until  through 
the  craving  after  the  corporeal  which  never  leaves  them,  they 
arc  imprisoned  finally  in  another  body.  And  they  may  be 
supposed  to  find  their  prisons  in  the  same  natures  which  they 
have  had  in  their  former  lives. 

What  do  you  mean,  Socrates  ? 

I  mean  to  say  that  men  who  have  followed  after  gluttony, 
and  wantonness,  and  drunkenness,  and  have  had  no  thought  of 
avoiding  them,  would  pass  into  asses  and  animals  of  that  sort. 
—  Phaedo,  i.  409. 
Education,  compulsion  in. 

Solon  was  under  a  delusion  when  he  said   that  a  man  as 

he  is  growing  older  may  learn  many  things,  —  for  he  can  no 
more  learn  than  he  can  run  ;  youth  is  the  time  of  toil. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  145 

Very  true. 

And,  therefore,  calculation  and  geometry,  and  all  the  other 
elements  of  instruction,  which  are  a  preparation  for  dialectic, 
should  be  presented  to  the  mind  in  childhood  ;  not,  however, 
under  any  notion  of  forcing  them. 

Why  not  ? 

Because  a  freeman  ought  to  be  a  freeman  in  the  acquisition 
of  knowledge.  Bodily  exercise,  when  compulsory,  does  no 
harm ;  but  knowledge  which  is  acquired  under  compulsion  has 
no  hold  on  the  mind. 

Very  true. 

Then  my  good  friend,  I  said,  do  not  use  compulsion,  but  let 
early  education  be  a  sort  of  amusement ;  you  will  then  be  bet- 
ter able  to  find  out  the  natural  bent. 

You  are  right  there.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  364. 
Education,  sign  of  a  liberal. 

Soc.  Theaetetus,  I  take  another  view  of  the  subject :  you 

answered  that  knowledge  is  perception  ? 

Theaet.  I  did. 

Soc.  And  if  any  one  were  to  ask  you  :  With  what  does  a 
man  see  black  and  white  colors  ?  and  with  what  does  he  hear 
sharp  and  flat  sounds  ?  —  you  would  say,  if  I  am  not  mistaken, 
"  With  the  eyes  and  with  the  ears." 

Theaet.  I  should. 

Soc.  The  free  use  of  words  and  phrases,  rather  than  minute 
precision,  is  generally  characteristic  of  a  liberal  education,  and 
the  opposite  is  pedantic ;  but  sometimes  precision  is  necessary, 
and  I  believe  that  the  answer  which  you  have  just  given  is 
open  to  the  charge  of  incorrectness ;  for  which  is  more  cor- 
rect, to  say  that  we  see  or  hear  with  the  eyes  and  with  the  ears, 
or  through  the  eyes  and  through  the  ears  ? 

Theaet.  I  should  say,  Socrates,  "  through,"  rather  than 
«  with." 

Soc.  Yes,  my  boy  ;  for  no  one  can  suppose  that  we  are  Tro- 
jan horses,  in  whom  are  perched  several  unconnected  senses,  not 
meeting  in  some  one  nature,  of  which  they  are  the  instruments, 
whether  you  term  this  soul  or  not,  with  which  through  these  we 
perceive  objects  of  sense.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  387. 
Education,  early. 

Ath.  According  to  my  view,  he  who  would  bo  gooa  at  any 

thing  must  practic.3  that  thing  from  his  youth  upwards,  both  in 
sport  and  earnest,  in  the  particular  manner  which  the  work  re- 
10 


14«  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

quires ;  for  example,  he  who  is  to  be  a  good  builder,  should 
play  at  building  children's  houses ;  and  he  who  is  to  be  a  good 
husbandman,  at  tilling  the  ground  ;  those  who  have  the  care  of 
their  education  should  provide  them  when  young  with  mim>> 
tools.  And  they  should  learn  beforehand  the  knowledge  which 
they  will  afterwards  require  for  their  art.  For  example,  the 
future  carpenter  should  learn  to  measure  or  apply  the  line  in 
play ;  and  the  future  warrior  should  learn  riding,  or  some  other 
exercise  for  amusement,  and  the  teacher  should  endeavor  to 
direct  the  children's  inclinations  and  pleasures  by  the  help  of 
amusements,  to  their  final  aim  in  life.  The  most  important 
part  of  education  is  right  training  in  the  nursery.  The  soul  of 
the  child  in  his  play  should  be  trained  to  that  sort  of  excel- 
lence in  which,  when  be  grows  up  to  manhood,  he  will  have  to 
be  perfected.  Do  you  agree  with  me  thus  far  ? 

Cle.   Certainly. 

Aih.  Then  let  us  not  leave  the  meaning  of  education  ambig- 
uous or  ill-defined.  At  present,  when  we  speak  in  terms  of 
praise  or  blame  about  the  briuging-up  of  each  person,  we  call 
one  man  educated  and  another  uneducated,  although  the  unedu- 
cated man  may  be  sometimes  very  well  educated  for  the  calling 
of  a  retail  trader,  or  of  a  captain  of  a  ship,  and  the  like.  For 
we  are  not  speaking  of  education  in  this  narrower  sense,  but 
of  that  other  education  in  virtue  from  youth  upwards,  which 
makes  a  man  eagerly  pursue  the  ideal  perfection  of  citizenship, 
and  teaches  him  how  rightly  to  rule  and  how  to  obey.  This  is 
the  only  education  which,  upon  our  view,  deserves  the  name ; 
that  other  sort  of  training,  which  aims  at  the  acquisition  of 
wealth  or  bodily  strength,  or  mere  cleverness  apart  from  intel- 
ligence and  justice,  is  mean  and  illiberal,  and  is  not  worthy  to 
be  called  education  at  all.  But  let  us  not  quarrel  with  one 
another  about  a  word,  provided  that  the  proposition  which  has 
just  been  granted  hold  good ;  to  wit,  that  those  who  are  rightly 
educated  generally  become  good  men.  Neither  must  we  cast  a 
slight  upon  education,  which  is  the  first  and  fairest  thing  that 
the  best  of  men  can  ever  have,  and  which,  though  liable  to  take 
a  wrong  direction,  is  capable  of  reformation.  And  this  work 
of  reformation  is  the  great  business  of  every  man  while  he  lives. 
—  Laws,  iv.  173. 

Education  of  youth  and  children.     See  Youth,  etc. 
Education,  the  benefit  of,  to  the  State. 
If  you  mean  to  ask  what  great  good  accrues  to  the  State 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  147 

from  the  right  training  of  a  single  youth,  or  of  a  single  chorus, 
—  when  the  question  is  put  in  that  form,  we  cannot  deny  that 
the  good  is  not  very  great  in  any  particular  instance.  But  if 
you  ask  what  is  the  good  of  education  in  general,  the  answer 
is  easy  —  that  education  makes  good  men,  and  that  good  men 
act  nobly,  and  conquer  their  enemies  in  battle,  because  they  are 
good.  Education  certainly  gives  victory,  although  victory 
sometimes  produces  forgetfulness  of  education  ;  for  many  have 
grown  insolent  from  victory  in  war,  and  this  insolence  has  en- 
gendered in  them  innumerable  evils  ;  and  many  a  victory  has 
been  and  will  be  suicidal  to  the  victors ;  but  education  is  never 
suicidal.  —  Laws,  iv.  172. 
Elevation  of  self. 

Do   you   see  any  way  in  which  the  philosopher  can  be 

preserved  in  his  calling  to  the  end  ?  and  remember  what  we 
were  saying  of  him,  that  he  was  to  have  knowledge  and  mem- 
ory and  courage  and  magnanimity  —  these  were  admitted  by  us 
to  be  the  true  philosopher's  gifts. 

Yes. 

Now,  will  not  such  an  one  be,  from  the  first,  in  all  things 
first  among  all,  especially  if  his  bodily  endowments  are  like  his 
mental  ones  ? 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  his  friends  and  fellow-citizens  will  want  to  use  him  as 
he  gets  older  for  their  own  purposes  ? 

No  question. 

Falling  at  his  feet,  they  will  make  requests  to  him  and  do 
him  honor  and  flatter  him,  because  they  want  to  get  into  their 
hands  now,  the  power  which  he  will  one  day  possess. 

That  often  happens,  he  said. 

And  what  will  he  do  under  such  circumstances,  especially  if 
he  be  a  citizen  of  a  great  city,  rich  and  noble,  and  a  tall,  proper 
youth  ?  "Will  he  not  be  full  of  boundless  aspirations,  and  fancy 
himself  able  to  manage  the  affairs  of  Hellenes  and  of  barbarians, 
and  therefore  will  he  not  dilate  and  elevate  himself  in  the  full- 
ness of  vain  pomp  and  senseless  pride  ? 

To  be  sure  he  will. 

Now,  when  he  is  in  this  state  of  mind,  if  some  one  gently 
comes  to  him  and  tells  him  that  he  is  without  sense,  which  he 
must  have,  but  can  only  get  it  by  slaving  for  it,  do  you  think 
that,  under  such  adverse  circumstances,  he  will  be  easily  in- 
duced to  listen  'r 


148  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

He  would  be  very  unlikely  to  listen. 

But,  suppose  further  that  there  is  one  person  who  has  feeling, 
and  who,  either  from  some  excellence  of  disposition  or  natural 
affinity,  is  inclined  or  drawn  towards  philosophy,  and  his  friends 
think  that  they  are  likely  to  lose  the  advantages  which  they 
were  going  to  reap  from  his  friendship,  what  will  be  the  effect 
upon  them  ?  Will  they  not  do  and  say  anything  to  prevent  his 
learning  and  to  make  the  teacher  powerless,  using  to  this  end 
private  intrigues  as  well  as  public  prosecutions  ? 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  it. 

And  how  can  one  who  is  thus  circumstanced  ever  become  a 
philosopher  ?  , 

Impossible. 

Then,  were  we  not  right  in  saying  that  even  the  very  quali- 
ties which  make  a  man  a  philosopher  may,  if  he  be  ill-educated, 
serve  to  divert  him  from  philosophy,  no  less  than  riches  and 
their  accompaniments  and  the  other  so-called  goods  of  life  ? 

We  were  quite  right. 

Thus,  my  excellent  friend,  is  brought  about  the  ruin  and 
failure  of  the  natures  best  adapted  to  the  best  of  all  pursuits, 
who,  as  we  assert,  are  rare  at  any  time ;  and  this  is  the  class 
out  of  whom  come  those  who  are  the  authors  of  the  greatest 
evil  to  States  and  individuals  ;  and  also  of  the  greatest  good 
when  the  tide  carries  them  in  the  direction  of  good  ;  but  a 
small  man  never  was  the  doer  of  any  great  thing  either  to  in- 
dividuals or  States. 

That  is  most  true,  he  said. 

They  fall  away,  and  philosophy  is  left  desolate,  with  her 
marriage  rite  incomplete  :  for  her  own  have  forsaken  her,  and 
while  they  are  leading  a  false  and  unbecoming  life,  other  un- 
worthy persons,  seeing  that  she  has  no  protector,  enter  in  and 
dishonor  her  ;  and  fasten  upon  her  the  reproaches  which  her  re- 
provers utter;  who  say  of  her  votaries  that  some  of  them  are 
good  for  nothing,  and  the  greater  number  deserving  of  every- 
thing that  is  bad. 

~  » 

That  is  certainly  said. 

Yes :  and  what  else  would  you  expect,  I  said,  when  you 
think  of  the  puny  creatures  who,  seeing  this  land  open  to  them 
—  a  land  well  stocked  with  fair  names  and  showy  titles  —  like 
prisoners  who  run  away  out  of  prison  into  a  sanctuary,  take  a 
leap  out  of  the  arts  into  philosophy  ;  those  who  do  so  being 
probably  the  cleverest  hands  at  their  own  miserable  crafts  ? 


PLATO'S  HES2'  THOi  GETS.  149 

For,  although  philosophy  be  in  this  evil  case,  still  there  remaiiia 
a  dignity  about  her  which  is  not  found  in  the  other  arts.  And 
many  are  thus  attracted  by  her  whose  natures  are  imperfect 
and  whose  souls  are  marred  and  disfigured  by  their  meanness, 
as  their  bodies  are  by  their  arts  and  crafts.  Is  not  that  true  ? 

Yes. —  The  Republic,  ii.  82!. 
Eloquence,  its  force  of  truth. 

How  you,  O  Athenians,  have  been  affected  by  my  accu 

sers,  I  cannot  tell ;  but  I  know  that  they  almost  made  me  for- 
get myself  —  so  persuasively  did  they  speak  ;  and  yet  they  have 
hardly  uttered  a  word  of  truth.  But  many  as  their  falsehoods 
were,  there  was  one  of  them  which  quite  amazed  me :  —  I  mean 
when  they  told  you  to  be  upon  your  guard,  and  not  allow  your- 
selves be  deceived  by  the  force  of  my  eloquence.  To  use  such 
language,  when  they  were  sure  to  be  detected  as  soon  as  I 
opened  my  lips  and  displayed  my  deficiency,  did  certainly  ap- 
pear to  me  most  shameless,  —  unless  by  the  force  of  eloquence 
they  mean  the  force  of  truth ;  for  if  this  is  their  meaning,  I 
admit  that  I  am  eloquent.  But  in  how  different  a  way  from 
theirs  \  Well,  as  I  was  saying,  they  have  hardly  uttered  a 
word,  or  not  more  than  a  word,  of  truth ;  but  you  shall  hear 
from  me  the  whole  truth  :  not,  however,  delivered  after  their 
manner,  in  a  set  oration  duly  ornamented  with  words  and  phrases. 
No,  by  heaven  \  but  I  shall  use  the  words  and  arguments  which 
occur  to  me  at  the  moment ;  for  I  am  certain  that  I  am  right  in 
this  ;  and  that  at  my  time  of  life  I  ought  not  to  be  appearing 
beiore  you,  0  men  of  Athens,  in  the  character  of  a  juvenile 
orator  :  let  no  one  expect  it  of  me.  —  Apology,  i.  315. 
Eloquence,  power  of.  See  Battle. 
Endurance.  See  Courage. 
Enemies  and  friends,  treatment  of. 

Well,  there  is  another  question :  Are  friends  to  be  in- 
terpreted as  real  or  seeming,  enemies  as  real  or  seeming? 

Surely,  he  said,  a  man  may  be  expected  to  love  those  whom 
he  thinks  good,  and  to  hate  those  whom  he  thinks  evil. 

Yes,  but  do  not  persons  often  err  in  their  judgment  of  good 
and  evil ;  many  who  are  not  good  appear  to  them  to  be  good, 
and  conversely  ? 

That  is  true. 

Then  to  them  the  good  will  be  enemies,  and  the  evil  will  be 
their  friends  ? 

True. 


150  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

And  in  that  case  they  will  be  right  in  doing  good  to  the  evil 
and  evil  to  the  good  ? 

Apparently. 

But  the  good  are  just  and  would  not  do  an  injustice  ? 

True. 

Then  according  to  your  argument  it  is  just  to  injure  those 
who  do  no  wrong? 

Nay,  Socrates  ;  the  doctrine  is  immoral. 

Then  I  suppose  that  they  ought  to  do  good  to  the  just  and 
harm  to  the  unjust  ? 

I  like  that  better. 

But  see  the  consequence :  Many  a  man  who  is  ignorant  of 
the  world  has  friends  who  are  friends,  and  then  he  ought  to  do 
harm  to  them  ;  and  he  has  good  enemies  whom  he  ought  to 
benefit;  but  if  so,  we  shall  be  saying  the  very  opposite  of 
that  which  we  affirm  to  be  the  meaning  of  Simonides. 

That  is  true,  he  said  ;  and  I  think  that  we  had  better  cor- 
rect an  error  into  which  we  have  fallen  in  the  use  of  the  words 
"  friend  "  and  "  enemy." 

What  was  the  error,  Polemarchus  ?  I  replied. 

The  error  lay  in  the  assumption  that  he  is  a  friend  who 
seems  or  is  thought  good. 

And  how  is  the  error  to  be  corrected  ? 

We  should  rather  say  that  he  is  a  friend  who  is,  as  well  as 
seems,  good  ;  and  that  he  who  seems  only,  and  is  not  good, 
only  seems  to  be  and  is  not  a  friend  ;  and  of  an  enemy  the 
same  may  be  said. 

You  would  argue  that  the  good  are  our  friends  and  the  bad 
our  enemies? 

Yes. 

And  instead  of  saying  simply,  as  we  did  at  first,  that  it  is 
just  to  do  good  to  your  friends  and  harm  to  your  enemies,  you 
would  now  say,  it  is  just  to  do  good  to  your  friends  when  they 
are  good,  and  harm  to  your  enemies  when  they  are  evil  ? 

Yes,  that  appears  to  me  to  be  the  truth. 

But  then  ought  the  just  to  injure  any  one  at  all  ? 

Undoubtedly  he  ought  to  injure  the  wicked  who  are  hja 
enemies. 

And  when  horses  are  injured,  are  they  improved  or  de- 
teriorated ? 

The  latter. 

Deteriorated,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  good  qualities  of  horses, 
not  of  do<j.s  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  151 

Yes,  of  horses. 

And  dogs  are  deteriorated  in  the  good  qualities  of  dogs,  and 
not  of  horses? 

Of  course. 

And  will  not  men  who  are  injured  be  deteriorated  in  that 
which  is  the  proper  virtue  of  man  ? 

Certainly. 

And  that  human  virtue  is  justice  ? 

To  be  sure. 

Then  men  who  are  injured  are  of  necessity  made  unjust  ? 

That  is  the  result. 

But  can  the  musician  by  his  art  make  men  unmusical  ? 

Certainly  not. 

Or  the  horseman  by  his  art  make  bad  horsemen  ? 

Impossible. 

And  can  the  just  by  justice  make  men  unjust,  or,  speaking 
generally,  can  the  good  by  virtue  make  them  bad  ? 

Assuredly  not. 

Nor  can  heat  produce  cold  ? 

No. 

Nor  drought  moisture  ? 

Never. 

Nor  can  the  good  harm  any  one  ? 

Clearly  not. 

And  the  just  is  the  good  ? 

Certainly. 

Then  to  injure  a  friend  or  any  one  else  is  not  the  act  of  a 
just  man,  but  of  the  opposite,  who  is  the  unjust  ? 

I  think  that  what  you  say  is  quite  true,  Socrates. 

Then  if  a  man  says  that  justice  consists  in  repaying  a  debt, 
meaning  that  a  just  man  ought  to  do  good  to  his  friends  and 
injure  his  enemies,  he  is  not  really  wise  ;  for  he  says  what  is 
not  true,  if,  as  has  been  clearly  shown,  the  injuring  of  another 
can  be  in  no  case  just. 

I  agree  with  you,  said  Polemarchus. 

Then  you  and  I  are  prepared  to  take  up  arms  against  any 
one  who  attributes  such  a  saying  to  Simonides  or  Bias  or  Pitta- 
cus,  or  any  other  wise  man  or  seer  ? 

I  am  quite  ready  to  join  with  you,  he  said. 

Shall  I  whisper  in  your  ear  whose  I  believe  the  saying  to 
be? 

"Whose  ? 


Io2  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

I  believe  that  Periander,  or  Perdiccas,  or  Xerxes,  or  Isme- 
nias,  the  Theban,  or  some  other  rich  and  mighty  man,  who  had 
a  great  opinion  of  his  own  power,  first  said  that  justice  is  doing 
good  to  your  friexxls  and  harm  to  your  enemies. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

Yes,  I  said ;  but  if  this  definition  of  justice  also  breaks 
down,  what  other  can  be  offered  ? 

Several  times  in  the  middle  of  our  discourse  Thrasymachus 
had  made  an  attempt  to  get  the  argument  into  his  own  hands 
by  interrupting  us,  aud  had  been  put  down  by  the  rest  of  the 
company,  who  wanted  to  hear  the  end.      But  when  I  had  done 
speaking  and  there  was  a  pause,  he  could  no  longer  hold  his 
peace ;  and,  gathering  himself  up,  he   came  at  us  like  a  wild 
beast  seeking  to  devour  us.      Polemarchus  and  I  cowered  in  fear. 
—  TJie  Republic,  ii.  155. 
Enemies,  all  men  are. 
Ath.  Are  we  to  conceive  each  man  as   warring  against 

O  O 

himself  :  or  how  is  that  to  be  ? 

Cle.  O  Athenian  Stranger,  inhabitant  of  Attica  I  will  not 
call  you,  who  seem  to  me  worthy  to  be  named  after  the  god- 
dess Athene,  because  you  go  back  to  first  principles;  you, 
from  the  light  which  you  have  thrown  upon  the  argument, 
will  more  readily  recognize  the  truth  of  my  assertion,  when  I 
said  just  now  that  all  men  are  the  enemies  of  all  other  men, 
both  in  public  and  private,  and  every  individual  of  himself. 

Ath.  My  good  sir,  what  do  you  mean  ? 

Cle.  I  mean  what  I  say ;  and,  further,  that  there  is  a  victory 
and  defeat,  —  the  first  and  best  of  victories,  the  lowest  and 
worst  of  defeats,  —  which  each  man  gains  or  sustains  at  the 
hands,  not  of  another,  but  of  himself ;  this  shows  that  there  is 
a  war  against  ourselves  going  on  in  every  one  of  us.  —  Laws, 
iv.  157. 
Enslaving  power  of  money. 

Come,  now,  and  let  us  reason  with  the  unjust,  who  is  not 

intentionally  in  error.  "  Sweet  Sir,"  we  will  say  to  him, 
"what  think  you  cf  things  esteemed  noble  and  ignoble?  Is 
not  the  noble  that  which  subjects  the  beast  to  the  man,  or 
rather  to  the  god  in  man ;  and  the  ignoble  that  which  subjects 
the  man  to  the  beast  ?  "  He  can  hardly  avoid  saying  Yes,  — 
can  he  now  ? 

Not  if  he  has  any  regard  for  my  opinion. 

But,  if  he   admit   this,  we   may  ask  him  another  question: 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  153 

How  would  a  man  profit  if  he  received  gold  and  silver  on  the 
condition  that  he  was  to  enslave  the  noblest  part  of  him  to  the 
worst  ?  Who  can  imagine  that  a  man  who  sold  his  son  or 
daughter  into  slavery  for  money,  especially  if  he  sold  them 
into  the  hands  of  fierce  and  evil  men,  would  be  vhe  gainer, 
however  large  might  be  the  sum  which  he  received  ?  And 
will  any  one  say  that  he  is  not  a  miserable  caitiff  who  sells  his 
own  divine  being  to  that  which  is  most  atheistical  and  detest- 
able, and  has  no  pity?  Eriphyle  took  the  necklace  as  the 
price  of  her  husband's  life,  but  he  is  taking  a  bribe  in  order  to 
compass  a  worse  ruin. —  TJie  Republic,  ii.  421. 
Envy  causing  the  death  of  good  men. 

I  have  said  enough  in  answer  to  the  charge  of  Meletus: 

any  elaborate  defense  is  unnecessary;  but  as  I  was  saying  be- 
fore, I  certainly  have  many  enemies,  and  this  is  what  will  be 
my  destruction  if  I  am  destroyed  ;  of  that  I  am  certain ;  not 
Meletus,  nor  yet  Anytus,  but  the  envy  and  detraction  of  the 
world,  which  has  been  the  death  of  many  good  men,  and  will 
probably  be  the  death  of  many  more ;  there  is  no  danger  of 
my  being  the  last  of  them.  —  Apology,  i.  826. 
Envy,  a  pain  of  the  soul 

Soc.  Do  we  not  speak  of  anger,  fear,  desire,  sorrow,  LOVA 

emulation,  envy,  and  the  like,  as  pains  which  belong  to  t*« 
soul  only  ? 

Pro.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  shall  we  not  find  them  also  full  of  the  mopt  wnt> 
derful  pleasures  ?  need  I  remind  you  of  the  anger 

"  Which  stirs  even  a  wise  man  to  violence, 
And  sweeter  is  than  honey  and  the  honeycomb?  " 

And  you  remember  how  pleasures  mingle  with  pains  in  lamen 
tation  and  bereavement  ? 

Pro.  Yes,  there  is  a  natural  connection  between  them. 

Soc.  And  you  remember  also  how  at  the  sight  of  tragedies 
the  spectators  smile  through  their  tears  ? 

Pro.   Certainly,  I  do. 

Soc.  And  are  you  aware  that  even  at  a  comedy  the  soul  ex 
periences  a  mixed  feeling  of  pain  and  pleasure  ? 

Pro.  I  do  not  understand  you. 

Soc.  I  admit,  Protarchus,  that  there  is  some  difficulty  in  rec 
ognizing  this  mixture  of  feelings  at  a  comedy. 

Pro.  There  is,  I  think. 


154  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Soc.  And  the  greater  the  difficulty  the  more  desirable  is  the 
examination  of  the  case,  because  the  difficulty  of  examining 
other  cases  of  mixed  pleasures  and  pains  will  be  less. 

Pro.   Proceed. 

Soc.  I  have  just  mentioned  envy ;  would  you  not  call  that 
a  pain  of  the  soul  ? 

Pro.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  yet  the  envious  man  finds  something  in  the  mis- 
fortunes of  his  neighbors  at  which  he  is  pleased  ? 

Pro.  Certainly.  —  Philebus,  iii.  187. 
Envy  and  injustice. 

Worthy  of  honor,  too,  is  he  who  does  no  injustice,  and  of 

more  than  twofold  honor  if  he  not  only  does  no  injustice  him- 
self, but  hinders  others  from  doing  any ;  the  first  may  count  as 
one  man,  the  second  is  worth  many  men,  because  he  informs 
the  rulers  of  the  injustice  of  others.  And  yet  more  highly 
to  be  esteemed  is  he  who  cooperates  with  the  rulers  in  correct- 
ing the  citizens  as  far  as  he  can  —  he  shall  be  proclaimed  the 
great  and  perfect  citizen,  and  bear  away  the  palm  of  virtue. 
The  same  praise  may  be  given  about  temperance  and  wisdom, 
and  all  other  goods  which  may  be  imparted  to  others,  as  well 
as  acquired  by  a  man  for  himself ;  he  who  imparts  them  shall 
be  honored  as  the  man  of  men,  and  he  who  is  willing  yet  is 
not  able,  may  be  allowed  the  second  place ;  but  he  who  is 
jealous  and  will  not,  if  he  can  help,  allow  others  to  partake  in 
a  friendly  way  of  any  good,  is  deserving  of  blame:  the  good, 
however,  which  he  has,  is  not  to  be  undervalued  because  pos- 
sessed by  him,  but  to  be  acquired  by  us  to  the  utmost  of  our 
power.  Let  every  man,  then,  freely  strive  for  the  prize  of 
virtue,  and  let  there  no  envy.  For  the  unenvious  nature  in- 
creases the  greatness  of  States  —  he  himself  contends  in  the 
race  and  defames  no  man  ;  but  the  envious,  who  thinks  that 
he  ought  to  get  the  better  by  defaming  others,  is  less  energetic 
himself  in  the  pursuit  of  true  virtue,  and  reduces  his  rivals  to 
despair  by  his  unjust  slanders  of  them.  And  thus  he  deprives 
the  whole  city  of  the  proper  training  for  the  contest  of  virtue, 
and  diminishes  her  glory  as  far  as  in  him  lies.  —  Laws,  iv. 
256. 
Equality  not  the  same  as  impartiality. 

When  Alcibiades  had  done  speaking,  some  one  —  Critias, 

I  believe  —  went  on   to  say :  O  Prodicus  and  Hippias,  Callias 
appears  to  me   fo  be  a  partisan  of  Protagoras.     And  this  led 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  155 

Alcibiades,  who  loves  opposition,  to  take  the  other  side.  But 
we  should  not  be  partisans  either  of  Socrates  or  Protagoras ; 
let  us  rather  unite  in  entreating  both  of  them  not  to  break  up 
the  discussion. 

Prodicus  added :  That,  Critias,  seems  to  me  to  be  well  said, 
for  those  who  are  present  at  such  discussions  ought  to  be  im- 
partial hearers  of  both  the  speakers ;  remembering,  however, 
that  impartiality  is  not  the  same  as  equality,  for  both  sides 
should  be  impartially  heard,  and  yet  an  equal  meed  should  no4 
be  assigned  to  both  of  them  ;  but  to  the  wiser  a  higher  meed 
should  be  given,  and  a  lower  to  the  less  wise.  And  I  as  well 
as  Critias  would  beg  you,  Protagoras  and  Socrates,  to  grant 
our  request,  which  is,  that  you  will  argue  with  one  another 
and  not  wrangle ;  for  friends  argue  with  friends  out  of  good- 
will, but  only  adversaries  and  enemies  wrangle.  —  Protagoras, 
i.  137. 
Equality  and  unequality. 

Shall  we  proceed  a  step  further,  and  affirm  that  there  is 

such  a  thing  as  equality,  not  of  one  piece  of  wood  o^  stone  with 
another,  but  that,  over  and  above  this,  there  is  equality  in  the 
abstract  ?  Shall  we  say  so  ? 

Say  so,  yes,  replied  Simmias,  and  swear  to  it,  with  all  the 
confidence  in  life. 

And  do  we  know  the  nature  of  this  abstract  essence  ? 

To  be  sure,  he  said. 

And  whence  did  we  obtain  our  knowledge  ?  Did  we  not 
see  equalities  of  material  things,  such  as  pieces  of  wood  and 
stones,  and  gather  from  them  the  idea  of  an  equality  which  is 
different  from  them  ?  for  you  will  acknowledge  that  there  is  a 
difference.  Or  look  at  the  matter  in  another  way  :  —  Do  not 
the  same  pieces  of  wood  or  stone  appear  at  one  time  equal, 
and  at  another  time  unequal  ? 

That  is  certain. 

But  are  real  equals  ever  unequal  ?  or  is  the  idea  of  equality 
the  same  as  that  of  inequality  ? 

Impossible,  Socrates. 

Then  these  (so-called)  equals  are  not  the  same  with  the  idea 
of  equality? 

I  should  say,  clearly  not,  Socrates. 

And  yet  from  these  equals,  although  differing  from  the  idea 
of  equality,  you  conceived  and  attained  that  idea  ? 

Very  true,  he  said. 


156  £  LATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Which  might  be  like,  or  might  be  unlike  them  ? 

Yes. 

But  that  makes  no  difference  :  whenever  from  seeing  one 
thing  you  conceived  another,  whether  like  or  unlike,  there 
must  surely  have  been  an  act  of  recollection  ? 

Very  true. 

But  what  would  you  say  of  equal  portions  of  wood  ant! 
stone,  or  other  material  equals  ?  and  what  is  the  impression 
produced  by  them  ?  Are  they  equals  in  the  same  sense  in 
which  absolute  equality  is  equal  ?  or  do  they  fall  short  of  this 
equality  in  a  measure  ? 

Yes,  he  said,  in  a  very  great  measure  too.  —  Phaedo,  i.  401. 
Equality  of  anarchy. 

When  a  democracy  which  is  thirsting  for  freedom  has 

evil  cup-bearers  presiding  over  the  feast,  and  has  drunk  too 
deeply  of  the  strong  wine  of  freedom,  then,  unless  her  rulers 
are  very  amenable  and  give  a  plentiful  draught,  she  calls  them 
to  account  and  punishes  them,  and  says  that  they  are  cursed 
oligarchs. 

Yes,  he  replied,  a  very  common  thing. 

Yes,  I  said  ;  and  loyal  citizens  are  insulted  by  her  as  lovers 
of  slavery  and  men  of  naught ;  she  would  have  subjects  who 
are  like  rulers,  and  rulers  who  are  like  subjects :  these  are  men 
after  her  own  heart,  whom  she  praises  and  honors  both  in  pri- 
vate and  public.  Now,  in  such  a  State,  can  liberty  have  any 
limit? 

Certainly  not. 

By  degrees,  the  anarchy  finds  a  way  into  private  houses, 
and  ends  by  getting  among  the  animals  and  infecting  them. 

How  do  you  mean  ? 

I  mean  that  the  father  gets  accustomed  to  descend  to  the 
level  of  his  sons  and  to  fear  them,  and  the  son  to  be  on  a  level 
with  his  father,  he  having  no  shame  or  fear  of  either  of  his 
parents ;  and  this  is  his  freedom,  and  the  metic  is  equal  with 
the  citizen  and  the  citizen  with  the  metic,  and  the  stranger  on 
a  level  with  either. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  true. 

That  is  true ;  and,  there  are  other  light  evils  such  as  the 
.  ollowing :  the  master  fears  and  flatters  his  scholars,  and  the 
scholars  despise  their  masters  and  tutors ;  and,  in  general, 
young  and  old  are  alike,  and  the  young  man  is  on  a  level  with 
the  old,  and  is  ready  to  compete  with  him  in  word  or  deed ; 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  157 

and  old  men  condescend  to  the  youi.g,  and  are  full  of  pleasantry 
and  gayety ;  they  do  not  like  to  be  thought  morose  and  au- 
thoritative, and  therefore  they  adopt  the  manners  of  the  young. 
—  The  Republic,  ii.  391. 
Essence,  individual. 

Now  God  did  not  make  the  soul  after  the  body,  although 

we  have  spoken  of  them  in  this  order  ;  for  when  he  put  them 
together  he  would  never  have  allowed  that  the  elder  should 
serve  the  younger,  but  this  is  a  random  manner  of  speaking, 
because  we  ourselves  too  are  very  largely  affected  by  chance. 
Whereas  he  made  the  soul  in  origin  and  excellence  prior  to 
and  older  than  the  body,  to  be  the  ruler  and  mistress,  of  whom 
the  body  was  to  be  the  subject.  And  he  made  her  out  of  the 
following  elements  and  on  this  manner :  of  the  unchangeable 
and  indivisible,  and  also  of  the  divisible  and  corporeal,  he 
made  a  third  sort  of  intermediate  essence,  partaking  of  the 
same  and  of  the  other  or  diverse,  and  this  compounded  in  like 
manner  he  placed  in  a  mean  between  the  indivisible  and  the 
divisible  or  corporeal.  He  took  these  three  elements  of  the 
same,  the  other  and  the  essence,  and  mingled  them  all  to- 
gether, compressing  the  reluctant  and  unsociable  nature  of  the 
other  into  the  same.  And  when  he  had  mixed  them,  and  out 
of  all  the  three  made  one,  he  again  divided  this  whole  into  as 
many  portions  as  was  fitting,  each  of  them  containing  an  ad 
mixture  of  all  three.  —  Timaeus,  ii.  528. 
Essence,  war  about. 

Sir.  There  appears  to  be  a  sort  of  war  of  Giants  and 

Gods  going  on  amongst  them  ;  they  are  fighting  about  the  nat- 
ure of  essence. 

Theaet.  How  is  that  ? 

Str.  Some  of  them  are  dragging  down  all  things  from  heaven 
and  from  the  unseen  to  earth,  and  seem  determined  to  grasp  in 
their  hands  rocks  and  oaks  ;  of  these  they  lay  hold,  and  are 
obstinate  in  maintaining,  that  the  things  only  which  can  be 
touched  or  handled  have  being  or  essence,  because  they  define 
being  and  body  as  one,  and  if  any  one  else  says  that  what  is 
not  a  body  exists  they  altogether  despise  him,  and  will  hear  of 
nothing  but  body. 

Theaet.  I  have  often  met  with  such  men,  and  terrible  fellows 
<hey  are. 

Str.  And  that  is  the  reason  why  their  opponents  cautiously 
defend  themselves  from  above,  out  of  an  unseen  world,  mightily 


158  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

contending  that  true  essence  consists  of  certain  intelligible  and 
incorporeal  ideas  ;  the  bodies  of  the  materialists,  which  by  them 
are  maintained  to  be  the  very  truth,  they  break  up  into  little 
bits  by  their  arguments,  and  affirm  them  to  be  generation  and 
not  essence.  O  Theaetetus,  there  is  an  endless  war  upon  this 
theme  which  is  always  being  waged  between  the  two  armies. 
-—  Sophist,  iii.  483. 
Essence,  nature  of. 

Str.  If  they  will  admit  that  any,  even  the  smallest  particle  of 

being  is  incorporeal,  that  is  enough  ;  they  must  then  say  what 
that  nature  is  which  is  common  to  both  the  corporeal  and  in- 
corporeal, which  they  have  in  their  mind's  eye  when  they  say 
of  both  of  them  that  they  "  are."  Perhaps  they  may  be  in  a 
difficulty ;  and  if  this  is  the  case,  there  is  a  possibility  that  they 
may  accept  a  notion  of  ours  respecting  the  nature  of  essence, 
having  nothing  of  their  own  to  offer. 

Theaet.  What  is  the  notion  ?     Tell  us,  and  we  shall  see. 

Str.  My  notion  would  be,  that  anything  which  possesses  any 
sort  of  power  to  affect  another,  or  to  be  affected  by  another 
even  for  a  moment,  however  trifling  the  cause  and  however 
slight  and  momentary  the  effect,  has  real  existence ;  and  I  hold 
that  the  definition  of  being  is  simply  power. 

Theaet.  They  accept  your  suggestion,  having  nothing  better 
of  their  own  to  offer. 

Str.  Very  good ;  perhaps  we,  as  well  as  they,  may  one  day 
change  our  mind ;  but,  for  the  present,  this  may  be  regarded  as 
the  understanding  which  is  established  with  them. 

Theaet.  Agreed.  —  Sophist,  iii.  485. 
Esteem  and  praise  distinguished. 

Then  our  meeting  will  be  delightful ;  for  in  this  way  you, 

who  are  the  speakers,  will  be  most  likely  to  win  esteem,  and 
not  praise  only,  among  us  who  are  your  audience  ;  for  es- 
teem is  a  sincere  conviction  of  the  hearers'  souls,  but  praise  is 
often  an  insincere  expression  of  men  uttering  falsehoods  con- 
trary to  their  conviction.  And  thus  we  who  are  the  hearer j 
will  be  gratified  and  not  pleased  ;  for  gratification  is  of  the 
mind  when  receiving  wisdom  and  knowledge,  but  pleasure  is  of 
the  body  when  eating  or  experiencing  some  other  bodily  delight. 
Thus  spoke  Prodicus,  and  many  of  the  company  applauded  hif: 
words.  —  Protagoras,  i.  137. 
Eternal,  space  is. 
There  is  a  third  nature,  which  is  space,  and  is  eternal,  and 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  159 

admits  not  of  destruction,  and  provides  a  home  for  all  create^, 
things,  and  is  perceived  without  the  help  of  sense,  by  a  kind  of 
spurious  reason,  and  is  hardly  matter  of  belief,  which  we,  be- 
holding as  in  a  dream,  say,  of  all  existence,  that  it  must  of 
necessity  be  in  some  place  and  occupy  a  space,  but  that  what  is 
neither  in  heaven  nor  in  earth  has  no  existence.  —  Timaeus,  ii. 
544. 
Evil  and  good,  the  presence  of. 

Now  I  want  to  know  whether  in  all  cases  a  substance  is 

assimilated  by  the  presence  of  another  substance  ;  or  must  the 
presence  be  after  a  peculiar  sort  ? 

The  latter,  he  said. 

Then  that  which  is  neither  good  nor  evil  may  be  in  the  pres- 
ence of  evil,  but  not  as  yet  evil,  and  that  has  happened  before 
now  ? 

True. 

And  when  anything  is  in  the  presence  of  evil,  not  being  as 
yet  evil,  the  presence  of  good  arouses  the  desire  of  good  in  that 
thing  ;  but  the  presence  of  evil,  which  makes  a  thing  evil,  takes 
away  the  desire  and  friendship  of  the  good ;  for  that  which  was 
once  both  good  and  evil  has  now  become  evil  only,  and  the 
good  had  no  friendship  with  the  evil  ? 

None. 

And  therefore  we  say  that  those  who  are  already  wise, 
whether  Gods  or  men,  are  no  longer  lovers  of  wisdom ;  nor 
can  they  be  lovers  of  wisdom,  who  are  ignorant  to  the  extent 
of  being  evil,  for  no  evil  or  ignorant  person  is  a  lover  of  wis- 
dom. There  remain  those  who  have  the  misfortune  to  be  ig- 
norant, but  are  not  yet  hardened  in  their  ignorance,  or  void  of 
understanding,  and  do  not  as  yet  fancy  that  they  know  what 
they  do  not  know  ;  and  therefore  those  who  are  the  lovers  oi 
wisdom  are  as  yet  neither  good  nor  bad.  But  the  bad  do  not 
love  wisdom  any  more  than  the  good ;  for,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  neither  unlike  is  the  friend  of  unlike,  nor  like  of  like. 
You  remember  that  ? 

Yes,  they  both  said.  —  Lysis,  i.  58. 
Evil,  concealment  of.     See  Concealment,  etc. 
Evil,  God  not  the  author  of.      See  God. 

—  Let  us  equally  refuse  to  believe,  or  allow  to  be  repeated, 
the  tale  of  Theseus  son  of  Poseidon,  or  of  Peirithous  son  of 
Zeus,  going  forth  to  perpetrate  such  a  horrid  rape  ;  or  of  any 
other  hero  or  son  of  a  God  daring  to  do  such  impious  and  hor« 


160  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

rible  things  as  they  falsely  ascribe  to  them  in  our  day :  and  let 
us  compel  the  poets  to  declare  either  that  these  acts  were  not 
done  by  them,  or  that  they  were  not  the  sons  of  Gods :  —  both 
in  the  same  breath  they  shall  not  be  permitted  to  affirm.  We 
will  not  have  them  teaching  our  youth  that  the  gods  are  the 
authors  of  evil,  and  that  heroes  are  no  better  than  men  ;  un- 
doubtedly, these  sentiments,  as  we  were  saying,  are  neither 
pious  nor  true,  for  they  are  at  variance  with  our  demonstration 
that  evil  cannot  come  from  God.  Undoubtedly. 

And  further  they  are  likely  to  have  a  bad  effect  on  those 
who  hear  them  ;  for  everybody  will  begin  to  excuse  his  own 
vices  when  he  is  convinced  that  similar  wickednesses  are  always 
being  perpetrated  by  the  kindred  of  the  Gods,  — 

"  The  relatives  of  Zeus,  whose  paternal  altar  is  in  the  heavens  and  on  the  mount 
of  Ida," 

and  who  have  — 

"  The  blood  of  deity  yet  flowing:  in  their  veins." 

And  therefore  let  us  put  an  end  to  such  tales,  lest  they  engen 
der  laxity  of  morals  among  the  young.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  214. 
Evil,  suffering  less  than  doing.     See  Injustice. 
Evil-doers,  justice  among.     See  Honor  among  theives. 
Evil-doers,  effect  of  punishment  on.     See  Punishment,  etc. 
Evil ;  the  greatest  in  the  State.     See  Injustice,  penalty  of. 

Shall  We  begin  by  asking  of  ourselves  what  we  conceive 

to  be  the  greatest  good,  and  what  ought  to  be  the  chief  aim  of 
the  legislator  in  the  organization  of  a  State,  and  what  is  the 
greatest  evil,  and  then  consider  whether  our  previous  description 
has  the  stamp  of  the  good  or  of  the  evil. 

By  all  means. 

Can  there  be  any  greater  evil  than  discord  and  distraction 
and  plurality  where  unity  ought  to  reign  ?  or  any  greater  good 
than  the  bond  of  unity  ? 

There  cannot. 

And  there  is  unity  where  there  is  community  of  pleasures 
and  pains  —  where  all  the  citizens  are  glad  or  sorry  on  the 
same  occasions? 

No  doubt. 

Yes  ;  and  where  there  is  no  common  but  only  private  feeling, 
a  State  is  disorganized  —  when  you  have  one  half  of  the  world 
triumphing  and  the  other  sorrowing  at  the.  same  events  hai>- 
pening  to  the  city  and  the  citizens  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  161 

Certainly. 

Such  differences  commonly  originate  in  a  disagreement  about 
the  use  of  the  terms  "  meum  "  and  "  tuum,"  mine  and  thine. 

Exactly. 

And  is  not  that  the  best-ordered  State  in  which  the  greatest 
number  of  persons  apply  the  terms  "  mine  "  and  "  not  mine  " 
in  the  same  way  to  the  same  thing  ? 

True,  very  true. 

Or  that  again  which  most  nearly  approaches  to  the  condition 
of  the  individual  —  as  in  the  body,  when  but  a  finger  is  hurt, 
the  whole  frame,  drawn  towards  the  soul  and  forming  one  realm 
under  the  ruling  power  therein,  feels  the  hurt  and  sympathizes 
all  together  with  the  part  affected,  and  we  say  that  the  man 
has  a  pain  in  his  finger  ;  and  the  same  expression  is  used  about 
any  other  part,  which  has  a  sensation  of  pain  at  suffering  or 
of  pleasure  at  the  alleviation  of  suffering. 

Very  true,  he  replied ;  and  I  agree  with  you  that  in  the 
best-ordered  State  there  is  the  nearest  approach  to  this  com- 
mon feeling  which  you  describe. 

Then  when  any  one  of  the  citizens  experiences  any  good  or 
evil,  the  whole  State  will  make  his  case  their  own,  and  either 
rejoice  or  sorrow  with  him  ? 

Yes,  he   said,  that   is  what  will  happen  in  a  well-ordered 
State.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  287. 
Evil  and  good,  power  for.     See  Good,  etc. 
Evil  and  good,  when  they  are  such. 
Soc.  And  punishment  is  an  evil  ? 

Pol.  Certainly. 

Soc.  And  you  would  admit  once  more,  my  good  sir,  that 
great  power  is  a  benefit  to  a  man  if  his  actions  turn  out  to  his 
advantage,  and  that  this  is  the  meaning  of  great  power;  and 
if  not,  then  his  power  is  an  evil  and  is  no  power.  But  let  us 
look  at  the  matter  in  another  way  : — do  we  not  acknowledge 
that  the  things  of  which  we  were  speaking,  the  infliction  of 
death,  and  exile,  and  the  deprivation  of  property,  are  some- 
times a  good  and  sometimes  not  a  good  ? 

Pol.  Certainly. 

Soc.  About  that  you  and  I  may  be  supposed  to  agree  ? 

Pol  Yes. 

Soc.  Tell  me,  then,  when  do  you  say  that  they  are  good 
and  when  that  they  are  evil :  what  principle  do  you  lay 
down  ? 

11 


162  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Pol.  I  would  rather,  Socrates,  that  you  should  answer  as 
well  as  ask  that  question. 

Soc.  Well,  Polus,  since  you  would  rather  have  the  answer 
from  me,  I  say  that  they  are  good  when  they  are  just,  and 
evil  when  they  are  unjust.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  56. 
Evils  imperishable. 

Soc.  Evils,  Theodoras,  can  never  pass  away ;  for  there 

must  always  remain  something  which  is  antagonistic  to  good. 
Having  no  place  among  the  Gods  in  heaven,  of  necessity  they 
hover  around  the  earthly  nature  and  this  mortal  sphere. 
Wherefore  we  ought  to  fly  away  from  earth  to  heaven  as 
quickly  as  we  can  ;  and  to  fly  away  is  to  become  like  God, 
as  far  as  this  is  possible ;  and  to  become  like  him,  is  to  become 
holy  and  just  and  wise.  But,  0  my  friend,  you  cannot  easily 
convince  mankind  that  they  should  pursue  virtue  or  avoid  vice, 
not  in  order  that  a  man  may  seem  to  be  good,  which  is  the 
reason  given  by  the  world,  and  in  my  judgment  is  only  a  rep- 
etition of  an  old  wives'  fable,  whereas,  the  truth  is  that  God 
is  never  unrighteous  at  all  —  he  is  perfect  righteousness ;  and 
he  of  us  who  is  the  most  righteous  is  most  like  him.  Herein  is 
seen  the  true  cleverness  of  a  man,  and  also  his  nothingness  and 
want  of  manhood.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  378. 
Excess  in  pleasures. 

Soc.  Then  if  we  want  to  see  the  true  nature  of  pleasures 

as  a  class,  we  should  not  look  at  the  most  diluted  pleasures,  but 
at  the  most  extreme  and  most  vehement  ? 

Pro.  In  that  every  one  will  be  ready  to  agree. 

Soc.  And  the  obvious  instances  of  the  greatest  pleasure,  as 
we  have  often  said,  are  pleasures  of  the  body  ? 

Pro.   Certainly. 

Soc.  And  are  they  felt  by  us  to  be  or  become  greater,  when 
we  are  sick  or  when  we  are  in  health  ?  And  here  we  must  be 
careful  in  our  answer,  and  not  make  a  mistake. 

Pro.  How  are  we  likely  to  mistake  ? 

Soc.  Why,  because  we  might  be  tempted  to  answer  rashly, 
"  when  we  are  in  health." 

Pro.  Yes,  that  is  the  natural  answer. 

Soc.  Well,  but  are  not  those  pleasures  the  greatest  of  which 
mankind  have  the  greatest  desires  ? 

Pro.  True. 

Soc.  And  do  not  people  who  are  in  a  fever,  or  any  similar 
illness,  feel  cold  or  thirst  or  other  bodily  affection  more  in- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  168 

tensely  ?  Am  I  not  right  in  saying  that  they  have  a  deeper 
want  and  great  pleasure  in  the  satisfaction  of  their  want  ? 

Pro.  That  is  clear  when  you  say  so. 

Soc.  Well,  then,  shall  we  not  be  right  in  saying,  that  if  & 
person  would  wish  to  see  the  greatest  pleasures  he  ought  to  go 
and  look,  not  at  health,  but  at  disease  ?  And  here  you  must 
distinguish :  do  not  imagine  that  I  am  asking  whether  those 
who  are  very  ill  have  more  pleasure  than  those  who  are  well, 
but  understand  that  I  am  speaking  of  the  intensity  of  pleasure , 
1  want  to  know  where  pleasures  are  found  to  be  most  in  ex- 
cess. For,  as  I  say,  we  have  to  discover  what  is  pleasure,  and 
what  nature  they  attribute  to  her  who  deny  her  very  exist- 
ence. 

Pro.  I  believe  that  I  follow  you. 

Soc.  We  shall  soon  see  whether  you  do  or  not,  Protarchus, 
for  you  shall  answer  me ;  tell  me,  then,  whether  you  see,  I  will 
not  say  more,  but  more  intense  and  excessive  pleasures  in  wan- 
tonness than  in  temperance  ?  and  please  to  think  before  you 
speak. 

Pro.  I  understand  you,  and  see  that  there  is  a  great  differ- 
ence between  them ;  the  temperate  are  restrained  by  the  wise 
man's  aphorisms  of  "  never  too  much,"  which  is  their  rule,  but 
excess  of  pleasure  possessing  the  minds  of  fools  and  wantons 
quite  maddens  and  infuriates  them.  —  Philebus,  iii.  183. 
Exchange,  art  of. 

Sir.  Take  another  branch  of  his  (the  Sophist's)  geneal- 
ogy ;  for  he  is  a  professor  of  a  great  and  many-sided  art ;  and 
if  we  look  back  at  what  has  preceded,  we  see  that  he  presents 
another  aspect,  besides  that  of  which  we  are  speaking. 

Theaet.  In  what  respect  ? 

Sir.  There  were  two  sorts  of  acquisitive  art ;  the  one  con- 
cerned with  hunting,  the  other  with  exchange. 

Theaet.  There  were. 

Str.  And  of  the  art  of  exchange  there  are  two  divisions, 
the  one  of  giving,  and  the  other  of  selling. 

Theaet.  Let  us  assume  that. 

Str.  Further,  we  will  suppose  that  the  art  of  selling  is  di- 
vided into  two  parts. 

Theaet.  How  ? 

Str.  There  is  one  part  which  is  distinguished  as  the  sale  of 
a  man's  own  productions ;  another,  which  is  the  exchange  of 
the  works  of  others. 


16 i  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

TheaeL   Certainly. 

Str.  And  is  not  that  part  of  exchange  which  takes  place  in 
the  city,  being  about  half  of  the  whole,  termed  retailing  ' 

Theaet.  Yes. 

Str.  And  that  which  exchanges  the  goods  of  one  city  for 
those  of  another  by  selling  and  buying  is  the  exchange  of  the 
merchant  ? 

Theaet.  To  be  sure. 

Str.  And  this  exchange  of  the  merchant  is  partly  an  ex- 
change of  food  for  the  use  of  the  body,  and  partly  of  the  food 
of  the  soul  which  is  bartered  and  received  in  exchange  for 
money. 

Theaet.  What  do  you  mean  ? 

Str.  You  want  to  know  what  is  the  meaning  of  food  for  the 
soul ;  the  other  kind  you  understand. 

Theaet.  Yes. 

Str.  Take  music  in  general  and  painting  and  marionette 
playing  and  many  other  things,  which  are  purchased  in  one 
city,  and  carried  away  and  sold  in  another  —  wares  of  the  soul 
which  are  hawked  about  either  for  the  sake  of  instruction  or 
amusement ;  —  may  not  he  who  takes  them  about  and  sells 
them  be  quite  as  truly  called  a  merchant  as  he  who  sells  meats 
and  drinks  ? 

Theaet.  To  be  sure  he  may. 

Str.  And  would  you  not  call  by  the  same  name  him  who 
goes  about  from  city  to  city,  buying  knowledge  from  all  quar- 
ters and  exchanging  his  wares  for  money  ? 

Theaet.   Certainly  I  should. 

Str.  Of  this  merchandise  of  the  soul,  may  not  one  part  be 
fairly  termed  the  art  of  display  ?  And  there  is  another  which 
is  certainly  not  less  ridiculous,  but  being  a  trade  in  learning 
must  be  called  by  some  name  germane  to  the  matter  ? 

Theaet.   Certainly. 

Str.  There  should  be  two  names  for  them,  one  descriptive 
of  the  sale  of  the  knowledge  of  virtue,  and  the  other  of  the 
sale  of  other  kinds  of  knowledge. 

Theaet.  Of  course. 

Str.  The  name  of  art  seller  corresponds  well  enough  to 
the  one ;  and  I  hope  that  you  will  tell  me  the  name  of  the 
other. 

Theaet.  He  must  be  the  Sophist,  whom  we  are  seeking  ;  no 
other  name  can  possibly  be  right. 


PLATO'S  BEtT  THOUGHTS. 

Str.  No  other ;  and  so  this  trader  in  virtue  again  turns  out 
to  be  our  friend  the  Sophist,  whose  art  may  now  be  traced  a 
second  time,  through  the  art  of  acquisition  —  exchange  —  buy- 
ing and  selling,  —  by  the  merchant,  not  forgetting  that  there  is 
a  merchandise  of  the  soul  which  is  concerned  with  speech  and 
knowledge. 

Theaet.   Certainly. 

Str.  And  there  may  be  a  third  reappearance  of  him ;  for 
i_e  may  have  settled  down  in  a  city,  and  partly  fabricate  as 
well  as  buy  these  same  wares,  intending  to  live  by  selling  them, 
and  he  would  still  be  called  a  Sophist  ? 

Theaet.   Certainly. 

Str.  Then  that  part  of  the  acquisitive  art  which  exchanges, 
and  of  exchange  which  either  sells  a  man's  own  productions  or 
retails  those  of  others,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  in  either  way 
sells  knowledge,  you  would  again  term  Sophistry  ? 

Tlieaet.  I  must  if  I  am  to  keep  up  with  the  argument.  — 
Sophist,  iii.  457. 
Existence,  recollection  a  proof  of  previous. 

Yes,  he  said,  Cebes,  I  entirely  think  so  too  ;  nor  is  this  a 

delusion  in  which  we  are  agreeing ;  but  I  am  confident  in  the 
belief  that  there  truly  is  such  a  thing  as  living  again,  and  that 
the  living  spring  from  the  dead,  and  that  the  souls  of  the  dead 
are  in  existence,  and  that  the  good  souls  have  a  better  portion 
than  the  evil. 

Cebes  added  :  Your  favorite  doctrine,  Socrates,  that  knowl- 
edge is  simply  recollection,  if  true,  also  necessarily  implies  a 
previous  time  in  which  we  learned  that  which  we  now  recol- 
lect. But  this  would  be  impossible  unless  our  soul  was  in 
some  place  before  existing  in  the  human  form ;  here  then  is 
another  argument  of  the  soul's  immortality. 

But  tell  me,  Cebes,  said  Simmias  interposing,  what  proofs 
are  given  of  this  doctrine  of  recollection  ?  I  am  not  very  sure 
at  this  moment  that  I  remember  them. 

One  excellent  proof,  said  Cebes,  is  afforded  by  questions.  If 
you  put  a  quest:  DL  to  a  person  in  a  right  way,  he  will  give  a 
true  answer  of  himself,  but  how  could  he  do  this  unless  thero 
were  knowledge  and  right  reason  already  in  him  ?  And  this 
is  most  clearly  shown  when  he  is  taken  to  a  diagram  or  to  any- 
thing of  that  sort. 

But  if,  said  Socrates,  you  are  still  incredulous,  Simmias,  I 
would  ask  you  whether  you  may  not  agree  with  me  when  you 


160  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

look  at  the  matter  in  another  way  ;  I  mean,  if  you  are  still  in- 
credulous as  to  whether  knowledge  is  recollection  ? 

Incredulous,  I  am  not,  said  Simmias;  but  I  want  to  have 
this  doctrine  of  recollection  brought  to  my  own  recollection, 
and,  from  what  Cebes  has  said,  I  am  beginning  to  recollect 
and  be  convinced  ;  but  I  should  still  like  to  hear  what  you 
were  going  to  say. 

This  is  what  I  should  say,  he  replied :  —  We  should  agree,  if 
I  am  not  mistaken,  that  what  a  man  recollects  he  must  have 
known  at  some  previous  time. 

Very  true. 

And  what  is  the  nature  of  this  knowledge  or  recollection  ? 
I  mean  to  ask,  whether  when  a  person  has  already  seen  or 
heard,  or  in  any  way  perceived  anything,  and  he  knows  not 
only  that,  but  something  else  of  which  he  has  not  the  same  but 
another  knowledge,  we  may  not  fairly  say  that  he  recollects 
that  which  comes  into  his  mind.  Are  we  agreed  about  that  ? 
—  Phaedo,  i.  399. 
Existence,  pure  and  real. 

Which  classes  of  things  have  a  greater  share  of  pure  ex- 
istence in  your  judgment,  —  those  of  which  food  and  drink 
and  condiments  and  all  kinds  of  sustenance  are  examples,  or 
the  class  which  contains  true  opinion  and  mind,  and,  in  general, 
all  virtue  ?  Put  the  question  in  this  way  :  Which  has  a  more 
pure  being,  —  that  which  is  concerned  with  the  invariable,  the 
immortal,  and  the  true,  and  is  found  in  the  invariable,  immortal, 
true  ;  or  that  which  is  concerned  with  the  variable  and  mor- 
tal, and  is  found  in  the  variable  and  mortal  ? 

Far  purer,  he  replied,  is  the  being  of  that  which  is  con- 
cerned with  the  invariable. 

And  does  the  essence  of  the  invariable  partake  of  knowl- 
edge in  the  same  degree  as  of  essence  ? 

Yes,  of  knowledge  in  the  same  degree. 

And  of  truth  in  the  same  degree  ? 

Yes. 

And,  conversely,  that  which  has  less  of  truth  will  also  have 
less  of  essence  ? 

Necessarily. 

Then,  in  general,  those  kinds  of  things  which  are  in  the  ser- 
vice of  the  body  have  less  of  truth  and  essence  than  those 
which  are  in  the  service  of  the  soul  ? 

Far  less. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  167 

And  has  not  the  body  itself  less  of  truth  and  essence  than 
the  soul  ? 

Yes. 

What  is  filled  with  more  real  existence,  and  actually  has  a 
more  real  existence,  is  more  really  filled  than  that  which  is 
filled  with  less  real  existence  and  is  less  real  ? 

Of  course. 

And  if  there  be  a  pleasure  in  being  filled  with  that  which 
is  according  to  nature,  that  which  is  more  really  filled  with 
more  real  being  will  have  more  real  and  true  joy  and  pleasure  ; 
whereas  that  which  participates  in  less  real  being  will  be  less 
truly  and  surely  satisfied,  and  will  participate  in  a  less  true  and 
real  pleasure  ? 

Unquestionably.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  41 6. 

Str.  Let  us  push  the  question  ;  for  if  they  will  admit  that 
any,  even  the  smallest  particle  of  being,  is  incorporeal,  that  is 
enough  ;  they  must  then  say  what  that  nature  is  which  is  com- 
mon to  both  the  corporeal  and  incorporeal,  and  which  they  have 
in  their  mind's  eye  when  they  say  of  both  of  them  that  they 
"  are."  Perhaps  they  may  be  in  a  difficulty ;  and  if  this  is 
the  case,  there  is  a  possibility  that  they  may  accept  a  notion  of 
ours  respecting  the  nature  of  essence,  having  nothing  of  their 
own  to  offer. 

Theaet.  What  is  the  notion  ?     Tell  us,  and  we  shall  see. 

Str.  My  notion  would  be,  that  anything  which  possesses  any 
sort  of  power  to  affect  another,  or  to  be  affected  by  another 
even  for  a  moment,  however  trifling  the  cause  and  however 
slight  and  momentary  the  effect,  has  real  existence  ;  and  I  hold 
that  the  definition  of  being  is  simply  power.  —  Sophist,  iii. 
485. 
Existences,  separation  of. 

Str.  But    to  show  that  somehow  and  in  some  sense  the 

same  is  other,  or  the  other  same,  or  the  great  small,  or  the  like 
unlike  ;  and  to  delight  in  always  thus  bringing  forward  oppo- 
sitions in  argument,  is  no  true  refutation,  but  only  proves  that 
he  who  uses  such  arguments  is  a  neophyte  who  has  got  but  a 
little  way  in  the  investigation  of  truth. 

Theaet.  To  be  sure. 

Str.  For  certainly,  my  friend,  the  attempt  to  separate  all 
existences  from  one  another  is  not  only  tasteless  but  also  illit- 
erate and  unphilosophical. 

Theaet.  Why  so  ? 


168  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Str.  The  attempt  at  universal  separation  is  the  final  annihi- 
lation of  all  reason  ;  for  only  by  the  union  of  conceptions  with 
one  another  do  we  attain  to  discourse  of  reason. 

Theaet.  True. 

Str.  And  observe  that  we  were  only  just  in  time  in  making  a 
resistance  to  such  separatists,  and  compelling  them  to  make  the 
admission  that  other  did  mingle  with  other.  —  Sophist,  iii.  499. 

Faculties  ;  what  are  they  ? 

Do  we  admit  the  existence  of  opinion? 

Undoubtedly. 

As  being  the  same  with  knowledge,  or  another  faculty  ? 

Another  faculty. 

Then  opinion  and  knowledge  have  to  do  with  different  kinds 
of  matter  corresponding  to  this  difference  of  faculties  ? 

Yes. 

And  knowledge  is  relative  to  being,  and  knows  being ;  but 
before  I  proceed,  I  will  first  make  a  division. 

What  division  ? 

I  will  begin  by  placing  faculties  in  a  class  by  themselves ; 
they  are  powers  in  us  and  in  all  other  things  by  which  we  do 
as  we  do.  Sight  and  hearing,  for  example,  I  should  call  fac- 
ulties. Have  I  clearly  explained  the  class  which  I  mean  ? 

Yes,  I  quite  understand. 

Then  let  me  tell  you  my  view  about  them.  I  do  not  see 
them,  arid  therefore  the  distinctions  of  figure,  color,  and  the 
like,  which  enable  me  to  discern  the  differences  of  some  things, 
do  not  apply  to  them.  In  speaking  of  a  faculty  I  think  only 
of  the  end  and  the  operation  ;  and  that  which  has  the  same 
end  and  the  same  operation  I  call  the  same  faculty,  but  that 
which  has  another  end  and  another  operation  I  call  different. 
Would  that  be  your  way  of  speaking? 
Yes. 

To  return.  Would  you  place  knowledge  among  faculties,  or 
in  some  o'Jier  class  ? 

Certainly  knowledge  is  a  faculty,  and  the  most  powerful  of 
all  faculties. 

And  is  opinion  also  a  faculty  ? 

Certainly,  he  said ;  for  opinion  is  that  with  which  we  are 
able  to  form  an  opinion. 

And  yet  you  were  surely  admitting  a  little  while  ago  that 
knowledge  is  not  the  same  as  opinion  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  T  UOUGHTS.  169 

Why,  yes,  said  he  :  for  how  can  any  reasonable  being  ever 
identify  that  which  is  infallible  with  that  which  errs  ? 

That  is  very  good,  I  said,  and  clearly  shows  that  we  are 
conscious  of  a  distinction  between  them  ? 

Yes. 

Then  knowledge  and  opinion,  having  distinct  powers,  have 
also  distinct  ends  or  subject-matters  ? 

That  is  certain.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  305. 
False  oaths.     See  Oaths. 
False  opinion  and  true.    See  Heterodoxy. 

-  What  do  you  mean,  Dionysodorus  ?  I  have  often  heard, 
and  have  been  amazed,  to  hear  this  thesis  of  yours,  which  is 
maintained  and  employed  by  the  disciples  of  Protagoras,  and 
others  before  them,  and  which  to  me  appears  to  be  quite  won- 
derful and  suicidal,  as  well  as  destructive,  and  I  think  that  I 
am  most  likely  to  hear  the  truth  of  this  from  you.  The  dictum 
is  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  falsehood  ;  a  man  must  either 
say  what  is  true  or  say  nothing.  Is  not  that  your  position  ? 

He  assented. 

But  if  he  cannot  speak  falsely,  may  he  not  think  falsely  ? 

No,  he  cannot,  he  said. 

Then  there  is  no  such  thing  as  false  opinion  ? 

No,  he  said.  —  JEuthedymus,  i.  189. 

Soc.  Let  us  then  put  into  more  precise  terms  the  question 
which  has  arisen  about  pleasure  and  opinion.  Is  there  such  a 
thing  as  opinion  ? 

Pro.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  such  a  thing  as  pleasure  ? 

Pro.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  there  must  be  something  about  which  a  man  has 
au  opinion  ? 

Pro.  True. 

Soc.  And  something  which  gives  pleasure  ? 

Pro.   Quite  correct. 

Soc.  And  whether  his  opinion  is  right  or  wrong,  makes  no 
difference ;  he  will  still  always  have  an  opinion  ? 

Pro.  Certainly. 

Soc.  And  he  who  is  pleased,  whether  he  is  rightly  pleased  or 
not,  will  always  have  a  real  feeling  of  pleasure  ? 

Pro.  Yes  :  that  is  also  quite  true. 

Soc.  Then,  how  can  opinion  be  true  and  ialse,  and  pleasure 
only  true  ;  and  yet  the  state  of  being  pleased,  or  holding  an 
opinion  may  be  both  real  ? 


170  PLATO'S  BEST  TH  tVGHTS. 

Pro.  Yes ;  that  is  the  question. 

S?c.  You  mean  that  opinion  has  the  attributes  of  true  and 
false,  and  hence  becomes  not  merely  opinion,  but  opinion  of  a 
certain  quality ;  and  this  is  what  you  think  should  be  exam- 
ined  ? 

Pro.  Yes. — Philebus,  iii.  174. 
Falsehood,  when  committed.     See  Fiction,  etc. 
Falsehood,  God  incapable  of.    See  Deception. 
Falsehood  for  the  State.     See  Lies,  etc. 
Fame,  immortality  of  fame.     See  Immortality,  etc. 
Family  ties  in  the  State. 

Did  you  ever  know  an  example  in  other  States  of  a  ruler 

who  would  speak  of  one  of  his  colleagues  as  a  friend  and  of 
another  as  not  a  friend  to  him  ? 

Yes,  very  often. 

And  the  friend  he  describes  and  regards  as  one  in  whom  he 
has  an  interest,  and  the  other  as  one  in  whom  he  has  no  in- 
terest ? 

Exactly. 

But  would  any  of  your  guardians  speak  of  one  of  their  fel- 
lows as  a  friend  and  of  another  as  not  a  friend  to  him  ? 

Certainly  not :  for  every  one  whom  they  meet  will  be  re- 
garded by  them  either  as  a  brother  or  sister,  or  father  or 
mother,  or  son  or  daughter,  or  as  the  child  or  parent  of  those 
who  are  thus  connected  with  him. 

Capital,  I  said ;  but  let  me  ask  you  once  more :  Shall  they 
be  a  family  hi  name  only,  or  shall  they  always  act  as  if  they 
were  a  family  ?  For  example,  in  the  use  of  the  word  "  father," 
would  the  care  of  a  father  be  implied  and  the  filial  reverence 
and  duty  and  obedience  to  him  which  the  law  commands  ;  and 
is  the  violator  of  these  duties  to  be  regarded  as  an  impious  and 
unrighteous  person  who  is  not  likely  to  receive  much  good 
either  from  the  hands  of  God  or  man  ?  Are  these  to  be  the 
strains  which  the  children  will  hear  repeated  in  their  ears  by 
all  the  citizens  about  their  parents  and  kindred  when  they  are 
pointed  out  to  them  ? 

These,  he  said,  and  none  other ;  for  what  can  be  more  ridic- 
ulous than  for  them  to  utter  the  names  of  family  ties  with  the 
lips  only,  and  not  to  act  upon  them? 

Then  in  our  city  the  language  of  harmony  and  concord  will 
be  more  often  heard  than  in  any  other.  As  I  was  describing 
before,  when  any  one  is  well  or  ill,  the  universal  word  will  be, 
"  mine  is  well  "  or  "  mine  is  ill." 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  171 

Most  true. 

And  agreeably  to  this  mode  of  thinking  or  speaking,  were 
we  not  saying  also  that  they  will  have  their  pleasures  and 
pains  in  common  ? 

Yes,  and  so  they  will. 

And  they  will  have  a  common  interest  in  the  same  which 
they  will  call  "  my  own,"  and  having  this  common  interest  they 
will  have  a  common  feeling  of  pleasure  and  pain  ? 

Yes,  they  will  have  a  far  greater  community  of  feeling. — 
The  Republic,  ii.  289. 
Fancies  of  people. 

But  first  I  must  tell  you  that  I  am  one  who  from  my 

childhood  upward  have  set  my  heart  upon  a  certain  thing.  All 
people  have  their  fancies  ;  some  desire  horses,  and  others  dogs  ; 
and  some  are  fond  of  gold  and  others  of  honor.  Now,  I  have 
no  violent  desire  for  any  of  these  things  ;  but  I  have  a  passion 
for  friends  ;  and  I  would  rather  have  a  good  friend  than  the 
best  cock  or  quail  in  the  world:  I  would  even  go  further,  and 
say  than  a  horse  or  dog.  Yea,  by  the  dog  of  Egypt,  I  should 
greatly  prefer  a  real  friend  to  all  the  gold  of  Darius,  or  even 
to  Darius  himself ;  I  am  such  a  lover  of  friends  as  that.  And 
when  I  see  you  and  Lysis,  at  your  early  age,  so  easily  possessed 
yf  this  treasure,  and  so  soon,  he  of  you,  and  you  of  him,  I  am 
amazed  and  delighted,  seeing  that  I  myself,  although  I  am  now 
advanced  in  years,  am  so  far  from  having  made  a  similar  acqui- 
sition, that  I  do  not  even  know  in  what  way  a  friend  is  acquired. 
But  I  want  to  ask  you  a  question  about  this,  for  you  have  ex- 
perience :  tell  me  then,  when  one  loves  another,  is  the  lover  or 
the  beloved  the  friend ;  or  may  either  be  the  friend  ? 

I  think  that  either  may  be  the  friend. 

Do  you  mean,  I  said,  that  if  only  one  of  them  loves  the 
other,  they  are  mutual  friends  ? 

Yes,  he  said  ;  that  is  my  meaning. 

But  what  if  the  lover  is  not  loved  in  return  ?  That  is  a 
possible  case. 

Yes. 

Or  is,  perhaps,  even  hated  ?  for  that  is  a  fancy  which  lovers 
sometimes  have,  Nothing  can  exceed  their  love  ;  and  yet  they 
imagine  either  that  they  are  not  loved  Li  return,  or  that  they 
are  hated.  Is  not  that  true  : 

Yes,  he  said,  quite  true.  —  Lysis,  i.  50 


172  PLATO'S  BES7    THOUGHTS. 

Fancies  of  hope. 

Soc.  All  men,  as  we  were  saying  just  now,  aie  always 

filled  with  hopes  ? 

Pro.   Certainly. 

Soc.  And  these  hopes,  as  they  are  termed,  are  propositions 
which  exist  in  the  minds  of  each  of  us  ? 

Pro.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  the  fancies  of  hope  are  also  pictured  in  us  ;  a  man 
may  often  have  a  vision  of  a  heap  of  gold,  and  pleasures  ensu- 
ing, and  in  the  picture  there  may  be  a  likeness  of  himself 
mightily  rejoicing  over  his  good  fortune. 

Pro.  True. 

Soc.  And  may  we  not  say  that  the  good,  being  friends  of 
the  Gods,  have  generally  true  pictures  presented  to  them,  and 
the  bad  false  pictures  ? 

Pro.  Certainly. 

Soc.  And  yet  the  bad  have  pleasures  painted  in  their  fancy 
as  well  as  the  good  ;  but  I  presume  that  they  are  false  pleas- 
ures ? 

Pro.  They  are.  —  Philebus,  iii.  178. 
Fathers,  brave  sons  of  brave.     See  State,  heroes,  etc. 
Fathers,  sons  of  good,  why  they  turn  out  ill. 

But  why  do  the   sons  of  good    fathers  often    turn    out 

ill?  Let  me  explain  that,  —  which  is  far  from  being  wonder- 
ful, if,  as  I  have  been  saying,  the  very  existence  of  the  State 
implies  that  virtue  is  not  any  man's  private  possession.  If 
this  be  true  —  and  nothing  can  be  truer  —  then  I  will  ask  you 
to  imagine,  as  an  illustration,  some  other  pursuit  or  branch  of 
knowledge  which  may  be  assumed  equally  to  be  the  condition 
of  the  existence  of  a  State.  Suppose  that  there  could  be  no 
State  unless  we  were  all  flute-players,  as  far  as  each  had  the 
capacity,  and  everybody  was  freely  teaching  everybody  the  art, 
both  in  private  and  public,  and  reproving  the  bad  player  as 
freely  and  openly  as  every  man  now  teaches  justice  and  the 
laws,  not  concealing  them  as  he  would  conceal  the  other  arts, 
but  imparting  them  —  for  all  of  us  have  a  mutual  interest  in 
the  justice  and  virtue  of  one  another,  and  this  is  the  reason 
why  every  one  is  ready  to  teach  justice  and  the  laws ;  suppose, 
I  say,  that  there  were  the  same  readiness  and  liberality  among 
us  in  teaching  one  another  flute-playing,  do  you  imagine,  Soc- 
rates, that  the  sons  of  good  flute-player?  would  be  more  likely 
to  be  good  than  the  sons  of  bad  ones  ?  I  think  not.  Would 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  173 

not  their  sons  grow  up  to  be  distinguished  or  undistinguished 
according  to  their  own  natural  capacities  as  flute-playeis,  and 
tlie  son  of  a  good  player  would  often  turn  out  to  be  a  bad  one, 
and  the  son  of  a  bad  player  to  be  a  good  one,  and  all  flute- 
players  would  be  good  enough  in  comparison  of  those  who 
were  ignorant  and  unacquainted  with  the  art  of  flute-playing? 
la  like  manner  I  would  have  you  consider  that  he  who  ap- 
pears to  you  to  be  the  worst  of  those  who  have  been  brought 
up  in  laws  and  humanities,  would  appear  to  be  a  just  man  and 
a  master  of  justice  if  he  were  to  be  compared  with  men  who 
had  no  education,  or  courts  of  justice,  or  laws,  or  any  restraints 
upon  them  which  compelled  them  to  practice  virtue  —  with  the 
savages,  for  example,  whom  the  poet  Pherecrates  exhibited  on 
the  stage  at  the  last  year's  Lenaean  festival.  If  you  were  liv- 
ing among  men  such  as  the  man-haters  in  his  Chorus,  you 
would  be  only  too  glad  to  meet  with  Eurybates  and  Phrynon- 
das,  and  you  would  sorrowfully  long  to  revisit  the  rascality  of 
this  part  of  the  world.  And  you,  Socrates,  are  discontented, 
and  why  ?  Because  all  men  are  teachers  of  virtue,  each  one 
according  to  his  ability,  and  you  say  that  there  is  no  teacher. 
You  might  as  well  ask,  Who  teaches  Greek  ?  For  of  that  too 
there  will  not  be  any  teachers  found.  Or  you  might  ask,  Who 
is  to  teach  the  sons  of  our  artisans  this  same  art  which  they 
have  learned  of  their  fathers  ?  He  and  his  fellow-workmen 
have  taught  them  to  the  best  of  their  ability,  —  but  who  will 
carry  them  further  in  their  arts  ?  And  you  would  certainly 
have  a  difficulty,  Socrates,  in  finding  a  teacher  of  them  ;  but 
there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  finding  a  teacher  of  those  who 
are  wholly  ignorant.  And  this  is  true  of  virtue  or  of  any- 
thing ;  and  if  a  man  is  better  able  than  we  are  to  promote 
virtue  ever  so  little,  that  is  as  much  as  we  can  expect.  A 
teacher  of  this  sort  I  believe  myself  to  be,  and  above  all  other 
men  to  have  the  knowledge  which  makes  a  man  noble  and 
good  ;  and  I  give  my  pupils  their  money's-worth,  and  even 
more,  as  they  themselves  confess.  And  therefore  I  have  in- 
troduced the  following  mode  of  payment :  When  a  man  has 
been  my  pupil,  if  he  likes  he  pays  my  price,  but  there  is  no 
compulsion ;  and  if  he  does  not  like,  he  has  only  to  go  into  a 
temple  and  take  an  oath  of  the  value  of  the  instructions,  and 
he  pays  no  more  than  he  declares  to  be  their  value. 

Such  is  my  Apologue,  Socrates,  and  sucr  is  the  argument  bj 
which  I  endeavor  to  show  that  virtue  may  be  taught,  and   that 


174  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

this  is  the  opinion  of  the  Athenians.     And  I  have    also  at- 
tempted to  show  that  you  are  not  to  wonder  at  good  sons  hav 
Ing  bad  fathers,  or  at  good  fathers  having  bad  sons,  of  which  the 
sons  of  Polycleitus  afford  an  example,  who  are  the  companions 
of  our  friends  here,  Paralus  and  Xanthippus,  but  are  nothing 
in  comparison  with  their  father ;  and  this  is  true  of  the  sons  of 
many  other  artists.  —  Protagoras,  i.  126. 
Faultless  man  not  to  be  found. 

All  this  relates  to  Pittacus,  as  is  further  proved  by  the 

sequel.  For  he  adds  :  "  Therefore  I  will  not  throw  away  my 
life  in  searching  after  the  impossible,  hoping  in  vain  to  find  a 
perfectly  faultless  man  among  those  who  partake  of  the  fruit 
of  the  broad-bosomed  earth  ;  and  when  I  have  found  him  to 
tell  you  of  him  "  (this  is  the  vehement  way  in  which  he  pur- 
sues his  attack  upon  Pittacus  throughout  the  whole  poem)  : 
"  but  him  who  does  no  evil,  voluntarily  I  praise  and  love  ;  not 
even  the  Gods  war  against  necessity."  All  this  has  a  similar 
drift,  for  Simonides  was  not  so  ignorant  as  to  say  that  he 
praised  those  who  did  no  evil  voluntarily,  as  though  there  were 
some  who  did  evil  voluntarily.  For  no  wise  man,  as  I  believe, 
will  allow  that  any  human  being  errs  voluntarily,  or  volunta- 
rily does  evil  and  dishonorable  actions  ;  but  they  are  very  well 
aware  that  all  who  do  evil  and  dishonorable  things  do  them 
against  their  will.  And  Simonides  never  says  that  he  praises 
him  who  does  no  evil  voluntarily ;  the  word  u  voluntarily  "  ap- 
plies to  himself.  For  he  was  under  the  impression  that  a 
good  man  might  often  compel  himself  to  love  and  praise  an- 
other, and  to  be  the  friend  and  approver  of  another  ;  and  that 
there  might  be  an  involuntary  love,  such  as  a  man  might  feel 
to  an  unnatural  father  or  mother,  or  his  country,  or  the  like. 
Now  bad  men,  when  their  parents  or  country  have  any  defects, 
rejoice  at  the  sight  of  them  and  find  fault  with  them  and  ex- 
pose and  denounce  them  to  others  under  the  idea  that  the  rest 
of  mankind  will  be  less  likely  to  take  themselves  to  task  and 
accuse  them  of  neglect ;  and  they  blame  their  defects  far  more 
than  they  deserve  in  order  that  the  odium  which  is  necessarily 
incurred  by  them  may  be  increased:  but  the  good  man  dissem- 
bles his  feelings,  and  constrains  himself  to  praise  them  ;  and  if 
they  have  wronged  him  and  he  is  angry,  he  pacifies  his  anger 
and  is  reconciled,  and  compels  himself  to  "Jove  and  praise  his 
own  flesh  and  blood.  And  Simonides,  as  is  probable,  consid- 
ered that  he  himself  bad  often  had  to  praise  and  magnify  a  ty 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  175 

rant  or  the  like,  much  against  his  will,  and  he  also  wishes  to 
imply  to  Pittacus  that  he  is  not  censorious  and  does  not  cen- 
sure him.  "  For  I  am  satisfied,"  he  says,  "  when  a  man  is 
neither  bad  nor  very  stupid,  and  when  he  knows  justice  (which 
is  the  health  of  States),  and  is  of  sound  mind,  I  will  find  no  fault 
with  him,  for  I  am  not  given  to  finding  fault,  and  there  are  in 
numerable  fools  "  (implying  that  if  he  delighted  in  censure  he 
might  have  abundant  opportunity  of  finding  fault).  "  All 
things  are  good  with  which  evil  is  unmingled."  In  these  lat- 
ter words  he  does  not  mean  to  say  that  all  things  are  good 
which  have  no  evil  in  them,  as  you  might  say  "  All  things  are 
white  which  have  no  black  in  them,"  for  that  would  be  ridicu- 
lous ;  but  he  means  to  say  that  he  accepts  and  finds  no  fault 
with  the  moderate  or  intermediate  state.  "  I  do  not  hope,"  he 
says,  "  to  find  a  perfectly  blameless  man  among  those  who  par- 
take of  the  fruits  of  the  broad-bosomed  earth,  and  when  I  have 
found  him  to  tell  you  of  him ;  in  this  sense  I  praise  no  man. 
But  he  who  is  moderately  good,  and  does  no  evil,  is  good 
enough  for  me,  who  love  and  approve  every  one  "  (and  here 
observe  that  he  uses  a  Lesbian  word  liraaij^  because  he  is  ad- 
dressing Pittacus,  — "who  love  and  approve  every  one  volun- 
tarily, who  does  no  evil : "  and  that  the  stop  should  be  put 
after  '•  voluntarily  ")  ;  "  but  there  are  some  whom  I  involun- 
tarily praise  and  love.  And  you,  Pittacus,  I  would  never 
have  blamed,  if  you  had  spoken  what  was  moderately  good  and 
true  ;  but  I  do  blame  you  because,  wearing  the  appearance  of 
truth,  you  are  speaking  falsely  about  the  greatest  matters." 
And  this,  I  said,  Prodicus  and  Protagoras,  I  take  to  be  the 
true  meaning  of  Simonides  in  this  poem.  —  Protagoras,  i.  145. 
Fear,  its  object.  See  Courage,  Bravery. 

Soc.  Now,  let  us  proceed  a  step,  and  see  whether  we  are 

equally  agreed  about  the  fearful  and  the  hopeful.  Let  me  tell 
you  my  own  opinion,  and  if  I  am  wrong  you  shall  set  me  right ; 
in  my  opinion  the  terrible  and  the  hopeful  are  the  things  which 
do  or  do  not  create  fear,  and  fear  is  not  of  the  present,  nor 
of  the  past,  but  is  of  future  and  expected  evil.  Do  you  not 
agree  to  that.  Laches  ? 

La.  Yes,  Socrates,  entirely. 

Soc.  That  is  my  view,  Nicias  ;  the  terrible  things,  as  I  should 
say,  are  the  evils  which  are  future  ;  and  the  hopeful  are  the 
good  or  not  evil  things  which  are  future.  Do  you  or  do  you 
not  agree  with  me  ?  —  Laches,  i.  92. 


176  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Fear,  its  source  and  influi-nce. 

Aih.   Fear  springs  out  of  an  evil  habit  of  the  soul.      And 

when  some  one  applies  external  agitation  to  affections  of  this 
sort,  the  motion  coming  from  without  gets  the  better  of  the  ter- 
rible and  violent  internal  one,  and  produces  a  peace  and  calm  iu 
the  soul,  and  quiets  the  restless  palpitation  of  the  heart,  which 
is  a  thing  much  to  be  desired,  sending  some  to  sleep,  and  mak- 
ing others  who  are  awake  to  dance  to  the  pipe,  with  the  help 
of  the  Gods,  to  whom  they  offer  acceptable  sacrifices,  and  pro- 
ducing in  them  a  sound  mind,  which  takes  the  place  of  their 
former  agitations.  And  in  this,  as  I  would  shortly  say,  there 
is  a  considerable  amount  of  sense. 

Cle.  Certainly. 

Aih.  But  if  fear  has  such  a  power  we  ought  to  consider  fur- 
ther, that  every  soul  which  from  youth  upward  has  been  famil- 
iar with  fears,  will  be  made  more  liable  to  fear,  and  every  one 
will  admit  that  this  is  the  way  to  form  a  habit  of  cowardice  and 
not  of  courage. 

Cle.  Certainly. 

Aih.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  the  habit  of  overcoming,  from 
our  youth  upwards,  the  fears  and  terrors  which  beset  us,  may 
be  said  to  be  an  exercise  of  courage  ? 

Cle.  True.  —  Laws,  iv.  309. 
Few,  the  government  of  the,  only  true. 

Str.  The  several  forms  of  government  cannot  be  defined 

by  the  words  few  or  many,  voluntary  or  compulsory,  poverty 
or  riches  ;  but  some  notion  of  science  must  enter  in,  if  we  are 
to  be  consistent  with  what  has  preceded. 

Y.  Soc.  And  we  must  be  consistent. 

Str.  Well,  then,  in  which  of  these  various  forms  of  States 
may  the  science  of  government,  which  is  among  the  greatest 
and  most  difficult  of  all  sciences,  be  supposed  to  reside  ?  That 
we  must  discover,  and  then  we  shall  see  who  are  the  false  poli- 
ticians who  win  popularity  and  pretend  to  be  politicians  and  are 
not,  and  separate  them  from  the  wise  king. 

Y.  Soc.  That,  as  the  argument  has  already  intimated,  is  our 
duty. 

Str.  Do  you  think  that  the  multitude  in  a  State  can  attain 
political  science  ? 

Y.  Soc.  Impossible. 

Str.  But,  perhaps,  in  a  city  of  a  thousand  men,  there  would 
be  a  hundred,  or  say  fifty,  who  could  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  177 

T.  Soc.  In  that  case  political  science  would  certainly  be  the 
easiest  o'  all  sciences  ;  there  could  not  be  found  in  a  city  of  that 
number  as  many  really  first-rate  draught-players,  if  judged  by 
the  standard  of  the  rest  of  Hellas,  and  there  would  certainly 
not  be  as  many  kings.  For  kings  we  may  truly  call  those  who 
possess  royal  science,  whether  they  rule  or  not,  as  was  shown 
in  the  previous  argument. 

Sir.  Thank  you  for  reminding  me ;  and  the  consequence  is 
that  any  true  form  of  government  can  only  be  supposed  to  be 
the  government  of  one,  two,  or,  at  any  rate,  of  a  few. 

T.  Soc.   Certainly.  —  Statesman,  iii.  578. 
Fickleness  of  youth.     See  Chang eableness. 
Fiction,  censorship  of. 

You  know  also  that  the  beginning  is  the  chief est  part  of 

any  work,  especially  in  a  young  and  tender  thing ;  for  that  is 
the  time  at  which  the  character  is  formed  and  most  readily  re- 
ceives the  desired  impression. 

Quite  true. 

And  shall  we  just  carelessly  allow  children  to  hear  any  cas- 
ual tales  which  may  be  framed  by  casual  persons,  and  to  receive 
into  their  minds  notions  which  are  the  very  opposite  of  those 
which  are  to  be  held  by  them  when  they  are  grown  up  ? 

We  cannot. 

Then  the  first  thing  will  be  to  have  a  censorship  of  the 
writers  of  fiction,  and  let  the  censors  receive  any  tale  of  fiction 
which  is  good,  and  reject  the  bad  ;  and  we  will  desire  mothers 
and  nurses  to  tell  their  children  the  authorized  ones  only.  Let 
them  fashion  the  mind  with  these  tales,  even  more  fondly  than 
they  form  the  body  with  their  hands.  And  most  of  those  which 
are  now  in  use  must  be  discarded. 

Of  what  tales  are  you  speaking  ?  he  said. 

You  may  find  a  model  of  the  lesser  in  the  greater,  I  said ;  for 
they  are  necessarily  cast  in  the  same  mould,  and  there  is  the 
game  spirit  in  both  of  them. 

That  may  be  very  true,  he  replied  ;  but  I  do  not  as  yet  know 
what  you  would  term  the  greater. 

Those,  I  said,  which  are  narrated  by  Homer  and  Hesiod,  and 
the  rest  of  the  poets,  who  have  ever  been  the  great  story-tellers 
of  mankind. 

But  which  stories  do  you  mean,  he  said  ;  and  what  fault  do 
you  find  with  them? 

12 


178  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

A  fault  which  is  most  serious,  I  said ;  the  fault  of  telling  a 
He,  and  what  is  more,  a  bad  lie. 

But  when  is  this  fault  committed  ? 

Whenever  au  erroneous  representation  is  made  of  the  nature 
of  gods  and  heroes,  —  like  the  drawing  of  a  limner  which  has 
not  the  shadow  of  a  likeness  to  the  truth. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  sort  of  thing  is  certainly  very  blameable. 
—  The  Republic,  ii.  200. 
Figure  and  melody. 

I  may  observe,  however,  in  passing,  that  in  music  there 

certainly  are  figures  and  there  are  melodies ;  and  music  is  con- 
cerned with  harmony  and  rhythm,  so  that  you  may  speak  of  a 
melody  or  figure  having  rhythm  or  harmony  ;  the  term  is  cor- 
rect enough,  but  you  cannot  speak  correctly,  as  the  masters  of 
choruses  have  a  way  of  talking  metaphorically  of  the  "  color  " 
of  a  melody  or  figure,  although  you  can  speak  of  the  melodies 
or  figures  of  the  brave  and  the  coward,  praising  the  one  and 
censuring  the  other.  And  not  to  be  tedious,  the  figures  and 
melodies  which  are  expressive  of  virtue  of  soul  or  body,  or  of 
images  of  virtue,  are  without  exception  good,  and  those  which 
are  expressive  of  vice  are  the  reverse  of  good.  —  Laws,  iv.  184. 
Filial  monsters. 

But  we  are  digressing.  Let  us  therefore  return  and  in- 
quire how  the  tyrant  will  maintain  that  fair  and  numerous  and 
various  and  ever-changing  army  of  his. 

If,  he  said,  there  are  sacred  treasures  in  the  city,  he  will 
confiscate  them  and  spend  the  proceeds  ;  that  is  obvious.  And 
in  so  far  as  they  suffice,  he  will  be  able  to  diminish  the  taxes 
which  he  would  otherwise  have  to  impose. 

And  when  these  fail  ? 

Why,  clearly,  he  said,  then  he  and  his  boon  companions, 
whether  male  or  female,  will  be  maintained  out  of  his  father's 
estate. 

I  see  your  meaning,  I  said.  You  mean  that  the  people  from 
whom  he  has  derived  his  being,  will  maintain  him  and  his  com- 
panions ? 

Yes,  he  said ;  he  must  be  maintained  by  them. 

But  what  if  the  people  go  into  a  passion,  and  aver  that  a 
grown-up  son  ought  not  to  be  supported  by  his  father,  but  that 
the  father  should  be  supported  by  the  son  ?  He  did  not  bring 
his  son  into  the  world  in  order  that  when  he  was  grown  up  ho 
should  be  the  servant  of  his  own  servants,  and  should 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  179 

support  him  and  his  rabblo  of  slaves  and  companions  ;  but 
that,  having  such  a  protector,  he  might  be  emancipated  from 
the  government  of  the  rich  and  aristocratic,  as  they  are  termed. 
And  so,  bids  him  and  his  companions  depart,  just  as  any  other 
father  might  drive  out  of  his  house  a  riotous  son  and  his  party 
of  revelers. 

By  heaven,  he  said,  then  the  parent  will  discover  what  a 
monster  he  has  been  fostering  in  his  bosom ;  and  when  he 
wants  to  drive  him  out,  he  will  find  that  he  is  weak  and  his  son 
strong. 

Why,  you  do  not  mean  to  say  that  the  tyrant  will  use  vio- 
lence ?  What !  beat  his  father  if  he  opposes  him  ? 

Yes,  he  will ;  and  he  will  begin  by  taking  away  his  arms. 

Then  he  is  a  parricide,  and  a  cruel,  unnatural  son  to  an  aged 
parent  whom  he  ought  to  cherish ;  and  this  is  real  tyranny, 
about  which  there  is  no  mistake ;  as  the  saying  is,  the  people 
who  would  escape  the  smoke  which  is  the  slavery  of  freemen, 
have  fallen  into  the  fire  which  is  the  tyranny  of  slaves.  Thus 
liberty,  getting  out  of  all  order  and  reason,  passes  into  the 
harshest  and  bitterest  form  of  slavery.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  398. 

But,  O  heavens  !  Adeimantus,  on  account  of  some  new-fan- 
gled love  of  a  harlot,  who  is  anything  but  a  necessary  con- 
nection, can  you  believe  that  he  would  strike  the  mother  who 
is  his  ancient  friend  and  necessary  to  his  very  existence,  and 
would  place  her  under  the  authority  of  the  other,  when  she  is 
brought  under  the  same  roof  with  her  ;  or  that,  under  like 
circumstances,  he  would  do  the  same  to  his  withered  old  father, 
first  and  most  indispensable  of  friends,  for  the  sake  of  some 
newly-found,  blooming  youth  who  is  the  reverse  of  indispen- 
sable ?  —  The  Republic,  ii.  403. 

Filial  regards  and  duties.     See  Children,  what  they  owe  to  their  par- 
ents.    See  Parents,  etc. 
Finite  and  infinite. 

Soc.  Were  we  not  saying  that  God  revealed  a  finite  ele- 
ment of  existence,  and  also  an  infinite  ? 

Pro.  Certainly. 

Son.  Let  us  assume  these  two  principles,  and  also  a  third, 
which  is  compounded  out  of  them  ;  but  I  fear  that  I  am  very 
clumsy  at  these  processes  of  division  and  enumeration. 

Pro.  What  are  you  saying,  my  good  friend  ? 

Soc.  I  say  that  still  a  fourth  class  is  wanted. 

Pro.  And  what  will  that  be? 


180  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Soc.  Find  the  cause  of  the  third  or  compound,  au  I  add  this 
as  a  fourth  class  to  the  three  others. 

Pro.  And  would  you  like  to  have  a  fifth  class  or  cause  of 
resolution,  as  well  as  a  cause  of  composition  ? 

Soc.  Not,  I  think,  at  present ;  but  if  I  want  a  fifth  at  some 
future  time  you  shall  allow  me  to  have  one. 

Pro.   Certainly. 

Soc.  Let  us  begin  with  the  three  first ;  and  as  we  find  two 
out  of  the  three  greatly  divided  and  dispersed,  let  us  endeavor 
to  reunite  them,  and  see  how  in  each  of  them  there  is  a  one 
and  many. 

Pro.  If  you  would  explain  to  me  a  little  more  about  them, 
perhaps  I  might  be  able  to  follow  you. 

Soc.  Well,  the  two  classes  are  the  same,  which  I  mentioned 
before  ;  one  the  finite,  and  the  other  the  infinite,  and  I  will  first 
show  that  the  infinite  is  in  a  certain  sense  many,  and  the  finite 
may  be  hereafter  discussed. 

Pro.  I  agree. 

Soc.  And  now  consider  well ;  for  the  question  to  which  I 
invite  your  attention  is  difficult  and  controverted.  When  you 
speak  of  hotter  and  colder,  can  you  conceive  any  limit  in  those 
qualities  ?  Does  not  the  more  and  less,  which  dwells  in  their 
very  nature,  prevent  their  having  any  end  ?  for  if  they  had  an 
end,  the  more  and  less  would  themselves  have  an  end. 

Pro.  That  is  most  true. 

Soc.  Ever,  as  we  say,  into  the  hotter  and  the  colder  there 
enters  a  more  and  a  less. 

Pro.  True. 

Soc.  Then,   says  the  argument,  they  have   never  any  end, 
and  being  endless  must  also  be  infinite.  —  Philebus,  iii.  158. 
Fire  in  the  Universe. 

Soc.  We  see  the  elements  which  enter  into  the  nature  of 

the  bod.es  of  all  animals,  fire,  water,  air,  and,  as  the  storm- 
tossed  sailor  cries,  u  Land  ahead,"  in  the  constitution  of  the 
world. 

Pro.  The  proverb  may  be  applied  to  us  ;  for  truly  the 
storm  gathers  us  and  we  are  at  our  wit's  end. 

Soc.  Consider  now  that  each  of  the  elements,  as  they  exist 
in  us,  is  but  a  small  fraction  of  any  one  of  them,  and  of  a 
mean  sort,  and  not  in  any  way  pure,  or  having  any  power 
worthy  of  its  nature.  One  instance  will  prove  this  of  all  of 
them  ;  there  is  a  fire  within  us,  and  in  the  universe. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  181 

Pro.  True. 

Soc.  And  is  not  our  fire  small  and  weak  and  mean,  but  the 
fire  in  the  universe  is  wonderful  in  quantity  and  beauty,  and  in 
every  power  that  fire  has  ? 

Pro.  Most  true. 

Soc.  And  is  that  universal  element  nourished  and  generated 
and  ruled  by  our  fire,  or  is  the  fire  in  you  and  me,  and  in  other 
animals,  dependent  on  the  universal  fire  ? 

Pro.  That  is  a  question  which  does  not  deserve  an  an- 
swer. 

Soc.  Right ;  and  you  would  say  the  same,  if  I  am  not  mis- 
taken, of  the  earth  which  is  in  animals  and  the  earth  which  is 
in  the  universe,  and  you  would  give  a  similar  reply  about  all 
the  other  elements  ? 

Pro.  Why,  how  could  any  man  who  gave  any  other  be 
deemed  in  his  senses  ? 

Soc.  I  do  not  think  that  he  could,  —  but  now  go  a  step 
further  ;  when  we  see  those  elements  of  which  we  have  been 
speaking  gathered  up  in  one,  do  we  not  call  them  a  body  ? 

Pro.  Very  true. 

Soc.  And  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  cosmos,  which  for 
the  same  reason  may  be  considered  as  a  body,  because  made 
up  of  the  same  elements. 

Pro.   Very  true.  —  Philebus,  iii.  164. 
Fire  and  friction. 

Soc.  There  are  plenty  of  other  proofs  which  will  show  that 

motion  is  the  source  of  that  which  is  said  to  be  and  become, 
and  rest  of  not-being  and  destruction  ;  for  fire  and  warmth, 
which  are  supposed  to  be  the  parent  and  nurse  of  all  other 
things,  are  born  of  friction,  which  is  a  kind  of  motion  ;  is  not 
this  the  origin  of  fire  ? 

TJteaet.  Yes.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  353. 
Flattery  and  shams.     See  Cookery. 
Flattery  in  rhetoric. 

Soc.  In  my  opinion,  Gorgias,  the  whole  of  which  rhetoric 

is  a  part  is  not  an  art  at  all,  but  the  habit  of  a  bold  and  ready 
wit,  which  knows  how  to  manage  mankind :  this  habit  I  sum 
up  under  the  word  "  flattery ; "  and  it  appears  to  me  to  have 
many  other  parts,  one  of  which  is  cookery,  which  may  seem  to 
be  an  art,  but,  as  I  maintain,  is  only  an  experience  or  routine, 
and  not  an  art :  another  part  is  rhetoric,  and  the  art  of  dressing 
up  and  sophistry  are  two  others :  thus  there  are  four  branches, 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

and  four  different  things  answering  to  them.  And  Polus  may 
ask,  if  be  likes,  for  he  has  not  as  yet  been  informed,  what  part 
of  flattery  is  rhetoric :  he  did  not  see  that  I  had  not  yet  an- 
swered him  when  he  proceeded  to  ask  a  further  question :  — 
Whether  I  do  not  think  rhetoric  a  fine  thing  ?  But  I  shall  not 
tell  him  whether  rhetoric  is  a  fine  thing  or  not,  until  I  have 
first  answered,  "  What  is  rhetoric  ?  "  For  that  would  not  be 
right,  Polus ;  but  I  shall  be  happy  to  answer,  if  you  will  ask 
me,  What  part  of  flattery  is  rhetoric  ? 

Pol.  I  will  ask,  and  do  you  answer;  what  part  of  flattery  is 
rhetoric  ? 

Soc.  Will  you  understand  my  answer  ?  Rhetoric,  according 
to  my  view,  is  the  shadow  of  a  part  of  politics. —  Gorgias, 
iii.  48. 

Flesh  rejected  as  food. 

Ath.  The  practice  of  men  sacrificing  one  another  still  ex- 
ists among  many  nations :  and,  on  the  other  hand,  we  hear 
of  other  human  beings  who  do  not  even  venture  to  taste  the 
flesh  of  a  cow  and  had  no  animal  sacrifices,  but  only  cakes  and 
fruits  swimming  in  honey,  and  similar  pure  offerings,  but  no 
flesh  or  animals ;  from  these  they  abstained  under  the  idea 
that  they  ought  not  to  eat  them,  and  might  not  stain  the  altars 
of  the  Gods  with  blood.  In  former  days  men  are  said  to  have 
lived  a  sort  of  Orphic  life,  having  the  use  of  all  lifeless  things, 
but  abstaining  from  all  living  things.  —  Laws,  iv.  303. 
Flux  and  change. 

Soc.  We  may  leave  the  rest  of  their  theory  unexam- 

ined,  but  we  must  not  forget  to  ask  them  the  only  question  with 
which  we  are  concerned :  Are  all  things  in  motion  and  flux  ? 

Theod.  Yes,  they  will  reply. 

Soc.  And  they  are  moved  in  both  those  ways  which  we  dis- 
tinguished ;  that  is  to  say,  they  move  and  are  also  changed  ? 

Theod.  Of  course,  if  the  motion  is  to  be  perfect. 

Soc.  If  they  only  moved,  and  were  not  changed,  we  should 
be  able  to  say  what  are  the  kinds  of  things  which  are  in  mo- 
tion and  flux? 

Theod.  Exactly. 

-Soc.  But  now,  since  not  even  white  continues  to  flow  white, 
and  the  very  whiteness  is  a  flux  or  change  which  is  passing 
into  another  color,  and  will  not  remain  white,  can  the  name 
of  any  color  be  rightly  used  at  all  ? 

Theod.  How  is  that  possible.  Socrates,  either  in  the  case  of 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  183 

this  or  of  any  other  quality,  if  while  we  are  using  the  word 
the  object  is  escaping  in  the  flux  ? —  Theaetetus,  iii.  385. 
Food,  flesh  rejected  as.     See  Flesh. 

Force  and  persuasion  in  legislation.     See  Legislation,  etc. 
Forgetfulness  and  memory. 

Soc.  The  other  class  of  pleasures,  which,  as  we  were  say- 
ing is  purely  mental,  is  entirely  derived  from  memory. 

Pro.  What  do  you  mean  ? 

Soc.  I  must  first  of  all  analyze  memory  or  rather  percep- 
tion which  is  prior  to  memory  if  the  nature  of  these  mental 
states  is  ever  to  be  properly  cleared  up. 

Pro.  How  will  you  proceed. 

Soc.  Let  us  imagine  affections  of  the  body  that  are  extin- 
guished before  they  reach  the  soul,  which  remains  unaffected 
by  them ;  and  again,  other  affections  which  vibrate  through 
both  soul  and  body,  and  impart  a  shock  to  both  of  them. 

Pro.   Granted. 

Soc.  And  the  soul  may  be  said  to  be  oblivious  of  the  first 
but  not  of  the  second  ? 

Pro.   Quite  true. 

Soc.  When  I  say  oblivious  do  not  suppose  that  I  mean  for- 
getfulness  in  a  literal  sense ;  for  forgetfulness  is  the  exit  of 
memory,  which  in  this  case  has  not  yet  entered ;  and  to  speak 
of  the  loss  of  that  which  is  not  yet  in  existence,  and  never  has 
been,  is  a  contradiction  ;  do  you  see  ? 

Pro.  Yes. 

Soc.  Then  just  be  so  good  as  change  the  terms. 

Pro.  To  what  shall  I  change  them  ? 

Soc.  Instead  of  the  oblivion  of  the  soul,  when  you  are  de- 
scribing the  state  in  which  she  is  unaffected  by  the  shocks  of 
the  body,  say  unconsciousness.  —  Philebus,  iii.  169. 
Form,  harmony  of  soul  and. 

I  maintain  that  neither  we  nor  our  guardians,  whom  we 

have  to  educate,  can  ever  become  musical  until  we  and  they 
know  the  essential  forms  of  temperance,  courage,  liberality, 
magnificence,  and  then  kindred  as  well  as  the  contrary  forms, 
in  all  their  combinations,  and  can  recognize  them  and  their  im- 
ages wherever  they  are  found,  not  slighting  them  either  in 
small  things  or  great,  but  believing  them  all  to  be  within  the 
sphere  of  one  art  and  study. 

Most  assuredly. 

And  when  a  beautiful  soul  harmonizes  with  a  beautiful  form, 


184  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

and  the  two  are  cast  in  one  mould,  that  will  be  the  fairest  of 
sights  to  him  who  has  an  eye  to  contemplate  the  vision? 
The  fairest  indeed. 

And  the  fairest  is  also  the  loveliest  ? 

That  may  be  assumed. 

And  the  man  who  has  the  spirit  of  harmony  will  be  most  in 
love  with  the  loveliest ;  but  he  will  not  love  him  who  is  of  an 
inharmonious  soul  ? 

That  is  true,  he  replied,  if  the  deficiency  be  in  his  soul,  but 
any  merely  personal  defect  he  will  not  mind,  and  will  love  all 
the  same.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  226. 
Forms  of  government  unessential. 

We  seem  to  have  reached  a  height  from  which    a  man 

may  look  down  and  see  that  virtue  is  one  but  that  the  forms 
of  vice  are  innumerable ;  there  being  four  special  ones  which 
are  deserving  of  note. 

What  do  you  mean  ?  he  said. 

I  mean,  I  replied,  that  there  appear  to  be  as  many  forms  of 
the  soul  as  there  are  forms  of  the  State. 

How  many  ? 

There  are  five  of  the  State,  and  five  of  the  soul,  I  said. 

What  are  they? 

The  first,  I  said,  is  that  which  we  have  been  describing,  and 
which  may  be  said  to  have  two  names,  monarchy  and  aristoc- 
racy, accordingly  as  rule  is  exercised  by  one  or  many. 

True,  he  replied. 

But  I  regard  the  two  names  as  describing  one  form  only  ; 
for  whether  the  government  is  in  the  hands  of  one  or  many,  if 
the  governors  have  been  trained  in  the  manner  which  we  have 
described,  the  fundamental  laws  of  the  State  will  be  main- 
tained. 

That  is  true,  he  replied.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  272. 
Forms  of  government,  four. 

I  shall  particularly  wish  to  hear  what  were  the  four  con- 
stitutions of  which  you  were  speaking. 

That,  I  said,  is  easily  answered :  the  four  governments  of 
which  I  spoke,  so  far  as  they  have  distinct  names,  are,  first,  the 
Cretan  and  Spartan,  which  are  generally  applauded :  next, 
there  is  oligarchy ;  this  is  not  equally  approved,  and  is  a  form 
of  government  which  has  many  evils :  thirdly,  democracy, 
which  naturally  follows  oligarchy,  although  different ;  and 
comes  tyranny,  great  and  famous,  which  is  different  from 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  185 

them  all,  and  is  the  fourth  and  worst  disorder  of  a    State.     I 

do  not  know  of  any  other  constitution  which  can   be  said  to 

Lave  a  distinct  form.     There  are  lordships  and  principalities 

which  are  bought  and  sold,  and  some  other  intermediate  forms 

of  government.      But    these    nondescripts    are    oftener    found 

among  barbarians  than  among    Hellenes. —  The  Republic,  ii. 

371. 

Fortunate  unjust,  the.      See  Clever. 

Free  use  of  words  and  phrases.     See  Education,  the  sign  of  a  liberal. 

Freedom,  artificers  of. 

If  then  we  would  retain  the  notion  with  which  we  began, 

that  our  guardians  are  to  be  released  from  every  other  art,  and 
to  be  the  special  artificers  of  freedom,  and  to  minister  to  this 
and  have  no  other  end,  they  ought  not  to  practice  or  imitate 
anything  else ;  and,  if  they  imitate  at  all,  they  should  imitate 
from  youth  upward  the  characters  which  are  suitable  to  their 
profession  —  the  temperate,  holy,  free,  courageous,  and  the  like  ; 
but  they  should  not  depict  or  be  skillful  at  imitating  any  kind 
of  illiberality  or  other  baseness,  lest  from  imitation  they  should 
come  to  be  what  they  imitate.  Did  you  never  observe  how  im- 
itations, beginning  in  early  youth,  at  last  sink  into  the  constitu- 
tion and  become  a  second  nature  of  body,  voice,  and  mind  ?  — 
The  Republic,  ii.  218. 

Freedom,  anarchy,  resulting  from.     See  Anarchy. 
Freedom  unknown  to  the  tyrant. 

The  people  are  such  fools,  and  this  noxious  class  and  theil 

followers  grow  numerous  and  become  aware  of  their  numbers 
and  then  they  choose  him  who  has  most  of  the  tyrant  in  hi? 
soul,  and  make  him  their  leader. 

Yes,  he  said,  they  will  choose  him  because  he  will  be  the 
most  fit  to  be  a  tyrant. 

If  the  people  yield,  well  and  good  ;  but  if  they  resist  him,  as 
he  began  by  beating  his  own  father  and  mother,  so  now,  if  he 
has  the  power,  he  beats  them,  and  will  maintain  his  dear  old 
fatherland  and  motherland,  as  the  Cretans  say,  in  subjection  to 
his  young  retainer  whom  he  has  introduced  to  be  their  rulers 
and  masters.  Such  is  the  end  of  his  passions  and  desires. 

Exactly. 

Even  in  early  days  and  before  they  get  power,  this  is  their 
character ;  they  associate  only  with  their  own  flatterers  or 
ready  tools  ;  or,  if  they  want  anything  from  anybody,  they  in 
their  turn  are  equally  ready  to  fall  down  before  them ;  there  is 


186  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

no  attitude  of  kindness  which  they  will  not  assume,  but  when 
they  have  gained  their  point  they  know  them  no  more. 

Yes,  truly. 

They  are  always  either  the  masters  or  servants  and  never 
the  friends  of  anybody ;  the  tyrant  never  tastes  of  true  freedom 
or  true  friendship. 

Certainly  not. —  The  Republic,  ii.  404. 
Freedom  of  Philosophy 

Soc.  Those  who  have  been  trained  in  philosophy  and  liberal 

pursuits  compared  with  those  who  from  their  youth  upwards 
have  been  knocking  about  in  the  courts  and  such  like  places, 
are  in  their  way  of  life  as  freemen  are  to  slaves. 

Theod.  In  what  is  the  difference  seen  ? 

Soc.  In  the  leisure  spoken  of  by  you,  which  a  freeman  can 
always  command ;  he  has  his  talk  out  in  peace,  and,  like  our- 
selves, wanders  at  will  from  one  subject  to  another,  and  from  a 
second  to  a  third  if  his  fancy  prefers  a  new  one,  caring  not 
whether  his  words  are  many  or  few ;  his  only  aim  is  to  attain 
the  truth.  But  the  lawyer  is  always  in  a  hurry ;  there  is  the 
water  of  the  clepsydra  driving  him  on,  and  not  allowing  him  to 
expatiate  at  will  ;  and  there  is  his  adversary  standing  over  him, 
enforcing  his  rights ;  the  affidavit,  which  in  their  phraseology 
is  termed  the  brief,  is  recited ;  and  from  this  he  must  not  de- 
viate. He  is  a  servant,  and  is  disputing  about  a  fellow-servant 
before  his  master,  who  is  seated,  and  has  the  cause  in  his  hands  ; 
the  trial  is  never  about  some  indifferent  matter,  but  always  con- 
cerns himself ;  and  often  the  race  is  for  his  life.  The  conse- 
quence has  been,  that  he  has  become  keen  and  shrewd  ;  he  has 
learned  how  to  flatter  his  master  in  word  and  indulge  him  in 
deed  ;  but  his  soul  is  small  and  unrighteous.  His  slavish  con- 
dition has  deprived  him  of  growth  and  uprightness  and  inde- 
pendence ;  dangers  and  fears,  which  were  too  much  for  his 
truth  and  honesty,  came  upon  him  in  early  years,  when  the  ten- 
derness of  youth  was  unequal  to  them,  and  he  has  been  driven 
into  crooked  ways ;  from  the  first  he  has  practiced  deception 
and  retaliation,  and  has  become  stunted  and  warped.  And  so 
he  has  passed  out  of  youth  into  manhood,  having  no  soundness 
in  him  ;  and  is  now,  as  he  thinks,  a  master  in  wisdom.  Such  is 
the  lawyer,  Theodorus.  Will  you  have  the  companion  picture  of 
the  philosopher,  who  is  of  our  brotherhood  ;  or  shall  we  return 
to  the  argument  ?  Do  not  let  us  abuse  the  freedom  of  digres- 
sion which  we  claim. 


PLATO'S  BEST' THOUGHTS.  187 

Theod.  Nay,  Socrates,  let  us  finish  what  we  are  about ;  for 
you  truly  said  that  we  belong  to  a  brotherhood  which  is  free, 
and  are  not  the  servants  of  the  argument ;  but  the  argument  is 
our  servant,  and  must  wait  our  leisure.  Who  is  our  judge?  Or 
where  is  the  spectator  having  any  right  to  censure  or  control 
us,  as  he  might  the  poets  ?  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  375. 
Freedom  in  the  Persian  State. 

Ath.  The  State  which  has  become  exclusively  and  exces- 
sively attached  to  monarchy  or  to  freedom  has  neither  of  them 
in  moderation ;  but  your  States,  the  Laconian  and  Cretan,  have 
a  certain  moderation ;  and  the  Athenians  and  Persians  having 
had  more  at  first,  have  now  less.  Shall  I  tell  you  why  ? 

Cle.  By  all  means,  if  it  will  tend  to  the  elucidation  of  our 
subject. 

Ath.  Hear,  then  :  —  There  was  a  time  when  the  Persians 
had  more  of  the  state  which  is  a  mean  between  slavery  and 
freedom.  In  the  reign  of  Cyrus  they  were  freemen  and  also 
lords  of  many  others  ;  the  rulers  gave  a  share  of  freedom  to 
the  subjects,  and  being  treated  as  equals,  the  soldiers  were  on 
better  terms  with  their  generals,  and  showed  themselves  more 
ready  in  the  hour  of  danger.  And  if  there  was  any  wise 
councilor  among  them,  he  imparted  his  wisdom  to  the  public; 
for  the  king  was  not  jealous,  but  allowed  him  full  liberty  of 
speech  and  gave  honor  to  those  who  were  able  to  be  his  coun- 
selors in  anything,  and  allowed  all  men  equally  to  participate 
in  wisdom.  And  the  nation  waxed  in  all  respects,  because 
there  was  freedom  and  friendship  and  communion  of  soul 
among  them.  —  Laws,  iv.  223. 
Freedom  growing  to  license. 

Ath.  As  time  went  on,  the  poets  themselves  introduced  the 

reign  of  ignorance  and  misrule.  They  were  men  of  genius, 
but  they  had  no  knowledge  of  what  is  just  and  lawful  in  music ; 
raging  like  Bacchanals  and  possessed  with  inordinate  delights 
—  mingling  lamentations  with  hymns,  and  paeans  with  dithy- 
rambs ;  imitating  the  sounds  of  the  flute  on  the  lyre,  and 
making  one  general  confusion  ;  ignorantly  affirming  that  music 
has  no  truth,  and  whether  good  or  bad,  can  only  be  judged  of 
rightly  by  the  pleasure  of  the  hearer.  And  by  composing  such 
licentious  poems,  and  adding  to  them  words  as  licentious,  they 
have  inspired  the  multitude  with  lawlessness  and  boldness,  and 
made  them  fancy  that  they  can  judge  for  themselves  about 
melody  and  song.  And  in  this  way,  the  theatres  from  being 


188  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

mute  have  become  vocal,  as  though  they  had  understanding  of 
good  and  bad  in  music  and  poetry  ;  and  instead  of  an  aristoc- 
racy, an  evil  sort  of  theatrocracy  has  grown  up.  For  if  the 
democracy  which  judged  had  only  consisted  of  freemen,  there 
would  have  been  no  fatal  harm  done  ;  but  in  music  there  first 
arose  the  universal  conceit  of  omniscience  and  general  lawless- 
ness ;  freedom  came  following  afterwards,  and  men  fancying 
that  they  knew  what  they  did  not  know,  had  no  longer  any  fear, 
and  the  absence  of  fear  begets  shamelessness.  For  what  is 
shamelessness  but  the  insolent  refusal  to  regard  the  opinion  of 
the  better  by  reason  of  an  overdaring  sort  of  liberty  ? 

Meg.  That  is  most  true. 

Ath.  Consequent  upon  this  freedom  comes  the  other  free- 
dom of  disobedience  to  rulers  ;  and  then  the  attempt  to  escape 
the  control  and  exhortation  of  father,  mother,  elders,  and  when 
near  the  end,  the  control  of  the  laws  also ;  and  at  the  very 
end  there  is  the  contempt  of  oaths  and  pledges,  and  no  regard 
nt  all  for  the  Gods,  —  herein  they  exhibit  and  imitate  the  old  Ti- 
tanic nature ;  and  thus  they  return  again  to  the  old,  and  lead  a 
life  of  evils  which  have  no  end.  Why  do  I  say  so  ?  Because 
I  think  that  the  argument  ought  to  be  pulled  up  from  time  to 
time,  and  not  be  allowed  to  run  away,  but  held  with  bit  and 
bridle,  and  then  we  shall  not,  as  the  proverb  says,  fall  off  our 
ass.  —  Laws,  iv.  230. 

Friends  and  enemies, — treatment  of.     See  Enemies. 
Friendship  dearer  than  money.     See  Fancies,  etc. 

Oh  !  my  beloved  Socrates,  let  me  entreat  you  once  more 

to  take  my  advice  and  escape.  For  if  you  die  I  shall  not  only 
lose  a  friend  who  can  never  be  replaced,  but  there  is  another 
evil ;  people  who  do  not  know  you  and  me  will  believe  that  I 
might  have  saved  you  if  I  had  been  willing  to  give  money,  but 
that  I  did  not  care.  Now,  can  there  be  a  worse  disgrace  than 
this  —  that  I  should  be  thought  to  value  money  more  than  the 
life  of  a  friend?  For  the  many  will  not  be  persuaded  that  I 
wanted  you  to  escape,  and  that  you  refused. —  Orito,  i.  348. 
Friendship,  the  principle  of. 

Ath.  He  who  would  rightly  consider  these  matters  must  see 

the  nature  of  friendship  and  desire,  and  of  these  so-called 
loves,  for  they  are  of  two  kinds,  and  out  of  the  two  arises  a 
third  kind,  having  the  same  name ;  and  this  similarity  of  name 
causes  all  the  difficulty  and  obscurity. 

Cle.   How  is  tha'  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  189 

Atk.  Dear  is  the  like  iu  virtue  to  the  like,  and  tl  e  equal  to 
the  equal;  dear  also,  though  after  another  fashion,  is  he  who 
has  abundance  to  him  who  is  in  want.  And  when  either  of 
these  friendships  becomes  excessive,  we  term  the  excess  love. 

Cle.  Very  true. 

Ath.  The  friendship  which  arises  from  contraries  is  horrible 
and  coarse,  and  has  often  no  tie  of  communion  ;  but  that  which 
arises  from  likeness  is  gentle,  and  has  a  tie  of  communion, 
which  lasts  through  life.  As  to  the  mixed  sort,  which  is  made 
up  of  them  both,  there  is,  first  of  all,  a  difficulty  in  determin- 
ing what  he  who  is  possessed  by  this  third  love  desires  ;  more- 
over, he  is  drawn  different  ways,  and  is  in  doubt  between  the 
two  principles ;  the  one  exhorting  him  to  enjoy  the  beauty  of 
youth,  and  the  other  forbidding  him.  For  the  one  is  a  lover 
of  the  body,  and  hungers  after  beauty,  like  ripe  fruit,  and 
would  feign  satisfy  himself  without  any  regard  to  the  charac- 
ter of  the  beloved ;  the  other  holds  the  desire  of  the  body  to 
be  a  secondary  matter,  and  looking  rather  than  loving  with  his 
soul,  and  desiring  the  soul  of  the  other  in  a  becoming  manner, 
regards  the  satisfaction  of  the  bodily  love  as  wantonness  ;  he 
reverences  and  respects  temperance,  and  courage,  and  magnan- 
imity, and  wisdom,  and  wishes  to  live  chastely  with  the  chaste 
object  of  his  affection.  Now  the  sort  of  love  which  is  made 
up  of  the  other  two  is  that  which  we  have  described  as  the 
third.  Seeing  then  that  there  are  these  three  sorts  of  love, 
ought  the  law  to  prohibit  and  forbid  them  all  to  exist  among 
us  ?  Is  it  not  rather  clear  that  we  should  wish  to  have  in  the 
State  the  love  which  is  of  virtue  and  which  desires  the  beloved 
youth  to  be  the  best  possible ;  and  the  other  two,  if  possible, 
we  should  hinder  ?  What  do  you  say,  friend  Megillus  ? 

Meg.  I  think,  Stranger,  you  are  altogether  right  in  what  you 
have  been  now  saying.  —  Laws,  iv.  352. 
Funerals,  three  kinds  of. 

Of  three  kinds  of  funerals,  there  is  one  which  is  too  ex- 
travagant, another  is  too  niggardly,  the  third  in  a  mean ;  and 
you  choose  and  approve  and  order  the  last  wiihout  qualifica- 
tion. But  if  I  had  an  extremely  rich  wife,  and  she  bade  me 
bury  her,  and  I  were  to  describe  her  burial  in  poetry,  I  should 
praise  the  extravagant  sort ;  and  a  poor  miserly  man,  who  had 
not  much  to  spend,  would  approve  of  the  niggardly;  and  the 
man  of  moderate  means,  who  was  himself  moderate,  would 
praise  a  moderate  funeral.  Now  you  in  the  capacity  of  legis- 


190  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

lator  must  not  barely  say  "  a  moderate  funeral,"  but  you  must 
define  what  moderation  is,  and  how  much ;  unless  you  are  defi- 
nite, you  must  not  suppose  that  you  are  speaking  a  language 
that  can  become  law.  —  Laws,  iv.  247. 
Funeral  orations.     See  Battle,  death  in. 
Future  state  and  world. 

Such    is   the  nature   of  the   other  world ;  and   when  the 

dead  arrive  at  the  place  to  which  the  genius  of  each  severally 
conveys  them,  first  of  all,  they  have  sentence  passed  upon 
them,  as  they  have  lived  well  and  piously  or  not.  And  those 
who  appear  to  have  lived  neither  well  nor  ill,  go  to  the  river 
Acheron,  and  using  such  means  of  conveyance  as  they  have, 
are  carried  in  them  to  the  lake,  and  there  they  dwell  and  are 
purified  of  their  evil  deeds,  and  suffer  the  penalty  of  the 
wrongs  which  they  have  done  to  others,  and  are  absolved,  and 
receive  the  rewards  of  their  good  deeds  according  to  their  de- 
serts. But  those  who  appear  to  be  incurable  by  reason  of  the 
greatness  of  their  crimes  —  who  have  committed  many  and 
terrible  deeds  of  sacrilege,  murders  foul  and  violent,  or  the 
like  —  such  are  hurled  into  Tartarus  whicli  is  their  suitable 
destiny,  and  they  never  come  out.  Those  again  who  have  com- 
mitted crimes,  which,  although  great,  are  not  irremediable  — 
who  in  a  moment  of  anger,  for  example,  have  done  violence  tc 
a  father  or  a  mother,  and  have  repented  for  the  remainder  of 
their  lives,  or  who  have  taken  the  life  of  another  under  the 
like  extenuating  circumstances  —  these  are  plunged  into  Tar- 
tarus, the  pains  of  which  they  are  compelled  to  undergo  for  a 
year,  but  at  the  end  of  the  year  the  wave  casts  them  forth  — 
mere  homicides  by  way  of  Cocytus,  parricides  and  matricides 
by  Pyriphlegethon — and  they  are  borne  to  the  Acherusian 
lake,  and  there  they  lift  up  their  voices  and  call  upon  the  vic- 
tims whom  they  have  slain  or  wronged,  to  have  pity  on  them, 
and  to  be  kind  to  them,  and  to  let  them  come  out  into  the  lake. 
And  if  they  prevail,  then  they  come  forth  and  cease  from  their 
troubles ;  but  if  not,  they  are  carried  back  again  into  Tartarus 
and  from  thence  into  the  rivers  unceasingly,  until  they  obtain 
mercy  from  those  whom  they  have  wronged ;  for  that  is  the 
sentence  inflicted  upon  them  by  their  judges.  Those  too  who 
have  been  preeminent  for  holiness  of  life,  are  released  from 
this  earthly  prison,  and  go  to  their  pure  home  which  is  above. 
and  dwell  in  the  purer  earth  ;  and  those  who  have  duly  puri- 
fied themselves  with  philosophy,  live  henceforth  altogether 


PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS.  191 

without  the  body,  in  mansions  fairer  far  than  these,  which  may 
not  be  described,  and  of  which  the  time  would  fail  me  to  tell. 

Wherefore,  Simmias,  seeing  all  these  things,  what  ought  net 
we  to  do  in  order  to  obtain  virtue  and  wisdom  in  this  life  ? 
Fair  is  the  prize,  and  the  hope  great. 

A  man  of  sense  ought  not  to  say,  nor  will  I  be  too  confident, 
that  the  description  which  I  have  given  of  the  soul  and  her 
mansions  is  exactly  true.  But  I  do  say  that,  inasmuch  as  the 
soul  is  shown  to  be  immortal,  he  may  venture  to  think,  not  im- 
properly or  unworthily,  that  something  of  the  kind  is  true. 
The  venture  is  a  glorious  one,  and  he  ought  to  comfort  himself 
with  words  like  these,  which  is  the  reason  why  I  lengthen  out 
the  tale.  Wherefore,  I  say,  let  a  man  be  of  good  cheer  about 
his  soul,  who  has  cast  away  the  pleasures  and  ornaments  of  the 
body  as  alien  to  him,  and  hurtful  rather  in  their  effects,  and 
has  followed  after  the  pleasures  of  knowledge  in  this  life ;  who 
has  arrayed  the  soul  in  her  own  proper  jewels,  which  are 
temperance,  and  justice,  and  courage,  and  nobility,  and  truth  — 
thus  adorned,  she  is  ready  to  go  on  her  journey  to  the  world 
below,  when  her  hour  comes.  —  Phaedo,  i.  443. 

Gain,  the  lover  of. 

Has  the  lover  of  gain  greater  experience  of  the  pleasure 

of  knowledge  which  is  imparted  by  the  truth  than  the  philoso- 
pher has  of  the  pleasure  of  gain  ? 

The  philosopher,  he  replied,  has  greatly  the  advantage  ;  for 
he  has  always  known  the  taste  of  the  other  pleasures  from  his 
youth  upwards :  but  the  lover  of  gain  in  all  his  experience  has 
not  of  necessity  tasted  —  or,  I  should  rather  say,  even  if  he  de- 
sired could  hardly  have  tasted  by  any  process  of  learning  truth 
—  the  sweetness  of  intellectual  pleasures. 

Then  the  lover  of  wisdom  has  a  great  advantage  over  the 
lover  of  gain,  for  he  has  a  double  experience  ? 

Very  great  indeed.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  412. 
Generation  and  conception,  divine  nature  of.     See  Conception. 
Generation  of  opposites. 

Are  not  all  things  which  have  opposites  generated  out  of 

their  opposites  ?  I  mean  such  things  as  good  and  evil,  just 
and  unjust  —  and  there  are  innumerable  other  opposites  which 
are  generated  out  of  opposites.  And  I  want  to  show  that  ir 
all  opposites  there  is  a  similar  alternative  ;  I  mean  to  say,  for 
example,  that  anything  which  becomes  greater  must  become 
greater  after  being  less. 


192  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

True. 

And  that  which  becomes  less  must  have  been  once  greater 
and  then  have  become  less. 

Yes. 

And  the  weaker  is  generated  from  the  stronger,  and  the 
swifter  from  the  slower. 

Very  true. 

And  the  worse  is  from  the  better,  and  the  more  just  is  from 
the  more  unjust  ? 

Of  course. 

And  is  this  true  of  all  opposites  ?  and  are  we  convinced  that 
all  of  them  are  generated  out  of  opposites  ? 

Yes. 

And  in  this  universal  opposition  of  all  things,  are  there  not 
also  two  intermediate  processes  which  are  ever  going  on,  from 
one  to  the  other,  and  back  again  ;  where  there  is  a  greater  and 
a  less  there  is  also  an  intermediate  process  of  increase  and  dimi- 
nution, and  that  which  grows  is  said  to  wax,  and  that  which 
decays  to  wane  ? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  there  are  many  other  processes,  such  as  division  and 
composition,  cooling  and  heating,  which  equally  involve  a  pas- 
sage into  and  out  of  one  another.  And  this  holds  of  all  oppo- 
sites, even  though  not  always  expressed  in  words  —  they  are 
generated  oat  of  one  another,  and  there  is  a  passing  or  process 
from  one  to  the  other  of  them  ? 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

Well,  and  is  there  not  an  opposite  of  life,  as  sleep  is  the 
opposite  of  waking  ? 

True,  he  said. 

And  what  is  that  ? 

Death,  he  answered. 

And  these  then  are  generated,  if  they  are  opposites,  the  one 
from  the  other,  and  have  there  their  two  intermediate  processes 
also  ? 

Of  course. 

Now,  said  Socrates,  I  will  analyze  one  of  the  two  pairs  of 
opposites  which  I  have  mentioned  to  you,  and  also  its  interme- 
diate processes,  and  you  shall  analyze  the  other  to  me.  The 
state  of  sleep  is  opposed  to  the  state  of  waking,  and  out  of  sleep- 
ing waking  is  generated,  and  out  of  waking,  sleeping  ;  and  the 
process  of  generation  is  In  the  one  case  falling  asleep,  and  in 
the  other  waking  up.  Are  you  agreed  about  that  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  193 

Quite  agreed. 

Then,  suppose  that  you  analyze  life  and  death  to  me  in  the 
same  manner.  Is  not  death  opposed  to  life  ? 

Yes. 

And  they  are  generated  one  from  the  other  ? 

Yes. 

What  is  generated  from  the  living  ? 

The  dead. 

And  what  from  the  dead  ? 

I  can  only  say  in  answer  —  the  living. 

Then  the  living,  whether  things  or  persons,  Cebes,  are  gen- 
erated from  the  dead  ? 

That  is  clear,  he  replied. 

Then  the  inference  is  that  our  souls  exist  in  the  world  below  ? 

That  is  true. 

And  one  of  the  two  processes  or  generations  is  visible  —  for 
surely  the  act  of  dying  is  visible  ? 

Surely,  he  said.  —  Pkaedo,  i.  397. 
Generation,  spontaneous.     See  Life,  spontaneous. 
Generation  of  all  things. 
Soc.  Here  are  two  new  principles. 

Pro.  What  are  they  ? 

Soc.  One  is  the  generation  of  all  things,  and  another  i« 
essence. 

Pro.  I  readily  accept  both  generation  and  essence  at  your 
hands. 

Soc.  Very  right ;  and  would  you  say  that  generation  is  for 
the  sake  of  essence,  or  essence  for  the  sake  of  generation  ? 

Pro.  You  want  to  know  whether  that  which  is  called  essence 
is,  properly  speaking,  for  the  sake  of  generation  ? 

Soc.  Yes. 

Pro.  By  the  Gods,  I  wish  that  you  would  repeat  your  ques- 
tion. 

Soc.  I  mean,  0  my  Protarchus,  to  ask  whether  you  would 
tell  me  that  ship-building  is  for  the  sake  of  ships,  or  are  ships 
for  the  sake  of  ship-building  ?  and  in  all  similar  cases  I  should 
ask  the  same  question. 

Pro.  Why  do  you  not  answer  yourself,  Socrates  ? 

Soc.  I  have  no  objection,  but  you  must  take  your  part 

Pro.   Certainly. 

Soc.  My  answer  is,  that  all  things  instrumental,  remedial, 
material,  are  always  used  with  a  view  to  generation,  and  that 
13 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

each  generation  is  relative  to,  or  for  the  sake  of,  some  being  or 
essence,  and  the  whole  of  generation  relative  to  the  whole  of 
essence. 

Pro.  Assuredly. 

Soc.  Then  pleasure,  being  a  generation,  will  surely  be  for  :he 
sake  of  some  essence  ? 

Pro.  True. 

Soc.  And  that  for  the  sake  of  which  something  is  done  must 
be  placed  in  the  class  of  good,  and  that  which  is  done  for  the 
sake  of  another  thing,  in  some  other  class,  my  good  friend. 

Pro.  Most  certainly. 

Soc.  Then  pleasure,  being  a  generation,  will  be  rightly  placed 
in  some  other  class  than  that  of  good  ? 

Pro.   Quite  right. 

Soc.  Then,  as  I  said  at  first,  we  ought  to  be  very  grateful  to 
him  who  first  pointed  out  that  pleasure  was  a  generation  only, 
and  had  no  true  being ;  for  he  is  clearly  one  who  laughs  at  the 
notion  of  pleasure  being  a  good. 

Pro.  Assuredly. 

Soc.  And  he  would  surely  laugh  also  at  those  who  make 
generation  their  highest  end. 

Pro.  Of  whom  are  you  speaking  and  what  do  you  mean  ? 

Soc.  I  am  speaking  of  those  who  when  they  cure  hunger  or 
thirst  or  any  other  defect,  by  some  process  of  generation,  are  as 
much  delighted  as  if  the  generation  were  itself  pleasure  ;  and 
they  say  that  they  would  not  wish  to  live  without  these  and  the 
like  feelings. 

Pro.  That  is  certainly  what  they  appear  to  think. 

Soc.  And  is  not  destruction  universally  admitted  to  be  the 
opposite  of  generation? 

Pro.  Certainly. 

Soc.  Then  he  who  chooses  thus,  would   choose  generation 
and  destruction  rather  than  that  third  sort  of  life,  in  which,  as 
we  were  saying,  was  neither  pleasure  nor  pain,  but  only  the 
purest  possible  thought.  —  Pkilebus,  in.  194. 
Genius,  a  youthful. 

Socrates,  I  have  become  acquainted  with  one  very  re- 
markable Athenian  youth  whom  I  commend  to  you  as  well 
worthy  of  your  attention.  If  he  had  been  a  beauty  I  should 
have  been  afraid  to  praise  him,  lest  you  should  suppose  that  I 
was  in  love  with  him  ;  but  he  is  no  beauty,  and  you  must  noi 
be  offended  if  I  say  that  he  is  very  like  you  ;  for  he  has  a 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  195 

snub  iiose  and  projecting  eyes,  although  ttese  features  a.-e  less 
marked  in  him  than  in  you.  Seeing,  th*n,  that  he  has  no  per- 
sonal attractions,  I  may  freely  say,  that  in  all  my  acquaintance, 
which  is  very  large,  I  never  knew  any  one  who  was  his  equal 
in  natural  gifts  :  for  he  has  a  quickness  of  apprehension  which 
is  almost  unrivaled,  and  he  is  exceedingly  gentle,  and  also  the 
most  courageous  of  men  ;  there  is  a  union  of  qualities  in  him 
such  as  I  have  never  seen  in  any  other,  and  should  scarcely 
have  thought  possible  ;  for  those  who,  like  him,  have  quick  and 
ready  and  retentive  wits,  have  generally  also  quick  tempers  ; 
they  are  ships  without  ballast,  which  go  darting  about,  and 
grow  mad  rather  than  courageous  ;  and  the  steadier  sort,  when 
they  have  to  face  study,  are  stupid  and  cannot  remember. 
Whereas  he  moves  surely  and  smoothly  and  successfully  in  the 
path  of  knowledge  and  inquiry  ;  he  is  full  of  gentleness,  and 
flows  on  silently  like  a  river  of  oil  ;  at  his  age,  it  is  wonderful. 
—  Theaetetus,  iii.  343. 
Gentleness  and  greatness  seemingly  inconsistent. 

We  shall  have  to  select  natures  which  are  suited  to  their 

task  of  guarding  the  city  ? 

We  shall. 

And  the  selection  will  be  no  easy  task  I  said  ;  but  still  we 
must  endeavor  to  do  our  best  as  far  as  we  can  ? 

We  must. 

The  dog  is  a  watcher,  I  said,  and  the  guardian  is  also  a 
watcher  ;  and  in  this  point  of  view,  is  not  the  noble  youth  very 
like  a  well-bred  dog  ? 

How  do  you  mean  ? 

I  mean  that  both  of  them  ought  to  be  quick  to  see,  and 
swift  to  overtake  the  enemy  ;  and  strong  too,  if,  when  they 
have  caught  him,  they  have  to  fight  with  him. 

All  these  qualities,  he  replied,  will  certainly  be  required. 

Well,  and  your  guardian  must  be  brave  if  he  is  to  fight 
well? 

Certainly. 

And  is  he  likely  to  be  brave  who  has  no  spirit,  whether 
horse  or  dog  or  any  other  animal  ?  Have  you  never  observed 
how  the  presence  of  spirit  makes  the  soul  of  any  creature  ab- 
solutely fearless  and  invincible  ? 

I  have. 

Then  now  we  have  a  clear  idea  of  the  bodily  qualities  which 
are  required  in  the  guardian. 


196  PLATO'*  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

True. 

And  also  of  the  mental  ones  ;  his  soul  is  to  be  full  of  spirit  ? 

Yes. 

But  then,  Glaucon,  those  spirited  natures  are  apt  to  be  furi- 
ous with  one  another,  and  with  everybody  else. 

There  is  a  difficulty,  he  replied. 

Whereas,  I  said,  they  ought  to  be  gentle  to  their  friends, 
and  dangerous  to  their  enemies ;  or,  instead  of  their  enemies 
destroying  them,  they  will  destroy  themselves. 

True,  he  said. 

What  is  to  be  done  then,  I  said ;  how  shall  we  find  a  gentle 
nature  which  has  also  a  great  spirit,  for  they  seem  to  be  incon- 
sistent with  one  another  ? 

True. 

And  yet  he  will  not  be  a  good  guardian  who  is  wanting  in 
either  of  these  two  qualities  ;  and,  as  the  combination  of  them 
appears  to  be  impossible,  this  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  to  be 
a  good  guardian  is  also  impossible.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  197. 
Gentleness  of  warriors  and  rulers. 

• Soc.  We  spoke  of  those  who  were  intended  to  be  our 

warriors,  and  said  that  they  were  to  be  guardians  of  the  city 
against  the  attacks  of  enemies  internal  as  well  as  external,  and 
to  have  no  other  employment ;  they  were  to  be  merciful  in 
judging  their  subjects,  of  whom  they  were  by  nature  friends, 
but  when  they  came  in  the  way  of  their  enemies  in  battle  they 
^ere  to  be  fierce  with  them. 

Tim.  Exactly. 

Soc.  We  said,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  that  the  guardians 
should  be  doubly  gifted  with  a  passionate  and  also  with  a  phi- 
losophical temper,  and  that  then  they  would  be  as  they  ought 
to  be,  gentle  to  their  friends  and  fierce  to  their  enemies.  — 
Timaeus,  ii.  514. 
Geometry,  its  study  and  uses. 

Shall  we  inquire  whether  the  kindred  science  also  concerns 

us  ? 

You  mean  geometry  ? 

Yes. 

Certainly,  he  said ;  that  part  of  geometry  which  relates  to 
war  is  clearly  our  concern  ;  for  in  pitching  a  camp,  or  taking 
up  a  position,  or  closing  or  extending  the  lines  of  an  army,  or 
any  other  military  manoeuvre,  whether  in  actual  battle  or  on  a 
march,  there  will  be  a  great  difference  in  a  general,  according 
as  he  is  or  is  not  a  geometrician. 


PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHT*.  197 

Yes,  I  jaid,  but  for  that  purpose  a  very  little  of  either  geom- 
etry or  calculation  will  be  enough  ;  the  question  is  rather  of 
the  higher  and  greater  part  of  geometry,  whether  that  tends 
towards  the  great  end  —  I  mean  towards  the  vision  of  the  idea 
of  good ;  and  thither,  as  I  was  saying,  all  things  tend  which 
compel  the  soul  to  turn  her  gaze  towards  that  place,  where  is 
the  full  perfection  of  being,  of  which  she  ought,  by  all  means, 
to  attain  the  vision. 

True,  he  said. 

Then  if  geometry  compels  us  to  view  being,  it  concerns  us  ; 
if  becoming  only,  it  does  not  concern  us  ? 

Yes,  that  is  what  we  assert. 

Nevertheless,  such  a  conception  of  the  science  is  in  flat  con- 
tradiction to  the  ordinary  language  of  geometricians,  as  will 
hardly  be  denied  by  those  who  have  any  acquaintance  with  their 
study  :  for  they  speak  of  squaring  and  applying  and  adding, 
having  in  view  use  only,  and  absurdly  confuse  the  necessities 
of  geometry  with  those  of  daily  life  ;  whereas  knowledge  is  the 
real  object  of  the  whole  science. 

Certainly,  he  said. 

Then  must  not  a  further  admission  be  made  ? 

What  admission  ? 

The  admission  that  this  knowledge  at  which  geometry  aima 
is  of  the  eternal,  and  not  of  the  perishing  and  transient. 

That,  he  replied,  may  be  readily  allowed,  and  is  true. 

Then,  my  noble  friend,  geometry  will  draw  the  soul  towards 
truth,  and  create  the  spirit  of  philosophy,  and  raise  up  that 
which  is  now  unhappily  allowed  to  fall  down. 

Nothiag  will  be  more  effectual. 

Then  nothing  should  be  more  effectually  enacted,  than  that 
the  inhabitants  of  your  fair  city  should  learn  geometry.  —  The 
Republic,  ii.  354. 

Giants  and  Gods.     See  Essence,  war  about. 
Gifted  minds,  ill-educated,  become  the  worst. 

—  There  is  reason  in  supposing  that  the  finest  natures, 
when  under  alien  conditions,  receive  more  injury  than  the  in- 
ferior, because  the  contrast  is  greater. 

Very  true. 

And  may  we  not  say,  Adeimantus,  that  the  most  gifted 
minds,  when  they  are  ill-educated,  become  the  worst  ?  Do  not 
great  crimes  and  the  spirit  of  pure  evil  spring  out  of  a  full- 
ness of  nature  ruined  by  education  rather  than  irom  any  iiife- 


198  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

riority,  whereas  weak  natures  are  scarcely  capable  of  any  veij 
great  good  or  very  great  evil  ? 

There  I  think  that  you  are  right. 

And  our  philosopher  follows  the  same  analogy  —  he  is  like  a 
plant  which,  having  proper  nurture,  grows  and  matures  into  all 
virtue,  but,  if  sown  and  planted  in  an  alien  soil,  becomes  the 
most  noxious  of  all  weeds,  unless  saved  by  some  divine  help. 
—  The  Republic,  ii.  318. 
Gifts  of  the  pure  and  impure.     See  Impure. 
Gifts,  natural.     See  Talents,  etc. 
Globe,  the  world,  a.     See  Earth,  rotundity  of  the. 
Gluttony  and  sensuality. 

Those  then   who  know  not  wisdom  and  virtue,  and  are 

always  busy  with  gluttony  and  sensuality,  go  down  and  up 
again  as  far  as  the  mean ;  and  in  this  region  they  move  at  ran- 
dom throughout  life,  but  they  never  pass  into  the  true  upper 
world ;  thither  they  neither  look,  nor  do  they  ever  find  their 
way,  neither  are  they  truly  filled  with  true  being,  nor  do  they 
taste  of  true  and  abiding  pleasure.  Like  cattle  with  their 
eyes  looking  down  and  their  heads  stooping,  not  indeed  to  the 
earth,  but  to  the  dining-table,  thty  fatten  and  feed  and  breed, 
and,  in  their  excessive  love  of  these  delights,  they  kick  and 
butt  at  one  another  with  horns  and  hoofs  which  are  made  of 
iron ;  and  they  kill  one  another  by  reason  of  their  insatiable 
lust.  For  they  fill  themselves  with  that  which  is  not  substan- 
tial, and  the  part  of  themselves  which  they  fill  is  also  unsub- 
stantial and  incontinent. 

Verily,  Socrates,  said  Glaucon,  you  describe  the  life  of  the 
many  like  an  oracle. 

Their  pleasures  are  mixed  with  pains.  How  can  they  be 
otherwise  ?  For  they  are  mere  images  and  pictures  of  the 
true,  and  are  colored  only  by  contrast,  which  exaggerates  both 
light  and  shade,  and  so  they  implant  in  the  minds  of  fools  in- 
sane desires  of  themselves ;  and  they  are  fought  about  as 
Stesichorus  says  that  the  Greeks  fought  about  the  shadow  of 
Helen  at  Troy  in  ignorance  of  the  truth.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  417. 
God,  not  the  author  of  evil.  See  Evil,  concealment  of. 

Then  God,  if  he  be  good,  is  not  the  author  of  all  things, 

as  the  many  assert,  but  he  is  the  cause  of  a  few  things  only, 
and  not  of  most  things  that  occur  to  men.  For  few  are  the 
goods  of  human  life,  and  many  are  the  evils,  and  the  good 
only  is  to  be  attributed  to  God  alone ;  of  the  evils  the  cause 
«s  to  be  sought  elsewhere  and  not  in  him. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  199 

That  appears  to  me  to  be  most  true,  he  said. 
Then  we  must  not  listen  to  Homer  or  any  other  poet  who 
is  guilty  of  the  folly  of  saying  that  two  casks 

"  Lie  at  the  threshold  of  Zeus,  full  of  lots,  one  of  good,  the  other  of  evil  loU;  * 
and  that  he  to  whom  Zeus  gives  a  mixture  of  the  two, 
"  Sometimes  meets  with  evil  fortune  at  other  times  with  good," 
but  that  he  to  whom  is  given  the  cup  of  unmingled  ill, 
"Him  wild  hunger  drives  over  the  divine  earth." 

And  again 

"  Zeus,  who  is  the  dispenser  of  good  and  evil  to  n»." 

And  if  any  one  asserts  that  the  violation  of  oaths  and  treaties 
of  which  Pandarus  was  the  real  author,  was  brought  about  by 
Athene  and  Zeus,  or  that  the  strife  and  conflict  of  the  Gods 
was  instigated  by  Themis  and  Zeus,  he  shall  not  have  our  ap- 
proval ;  neither  will  we  allow  our  young  men  to  hear  the 
words  of  Aeschylus,  that 

"  God  plants  guilt  among  men  when  he  desires  utterly  to  destroy  a  house." 
And  if  a  poet  writes  of  the  sufferings  of  Niobe,  which  is  the  sub- 
ject of  the  tragedy  in  which  these  iambic  verses  occur,  or  of. 
the  house  of  Pelops,  or  of  the  Trojan  War,  or  any  similar 
theme,  either  we  must  not  permit  him  to  say  that  these  are  the 
works  of  God,  or,  if  they  are  of  God,  he  must  devise  some  such 
explanation  of  them  as  we  are  seeking :  he  must  say  that  God 
did  what  was  just  and  right,  and  they  were  the  better  for  being 
punished ;  but  that  those  who  are  punished  are  miserable,  and 
God  is  the  author  of  their  misery, —  the  poet  is  not  to  be  per- 
mitted to  say,  though  he  may  say  that  the  wicked  are  misera- 
ble because  they  require  to  be  punished,  and  are  benefited  by 
receiving  punishment  from  God ;  but  that  God  being  good  is 
the  author  of  evil  to  any  one,  that  is  to  be  strenuously  denied, 
and  not  allowed  to  be  sung  or  said  in  any  well-ordered  com- 
monwealth by  old  or  young.  Such  a  fiction  is  suicidal,  ruinous, 
impious.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  202. 
God  unchangeable. 

What  do  you  think  of  another  principle  ?      Shall   I  ask 

you  whether  God  is  a  magician,  and  of  a  nature  to  appear  in- 
sidiously now  in  one  shape,  and  now  in  another  —  sometimes 
himself  changing  and  becoming  different  in  form,  sometimes 
deceiving  us  with  the  semblance  of  such  transformations :  or 
is  he  one  and  the  same,  immutably  fixed  in  his  own  proper 
image  ? 


200  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

1  cannot  answer  you  without  more  thought. 

Well,  I  said  ;  but  if  we  suppose  a  change  in  anything  that 
change  must  be  effected  either  by  the  thing  itself,  or  by  some 
other  thing  ? 

That  is  most  certain. 

And  things  which  are  at  their  best  are  also  least  liable  to  be 

O 

altered  or  discomposed ;  for  example,  when  healthiest  and 
strongest,  the  human  frame  is  least  liable  to  be  affected  by 
meats  and  drinks, and  labors,  and  the  plant  which  is  in  the 
fullest  vigor  also  suffers  least  from  heat  or  wind,  or  other  simi- 

O 

lar  accidents. 

Of  course. 

And  this  is  true  of  the  soul  as  well  as  of  the  body  ;  the 
bravest  and  wisest  soul  will  be  least  confused  or  deranged  by 
any  external  influence. 

True. 

And  further,  as  I  should  suppose,  the  same  principle  applies 
to  all  works  of  art  —  vessels,  houses,  garments  ;  and  that  when 
well  made  and  in  good  condition,  they  are  least  altered  by  time 
and  circumstances. 

Very  true. 

Then  everything  which  is  good,  whether  made  by  art  or  nat- 
ure, or  both,  is  liable  to  receive  the  least  change  at  the  hands 
of  others  ? 

True. 

But  surely  God  and  the  things  of  God  are  absolutely  per- 
fect ? 

Of  course  they  are. 

He  is  therefore  least  likely  to  take  many  forms. 

He  is. 

But  suppose  again  that  he  changes  and  transforms  himself? 

Clearly,  he  said,  that  must  be  the  case  if  he  is  changed  at 
all. 

And  will  he  then  change  himself  for  the  better,  or  for  the 
worse  ? 

If  he  change  at  all  he  must  change  for  the  worse,  for  we 
cannot  suppose  that  he  is  deficient  in  virtue  or  beauty. 

Very  true,  Adeimantus  ;  but  then,  would  any  one,  whether 
God  or  man,  desire  to  change  for  the  worse  ? 

Impossible. 

Then  God  too  cannot  be  willing  to  change  ;  being,  as  is  sup- 
posed, the  fairest  and  best  that  is  conceivable,  every  God  ze- 
mains  absolutelv  and  forever  in  his  own  form. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHT*.  201 

That  necessarily  follows,  he  said,  in  my  judgment.  --  Ths 
Republic,  ii.  203. 

God  incapable  of  falsehood.     See  Deception. 
God,  absolute  knowledge  in.     See  Absolute  knowledge,  etc. 
Gods,  impassiveness  of  the. 

Soc.  Well,  then,  assuming  that  pain  ensues  on  the  disso- 
lution, and  pleasure  on  the  restoration  of  the  harmony,  let  us 
now  ask  what  will  be  the  condition  of  animated  beings  who  are 
neither  in  process  of  restoration  nor  of  dissolution.  And  mind 
what  you  are  going  to  say  :  I  ask  whether  any  animal  who 
is  in  that  condition  can  possibly  have  any  feeling  of  pleasure  or 
pain,  great  or  small  ? 

Pro.   Certainly  not. 

Soc.  Then  here  we  have  a  third  state,  over  and  above  that 
of  pleasure  and  of  pain  ? 

Pro.  Very  true. 

Soc.  And  do  not  forget  that  there  is  such  a  state  of  which 
the  recognition  will  very  considerably  affect  our  judgment  of 
pleasure,  and  I  should  like  to  say  a  word  or  two  about  it. 

Pro.  AVhat  have  you  to  say  ? 

Soc.  Why,  you  know  that  if  a  man  chooses  the  life  of  wis- 
dom, there  is  no  reason  why  he  should  not  live  in  this  neutral 
state. 

Pro.  You  mean  that  he  may  live  neither  rejoicing  nor  sor- 
rowing ? 

Soc.  Yes  ;  and  if  I  remember  rightly,  when  the  lives  were 
compared,  no  degree  of  pleasure,  whether  great  or  small,  was 
thought  to  be  necessary  to  him  who  chose  the  life  of  thought 
and  wisdom. 

Pro.  Yes  certainly,  that  was  said. 

Soc.  Then  he  may  live  without  pleasure ;  and  who  knows 
whether  this  may  not  be  the  most  divine  of  all  lives  ? 

Pro.  At  any  rate,  the  Gods  cannot  be  supposed  to  have 
either  joy  or  sorrow. 

Soc.   Certainly  not.     There  would  be  great  impropriety  in 
their  having  either.  —  Philebus,  iii.  169. 
Gods,  war  of  Giants  and.     See  Essence,  war  about. 
Gods,  existence  of  the. 

Ath.  They  will  make  some  provoking  speech  of  this  sort : 

O  inhabitants  of  Athens,  and  Sparta,  and  Cuosus,  they  will  re- 
ply, in  that,  you  speak  truly ;  for  some  of  us  deny  the  very  ex- 
istence of  the  Gods,  while  others,  as  you  say,  are  of  opinion 


202  PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS. 

that  they  do  not  care  about  us  ;  and  others  that  they  are  turned 
from  their  course  by  gifts.  Now  we  have  a  right  to  claim,  as 
you  yourself  allowed,  in  the  matter  of  the  laws,  that  before  you 
are  hard  upon  us  and  threaten  us,  you  should  argue  with  us  and 
convince  us  —  you  should  first  attempt  to  teach  and  persuade  us 
that  there  are  Gods  by  reasonable  evidences  —  and  also  that 
they  are  too  good  to  be  unrighteous,  or  to  be  propitiated,  or 
turned  from  their  course  by  gifts.  For  when  we  hear  these 
and  the  like  things  said  of  them  by  those  who  are  esteemed  to 
be  the  best  of  poets,  and  orators,  and  prophets,  and  priests,  and 
innumerable  others,  the  thoughts  of  most  of  us  are  not  set  upon 
abstaining  from  unrighteous  acts,  but  upon  doing  them  and 
making  atonement  for  them.  When  lawgivers  profess  that 
they  are  gentle  and  not  stern,  we  think  that  they  should  first  of 
all  use  persuasion  to  us,  and  show  us  the  existence  of  Gods, 
if  not  in  a  better  manner  than  other  men,  at  any  rate  in  a  truer  ; 
and  who  knows  but  that  we  shall  hearken  to  them  ?  —  Laics, 
iv.  397. 

Good  and  evil,  the  presence  of.     See  Evil  and  good,  etc. 
Good,  all  men  desire  the. 

"  When  H  man  loves  the  beautiful,  what  does  he  desire  ?  " 

I  answered  her,  "  That  the  beautiful  may  be  his."  "  Still,"  she 
said,  "  the  answer  suggests  a  further  question  :  "  What  is  given 
by  the  possession  of  beauty  ?  "  "  To  what  you  have  asked,"  I 
replied,  "  I  have  no  answer  ready."  "  Then,"  she  said,  "  let 
me  put  the  word  '  good '  in  the  place  of  the  beautiful,  and  re- 
peat the  question  once  more  :  He  who  loves  the  good  loves, 
what  does  he  love?"  "The  possession  of  the  good,"  I  said. 
"  And  what  does  he  gain  who  possesses  the  good  ?  "  "  Happi- 
ness," I  replied ;  "  there  is  no  difficulty  in  answering  that." 
"  Yes,"  she  said,  "  the  happy  are  made  happy  by  the  acquisition 
of  good  things.  Nor  is  there  any  need  to  ask  why  a  man  de- 
sires happiness  ;  the  answer  is  already  final."  "  You  are  right " 
I  said.  "  And  is  this  wish  and  this  desire  common  to  all  ?  and 
do  all  men  always  desire  their  own  good,  or  only  some  men  ? 

—  what  say  you  ?  "  "  All  men,"  I  replied  ;  "  the  desire  is  com- 
mon to  all."  —  The  Symposium,  i.  497. 

Good,  sufficiency  of  the.     See  Sufficiency,  etc. 

Good,  the  idea  )f,  the  highest  knowledge. 

What,  he  said,  is  there  a  knowledge  still  higher  than  these 

—  higher  than  justice  and  the  c  ther  virtues  ? 

Yes,  I  said,  there  is.     And  of  these  too  we  must  behold  no' 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  203 

the  outline  merely,  as  at  present  —  nothing  short  of  the  most 
finished  work  should  satisfy  us.  When  little  things  are  elabo- 
rated with  an  infinity  of  pains,  in  order  that  they  may  appear 
in  full  clearness  and  precision,  how  ridiculous  that  the  highest 
truths  should  not  be  held  worthy  of  the  greatest  exactness  ! 

A  right  noble  thought ;  but  do  you  suppose  that  we  shall  re- 
frain from  asking  you  which  are  the  highest  ? 

Nay,  I  said,  ask  if  you  will  ;  but  I  am  certain  that  you  have 
often  heard  the  answer,  and  now  you  either  do  not  understand 
or  you  mean  to  be  troublesome ;  I  incline  to  think  the  latter, 
for  you  have  been  often  told  that  the  idea  of  good  is  the  high- 
est knowledge,  and  that  all  other  things  become  useful  and  ad- 
vantageous only  by  their  use  of  this.  You  must  have  already 
guessed  that  of  this  I  am  about  to  speak,  concerning  which,  as 
you  have  often  heard  me  say,  we  know  so  little ;  and,  without 
which,  any  other  knowledge  or  possession  of  any  kind  will 
profit  us  nothing.  Do  you  thiuk  that  the  possession  of  the 
whole  world  is  of  any  value  without  the  good  ?  or  of  all  knowl- 
edge, without  the  beautiful  and  good  ? 

Assuredly  not. 

You  are  doubtless  aware  that  most  people  call  pleasure  good, 
and  the  finer  sort  of  wits  say  knowledge  ?  And  are  you  aware 
that  the  latter  cannot  explain  the  nature  of  knowledge,  but  are 
obliged  after  all  to  say  that  knowledge  is  of  the  good  ? 

How  ridiculous. 

Yes,  I  said,  that  they  should  begin  by  reproaching  us  with 
our  ignorance  of  the  good,  and  then  presume  our  knowledge  of 
it  —  for  good,  they  say,  is  the  knowledge  of  the  good,  which 
implies  that  we  understand  them  when  they  use  the  term  "good," 
—  is  certainly  ridiculous.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  332. 
Good,  beautiful  and  true,  the.     See  Beautiful. 
Good  counsel. 

The  law  would  say  that  to  be  patient  under  suffering  is 

best,  and  that  we  should  not  give  way  to  impatience,  as  there 
is  no  knowing  whether  such  things  are  good  or  evil  ;  and  noth- 
ing is  gained  by  impatience  ;  also,  because  no  human  thing  is 
of  serious  importance  ;  and  grief  stands  in  the  way  of  that 
which  at  the  moment  is  most  required. 

What  is  most  required  ?  he  asked. 

That  we  should  take  counsel  about  the  past,  and  when  the 
dice  has  been  thrown,  order  our  affairs  accordingly  by  the  advice 
of  reason ;  not  like  children  who  have  had  a  fall,  keeping  hold 


204  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

of  the  part  struck  and  wasting  time  in  setting  up  a  howl,  but 
accustoming  the  soul  forthwith  to  apply  a  remedy,  raising  up 
that  which  is  sickly  and  fallen,  banishing  the  cry  of  sorrow  by 
a  real  cure. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  the  best  way  of  meeting  the  attacks  of 
fortune.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  435. 
Good,  the  greatest.     See  Evil,  the  greatest,  etc. 

Soc.  I  am  still  in  the  dark ;  for  which  are  the  greatest  and 

best  of  human  things  ?  I  dare  say  that  you  have  heard  men 
singing  at  feasts  the  old  drinking  song,  in  which  the  singers 
enumerate  the  goods  of  life,  first  health,  beauty  next,  thirdly, 
as  the  writer  of  the  song  says,  wealth  honestly  obtained. 

Gor.  Yes,  I  know  the  song  ;  but  what  is  your  drift  ? 

Soc.  I  mean  to  say,  that  the  producers  of  those  things  which 
the  author  of  the  song  praises,  that  is  to  say,  the  physician, 
the  trainer,  the  money-maker,  will  at  once  come  to  you,  and 
first  the  physician  will  say,  "O  Socrates,  Gorgias  is  deceiving 
you,  for  my  art  is  concerned  with  the  greatest  good  of  men, 
and  not  his."  And  when  I  ask,  Who  are  you  ?  he  will  reply, 
"  I  am  a  physician."  What  do  you  mean  ?  I  shall  say.  Do 
you  mean  that  your  art  produces  the  greatest  good  ?  "  Cer- 
tainly," he  will  answer,  "  for  is  not  health  the  greatest  good  ? 
What  greater  good  can  men  have,  Socrates  ?  "  And  after  him 
the  trainer  will  come  and  say,  "  I,  too,  Socrates,  shall  be  greatly 
surprised  if  Gorgias  can  show  more  good  of  his  art  than  I  can 
show  of  mine."  To  him  I  shall  say,  Who  are  you,  my  friend, 
and  what  is  your  business  ?  "I  am  a  trainer,"  he  will  reply, 
"  and  my  business  is  to  make  men  beautiful  and  strong  in 
body."  When  I  have  done  with  the  trainer,  there  arrives  the 
money-maker,  and  he,  as  I  expect,  will  utterly  despise  them  all. 
"  Consider,  Socrates,"  he  will  say,  "  whether  Gorgias  or  any 
one  else  can  produce  any  greater  good  than  wealth."  Well, 
you  and  I  say  to  him,  And  are  you  a  creator  of  wealth  ? 
"  Yes,"  he  replies.  And  who  are  you  ?  "  A  money-maker." 
And  do  you  consider  wealth  to  be  the  greatest  good  of  man  ? 
"  Yes,"  he  will  reply,  "  of  course."  And  we  shall  rejoin  : 
Yes  ;  but  our  friend  Gorgias  contends  that  his  art  produces  a 
greater  good  than  yours  ;  and  then  he  will  be  sure  to  go  on 
and  ask,  "'  What  good  ?  Let  Gorgias  answer."  Xow  I  want 
you,  Gorgias,  to  imagine  that  this  question  is  asked  of  you  by 
them  and  by  me :  What  is  that  which,  as  you  say,  is  the  great- 
est good  of  man,  and  of  which  you  are  the  creator  ?  Answer 

38. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  20i> 

Gor.  That  good,  Socrates,  which  is  truly  the  greatest, being 
that  which  gives  to  men  freedom  in  their  own  persons,  and  to 
rulers  the  power  of  ruling  over  others  in  their  several  States. 
—  Gorgias,  iii.  36. 

Good  and  evil;  when  they  are  such.    See  Ecil,  and  good ;   when,  etc. 
Good  or  evil,  power  for. 

Of  those  fearful  examples,  most,  as  I  believe,  are  taken 

from  the  class  of  tyrants,  and  kings,  and  potentates,  and  public 
men,  for  they  are  the  authors  of  the  greatest  and  most  impi- 
ous crimes,  because  they  have  the  power.  And  Homer  wit- 
nesses to  the  truth  of  this ;  for  they  are  always  kings  and 
potentates,  whom  he  has  described  as  suffering  everlasting  pun- 
ishment in  the  world  below  ;  such  were  Tantalus  and  Sisy- 
phus and  Tityus.  But  no  one  ever  described  Thersites,  or 
any  private  person  who  was  a  villain,  as  suffering  everlasting 
punishment  or  as  incurable.  For  to  commit  the  worst  crimes, 
as  I  am  inclined  to  think,  was  not  in  bis  power,  and  he  was 
happier  than  those  who  had  the  power.  Yes,  Callicles,  the 
very  bad  men  come  from  the  class  of  those  who  have  power. 
And  yet  in  that  very  class  there  may  arise  good  men,  and 
worthy  of  all  admiration  they  are,  for  where  there  is  great 
power  to  do  wrong,  to  live  and  die  justly  is  a  hard  thing,  and 
greatly  to  be  praised,  and  few  there  are  who  attain  this.  Such 
good  and  true  men,  however,  there  have  been,  and  will  be 
again,  at  Athens,  and  in  other  States,  who  have  fulfilled  theu 
trust  righteously. —  Gorgias,  iii.  117. 
Good,  highest  in  the  State.  See  Evil,  the  greatest,  etc. 
Good,  in  the  divine  mind. 

Soc.  And  now  have  I  not  sufficiently  shown  that  Phile- 

bus'  goddess  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  identical  with  the  good? 

Phi.  Neither  is  your  "  mind  "  the  good,  Socrates,  for  that 
will  be  open  to  the  same  objections. 

Soc.  Perhaps,  Philebus,  you  may  be  right  in  saying  of  so  my 
"  mind,"  but  of  the  true,  which  is  also  the  divine  mind  —  far 
otherwise.  However,  I  will  not  at  present  claim  the  first  place 
for  mind  as  against  the  mixed  life,  but  we  must  come  to  some 
understanding  about  the  second  place.  For  you  might  affirm 
pleasure  and  I  mind  to  be  the  cause  of  the  mixed  life,  and 
;hat  case,  although  neither  of  them  would  be  good,  one  of  them 
might  be  imagined  to  be  the  cause  of  the  good.  And  I  might 
proceed  further  to  argue  in  opposition  to  Philebus  that  the 
element  which  makes  this  mixed  life  eligible  and  good,  is  more 


206  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

akin  and  more  similar  to  mind  than  to  pleasure.     And  if  this 
is  true,  pleasure  cannot  be  truly  said  to  share  either  in  the  first 
or  second  place,  and  does  not,  if  I  may  trust  my  own  mind, 
attain  even  to  the  third.  —  Philebus,  iii.  157. 
Good  and  pleasant,  a  unity  in  nature. 

Philebus  says  that  pleasure  is  the  true  end  of  all  living 

beings,  at  which  all  ought  to  aim,  and  moreover,  that  it  is 
the  chief  good  of  all,  and  that  the  two  names  "  good "  and 
"  pleasant,"  are  correctly  given  to  one  thing  and  one  nature ; 
Socrates,  on  the  other  hand,  begins  by  denying  this,  and  further 
says,  that  in  nature  as  in  name,  they  are  two,  and  that  wis- 
dom partakes  more  than  pleasure  of  the  good.  —  Philebus,  iii. 
200. 
Good,  truth  the  beginning  of  every. 

Truth    is   the   beginning   of    every  good    thing,   both   in 

heaven  and  on  earth  ;  and  he  who  would  be  blessed  and  happy, 
should  be  from  the  first  a  partaker  of  the  truth,  that  he  may 
live  a  true  man  as  long  as  possible,  for  then  he  can  be  trusted  ; 
but  he  is  not  to  be  trusted  who  loves  voluntary  falsehood,  and 
he  who  loves  involuntary  falsehood  is  a  fool.  Neither  condi- 
tion is  to  be  desired,  for  the  untrustworthy  and  ignorant  has 
no  friend,  and  as  time  advances  he  becomes  known,  and  lays 
up  in  store  for  himself  isolation  in  crabbed  age  when  life  is  on 
the  wane ;  so  that,  whether  his  children  or  friends  are  alive 
or  not,  he  is  equally  solitary.  —  Laws,  iv.  255. 
Good  men,  simplicity  of. 

I  should  like  to  put  a  question  to  you.     Ought  there  not 

to  be  good  physicians  in  a  State,  and  are  not  the  best  those 
who  have  treated  the  greatest  number  of  constitutions  good  and 
bad,  just  as  good  judges  are  those  who  are  acquainted  with  all 
sorts  of  moral  natures  ? 

Yes,  I  said,  I  quite  agree  about  the  necessity  of  having  good 
judges  and  good  physicians.  But  do  you  know  whom  I  think 
good? 

Will  you  inform  me  ? 

Yes,  if  I  can.  Let  me  however  note  that  in  the  same  ques- 
tion you  join  two  things  which  are  not  the  same. 

How  so  ?  he  asked. 

Why,  I  said,  you  join  physicians  and  judges.  Now  skillful 
physicians  are  those  who,  from  their  youth  upwards,  have  com- 
bined with  the  knowledge  of  their  art,  the  greatest  experience 
of  disease  ;  they  had  better  not  be  robust  in  health,  and  should 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  207 

iave  had  all  manner  of  diseases  in  their  own  persons.  For 
the  body,  as  I  conceive,  is  not  the  instrument  with  which  they 
cure  the  body ;  in  that  case  we  would  not  allow  them  ever  to 
be  sickly  ;  but  they  cure  the  body  with  the  mind,  and  the 
mind  which  is  or  has  become  sick  can  cure  nothing. 

That  is  very  true,  he  said. 

But  with  the  judge  the  case  is  different ;  he  governs  mind 
by  mind,  and  he  ought  not  therefore  to  have  been  reared 
among  vicious  minds,  and  to  have  associated  with  them  from 
youth  upwards,  in  order  that,  having  gone  through  the  whole 
calendar  of  crime,  he  may  infer  the  crimes  of  others  like  their 
diseases  from  the  knowledge  of  himself ;  but  the  honorable 
mind  which  is  to  form  a  healthy  judgment  ought  rather  to 
have  had  no  experience  or  contamination  of  evil  habits  when 
young.  And  this  is  the  reason  why  in  youth  good  men  often 
appear  to  be  simple,  and  are  easily  practiced  upon  by  the  evil, 
because  they  have  no  examples  of  what  evil  is  in  their  own 
souls.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  233. 
Goods  of  life. 

Now  goods  are  of  two  kinds :  there  are  human  and  there 

are  divine  goods,  and  the  human  hang  upon  the  divine ;  and 
the  State  which  attains  the  greater,  at  the  same  time  acquires 
the  less,  or  not  having  the  greater  loses  both.  Of  the  lesser 
goods  the  first  is  health,  the  second  beauty,  the  third  strength, 
including  swiftness  in  running  and  bodily  agility  generally, 
and  the  fourth  is  wealth,  not  the  blind  god  [Pluto],  but  one 
who  is  keen  of  sight,  because  he  has  wisdom  for  a  companion. 
For  wisdom  is  chief  and  leader  of  the  divine  class  of  goods, 
and  next  follows  temperance  ;  and  from  the  union  of  these  two 
with  courage  springs  justice,  and  fourth  in  the  scale  of  virtue 
is  courage.  The  four  naturally  take  precedence  of  the  other 
goods,  and  this  is  the  order  in  which  the  legislator  must  place 
them ;  and  after  these  he  will  enjoin  the  rest  of  his  ordinances 
on  the  citizens  with  a  view  to  these,  the  human  looking  to 

the  divine,  and  the  divine  looking  to  their  leader  mind 

For  the  goods  of  which  the  many  speak  are  not  really  good  : 
first  in  the  catalogue  is  placed  health,  beauty  next,  wealth 
third,  and  then  innumerable  others,  as  for  example  to  have  a 
keen  eye,  or  a  quick  ear  and  in  general  to  have  all  the  senses 
perfect ;  or,  again,  to  be  a  tyrant  and  do  as  you  like  ;  and  the 
final  consummation  of  happiness  is  to  have  acquired  all  these 
things,  and  as  soon  as  you  are  possessed  of  them  to  be  imuior- 


208  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

tal.   But  you  and  I  say,  that  while  to  the  just  and  holy  all  these 
things  are   the  best  of  possessions,  to  the  unjust  they  are  all, 
including  even  health,  the  greatest  of  evils.  For  in  truth  to  have 
siglit,  and  hearing,  and  the  use  of  the  senses,  or  to  live  at  all, 
without  justice  and  virtue,  even  though  a  man  be  rich  in  all 
the  so-called  goods  of  fortune,  is  the  greatest  of  evils,  if  life 
be  immortal ;  but  not  so  great,  if  the  bad  man  lives  a  very 
short  time.      These  are  the  truths  of  which  you  must  persuade 
or  if  they  will   not  be  persuaded,  must  compel  your  poets,  to 
sing  with  suitable  accompaniments  of  harmony  and    rhythm, 
and  in  these  they  must  train  up  your  youth.     Am  I  not  right  ? 
For  I  plainly  declare  that  evils,  as  they  are  termed,  are  goods  to 
the  unjust,  and  only  evils  to  the  just,  and  that  goods  are  truly 
good  to  the  good,  but  evil  to  the  evil.  —  Laws,  iv.  162,  190. 
Government,  forms  of,  unessential.     See  Forms. 
Government,  four  kinds  of.     See  Forms. 
Government,  property  in. 
What  manner  of  government  do  you  term  oligarchy  ? 

A  government  resting  on  a  valuation  of  property,  in  which 
the  rich  have  power  and  the  poor  are  deprived  of  power. 

I  understand,  he  replied. 

Ought  I  not  to  describe,  first  of  all,  how  the  change  from 
timocracy  to  oligarchy  arises  ? 

Yes. 

Well,  I  said,  no  eyes  are  required  in  order  to  see  how  the 
cue  passes  into  the  other. 

How? 

The  accumulation  of  gold  in  the  treasury  of  private  individ- 
uals is  the  ruin  of  timocracy  :  they  invent  illegal  modes  of  ex- 
penditure, but  what  do  they  or  their  wives  care  about  the  law  ? 

Very  true. 

And  then  one  seeing  another  prepares  to  rival  him,  and  thus 
the  whole  body  of  the  citizens  acquires  a  similar  character. 

Likely  enough. 

After  that  they  get  on  in  trade,  and  the  more  they  think  of 
making  a  fortune  the  less  they  think  of  virtue ;  for  when 
riches  and  virtue  are  placed  together  in  the  scales  of  the  bal- 
ance, the  one  always  rises  as  the  other  falls. 

True. 

And  in  proportion  as  riches  and  rich  men  are  honored  in  the 
State,  virtue  and  the  virtuous  are  dishonored.  —  The  Republic^ 
ii.377. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHT^  209 

Government,  the  beginning  of.     See  Legislation,  beginning  of. 
Government,  science  of. 

Str.  The  several  forms  of  government  cannot  be  defined 

by  the  words  few  or  many,  voluntary  or  compulsory,  poverty 
or  riches  ;  but  some  notion  of  science  must  enter  in,  if  we  are 
to  be  consistent  with  what  has  preceded. 

Y.  Soc.  And  we  must  be  consistent. 

Str.  "Well,  then,  in  which  of  these  various  forms  of  States 
may  the  science  of  government,  which  is  among  the  greatest 
and  most  difficult  of  all  sciences,  be  supposed  to  reside  ?  That 
we  must  discover,  and  then  we  shall  see  who  are  the  false  poli- 
ticians who  win  popularity  and  pretend  to  be  politicians  and 
are  not,  and  separate  them  from  the  wise  king. 

Y.  Soc.  That,  as  the  argument  has  already  intimated,  is  our 
duty. 

Str.  Do  you  think  that  the  multitude  in  a  State  can  attain 
political  science  ? 

Y.  Soc.  Impossible. 

Str.  But,  perhaps,  in  a  city  of  a  thousand  men,  there  would 
be  a  hundred,  or  say  fifty,  who  could  ? 

Y.   Soc.  In  that  case  political  science  would  certainly  be  the 
easiest  of  all  sciences  ;  there  could  not  be  found  in  a  city  of 
that  number  as  many  really  good  draught-players,  if  judged  by 
the  standard  of  the  rest  of  Hellas,  and  there  would  certainly 
not  be  as  many  kings.      For  kings  we  may  truly  call  those 
who  possess  royal  science,  whether  they  rule  or  not,  as  was 
shown  in  the  previous  argument.  —  Statesman,  iii.  578. 
Government  of  the  few,  only  true.     See  Few. 
Government,  with  or  without  laws. 

Str.  That  can  be   the  only  true  form  of  government  in 

which  the  governors  are  found  to  possess  true  science,  ahd  are 
not  mere  pretenders,  whether  they  rule  according  to  law,  or 
without  law,  over  willing  or  unwilling  subjects,  and  are  rich  or 
poor  themselves,  —  none  of  these  things  can  properly  be  in- 
cluded in  the  notion  of  the  ruler. 

Y.  Soc.  True. 

Str.  And  whethsr  with  a  view  to  the  public  good  they  purge 
the  State  by  killing  some,  or  exiling  some;  whether  they  lower 
or  increase  the  body  corporate,  by  sending  out  or  receiving 
into  the  hive  swarms  of  citizens,  while  they  act  according  to 
the  rules  of  wisdom  and  justice,  whether  with  or  without  laws, 
if  they  use  their  power  with  a  view  to  the  general  security 
14 


210  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

and  improvement,  then  the  city  over  which  they  rule,  and 
which  has  these  characteristics,  may  be  described  as  the  only 
true  State.  All  other  governments  are  not  genuine  or  real, 
but  only  imitations  of  this,  and  some  of  them  are  better  and 
some  of  them  are  worse ;  the  better  are  said  to  be  well  gov- 
erned, but  they  are  mere  imitations  like  the  others. 

T.  Soc.  I  agree,  Stranger,  in  the  greater  part  of  what  you 
say ;  but  as  to  their  ruling  without  laws  —  the  expression  has 
a  harsh  sound. 

Str.  I  was  just  going  to  ask,  Socrates,  whether  you  objected 
to  any  of  my  statements ;  and  now  I  see  that  this  notion  of 
there  being  good  government  without  laws  will  require  some 
further  consideration. 

T.  Soc.   Certainly. 

Str.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  legislation  is  in  a  manner 
the  business  of  a  king,  and  yet  the  best  thing  of  all  is  not  that 
the  law  should  rule,  but  that  a  man  should  rule,  supposing  him 
to  have  wisdom  and  royal  power.  Do  you  see  why  this  is  ? 

T.  Soc.  Why  ? 

Str.  Because  the  law  in  aiming  at  what  is  noblest  or  most 
just  cannot  at  once  comprise  what  is  best  for  all.  The  differ- 
ences of  men  and  actions,  and  the  endless  irregular  movements 
of  human  things,  do  not  admit  of  any  universal  and  simple 
rule.  No  art  can  lay  down  a  rule  which  will  last  for  all  time. 

Y.  Soc.  Of  course  not. 

Str.  But  this  the  law  is  always  striving  to  make  one  ;  like 
an  obstinate  and  ignorant  tyrant,  who  will  not  allow  anything 
to  be  done  contrary  to  his  appointment,  or  any  question  to  be 
asked  —  not  even  in  sudden  changes  of  circumstances,  when 
something  happens  to  be  better  than  what  he  commanded  for 
some  one. 

Y.  Soc.  True  ;  such  is  the  manner  in  which  the  law  treats 
us. 

Str.  A  perfectly  simple  principle  can  never  be  applied  to  a 
state  of  things  which  is  the  reverse  of  simple. 

Y.  Soc.  True. 

Str.  Then  if  the  law  is  not  the  perfection  of  right,  why  are 
we  compelled  to  make  laws  at  all? —  Statesman,  iii.  579. 
Government  of  Sparta,  doubtful 

Meg.  Stranger,  I  perceive  that  I  cannot  say,  without  more 

thought,  what  I  should  call  the  government  of  Lueedaeruon, 
*•-  it  seems  to  me  to  be  like  a  tyranny;  the  power  of  our 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  211 

Ephors  is  marvelously  tyrannical ;  and  sometimes  it  appears  to 
me  to  be  of  all  cities  the  most  democratical ;  and  who  can  rea- 
sonably deny  that  it  is  an  aristocracy  ?  We  liav-e  also  a  mon- 
archy which  is  held  for  life,  and  is  said  by  all  mankind,  and 
not  by  ourselves  only,  to  be  the  most  ancient  of  all  mon- 
archies ;  and,  therefore,  when  asked  ou  a  sudden,  I  cannot  pre- 
cisely say  which  form  of  government  the  Spartan  is. 

Cle.  I  am  in  the  same  difficulty,  Megillus,  for  I  do  not  feel 
confident  that  the  polity  of  Cuosus  is  any  of  these. 

Ath.  The  reason  is,  my  excellent  friends,  that  you  really 
have  polities,  but  the  cities  of  which  we  were  speaking  are 
mere  aggregations  of  citizens  who  are  the  subjects  and  servants 
of  parts  of  their  own  State ;  they  are  named  after  their  several 
ruling  powers,  and  are  not  polities  at  all.  But  if  States  are  to 
be  named  after  their  rulers,  the  true  State  ought  to  be  called 
by  the  name  of  the  God  who  rules  over  wise  men.  —  Laws,  iv. 
240. 
Government,  necessity  for. 

Mankind  must  have  laws,  and  conform  to  them,  or  their 

life  would  be  as  bad  as  that  of  the  most  savage  beast.  And 
the  reason  of  this  is,  that  no  man's  nature  is  able  to  know 
what  is  best  for  the  social  state  of  man  ;  or  knowing,  always 
able  to  do  what  is  best.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  a  difficulty 
in  apprehending  that  the  true  art  of  politics  is  concerned,  not 
.with  private  but  with  public  good;  —  for  public  good  binds  to- 
gether States,  but  private  only  distracts  them,  —  nor  do  men 
always  see  that  the  gain  is  greater  both  to  the  individual  and 
the  State,  when  the  State  and  not  the  individual  is  first  consid- 
ered. In  the  second  place,  even  if  a  person  know  as  a  matter 
of  science  that  this  is  the  truth,  but  is  possessed  of  absolute 
and  irresponsible  power,  he  will  never  be  able  to  abide  in  this 
principle  or  to  persist  in  regarding  the  public  good  as  primary 
in  the  State,  and  the  private  good  as  secondary.  Human  nat- 
ure will  be  always  drawing  him  into  avarice  and  selfishness, 
avoiding  pain  and  pursuing  pleasure  without  any  reason,  and 
will  bring  these  to  the  front,  obscuring  the  juster  and  better  , 
and  so,  working  darkness  in  his  soul,  will  at  last  fill  with  evils 
both  him  and  the  whole  city.  For  if  a  man  were  born  so  di- 
vinely gifted  that  he  could  naturally  apprehend  the  truth,  he 
would  have  no  need  of  laws  to  rule  over  him  ;  for  there  is  no 
law  or  order  which  is  above  knowledge,  nor  can  mind,  without 
impiety,  be  deemed  the  subject  or  slave  of  any  man,  but'  rather 
the  lord  of  all.  —  Laws,  iv.  388. 


212  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Governors       See  Kings,  Rulers,  Legislators. 

Greatness  and  gentleness  seemingly  inconsistent.     See  Gentlenes*. 

etc. 
Greatness,  the  idea  of. 

You  see  a  number  of  great  objects,  and  when  you  look  at 

them  together,  there  seems  to  you  to  be  one  and  the  same  idea 
(or  nature)  in  them  all;  hence  you  conceive  of  a  greatness 
as  one. 

Very  true,  said  Socrates. 

And  if  you  go  on  and  allow  your  mind  in  like  manner  to 
embrace  in  one  view  the  idea  of  greatness  and  of  great  things 
which  are  not  the  idea,  and  to  compare  them,  will  not  another 
greatness  arise,  which  will  appear  to  be  the  source  of  all  these  ? 

That  is  true. 

Then  another  kind  of  greatness  now  comes  into  view  over 
and  above  absolute  greatness,  and  the  individuals  which  par- 
take of  it;  and  then  another  over  and  above  all  these,  by  virtue 
of  which  they  will  all  be  great,  and  so  each  idea,  instead  of  be- 
ing one,  will  be  infinitely  subdivided.  —  Parmenides,  iii.  249. 
Grief,  manifestations  of. 

Shall  we  proceed  to  get  rid  of  the  weepings  and  wailings 

of  famous  men  ? 

They  will  go  with  the  others. 

But  shall  we  be  right  in  getting  rid  of  them  ?  Reflect :  our 
principle  is  that  the  good  man  will  not  consider  death  terrible 
to  a  good  man. 

Yes  ;  that  is  our  principle. 

And  therefore  he  will  not  sorrow  for  his  departed  friend  as 
though  he  had  suffered  anything  terrible  ? 

He  will  not. 

Such  an  one,  as  we  further  maintain,  is  enough  for  himself  and 
his  own  happiness,  and  therefore  is  least  in  need  of  other  men. 

True,  he  said. 

And  for  this  reason  the  loss  of  a  son  or  brother,  or  the 
deprivation  of  fortune,  is  to  him  of  all  men  least  terrible. 

Assuredly. 

And  therefore  he  will  be  least  likely  to  lament,  and  will 
bear  with  the  greatest  equanimity  any  misfortune  of  this  sort 
which  may  befall  him. 

Yes,  he  will  feel  such  a  misfortune  less  than  another. 

Then  we  shall  be  right  in  getting  rid  of  the  lamentations  of 
famous  men,  and  making  them  over  to  woaien  ^and  not  even 


PLATO'S   BEST  THOUGHTS.  213 

to  women  who  are  good  for  anything),  or  to  men  of  a  baser 
sort,  that  those  who  are  being  educated  by  us  to  be  the  de- 
fenders of  their  country  may  scorn  to  do  the  like. 

That  will  be  very  right. 

Than  we  will  once  more  entreat  Homer  and  the  other  poets 
not  to  depict  Achilles,  who  is  the  son  of  a  goddess,  first  lying 
on  his  side,  then  on  his  back,  and  then  on  his  face  ;  then  start- 
ing up  and  sailing  in  a  frenzy  along  the  shores  of  the  barren 
sea ;  now  taking  the  dusky  ashes  in  both  his  hands  and  pouring 
them  over  his  head,  or  bewailing  and  sorrowing  in  the  various 
modes  which  Homer  has  delineated.  Nor  should  he  describe 
Priam,  the  kinsman  of  the  Gods,  as  praying  and  beseeching  — 
"  Rolling  in  the  dirt,  calling  each  man  loudly  by  his  name," 

Still  more  earnestly  will  we  beg  of  him  not  to  introduce  the 
Gods  lamenting  and  saying, — 

"Alas!  my  misery!  Alas!  that  I  bore  the  bravest  to  my  sorrow." 

But  if  he  must  introduce  the  Gods,  at  any  rate  let  him  not  dare 
so  completely  to  represent  the  greatest  of  the  Gods  as  to  make 
him  say  — 

"  O  heavens !  with  my  eyes  I  behold  a  dear  friend  of  mine  driven  round  and 
round  the  city,  and  my  heart  is  sorrowful." 

Or  again  :  — 

"  Woe  is  me  that  I  am  fated  to  have  Sarpedon,  dearest  of  men  to  me,  subdued  at 
the  hands  of  Patroclus  the  son  of  Menoetius." 

For  if,  my  sweet  Adeimantus,  our  youth  seriously  believe  in 
such  unworthy  representations  of  the  Gods,  instead  of  laughing 
at  them  as  they  ought,  hardly  will  any  of  them  deem  that  he 
himself,  being  but  a  man,  can  be  dishonored  by  similar  actions ; 
neither  will  he  rebuke  any  inclination  that  may  arise  in  his 
mind  to  say  and  do  the  like.  '  And  instead  of  having  any  shame 
or  self-control,  he  will  be  always  whining  and  lamenting  on 
slight  occasions  —  The  Republic,  ii.  209. 
Gyges,  story  of. 

• Now  that  justice  is  only  the  inability  to  do  injustice  will 

best  appear  if  we  imagine  something  of  this  kind  ;  suppose  we 
give  both  the  just  and  the  unjust  entire  liberty  to  do  what  they 
will,  and  let  us  attend  and  see  whither  desire  will  lead  them ; 
then  we  shall  detect  the  just  man  in  the  very  act ;  the  just  and 
unjust  will  be  found  going  the  same  way,  — following  their  in- 
terest, which  all  natures  follow  as  a  good,  and  are  only  diverted 
into  the  path  of  justice  by  the  force  of  law.  The  liberty 


214  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

which  we  are  supposing  may  be  most  conveniently  given  to 
them  in  the  form  of  such  a  power  as  is  said  to  have  been  pos- 
sessed by  Gyges,  the  ancestor  of  Croesus  the  Lydian.  Accord- 
ing to  the  tradition,  Gyges  was  a  shepherd  in  the  service  of  the 
king  of  Lydia,  and,  while  he  was  in  the  field,  there  was  a  storm 
and  earthquake,  which  made  an  opening  in  the  earth  at  the 
place  where  he  was  feeding  his  flock.  Amazed  at  the  sight,  he 
descended  into  the  opening,  where,  among  other  marvels,  he  be- 
held a  hollow  brazen  horse,  having  doors,  at  which  he  stooping 
and  looking  in  saw  a  dead  body,  of  stature,  as  appeared  to  him, 
more  than  human,  and  having  nothing  on  but  a  gold  ring;  this 
he  took  from  the  finger  of  the  dead  and  reascended.  Now  the 
shepherds  met  together,  according  to  custom,  that  they  might 
send  their  monthly  report  concerning  the  flock  to  the  king  ; 
and  into  their  assembly  he  came  having  the  ring  on  his  finger, 
and  as  he  was  sitting  among  them  he  chanced  to  turn  the  collet 
of  the  ring  towards  the  inner  side  of  the  hand,  when  instantly 
he  became  invisible,  and  the  others  began  to  speak  of  him  as 
if  he  were  no  longer  there.  He  was  astonished  at  this,  and 
again  touching  the  ring  he  turned  the  collet  outwards  and  re- 
appeared ;  thereupon  he  made  trials  of  the  ring,  and  always 
with  the  same  result ;  when  he  turned  the  collet  inwards  he  be- 
came invisible,  when  outwards  he  reappeared.  Perceiving  this, 
he  immediately  contrived  to  be  chosen  one  of  the  messengers 
sent  to  the  court,  where  he  no  sooner  arrived  than  he  seduced 
the  queen,  and  with  her  help  conspired  against  the  king  and 
slew  him  and  took  the  kingdom.  Suppose  now  that  there  were 
two  such  magic  rings,  and  the  just  put  on  one  of  them  and 
the  unjust  the  other ;  no  man  they  say  is  of  such  an  iron  nat- 
ure that  he  would  stand  fast  in  justice. —  The  Republic,  ii.  181. 
Gymnastics  and  music. 

In  speaking   of   education,  the    law  means  to  speak  of 

those  who  have  the  care  of  order  and  instruction  in  gymnasia 
and  schools,  and  of  the  going  to  school  and  lodging  of  boys  and 
girls ;  and  in  speaking  of  contests,  the  law  refers  to  the  judges 
of  gymnastics  and  of  music ;  these  again  are  divided  into  two 
classes,  the  one  having  to  do  with  music,  the  other  with  gym- 
nastic.—  Laws,  iv.  286. 

After  music  comes  gymnastic,  in  which  our  youth  are  next 
to  be  trained. 

Certainly. 

And  gymnastic  as  well  as  music  should  receive  careful  atten- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  215 

tion  in  childhood,  and  continue  through  life.  Now  my  belief  is, 
—  and  tbi>-  is  a  matter  upon  which  I  should  like  to  have  your 
opinion,  but  my  own  belief  is,  —  not  that  the  good  body  im- 
proves the  soul,  but  that  the  good  soul  improves  the  body. 
What  do  you  say  ? 

Yes,  I  agree. 

Then  if  we  have  educated  the  mind,  the  minuter  care  of  the 
body  may  properly  be  committed  to  the  mind,  and  we  need  only 
describe  the  outlines  of  the  subject  for  brevity's  sake. 

Very  good. 

That  they  must  abstain  from  intoxication  has  been  already 
remarked  by  us,  for  of  all  persons  a  guardian  should  be  the  last 
to  get  drunk  and  not  know  where  in  the  world  he  is. 

Yes,  he  said  ;  that  a  guardian  should  require  another  to 
guard  him  is  ridiculous  indeed. 

But  next,  what  shall  we  say  of  their  food  ;  for  the  men  are 
athletes  in  the  great  contest  of  all,  are  they  not? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  will  the  usual  gymnastic  exercises  be  suited  to  them  ? 

I  cannot  say. 

I  am  afraid,  I  said,  that  such  exercise  is  but  a  sleepy  sort  of 
thing,  and  rather  perilous  to  health.  Do  you  not  observe  that 
athletes  sleep  away  their  lives,  and  are  liable  to  most  dangerous 
illnesses  if  they  depart,  in  ever  so  slight  a  degree,  from  their 
customary  regimen  ? 

Yes.  I  do. 

Then,  I  said,  a  finer  sort  of  training  will  be  required  for  out 
warrior  athletes,  who  are  to  be  like  wakeful  dogs,  and  to  see 
and  hear  with  the  utmost  keenness  ;  in  the  many  changes  of 
water  and  also  of  food,  of  summer  heat  and  winter  cold,  which 
they  will  have  to  endure,  they  must  not  be  liable  to  break  down 
in  health. 

That  is  quite  my  view,  he  said. 

The  really  excellent  gymnastic  is  twin  sister  of  that  simple 
music  which  we  were  just  now  describing. 

How  so. 

Why,  I  conceive  that  there  is  a  gymnastic  also  which  is  sim- 
ple and  good  ;  and  that  such  ought  to  be  the  military  gymnastic. 

What  do  you  mean  ? 

My  meaning  may  be  learned  from  Homer  ;  he,  you  know, 
feeds  his  heroes,  when  they  are  campaigning,  on  soldiers'  fare  ; 
they  have  no  fish,  although  they  are  on  the  shores  of  the  Hel- 


216  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

lespout,  and  they  are  allowed  nothing  but  roast  meat — which 
only  requires  a  fire,  and  is  therefore  the  most  convenient  diet 
for  soldiers  —  and  not  boiled,  as  this  would  involve  a  carrying 
about  of  pots  and  pans. 

True. 

And  I  can  hardly  be  mistaken  in  saying  that  sweet  sauces 
are  not  even  mentioned  in  Homer.  In  proscribing  them,  how- 
ever, he  is  not  singular,  as  all  professional  athletes  know  that 
a  man  who  is  to  be  in  good  condition  should  take  nothing  of 
the  kind.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  227. 

Habit,  mental  and  bodily.     See  Mental,  etc. 
Happiness  gained  by  Wisdom. 

Let  us  consider  this  further  point,  I  said  :   Seeing  that  all 

men  desire  happiness,  and  happiness,  as  has  been  shown,  is 
gained  by  a  use,  and  a  right  use,  of  the  things  of  life,  and  the 
right  use  of  them,  and  good  fortune  in  the  use  of  them,  is 
given  by  knowledge,  the  inference  is  that  every  man  ought  by 
all  means  to  try  and  make  himself  as  wise  as  he  can  ? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  the  desire  to  obtain  this  treasure,  which  is  far  more 
precious  than  money,  from  a  father  or  a  guardian  or  a  friend 
or  a  suitor,  whether  citizen  or  stranger  —  the  eager  desire  and 
prayer  to  them  that  they  would  impart  wisdom  to  you,  is  not 
at  all  dishonorable,  Cleinias ;  nor  is  any  one  to  be  blamed  for 
doing  any  honorable  service  or  ministration  to  any  man, 
whether  a  lover  or  not,  if  his  aim  is  to  get  wisdom.  Do  you 
agree  to  that  ?  I  said. 

Yes,  he  said,  I  quite  agree,  and  think  that  you  are  right. 

Yes,  I  said,  Cleinias,  if  only  wisdom  can  be  taught,  and  does 
not  come  to  man  spontaneously ;  for  that  is  a  point  which 
has  still  to  be  considered,  and  is  not  yet  agreed  upon  by  you 
and  me. 

But  I  think,  Socrates,  that  wisdom  can  be  taught,  he  said. 

Best  of  men,  I  said,  I  am  delighted  to  hear  you  say  that; 
and  I  am  also  grateful  to  you  for  having  saved  me  from  a  long 
and  tiresome  speculation  as  to  whether  wisdom  can  be  taught 
or  not.  But  now,  as  you  think  that  wisdom  can  be  taught, 
and  that  wisdom  only  can  make  a  man  happy  and  fortunate, 
will  you  not  acknowledge  that  all  of  us  ought  to  love  wisdom, 
and  you  individually  will  try  to  love  her  ? 

Certainly,  Socrates,  he  said ;  and  I  will  do  my  best.  — 
Euthydemus,  i.  184. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  217 

Harmony. 

Might  not  a  person  say  that  harmony  is  a  thing  invisible, 

incorporeal,  perfect,  divine,  existing  in  the  lyre  which  is  har- 
monized, but  that  the  lyre  and  the  strings  are  matter  and  ma- 
terial, composite,  earthy,  and  akin  to  mortality?  And  when 
some  one  breaks  the  lyre,  or  cuts  and  rends  the  strings,  then 
he  who  takes  this  view  would  argue  as  you  do,  and  on  the  same 
analogy,  that  the  harmony  survives  and  has  not  perished  ;  for 
you  cannot  imagine,  as  he  would  say,  that  the  lyre  without  the 
strings,  and  the  broken  strings  themselves  which  are  mortal,  re- 
main, and  yet  that  the  harmony,  which  is  of  heavenly  and  im- 
mortal nature  and  kindred,  has  perished  —  and  perished  too 
before  the  mortal.  That  harmony,  he  would  say,  must  still 
exist  somewhere,  and  the  wood  and  strings  will  decay  before 

that  decays Now  there   is  an  absurdity  in  saying  that 

harmony  is  discord,  or  is  composed  of  elements  which  are 
still  in  a  state  of  discord.  But  perhaps  what  he  really  meant 
to  say  was  that  harmony  is  composed  of  differing  notes  of 
higher  or  lower  pitch  which  disagreed  once,  but  are  now  recon- 
ciled by  the  art  of  music ;  for  if  the  higher  and  lower  notes 
still  disagreed,  there  could  be  no  harmony,  as  is  indeed  evident. 
For  harmony  is  a  symphony,  and  symphony  is  an  agreement ; 
but  an  agreement  of  disagreements  while  they  disagree,  there 
cannot  be  ;  you  cannot  harmonize  that  which  disagrees.  This 
may  be  illustrated  by  rhythm,  which  is  composed  of  elements 
short  and  long,  once  differing  and  now  in  accord  ;  which  ac- 
cordance, as  in  the  former  instance,  medicine,  so  in  this,  music 
implants,  making  love  and  unison  to  grow  up  among  them ;  and 
thus  music,  too,  is  concerned  with  the  principles  of  love  in 
their  application  to  harmony  and  rhythm.  Again,  in  the  essen- 
tial nature  of  harmony  and  rhythm  there  is  no  difficulty  in  dis- 
cerning love  which  has  not  yet  become  double.  But  when 
you  want  to  use  them  in  actual  life,  either  in  the  composition 
of  music  or  in  the  correct  performance  of  airs  or  metres  com- 
}  osed  already,  which  latter  is  called  education,  then  the  diffi- 
culty begins,  and  the  good  artist  is  needed.  Then  the  old  tale 
has  to  be  repeated  of  fair  and  heavenly  love  —  the  love  of 
Urania  the  fair  and  heavenly  muse,  and  of  the  duty  of  accept- 
ing the  temperate,  and  those  who  are  as  yet  intemperate  only 
that  they  may  become  temperate,  and  of  preserving  their  love ; 
and  again,  of  the  vulgar  Polyhymnia,  who  must  be  used  with 
circumspection  that  the  pleasure  may  not  generate  licentious 
ness.  —  Phnedo,  i.  414,  481 


218  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Harmony  of  soul  and  form.     See  Form. 
Harmony  of  temperance 

Do  you  observe  that  we  were  pretty  right  in  our  antici 

patioti  that  temperance  was  a  sort  of  harmony  ? 

Why  so  ? 

Why,  because  temperance  is  unlike  courage  and  wisdom, 
each  of  which  resides  in  a  part  only,  the  one  making  the  State 
wise  and  the  other  valiant ;  but  that  is  not  the  way  with  tem- 
perance, which  extends  to  the  whole,  and  runs  through  the 
notes  of  the  scale,  and  produces  a  harmony  of  the  weaker  and 
the  stronger  and  the  middle  class,  whether  you  suppose  them 
to  be  stronger  or  weaker  in  wisdom  or  strength  or  numbers  or 

o  o 

wealth,  or  whatever  .else  may  be  the  measure  of  them.  Most 
truly  then  do  we  describe  temperance  as  the  natural  agreement 
of  superior  and  inferior,  both  in  States  and  individuals,  about 
which  of  the  two  elements  shall  rule.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  257. 
Harmony  civilizing. 

And  ought  not  the  rational  principle,  which  is  wise,  and 

has  the  care  of  the  whole  soul,  to  rule,  and  the  passionate  or 
spirited  principle  to  be  the  subject  and  ally? 

Certainly. 

And,  as  we  were  saying,  the  united  influence  of  music  and 
gymnastic  will  bring  them  into  accord,  nerving  and  sustaining 
the  reason  with  noble  words  and  lessons,  and  moderating, 
and  soothing  and  civilizing  the  wildness  of  passion  by  harmony 
and  rhythm? 

Quite  true,  he  said.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  268. 
Harmony  of  the  inner  man. 

As   we  were    saying  at  the   beginning   of  our    work  of 

construction,  some  divine  power  must  have  conducted  us  to  a 
primary  form  of  justice  —  that  suspicion  of  ours  has  been  now 
verified  ? 

Yes,  certainly 

And  justice  was  the  reality,  and  was  concerned  not  with  the 
outward  man,  but  with  the  inward,  which  is  the  true  self  and 
concernment  of  man;  for  the  just  man  does  not  permit  the 
several  elements  within  him  to  interfere  with  one  another,  or 
any  of  them  to  do  the  work  of  others,  but  he  sets  in  order 
his  own  inner  life,  and  is  his  own  master,  and  at  peace  with 
himself;  and  when  he  has  bound  together  the  three  principles 
within  him,  which  may  be  compared  to  the  higher,  lower,  and 
middle  no'es  of  the  scale,  and  the  intermediate  intervals  — 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  219 

when  he  has  bound  together  all  these,  and  is  no  longer  many, 
but  has  become  one  entirely  temperate  and  perfectly  adjusted 
nature,  then  he  will  begin  to  act,  if  he  has  to  act,  whether  in  a 
matter  of  property,  or  in  the  treatment  of  the  body,  or  some 
affair  of  politics  or  private  business;  in  all  which  cases  he  will 
think  and  call  that  which  preserves  and  cooperates  with  this 
harmonious  condition,  just  and  good  action  ;  and  the  knowledge 
which  presides  over  it,  wisdom  ;  and  that  which  at  any  time  de- 
stroys this  condition,  he  will  call  unjust  action,  and  the  opinion 
which  presides  over  it,  ignorance.  — The  Republic,  ii.  270. 
Harmony  of  health  and  wealth. 

On  this  higher  end  the  man  of  understanding  will  con- 
centrate the  energies  of  his  life.  And  in  the  first  place,  he 
will  honor  studies  which  impress  these  qualities  on  his  soul, 
and  will  disregard  others  ? 

Clearly,  he  said. 

In  the  next  place,  he  will  regulate  his  bodily  habit,  and  so 
far  will  he  be  from  yielding  to  brutal  and  irrational  pleasures, 
that  he  will  regard  even  health  as  quite  a  secondary  matter; 
his  first  object  will  be  not  that  he  may  be  fair  or  strong  or 
well,  unless  he  is  likely  thereby  to  gain  temperance,  but  he 
will  be  always  desirous  of  preserving  the  harmony  of  the 
body  for  the  sake  of  the  concord  of  the  soul  ? 

Certainly  he  will,  he  replied,  if  he  has  true  music  in  him. 

And  there  is  a  principle  of  order  and  harmony  in  the  acqui- 
sition of  wealth  ;  this  also  he  will  observe,  and  will  not  allow 
himself  to  be  dazzled  by  the  opinion  of  the  world,  and  heap 
up  riches  to  his  own  infinite  harm  ? 

I  should  think  not,  he  said. 

He  will  look  at  the  city  which  is  within  him,  and  take  care 
to  avoid  any  change  of  his  own  institutions,  such  as  might 
arise  either  from  superfluity  or  from  want ;  and  with  a  view 
\f:  this  only  gain  or  spend  in  so  far  as  he  is  able  ? 

Very  true. 

And,  for  the  same  reason,  he  will  accept  such  honors  as  he 
deems  likely  to  make  him  a  better  man  ;  but  those  which  are 
likely  to  disorder  his  constitution,  whether  private  or  public 
honors,  he  will  avoid.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  423. 
Harmony  in  the  soul. 

Soc.  What  would  you  say  of  the  soul  ?     Will  the  good 

soul  be  that  in  which  disorder  is  prevalent,  or  that  in  which 
there  is  harmony  and  order  ? 


220  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Gal.  The  latter  follows  from  our  previous  admissions. 

Soc.  What  is  the  name  which  is  given  to  the  effect  of  har- 
mony and  order  in  the  body  : 

Cal.  I  suppose  that  you  mean  health  and  strength  ? 

Soc.  Yes,  I  do  ;  and  what  is  the  name  which  you  would 
give  to  the  effect  of  harmony  and  order  in  the  soul  ?  Try  and 
discover  a  name  for  this  as  well  as  for  the  other. 

Cal.  Why  do  you  not  give  the  name  yourself,  Socrates  ? 

Soc.  Well,  if  you  would  rather,  I  will  ;  and  you  shall  say 
whether  you  agree  with  me,  and  if  not  you  shall  refute  and 
answer  me.  Healthy,  as  I  conceive,  is  the  name  which  is 
given  to  the  regular  order  of  the  body,  and  from  this  comes 
health  and  every  other  bodily  excellence  :  is  that  true  or  not  ? 

Col  True. 

Soc.  And  "  lawful  "  and  "  law  "  are  the  names  which  are 
given  to  the  regular  order  and  action  of  the  soul,  and  these 
make  men  lawful  and  orderly  :  and  so  we  have  temperance 
and  justice  ?  have  we  not  ? 

Cal.  Yes.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  95. 

Harmony,  counterparts  and  antagonisms  in  the  soul,  making.    See 

Antagonisms. 
Harmony  dissolved,  a  generation  of  pain. 

Soc.  I  say  that  when  the  harmony  in  animals  is  dissolved, 

there  is  also  a  dissolution  of  nature  and  a  generation  of  pain. 

Pro.  That  is  very  probable. 

Soc.  And   the  restoration  of  harmony  and  return   to    nat- 
ure is  the  source  of  pleasure,  if  I  may  be  allowed  to  speak  in 
the  fewest  and  shortest  words  about  matters  of  the  greatest 
moment.  —  Philebus,  iii.  167. 
Harmony  in  choral  song.     See  Choral. 
Harmonies  and  consonances.     See  Consonances. 
Harmonies  of  divers  kinds. 

We  were  saying,  as  you  may  remember,  in  speaking  of  the 

words,  that  we  had  no  need  of  lamentation  and  strains  of  sorrow  ? 

True. 

And  which  are  the  harmonies  expressive  of  sorrow  ?  As 
you  are  a  musician,  I  wish  that  you  would  tell  me. 

The  harmonies  which  you  mean  are  the  mixed  or  tenor 
Lydian,  and  the  full-toned  or  bass  Lydian,  and  others  which 
are  like  them. 

These  then,  I  said,  must  be  banished  ;  even  to  women  of 
virtue  and  character  they  are  of  no  use,  and  much  less  to  men 

Certainly. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  221 

In  the  next  place,  drunkenness  and  softness  and  indolence 
are  utterly  at  variance  with  the  character  of  our  guardians. 

Of  course. 

Then  I  must  ask  you  again,  .vhich  are  the  soft  or  drinking 
harmonies  ? 

The  Ionian,  he  replied,  and  the  Lydian  ;  they  are  termed 
'*  solute." 

Well,  and  are  these  of  any  military  use  ? 

Quite  the  reverse,  he  replied  ;  but  then  the  Dorian  and  the 
Phrygian  appear  to  be  the  only  ones  which  remain. 

I  answered  :  Of  the  harmonies  I  know  nothing,  but  I  want 
to  have  one  warlike,  which  will  sound  the  word  or  note  which 
a  brave  man  utters  in  the  hour  of  danger  and  stern  resolve,  or 
when  his  cause  is  failing  and  he  is  going  to  wounds  or  death 
or  is  overtaken  by  some  other  evil,  and  at  every  such  crisis 
meets  fortune  with  calmness  and  endurance  ;  and  another  to  be 
used  by  him  in  times  of  peace  and  freedom  of  action,  when 
there  is  no  pressure  of  necessity ;  and  he  is  seeking  to  per- 
suade God  by  prayer  or  man  by  instruction  and  advice ;  or  on  the 
other  hand,  which  expresses  his  willingness  to  listen  to  persua- 
sion or  entreaty  and  advice  ;  and  which  represents  him  when 
he  has  accomplished  his  aim,  not  carried  away  by  success,  but 
acting  moderately  and  wisely,  and  acquiescing  in  the  event. 
These  two  harmonies  I  ask  you  to  leave  ;  the  strain  of  neces- 
sity and  the  strain  of  freedom,  the  strain  of  the  unfortunate 
and  the  strain  of  the  fortunate,  the  strain  of  courage,  and  the 
strain  of  temperance  ;  these,  I  say,  leave. 

And  these,  he  replied,  are  the  very  ones  of  which  I  was 
speaking. 

Then,  I  said,  if  only  the  Dorian  and  Phrygian  harmonies 
are  used  in  our  songs  and  melodies,  we  shall  not  want  multiplic- 
ity of  notes  or  a  panharmonic  scale  ? 

I  suppose  not.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  222. 
"  Having  "  and  "  possessing,"  distinction  between. 

Soc.  You  have  heard  the    common    explanation  of  the 

verb  "  to  know  ?  " 

Theaet.  I  do  not  know  that  I  remember  at  the  moment. 

Soc.  They  explain  the  word  "  to  know  "  as  meaning  "  to 
have  knowledge." 

Tfieaet.  True. 

Soc.  I  should  like  to  make  a  slight  change,  and  say  "  to  pos 
sess  "  knowledge. 


222  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS 

TTieaet.  How  do  the  two  expressions  differ  ? 

Soc.  Perhaps  there  may  be  no  difference ;  but  still  I  should 
like  you  to  hear  and  help  to  test  my  view. 

Theaet.  I  will,  if  I  can. 

Soc.  I  should  distinguish  "  having  "  from  "  possessing  :  "  for 
example,  a  man  may  buy  and  keep  under  his  control  a  garment 
which  he  does  not  wear ;  and  then  we  should  say,  not  that  he 
has,  but  that  he  possesses  the  garment. 

Theaet.  That  would  be  the  correct  expression. 

Soc.  Well,  may  not  a  man  "  possess  "  and  yet  not  "  have  " 
knowledge  in  the  sense  of  which  I  am  speaking  ?  As  you 
may  suppose  a  man  to  have  caught  wild  birds  —  doves  or  any 
other  birds  —  and  to  be  keeping  them  in  an  aviary  which  he 
has  constructed  at  home  ;  and  then  we  might  say,  in  one  sense, 
that  he  always  has  them  because  he  possesses  them,  might  we 
not? 

Theaet.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  yet,  in  another  sense,  he  has  none  of  them ;  but 
he  has  power  over  them,  and  has  them  under  his  hand  in  an 
inclosure  of  his  own,  and  can  take  and  have  them  whenever 
he  likes ;  he  can  catch  any  which  he  likes,  and  again  let  them 
go,  and  he  may  do  so  as  often  as  he  pleases. 

Theaet.  True. 

Soc.  Once  more,  then,  as  in  what  preceded,  we  made  a  sort 
of  waxen  figment  in  the  mind,  so  let  us  now  suppose  that  in 
the  mind  of  each  man  there  is  an  aviary  of  all  sorts  of  birds 
—  some  flocking  together  apart  from  the  rest,  others  in  small 
groups,  others  solitary,  flying  anywhere  and  everywhere. 

Theaet.  Let  us  imagine  such  an  aviary ;  and  what  is  to  fol- 
low ? 

Soc.  We  may  suppose  this  receptacle  to  be  empty  while  we 
are  young,  and  that  the  birds  are  kinds  of  knowledge ;  when  a 
man  has  gotten  and  detained  in  the  inclosure  any  of  those   dif- 
ferent kinds  of  knowledge,  then  he  may  be  said  to  have  learned 
or  discovered  the  thing  of  which  that  knowledge  is :  and  this  is 
to  know.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  403. 
Health,  harmony  of  wealth  and.     See  Harmony,  etc. 
Health,  of  body  and  soul.     See  Body,  etc. 
Heavenly  idea  of  the  Earth.     See  Earth,  etc. 
Heavenly  bodies,  beheld  as  symbols  of  truths  and  means  of  educa- 
tion. 

Socrates,  as  you  rebuked  the  vulgar  manner  in  which  I 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS  223 

praised  astronomy  before,  my  praise  shall  be  more  worthy  of 
your  spirit.  For  every  one,  as  I  think,  must  feel  that  astron- 
omy compels  the  soul  to  look  upwards,  and  leads  us  from  this 
world  to  another. 

I  am  an  exception  then,  for  I  should  rather  say  that  those 
who  elevate  astronomy  into  philosophy  make  us  look  downward! 
and  not  upwards. 

What  do  you  mean  ?  he  asked. 

You,  I  replied,  have  in  your  mind  a  sublime  conception  of 
how  we  know  the  things  above.  And  I  dare  say  that  if  a  per- 
son were  to  throw  his  head  back  and  study  the  fretted  ceiling, 
you  would  still  think  that  his  mind  was  the  percipient,  and  not 
his  eyes.  And  you  are  very  likely  right,  and  I  may  be  a  sim- 
pleton :  but,  in  my  opinion,  that  knowledge  only  which  is  of 
being  and  of  the  unseen  can  make  the  soul  look  upwards,  and 
whether  a  man  gapes  at  the  heavens  or  blinks  on  the  ground, 
seeking  to  learn  some  particular  of  sense,  I  would  deny  that  he 
can  learn,  for  nothing  of  that  sort  is  matter  of  science;  his  soul 
is  looking,  not  upwards,  but  downwards,  whether  his  way  to 
knowledge  is  by  water  or  by  land,  and  in  whichever  element  he 
may  lie  on  his  back  and  float. 

I  acknowledge,  he  said,  the  justice  of  your  rebuke.  Still,  I 
should  like  to  know  how  astronomy  can  be  learned  in  any  other 
way  more  conducive  to  that  knowledge  of  which  we  speak  ? 

I  answered  ;  the  starry  heaven  which  we  behold  is  wrought 
upon  a  visible  ground,  and  therefore,  although  the  fairest  and 
most  perfect  of  visible  things,  must  necessarily  be  deemed  in- 
ferior far  to  the  true  motions  of  absolute  swiftness  and  absolute 
slowness,  which  are  relative  to  each  other,  and  carry  with  them 
that  which  is  contained  in  them,  in  the  true  number  and  in 
every  true  figure.  Now,  these  are  to  be  apprehended  by  rea- 
son and  intelligence,  but  not  by  sight. 

True,  he  replied. 

The  spangled  heavens  should  be  used  as  a  pattern  and 
with  a  view  to  that  higher  knowledge ;  their  beauty  is  like  the 
fceauty  of  figures  or  pictures  wrought  by  the  hand  of  Daedalus, 
or  some  other  great  artist,  which  we  may  chance  to  behold  ; 
any  geometrician  who  saw  them  would  appreciate  the  exquisite- 
ness  of  their  workmanship,  but  he  would  never  dream  of  think- 
ing that  in  them  he  could  find  the  true  equal  or  the  true  double, 
or  the  truth  of  any  other  proportion. 

No,  he  said,  to  think  so  would  be  ridiculous. 


224  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

And  will  not  a  true  astronomer  have  the  same  feeling  when 
he  looks  at  the  movements  of  the  stars  ?  Will  he  not  think 
that  heaven  and  the  things  in  heaven  are  framed  by  the  Creator 
in  the  most  perfect  manner  ?  But  when  he  reflects  that  the 
proportions  of  night  and  day,  or  of  both  to  the  month,  or  of  the 
month  to  the  year,  or  of  the  other  stars  to  these  and  to  one  an- 
other, are  of  the  visible  and  material,  he  will  never  fall  into  the 
error  of  supposing  that  they  are  eternal  and  liable  to  no  devia- 
tion —  that  would  be  monstrous ;  he  will  rather  seek  in  every 
possible  way  to  discover  the  truth  of  them. 

I  quite  agree  now  that  you  tell  me  so. 

Then,  I  said,  in  astronomy,  as  in  geometry,  we   should  use 
problems  and  let  the  heavens  alone — if  we  desire  to  have  a 
real  knowledge  of  the  science  and  to  train  the  reasoning  faculty 
by  the  aid  of  it.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  356. 
Heirships  of  wealth,  an  evil.     See  Inheritances. 
Heracles  and  lolaus. 

I  am  no  Heracles ;    and  even  Heracles  could  not  fight 

against  the  Hydra,  who  was  a  she-Sophist,  and  had  the  wit  to 
shoot  up  many  new  heads  when  one  of  them  was  cut  off  ;  espe- 
cially when  he  saw  a  second  monster  of  a  sea-crab,  who  was 
also  a  Sophist,  and  appeared  to  have  newly  arrived  from  a  sea 
voyage,  bearing  down  upon  him  from  the  left,  opening  his 
mouth  and  biting.  Then  he  called  lolaus,  his  nephew,  to  his 
help,  and  he  ably  succored  him  ;  but  if  my  lolaus,  who  is  Pa- 
trocles  the  statuary,  were  to  come,  he  would  make  a  bad  busi- 
ness worse. 

And  now  that  you  have  delivered  yourself  of  this  strain,  said 
Dionysodorus,  will  you  inform  me  whether  lolaus  was  the 
nephew  of  Heracles  any  more  than  he  is  yours  ? 

I  suppose  that  I  had  best  answer  you,  Dionysodorus,  I  said, 
for  you  will  insist  on  asking  —  that  I  pretty  well  know  —  out 
of  envy,  in  order  to  prevent  me  from  learning  the  wisdom  of 
Euthydemus. 

Then  answer  me,  he  said. 

Well  then,  I  said,  I  can  only  reply,  that  lolaus  was  not  my 
nephew  at  all,  but  the  nephew  of  Heracles  ;  and  his  father  was 
not  my  brother  Patrocles,  but  Iphicles,  who  has  a  name  rather 
like  his,  and  was  the  brother  of  Heracles.  —  Euthydemus,  i.  201. 
Heroic  sons  of  heroic  fathers.  See  State,  heroes. 
Heroic  men  to  be  kissed  and  honored  by  all.  See  Brace,  hoi/or  to  the. 
But  the  hero  who  has  distinguished  himself,  what  shall  be 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  225 

done  to  him  ?  In  the  first  place,  he  shall  receive  honor  in  the 
army  from  his  youthful  comrades ;  every  one  of  them  in  suc- 
cession shall  crown  him.  What  do  you  say  to  that  ? 

I  approve. 

And  what  do  you  say  to  his  receiving  the  right  hand  of 
fellowship  ? 

To  that  too,  I  agree. 

But  you  will  hardly  agree  to  my  next  proposal. 

What  is  your  proposal? 

That  he  should  kiss  and  be  kissed  by  them. 

Most  certainly,  and  I  should  be  disposed  to  go  further  and 
say  :  Let  no  one  whom  he  has  a  mind  to  kiss  refuse  to  be 
kissed  by  him  while  the  expedition  lasts.  So  that  if  there  be 
a  lover  in  the  army,  whether  his  love  be  youth  or  maiden,  he 
may  be  more  eager  to  win  the  prize  of  valor. 

That  is  good,  I  said.  That  the  brave  man  is  to  have  more 
wives  than  others  has  been  already  determined ;  and  he  is  to 
have  first  choices  in  such  matters  more  than  others,  in  order 
that  he  may  have  as  many  children  as  possible. 

Agreed.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  295. 
Heterodoxy  and  false  opinion.     See  False  opinion. 
Soc.  If  thinking  is  speaking  to  one's  self,  no  one  speak- 
ing and  thinking  of  two  objects,  and  apprehending  them  both 
in  his  soul,  will  say  and  think  that  the  one  is  the  other  of 
them,  and  I  must  add,  that  you  will    have  to  let   the  word 
"other"  alone   [i.  e.  not  insist  that  "one"  and  "other"  are 
both  in  Greek  called  "  other,"  ?repov].     I  mean  to  say,  that  no 
one  chinks  the  noble  to  be  base,  or  anything  of  the  kind. 

Theaet.  I  will  give  up  the  word  "  other,"  Socrates ;  and  I 
agree  in  what  you  say. 

Soc.  If  a  man  has  both  of  them  in  his  thoughts,  he  cannot 
think  that  the  one  of  them  is  the  other  ? 

Theaet.  True. 

Soc.  Neither,  if  he  has  one  of  them  in  his  mind  and  not  the 
other,  can  he  think  that  one  is  the  other  ? 

Theaet.  True ;  for  we  should  have  to  suppose  that  he  appre- 
hends that  which  is  not  in  his  thoughts  at  all. 

Soc.  Then  no  one  who  knows  either  both  or  only  one  of  the 
two  objects  in  his  mind  can  think  that  the  one  is  the  other.  And 
therefore,  he  who  maintains  that  false  "  doxy  "  is  heterodoxy  ig 
talking  nonsense ;  for  neither  in  this,  any  more  than  in  the  pre- 
vious way,  can  false  opinion  exist  in  us The  only  pos- 

15 


226  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

sibility  of  erroneous  opinion  is,  when  knowing  you  and  Theo- 
iorus,  and  having  the  seal  or  impression  of  both  of  you  in  the 
wax  block,  but  seeing  you  both  imperfectly  and  at  a  distance.  I 
try  to  assign  the  right  impression  of  memory  visual  to  the  right 
impression,  and  fit  this  into  the  proper  mould ;  if  I  succeed, 
recognition  will  take  place  :  but  if  I  fail  and  transpose  them, 
putting  the  foot  into  the  wrong  shoe,  —  that  is  to  say,  putting 
the  vision  of  either  of  you  on  to  the  wrong  seal,  or  seeing  you 
as  in  a  mirror  when  the  sight  flows  from  right  to  left  —  then 
"heterodoxy"  and  false  opinion  ensues. — Theaetetus,  iii.  395- 
398. 

Highest  good  in  the  State.     See  Evil,  etc. 
Hippias,  self-assertion  of.     See  Self-assertion,  etc. 
Holiness,  resembling  Justice. 

Suppose  that  he  went  on  to  say  :  Well  now,  is  there  such 

a  thing  as  holiness  ?  —  we  should  answer,  Yes,  if  I  am  not 
mistaken  ? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  that  you  acknowledge  to  be  a  thing  —  should  we  admit 
that? 

He  assented. 

And  is  this  a  sort  of  thing  which  is  of  the  nature  of  the 
holy,  or  of  the  nature  of  the  unholy  ?  I  should  be  angry  at 
his  putting  such  a  question,  and  should  say,  Peace,  man ;  noth- 
ing can  be  holy  if  holiness  is  not  holy.  What  do  you  say  to 
that  ?  Would  you  not  answer  in  the  same  way  ? 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  then  after  this  suppose  that  he  came  and  asked  us, 
What  were  you  saying  just  now  ?  Perhaps  I  may  not  have 
heard  you  rightly,  but  you  seemed  to  me  to  be  saying  that  the 
parts  of  virtue  were  not  the  same  as  one  another.  I  should 
reply,  You  certainly  heard  that  said,  but  not,  as  you  imagine, 
iaid  by  me  ;  for  Protagoras  gave  the  answer,  and  I  only  asked 
ihe  question.  And  suppose  that  he  turned  to  you  and  said,  Is 
this  true,  Protagoras  ?  and  do  you  maintain  that  one  part  of 
virtue  is  unlike  another,  and  is  this  your  position  ?  how  would 
you  answer  him  ? 

1  could  not  help  acknowledging  the  truth  of  what  he  said, 
Socrates. 

Well  then,  Protagoras,  we  will  assume  this ;  and  now  sup- 
posing that  he  proceeded  to  say  further,  Then  holiness  is  not 
of  the  nature  of  justice,  nor  justice  of  the  nature  of  holiness. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHT*.  227 

but  of  the  nature  of  unholiness  ;  and  holiness  is  of  the  nature 
of  the  not  just,  and  therefore  of  the  unjust,  and  the  unjust  is 
unholy  ; — how  shall  we  answer  him  ?  I  should  certainly  an- 
swer him  on  my  own  behalf  that  justice  is  holy,  and  that  holi- 
ness is  just ;  and  I  would  say  in  like  manner  on  your  behalf 
also,  if  you  would  allow  me,  that  justice  is  either  the  same  with 
holiness,  or  very  nearly  the  same  ;  and  above  all  I  would  as- 
sert that  justice  is  like  holiness  and  holiness  is  like  justice  ;  and 
I  wish  that  you  would  tell  me  whether  I  may  be  permitted  to 
give  this  answer  on  your  behalf,  and  whether  you  would  agree 
with  me. 

He  replied,  I  cannot  simply  agree,  Socrates,  to  the  proposi- 
tion that  justice  is  holy  and  that  holiness  is  just,  for  there 
appears  to  me  to  be  a  difference  between  them.  But  what 
matter  ?  if  you  please  I  please  ;  and  let  us  assume,  if  you  will, 
that  justice  is  holy,  and  that  holiness  is  just. 

Pardon  me,  I  said  ;  I  do  not  want  this  "  if  you  wish  "  or  "  if 
you  will "  sort  of  argument  to  be  proven,  but  I  want  you  and 
me  to  be  proven  ;  I  mean  to  say  that  the  argument  will  be 
best  proven  if  there  be  no  "  if." 

Well,  he  said,  I  admit  that  justice  bears  a  resemblance  to 
holiness,  for  there  is  always  some  point  of  view  in  which  every- 
thing is  like  every  other  thing ;  white  is  in  a  certain  way  like 
black,  and  hard  is  like  soft,  and  the  most  extreme  opposites 
have  some  qualities  in  common  ;  even  the  parts  of  the  face 
which,  as  we  were  saying  before,  are  distinct  and  have  different 
functions,  are  still  in  a  certain  point  of  view  similar,  and  one  of 
them  is  like  another  of  them.  And  you  may  prove  that  they 
are  like  one  another  on  the  same  principle  that  all  things  are 
like  one  another ;  and  yet  things  which  are  alike  in  some  par- 
ticular ought  not  to  be  called  alike,  nor  things  which  are  un- 
like in  some  particular,  however  slight,  unlike. 

And  do  you  think,  I  said  in  a  tone  of  surprise,  that  justice 
and  holiness  have  but  a  small  degree  of  likeness  ? 

Certainly  not,  he  said ;  but  I  do  not  agree  with  what  I  un- 
derstand to  be  your  view.  —  Protagoras,  i.  130. 
Holiness  ;  the  essence  of. 

—  Soc.   What  do  you  say  of  piety,  Euthyphro  :  is  not  piety, 
according  to  your  definition,  loved  by  all  the  Gods  ? 

Euth.  Yes. 

Soc.  Because  it  is  pious  or  holy,  or  for  some  other  reason  ? 

Euth.  No,  that  is  the  reason. 


228  PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS. 

Soc.  It  is  loved  because  it  is  holy,  not  holy  because  it  i* 
loved  ? 

Euth.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  that  which  is  in  a  state  to  be  loved  of  the  Gods, 
and  is  dear  to  them,  is  in  a  state  to  be  loved  of  them  because 
it  is  loved  of  them  ? 

Euth.   Certainly. 

Soc.  Then  that  which  is  loved  of  God,  Euthyphro,  is  not 
holy,  nor  is  that  which  is  holy  loved  of  God,  as  you  affirm ; 
but  they  are  two  different  things. 

Euth.  How  do  you  mean,  Socrates  ? 

Soc.  I  mean  to  say  that  the  holy  has  been  acknowledged  by 
ue  to  be  loved  of  God  because  it  is  holy,  not  to  be  holy  be- 
cause it  is  loved. 

Euth.  Yes. 

-Soc.  But  that  which  is  dear  to  the  Gods  is  dear  to  them  be- 
cause it  is  loved  by  them,  not  loved  by  them  because  it  is 
dear  to  them. 

Euth.  True. 

Soc.  But,  friend  Euthyphro,  if  that  which  is  holy  is  the 
same  as  that  which  is  dear  to  God,  and  that  which  is  holy  is 
loved  as  being  holy,  then  that  which  is  dear  to  God  would 
have  been  loved  as  being  dear  to  God ;  but  if  that  which  is 
dear  to  God  is  dear  to  him  because  loved  by  him,  then  that 
which  is  holy  would  have  been  holy  because  loved  by  him. 
But  now  you  see  that  the  reverse  is  the  case,  and  that  they  are 
quite  different  from  one  another.  For  one  ($eo<£<Ats)  is  of  a 
kind  to  be  loved  because  it  is  loved,  and  the  other  (OO-LOV)  is 
loved  because  it  is  of  a  kind  to  be  loved.  Thus  you  appear  to 
me,  Euthyphro,  when  I  ask  you  what  is  the  essence  of  holiness, 
to  offer  an  attribute  only,  and  not  the  essence  —  the  attribute 
of  being  loved  by  all  the  Gods.  But  you  still  refuse  to  explain 
to  me  the  nature  of  holiness.  And  therefore,  if  you  please,  I 
will  ask  you  not  to  hide  your  treasure,  but  to  tell  me  once 
more  what  piety  or  holiness  really  is,  whether  dear  to  the  Gods 
or  not  (for  that  is  a  matter  about  which  we  will  not  quarrel). 
And  what  is  impiety  ? 

Euth.  I  really  do  not  know,  Socrates,  how  to  say  what  I 
mean.  For  somehow  or  other  our  arguments,  on  whatever 
ground  we  rest  them,  seem  to  turn  round  and  walk  away.  — 
Euthyphro,  i.  294. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS  229 

Homer,  the  best  of  poets.      See  Imitative  poetry. 

Soc.  I  often  envy  the  profession  of  a  rhapsode,  Ion  ;  for 

you  have  always  to  wear  fine  clothes,  and  to  look  as  beautiful 
as  you  can  is  a  part  of  your  art.  Then,  again,  you  are  obliged 
to  be  continually  in  the  company  of  many  good  poets  ;  and 
especially  of  Homer,  who  is  the  best  and  most  divine  of  them  ; 
and  to  understand  him.  and  not  merely  learn  his  words  by  rote, 
is  a  thing  greatly  to  be  envied.  And  no  man  can  be  a  rhapsode 
who  does  not  understand  the  meaning  of  the  poet.  For  the 
rhapsode  ought  to  interpret  the  mind  of  the  poet  to  his  hear- 
ers, but  how  can  he  interpret  him  well  unless  he  knows  what 
he  means  ?  All  this  is  greatly  to  be  envied. 

Ion.  That  is  true,  Socrates ;  interpretation  has  certainly  been 
the  most  laborious  of  my  art ;  and  I  believe  myself  able  to 
speak  about  Homer  better  than  any  man 

Soc.  But  how  did  you  come  to  have  this  skill  about 
Homer,  and  not  about  Hesiod  or  the  other  poets  ?  Does  not 
Homer  speak  of  the  same  themes  which  all  other  poets  handle  ? 
Is  not  war  his  great  argument?  and  does  he  not  speak  of  hu- 
man society  and  of  intercourse  of  men,  good  and  bad,  skilled 
and  unskilled,  and  of  the  Gods  conversing  with  one  another 
and  with  mankind,  and  about  what  happens  in  heaven  and  in 
the  world  below,  and  the  generations  of  Gods  and  heroes  ? 
Are  not  these  the  themes  of  which  Homer  sings  ? 

Ion.  Very  true,  Socrates. 

Soc.  And  do  not  the  other  poets  sing  of  the  same  ? 

Ion.  Yes,  Socrates ;  but  not  in  the  same  way  as  Homer. 

Soc.  What !  in  a  worse  way  ? 

Ion.  Yes,  in  a  far  worse. 

Soc.  And  Homer  is  better  ? 

Ion.  He  is  incomparably  better.  —  Ion,  i.  219. 
Homer,  not  a  legislator.     See  Legislator. 

Homicide,  less  criminal  than  deception.     See  Deceioer  as  to  truth. 
Honesty  professed. 

That  you  may  not  suppose  yourself  to   be   deceived  in 

thinking  that  all  men  regard  every  man  as  having  a  share  of 
justice  and  of  every  other  political  virtue,  let  me  give  you  a 
further  proof,  which  is  this.  In  other  cases,  as  you  are  aware, 
if  a  man  says  that  he  is  a  good  flute-player,  or  skillful  in  any 
other  art  in  which  he  has  no  skill,  people  either  laugh  at  him 
or  are  angry  with  him,  and  his  relations  think  that  he  is  mad 
and  go  and  admonish  him  ;  but  when  honesty  is  in  question,  or 


230  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

some  other  political  virtue,  even  if  they  know  that  he  is  lis- 
honest,  yet,  if  the  man  comes  publicly  forward  and  tells  the 
truth  about  his  dishonesty,  in  this  case  they  deem  that  to  be 
madness  which  in  the  other  case  was  held  by  them  to  be  good 
sense.  They  say  that  men  ought  to  profess  honesty  whether 
they  are  honest  or  not,  and  that  a  man  is  mad  who  does  not 
make  such  a  profession.  Their  notion  is,  that  a  man  must  have 
some  degree  of  honesty ;  and  that  if  he  has  none  at  all  he 
ought  not  to  be  in  the  world.  —  Protagoras,  i.  123. 
Honor  due  to  parents.  See  Children,  etc.,  and  Parents. 
Honor  and  justice  among  thieves. 

We  have  already  shown  that  the  just  are  clearly  wiser 

and  better  and  abler  than  the  unjust,  and  that  the  unjust  are 
incapable  of  common  action  ;  nay  more,  that  to  speak  as  we 
did  of  evil-doers,  ever  acting  vigorously  together,  is  not  strictly 
true,  for  if  they  had  been  perfectly  evil,  they  would  have  laid 
hands  upon  one  another ;  but  there  must  evidently  have  been 
some  remnant  of  justice  in  them,  or  they  would  have  injured 
one  another  as  well  as  their  victims,  and  then  they  would  have 
been  unable  to  act  together  ;  they  were  but  semi-villainous, 
for  had  they  been  whole  villains,  wholly  unjust,  they  would 
have  been  wholly  incapable  of  action.  That,  as  I  believe,  is 
the  truth  of  the  matter,  and  not  what  you  said  at  first.  But 
whether  the  just  have  a  better  and  happier  life  than  the  unjust 
:s  a  further  question  which  we  also  proposed  to  consider.  I 
think  that  they  have,  and  for  the  reasons  which  I  have  given  ; 
but  still  I  should  like  to  examine  further,  for  this  is  no  light 
matter,  concerning  nothing  less  than  the  true  rule  of  life.  — 
The  Republic,  ii.  175. 

Honor  and  dishonor  in  love.     See  Love,  Honor,  etc. 
Honor  to  the  brave.     See  Death  in  battle,  and  Heroic. 
Hope,  fancies  of.     See  Fancies. 
Human  life,  in  what  consists  the  salvation  of. 

Suppose,  again,  the  salvation  of  human  life  to  depend  on 

the  choice  of  odd  and  even,  and  on  the  knowledge  of  when 
men  ought  to  choose  the  greater  or  less,  either  in  reference  to 
themselves  or  to  each  other,  whether  near  or  at  a  distance  ; 
what  would  be  the  saving  principle  of  our  lives  ?  Would  not 
knowledge  ?  —  a  knowledge  of  measuring,  when  the  question 
is  one  of  excess  and  defect,  and  a  knowledge  of  number, 
when  the  question  is  of  odd  and  even  ?  The  world  will  ac- 
knowledge that,  will  they  not  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  231 

Protagoras  himself  thought  that  they  would. 

"Well,  then,  ray  friends,  I  say  to  them,  seeing  that  the  salva- 
tion of  human  life  has  been  found  to  consist  in  the  right 
choice  of  pleasures  and  pains,  —  in  the  choice  of  the  more 
and  the  fewer  and  the  greater  and  the  less,  and  the  nearer  and 
remoter,  must  not  this  measuring  be  a  consideration  of  excess 
and  defect,  and  equality  in  relation  to  each  other  ? 

That  is  undeniably  true.  —  Protagoras,  i.  156. 
Hypotheses,  used  by  reason. 

Of  this  kind  I  still  spoke  as  intelligible,  although  in  in- 
quiring into  it  the  soul  is  compelled  to  use  hypotheses ;  not 
proceeding  to  a  first  principle  because  she  is  unable  to  ascend 
above  hypotheses,  but  employing  the  objects  of  which  the  shad- 
ows below  are  resemblances  in  their  turn  as  images,  they  hav- 
ing in  relation  to  the  shadows  a  greater  distinctness  and  there- 
fore a  higher  value. 

I  understand,  he  said,  that  you  are  speaking  of  geometry  and 
the  sister 'arts. 

And  when  I  speak  of  the  other  division  of  the  intellectual, 
you  will  also  understand  me  to  speak  of  that  knowledge,  which 
reason  herself  attains  by  the  power  of  dialectic,  using  the 
hypotheses  not  as  first  principles,  but  only  as  hypotheses  —  that 
is  to  say,  as  steps  and  points  of  departure  into  a  region  which 
is  above  hypotheses,  in  order  that  she  may  soar  beyond  them  to 
the  first  principle  of  the  whole  ;  and  clinging  to  this  and  then 
to  that  which  depends  on  this,  by  successive  steps  she  descends 
again  without  the  aid  of  any  sensible  object,  beginning  and 
ending  in  ideas. 

I  understand  you,  he  replied;  not  perfectly,  for  you  seem  to 
me  to  be  describing  a  task  far  from  easy ;  but,  at  any  rate,  I  un- 
derstand you  to  say  that  knowledge  and  being,  which  the  science 
of  dialectic  contemplates,  are  clearer  than  the  notions  of  the 
arts,  as  they  are  termed,  which  proceed  from  hypotheses  only : 
these  are  also  contemplated  by  the  understanding,  and  not  by 
the  senses  :  yet.  because  they  start  from  hypotheses  and  do  not 
ascend  to  a  principle,  those  who  contemplate  them  appear  to 
you  not  to  exercise  the  higher  reason  upon  them,  although  when 
a  first  principle  is  added  to  them  they  are  cognizable  by  the 
higher  reason.  And  the  habit  which  is  concerned  with  geome- 
try and  the  cognate  sciences  I  suppose  that  you  would  term  un- 
derstanding and  not  reason,  as  being  intermediate  between 
opinion  and  reason.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  339. 
Human  life,  progression  of.  See  Progression  of,  etc. 


232  .        PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Ibycus,  his  love  in  old  age. 

I  feel  like  Ibycus  who.  when  in  his  old  age,  against  his 

will,  he  fell  in  love,  compared  himself  to  an  old  race-horse,  who 
was  about  to  run  in  a  chariot  race,  shaking  with  fear  at  the 
course  he  knew  so  well  —  this  was  his  simile  of  himself. —  Par- 
menides,  iii.  254. 

Ideal  State,  Philosophers  to  be*  kings  in  the.     See  Rulers   in  the 

State,  who  should  be. 
Ideas,  abstract. 

Socrates,  he  said,  I  admire  the  bent  of  your  mind  towards 

philosophy  ;  tell  me  now,  was  this  your  own  distinction  between 
ideas  in  themselves  and  the  things  which  partake  of  them? 
and  do  you  think  that  there  is  an  idea  of  likeness  apart  from 
the  likeness  which  we  possess,  or  of  the  one  and  many,  and  of 
the  other  notions  of  which  Zeno  has  been  speaking  ? 

I  think  that  there  are  such  ideas,  said  Socrates. 

Parmeuides  proceeded.  And  would  you  also  make  ideas  of 
the  just  and  the  beautiful  and  the  good,  and  of  all  that  class  ? 

Yes,  he  said,  I  should. 

And  would  you  make  an  idea  of  man  apart  from  us  and 
from  all  other  human  creatures,  or  of  fire  and  water  ? 

I  am  often  undecided,  Parmeuides,  as  to  whether  I  ought  to 
include  them  or  not. 

And  would  you  feel  equally  undecided,  Socrates,  about  things 
of  which  the  mention  may  provoke  a  smile  ?  —  I  mean  such 
things  as  hair,  mud,  dirt,  or  anything  else  that  is  foul  and 
base ;  would  you  suppose  that  each  of  these  has  an  idea  dis- 
tinct from  the  actual  objects  with  which  we  come  into  contact, 
or  not  ? 

Certainly  not,  said  Socrates  ;  visible  things  like  these  are 
such  as  they  appear  to  us,  and  I  am  afraid  that  there  would  be 
an  absurdity  in  assuming  any  idea  of  them,  although  I  sometimes 
get  disturbed,  and  begin  to  think  that  there  is  nothing  without 
an  idea ;  but  then  again,  when  I  have  taken  up  this  position,  I 
run  away,  because  I  am  afraid  that  I  may  fall  into  a  bottom- 
less pit  of  nonsense,  and  perish  ;  and  so  I  return  to  the  ideas 
of  which  I  was  just  now  speaking,  and  occupy  myself  with 
them. 

Yes,  Socrates,  said  Parmenides  ;  that  is  because  you  are  still 
young ;  the  time  will  come  when  philosophy  will  have  a  firmer 
grasp  of  you,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  and  then  you  will  not  de- 
spise even  the  meanest  things :  at  your  age,  you  are  toe  rnucb 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  233 

disposed  to  regard  the  opinions  of  men.  But  I  should  like  to 
know  whether  you  mean  that  there  are  certain  ideas  of  which 
all  other  things  partake,  and. from  which  they  are  therefore 
named  ;  that  similars  for  example,  become  similar,  because  they 
partake  of  similarity ;  and  great  things  become  great,  because 
they  partake  of  greatness ;  and  that  just  and  beautiful  things 
become  just  and  beautiful,  because  they  partake  of  justice  and 
beauty  ? 

Yes,  certainly,  said  Socrates,  that  is  my  meaning.  —  Parmen- 
ides,  iii.  246. 

Ideas  that  are  cognitions.     See  Cognitions. 
Idle  talking. 
I  certainly  do  not  see  my  way  at  present. 

Yes,  said  Parmenides ;  and  I  think  that  this  arises,  Socrates, 
out  of  your  attempting  to  define  the  beautiful,  the  just,  the  good, 
and  the  ideas  generally,  without  sufficient  previous  training.  I 
noticed  your  deficiency,  when  I  heard  you  talking  here  with 
your  friend  Aristoteles,  the  day  before  yesterday.  The  impulse 
that  carries  you  towards  philosophy  is  assuredly  noble  and 
divine  ;  but  still  there  is  an  art  which  often  seems  to  be  use- 
less, and  is  called  by  the  vulgar  idle  talking  and  is  often  imag- 
ined to  be  useless  ;  in  that  you  must  train  and  exercise  yourself, 
now  that  you  are  young,  or  truth  will  elude  your  grasp.  —  Par- 
menides, iii.  253. 
Ignoble,  the. 

Come,  now  and  let  us  reason  with  the  unjust,  who  is  not 

intentionally  in  error.  "  Sweet  Sir,"  we  will  say  to  him, "  what 
think  you  of  things  esteemed  noble  and  ignoble  ?  Is  not  the 
noble  that  which  subjects  the  beast  to  the  man,  or  rather  to  the 
God  in  man ;  and  the  ignoble  that  which  subjects  the  man  to 
the  beast  ?  "  He  can  hardly  avoid  saying  yes  —  can  he  now  ? 

Not  if  he  has  any  regard  for  my  opinion. 

But,  if  he  admit  this,  we  may  ask  him  another  question  ; 
How  would  a  man  profit  if  he  received  gold  and  silver  on  the 
condition  that  he  was  to  enslave  the  noblest  part  of  him  to  the 
worst?  Who  can  imagine  that  a  man  who  sold  his  son  or 
daughter  into  slavery  for  money,  especially  if  he  sold  them 
into  the  hands  of  fierce  and  evil  men,  would  be  the  gainer, 
however  large  might  be  the  sum  which  he  received  ?  And 
will  any  one  say  that  he  is  not  a  miserable  caitiff  who  sells  his 
own  divine  being  to  that  which  is  most  atheistical  and  detest- 
able, and  has  no  pity  ?  Eriphyle  took  the  necklace  as  the 


234  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

price  of  her  husband's  life,  but  he  is  taking  a  bribe  in  order  to 
compass  a  worse  ruin. 

Yes,  said  Glaucon,  far  worse,  I  will  answer  for  him. 

Has  not  the  intemperate  been  censured  of  old,  because  in  him 
that  huge  multiform  monster  is  allowed  to  be  too  much  at  large  ? 

Clearly. 

And  men  are  blamed  for  pride  and  sullenness,  as  when  the 
growth  and  increase  of  the  lion  and  serpent  are  out  of  propor- 
tion ? 

Yes. 

And  luxury  and  softness  are  blamed,  because  they  relax  and 
weaken  this  same  creature,  and  make  a  coward  of  him  ? 

Very  true. 

And  is  not  a  man  reproached  for  flattery  and  meanness  who 
subordinates  the  spirited  animal  to  the  unruly  monster,  and,  for 
the  sake  of  money,  of  which  he  can  never  have  enough,  ha- 
bituates himself  in  the  days  of  his  youth  to  be  trampled  in  the 
mud,  and  from  being  a  lion  to  become  a  monkey? 

True,  he  said. 

And  why  are  mean  employments  and  handicraft  arts  a  re- 
proach ?  Only  because  they  imply  a  natural  weakness  of  the 
higher  principle,  and  the  individual  is  unable  to  control  the 
creatures  within  him,  but  has  to  court  them,  and  his  only  study 
is  how  to  flatter  them  ? 

Such  appears  to  be  the  reason.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  421. 
Ignorance,  legislative,  destroying  States.     See  States,  destroyed  by 

ignorance. 

Str.  When  the    foundation  of    politics    is  in    the  letter 

only  and  in  custom,  and  knowledge  is  divorced  from  action,  can 
we  wonder,  Socrates,  at  the  miseries  that  there  are,  and  always 
will  be,  in  States  ?  Any  other  art,  built  on  such  a  foundation, 
would  be  utterly  undermined,  —  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  that. 
Ought  we  not  rather  to  wonder  at  the  strength  of  the  political 
bon'd  ?  For  States  have  endured  all  this,  time  out  of  mind, 
and  yet  some  of  them  still  remain  and  are  not  overthrown, 
though  many  of  them,  like  ships  foundering  at  sea,  are  perish- 
ing and  have  perished,  and  will  hereafter  perish,  through  the  in- 
capacity of  their  pilots  and  crews,  who  have  the  worst  sort  of 
ignorance  of  the  highest  truths  —  I  mean  to  say,  that  they  are 
wholly  unacquainted  with  politics,  of  which,  above  all  other  sci- 
ences, they  believe  themselves  to  have  acquired  the  most  perfect 
knowledge.  —  Statesman,  iii.  588. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  235 

Ignorance  the  cause  of  crimes. 

A  man   may  truly  say  that  ignorance  is  a  third  cause  of 

crimes.  Ignorance,  however,  may  be  conveniently  divided  by 
the  legislator  into  two  sorts  :  There  is  simple  ignorance,  which 
is  the  source  of  lighter  offenses,  and  double  ignorance  which 
is  accompanied  by  conceit  of  wisdom  ;  and  he  who  is  under 
the  influence  of  the  latter,  fancies  that  he  knows  all  about 
matters  of  which  he  knows  nothing.  This  second  kind  of  ig- 
norance, when  possessed  of  power  and  strength,  will  be  held 
by  the  legislator  to  be  the  source  of  great  and  monstrous  crimes, 
but  when  attended  with  weakness  will  only  result  in  the  errors 
of  children  and  old  men  ;  and  these  he  will  treat  as  errors, 
and  will  make  laws  accordingly  for  those  who  commit  them, 
which  will  be  the  mildest  and  most  merciful  of  all  laws.  — 
Laws,  iv.  376. 
Images,  sensible,  some  truths  have  not. 

But  people  seem  to  forget  that  some  things  have  sensible 

images,  which  may  be  easily  shown,  when  any  one  desires  to 
exhibit  any  of  them  or  explain  them  to  an  inquirer,  without 
any  trouble  or  argument ;  while  the  greatest  and  noblest  truths 
have  no  outward  image  of  themselves  visible  to  man,  which  he 
who  wishes  to  satisfy  the  longing  soul  of  the  inquirer  can 
adapt  to  the  eye  of  sense,  and  therefore  we  ought  to  practice 
reasoning  ;  for  immaterial  things,  which  are  the  highest  and 
greatest,  are  shown  only  in  thought  and  idea,  and  in  no  other 
way,  and  all  that  we  are  saying  is  said  for  the  sake  of  them. 
Moreover,  there  is  always  less  difficulty  in  fixing  the  mind  on 
small  matters  than  on  great.  —  Statesman,  iii.  571. 
Imitation,  a  form  of  jest. 

Str.  Is  there  any  more  graceful  or  artistic  form  of  jest 

than  imitation  ? 

Theaet.  Certainly  not ;  and  imitation  is  a  very  comprehen- 
sive term,  which  includes  under  one  class  the  most  diverse 
sorts  of  things. 

Str.  We  know,  of  course,  that  he  who  professes  by  one  art 
to  make  all  things  is  really  a  painter,  and  by  the  painter's  art 
makes  resemblance  of  them  which  have  the  same  name  with 
them  ;  and  he  can  deceive  the  less  intelligent  sort  of  young 
children,  to  whom  he  shows  his  pictures  at  a  distance,  into  the  be- 
lief that  he  has  the  absolute  power  of  making  whatever  he  likes, 

Theaet.  Certainly. 

Str.  And  may  there  not  be  supposed  to  be  an  imitative  art 


236  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

of  reasoning  ?  Is  there  any  impossibility  in  stealing  the  hearts 
of  youths  through  their  ears,  when  they  are  still  at  a  distance 
from  the  truth,  by  showing  them  fictitious  arguments,  and  mak- 
ing them  think  that  they  are  true,  and  that  the  speaker  is  the 
wisest  of  men  in  all  things  ? 

Theaet.  Yes  ;   why  should  there  not  be  another  similar  art  ? 

Str.  But  as  time  goes  on,  and  they  advance  in  years,  and 
come  more  into  contact  with  realities,  and  have  learnt  by  sad 
experience  to  see  and  feel  the  truth  of  things,  are  they  not 
compelled  to  change  many  opinions  which  they  had  so  that  the 
great  appears  small  to  them,  and  the  easy  difficult,  and  all  their 
seeming  speculations  are  overturned  by  the  facts  of  life  ? 

Theaet.  That  is  my  view,  as  far  as  I  can  judge,  although, 
at  my  age,  I  may  be  one  of  those  who  see  things  at  a  distance 
only. 

Str.  And  the  wish  of  all  of  us,  who  are  your  friends,  is  and 
always  will  be  to  bring  you  as  near  to  the  truth  as  we  can 
without  the  sad  reality.  And  now  I  should  like  you  to  tell  me 
whether  the  Sophist  is  not  visibly  a  magician  and  imitator  of 
true  being ;  or  are  we  still  disposed  to  think  that  he  may  have 
a  true  knowledge  of  the  various  matters  about  which  he  dis- 
putes ? 

Theaet.  But  how  is  that  possible,  Stranger  ?  Is  there  any 
doubt,  after  what  has  been  said,  that  he  is  to  be  located  in  one 
of  the  divisions  of  children's  play  ? 

Str.  Then  we  must  place  him  in  the  class  of  magicians  and 
mimics. 

Theaet.   Certainly  we  must. 

Str.  And  now  our  business  is  not  to  let  the  animal  out,  for 
we  have  got  him  in  a  sort  of  dialectical  net,  and  there  is  one 
thing  which  he  certainly  will  not  escape. 

Theaet.  What  is  that  ? 

Str.  The  inference  that  he  is  a  juggler. 

Theaet.  Precisely  my  own  opinion  of  him. 

Str.  Then,  clearly,  we  ought  as  soon  as  possible  to  divide  the 
image-making  art.  and  go  down  into  the  net,  and,  !<f  the  Soph- 
ist does  not  run  away  from  us,  to  seize  him  and  deliver  him 
over  to  reason,  who  is  the  lord  of  the  hunt,  and  announce  the 
capture  of  him  ;  and  if  he  creeps  into  the  recesses  of  the  imita- 
tive art,  and  secretes  himself  in  one  of  them,  to  divide  again 
and  follow  him  up,  until  in  some  subsection  of  imitation  he 
is  caught.  For  our  method  of  tackling  each  and  all  is  one 


-    PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  237 

which  neither  he  nor  any  other  creature  will  ever  escape  in 
triumph. 

Theaet.  That  is  good,  and  let  us  do  as  you  say.  —  Sophist, 
iii.  469. 
Imitation  in  painting. 

All  that  is  said  by  any  of  us  can  only  be  imitation  and 

comparison.  For  if  we  consider  how  the  works  of  the  painter 
represent  bodies  divine  and  heavenly,  and  the  different  degrees 
of  gratification  with  which  the  eye  of  the  spectator  receives 
them,  we  shall  see  that  we  are  satisfied  with  the  artist  who  is 
able  in  any  degree  to  imitate  the  earth  and  its  mountains,  and 
the  rivers,  and  the  woods,  and  the  universe,  and  the  things  that 
are  and  move  therein,  and  further,  that  knowing  nothing  pre- 
cise about  such  matters,  we  do  not  examine  or  analyze  the 
painting  ;  all  that  is  required  is  a  sort  of  indistinct  and  decep- 
tive mode  of  shadowing  them  forth.  But  when  a  person  en- 
deavors to  paint  the  human  form  we  are  quick  at  finding  out 
defects,  and  our  familiar  knowledge  makes  us  severe  judges  of 
any  one  who  does  not  render  every  point  of  similarity  ;  and 
we  may  observe  the  same  thing  to  happen  in  discourse  ;  we 
are  satisfied  with  a  picture  of  divine  and  heavenly  things  which 
has  very  little  likeness  to  them  ;  but  we  are  more  precise  in 
our  criticism  of  mortal  and  human  things.  —  Critias,  ii.  594. 

Ath.  And  can  he  who  does  not  know  what  the  exact  object 
is  which  is  imitated,  ever  know  whether  the  resemblance  is 
truthfully  executed  ?  I  mean,  for  example,  whether  a  statue 
has  the  proportions  of  a  body,  and  the  true  situation  of  the 
parts,  what  fliose  proportions  are,  and  how  the  parts  fit  into 
one  another  in  due  order  ;  also  their  colors  and  conformations, 
or  whether  this  is  all  confused  in  the  execution  ?  Do  you 
think  that  any  one  can  know  about  this,  who  does  not  know 
what  the  animal  is  which  has  been  imitated  ? 

Cle.  Impossible. 

Ath.  But  even  if  we  know  that  the  thing  pictured  or  sculpt- 
ured is  a  man,  who  has  received  at  the  hand  of  the  artist  all 
his  proper  parts  and  forms  and  colors,  must  we  not  also  know 
whether  the  work  is  beautiful  or  in  any  respect  deficient  in 
beauty  ? 

Cle.  If  this  were  not  required,  Stranger,  we  should  all  of  us 
be  judges  of  beauty.  —  Laws,  iv.  198. 
Imitations  becoming  a  second  nature.     See  Freedom,  etc. 
Imitative  art.     See  Likeness-making. 


238  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Imitative  poetry. 

Of  the  many  excellences  which  I  perceive  in  the  order  of 

our  State,  there  is  none  which  upon  reflection  pleases  me  bet- 
ter than  the  rule  about  poetry. 

What  rule  ? 

The  rule  -about  rejecting  imitative  poetry,  which  certainly 
ought  not  to  be  received  ;  as  I  see  far  more  clearly  now  that 
the  parts  of  the  soul  have  been  distinguished. 

What  do  you  mean  ? 

Speaking  in  confidence,  for  I  should  not  like  to  have  my 
words  repeated  to  the  tragedians  and  the  rest  of  the  imitative 
tribe  —  but  I  do  not  mind  saying  to  you  that  all  poetical  imi- 
tations are  ruinous  to  the  understanding  of  the  hearers,  and 
that  the  knowledge  of  what  they  are  is  the  only  antidote  to 
them. 

Explain  the  purport  of  your  remark. 

Well,  I  will  tell  you :  although  I  have  always  from  my  earli- 
est youth  had  an  awe  and  love  of  Homer,  which  even  now 
makes  the  words  falter  on  my  lips,  for  he  is  the  great  captain 
and  teacher  of  the  whole  of  that  charming  tragic  company  ; 
but  a  man  is  not  to  be  reverenced  before  the  truth,  and  there- 
fore I  will  speak  out. —  The  Republic,  ii.  425. 
Imitators,  Poets  are. 

It  remains  narrative  both  in  the  speeches  which  the  poet 

recites  and  the  passages  between  ? 

Quite  true. 

But  when  the  poet  speaks  in  the  person  of  another,  may  we 
not  say  that  he  assimilates  his  style  to  that  of  the  person  who, 
as  he  informs  you,  is  going  to  speak  ? 

Certainly. 

And  this  assimilation  of  himself  to  another  either  by  the  use 
of  voice  or  gesture,  is  the  imitation  of  the  person  whose  char- 
acter he  assumes  ? 

Of  course. 

Then  in  this  case  the  narrative  of  the  poet  may  be  said  to 
proceed  by  way  of  imitation  ? 

Very  true. —  The  Republic,  ii.  216. 

To  me  the  wonder  is  rather  that  the  poets,  present  as  well  as 
past,  are  no  better  —  not  that  I  mean  to  depreciate  them,  but 
every  one  can  see  that  they  are  a  tribe  of  imitators,  and  will 
imitate  best  and  most  easily  the  ways  of  life  amid  which  they 
have  been  brought  up;  whereas  that  which  is  beyond  the  range 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  239 

of  a  man's  education  can  hardly  be  imitated  by  him  in  action, 
and  with  still  more  difficulty  in  speech.  —  Timaeus,  ii.  515. 
Immortal,  the  world  made. 

In    the  fullness  of    time,  when  the  change  was  to  take 

place,  and  the  earth-born  race  had  all  perished,  and  every  soul 
had  fallen  into  the  earth  and  been  sown  her  appointed  number 
of  times,  the  governor  of  the  universe  let  the  helm  go,  and  re- 
tired to  his  place  of  view  ;  and  then  Fate  and  innate  desire  re- 
versed the  motion  of  the  world.  Then,  also,  all  the  inferior 
deities  who  share  the  rule  of  the  supreme  power,  being  in- 
formed of  what  was  happening,  let  go  the  parts  of  the  world 
of  which  they  were  severally  the  guardians.  And  the  world 
turning  round  with  a  sudden  shock,  having  received  an  oppo- 
site impulse  at  both  ends,  was  shaken  by  a  mighty  earthquake, 
producing  a  new  destruction  of  all  manner  of  animals.  After 
a  while  the  tumult  and  confusion  and  earthquake  ceased,  and 
the  universal  creature,  once  more  at  peace,  attained  to  a  calm, 
and  settled  down  into  his  own  orderly  and  accustomed  course, 
having  the  charge  and  rule  of  himself  and  of  all  other  creat- 
ures, and  remembering  and  executing  the  instructions  of  the 
Father  and  Creator  of  the  world,  more  particularly  at  first, 
but  afterwards  with  less  exactness.  The  reason  of  the  falling 
off  was  the  admixture  of  matter  in  the  world ;  this  was  inher- 
ent in  the  primal  nature,  which  was  full  of  disorder,  until  at- 
taining to  the  present  cosmos  or  order.  From  God,  the  con- 
structor, the  world  indeed  received  every  good,  but  from  a 
previous  state  came  elements  of  violence  and  injustice,  which, 
Jience  derived,  first  of  all  passed  into  the  world  and  were  trans- 
mitted to  the  animals.  While  the  world  was  producing  ani- 
mals in  unison  with  God,  the  evil  was  small,  and  great  the 
good  which  worked  within,  but  in  the  process  of  separation 
from  him,  when  the  world  was  let  go,  at  first  all  proceeded 
well  enough  ;  but,  as  time  went  on,  there  was  more  and  more 
forgetting,  and  the  old  discord  again  entered  in  and  got  the 
better,  and  burst  forth  ;  and  at  last  small  was  the  good,  and 
great  was  the  admixture  of  the  elements  of  evil,  and  there  was 
a  danger  of  universal  ruin  of  the  world  and  the  things  in  the 
world.  Wherefore  God,  the  orderer  of  all,  in  his  tender  care, 
seeing  that  the  world  was  in  great  straits,  and  fearing  that  all 
might  be  dissolved  in  the  storm,  and  go  to  the  place  of  chaos 
and  infinity,  again  seated  himself  at  the  helm  ;  and  reversing 
the  elements  which  had  fallen  into  dissolution  and  disorder 


240  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

when  left  to  themselves  in  the  previous  cycle,  he  set  them  in 
order  and  restored  them,  and  made  the  world  imperishable  and 
immortal.  —  Statesman,  iii.  557. 
Immortality  of  fame  desired  by  men. 

Marvel  not  then  at  the  love  which  all  men  have  of  their 

offspring  ;  for  that  universal  love  and  interest  is  for  the  sake 
of  immortality  —  I  was  astonished  at  her  words  and  said  :  "  Is 
this  really  true,  0  thou  wise  Diotima  ?  "  And  she  answered 
with  all  the  authority  of  a  Sophist :  "  Of  that,  Socrates,  you 
may  be  assured ;  think  only  of  the  ambition  of  men,  and  you 
will  wonder  at  the  senselessness  of  their  ways,  unless  you  con- 
sider how  they  are  stirred  by  the  love  of  an  immortality  of 
fame.  They  are  ready  to  run  risks  greater  far  than  they  would 
have  run  for  their  children,  and  to  spend  money  and  undergo 
any  amount  of  toil,  and  even  to  die  for  the  sake  of  leaving  be- 
hind them  a  name  which  shall  be  eternal.  Do  you  imagine 
that  Alcestis  would  have  died  to  save  Admetus,  or  Achilles  to 
avenge  Patroclus,  or  your  own  Codrus  in  order  to  preserve  the 
kingdom  for  his  sons,  if  they  had  not  imagined  that  the  memory 
of  their  virtues,  which  is  still  retained  among  us,  would  be  im- 
mortal ?  Nay,"  she  said,  "  I  am  persuaded  that  all  men  do  all 
things  and  the  better  they  are  the  more  they  do  them,  in  hope 
of  the  glorious  fame  of  immortal  virtue ;  for  they  desire  the 
immortal." —  The  Symposium,  i.  500. 
Immortality  in  time. 

The  human  race  naturally  partakes  of    immortality,  of 

which  all  men  have  the  greatest  desire  implanted  in  them ;  for 
the  desire  of  every  man  that  he  may  become  famous,  and  not 
lie  in  the  grave  without  a  name,  is  only  the  love  of  continu- 
ance.    Now,  mankind  are  coeval  with  all  time,  and  are  ever 
following,  and   will  ever  follow,  the  course  of  time ;  and  so 
they  are  immortal,  inasmuch    as    they   leave  children  behind 
them,  and  partake  of  immortality  in   the  unity  of  generation. 
And  for  a  man  voluntarily  to  deprive  himself  of  this  gift,  as 
he  deliberately  does  who  will  not  have  a  wife  or  children,  is 
impiety.  —  Laws,  iv.  249. 
Immortality  of  the  soul.     See  Soul. 
Immortality  of  God.     See  God  unchangeable. 
Impartiality  not  the  same  as  equality.     See  Equality  not  the  same, 

etc. 
Impassiveness  of  the  Gods.     See  Gods,  impassiveness  of  the. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  241 

Impiety,  punishment  01. 

Xow,  men  fall  into  impiety  from  three  causes,  which  have 

been  already  mentioned,  and  from  each  of  these  causes  arise 
two  sorts  of  impiety,  in  all  six,  requiring  judicial  decision,  but 
differing  greatly  in  their  degrees  of  guilt.  For  he  who  does 
not  believe  in  the  Gods,  and  yet  has  a  righteous  nature,  hates 
the  wicked  and  dislikes  and  refuses  to  do  injustice,  and  avoids 
unrighteous  men,  and  loves  the  righteous.  But  they  who,  be- 
sides believing  that  the  world  is  devoid  of  Gods,  are  intemper- 
ate, and  have  at  the  same  time  good  memories  and  quick  wits, 
are  worse  ;  although  both  of  them  are  unbelievers,  much  less 
injury  is  done  by  the  one  than  by  the  other.  The  one  may 
talk  loosely  about  the  Gods  and  about  sacrifices  and  oaths,  and 
perhaps  by  laughing  at  other  men  he  may  make  them  like  him- 
self, if  he  be  not  punished.  But  the  other  unbeliever,  who 
has  ability,  is  full  of  stratagem  and  deceit  —  men  of  this  class 
are  prophets  and  jugglers  of  all  kinds,  and  out  of  their  ranks 
sometimes  come  tyrants,  and  demagogues,  and  generals,  and 
hierophants  of  private  mysteries  and  the  ingenuities  of  so- 
called  Sophists.  There  are  many  kinds  of  unbelievers,  but 
two  only  for  whom  legislation  is  required ;  one  the  hypocrit- 
ical sort,  whose  crime  is  deserving  of  death  many  times  over, 
while  the  others  need  only  bonds  and  admonition.  —  Laws, 
iv.  421. 
Impure  and  pure  soul. 

Are  we  to  suppose  that  the  soul,  which  is  invisible,  in 

passing  to  the  true  Hades,  which  like  her  is  invisible,  and  pure, 
and  noble,  and  on  her  way  to  the  good  and  wise  God,  whither, 
if  God  will,  my  soul  is  also  soon  to  go,  —  that  the  soul,  I  re- 
peat, if  this  be  her  nature  and  origin,  is  blown  away  and  per- 
ishes immediately  on  quitting  the  body,  as  the  many  say  ? 
That  can  never  be,  my  dear  Simmias  and  Cebes.  The  truth 
rather  is,  that  the  soul  which  is  pure  at  departing  draws  after 
her  no  bodily  taint,  having  never  voluntarily  had  connection 
with  the  body,  which  she  is  ever  avoiding,  herself  gathered  into 
herself;  (for  such  abstraction  has  been  the  study  of  her  life). 
And  what  does  this  mean  but  that  she  has  been  a  true  disciple 
of  philosophy,  and  has  practiced  how  to  die  cheerfully  ?  And 
is  not  philosophy  the  practice  of  death  ? 

Certainly. 

That  soul,  I   say,  herself  invisible,  departs   to   the   invisible 
world,  —  to  the  divine  and  immortal  and  rational ;  thither  ar 
16 


242  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

riving,  she  is  secure  of  bliss  and  is  released  from  the  error  and 
folly  of  men,  their  fears  and  wild  passions  and  all  other  human 
ills,  and  forever  dwells,  as  they  say  tf  the  initiated,  hi  com- 
pany with  the  Gods.  Is  not  this  tru^,  Cebes  ? 

Yes,  said  Cebes,  beyond  a  doubt. 

But  the  soul  which  has  been  polluted,  and  is  impure  at  the 
time  of  her  departure,  and  is  the  companion  and  servant  of 
the  body  always,  and  is  in  love  with  and  fascinated  by  the  body 
and  by  the  desires  and  pleasures  of  the  body,  until  she  is  led 
to  believe  that  the  truth  only  exists  in  a  bodily  form,  which  a 
man  may  touch  and  see  and  taste  and  use  for  the  purposes  of 
his  lusts,  —  the  soul,  I  mean,  accustomed  to  hate  and  fear  and 
avoid  the  intellectual  principle,  which  to  the  bodily  eye  is  dark 
and  invisible,  and  can  be  attained  only  by  philosophy  ;  do  you 
suppose  that  such  a  soul  as  this  will  depart  pure  and  unal- 
loyed ? 

That  is  impossible,  he  replied. 

She  is  held  fast  by  the  corporeal,  which  the  continual  asso- 
ciation and  constant  care  of  the  body  have  wrought  in  her 
nature. 

Very  true. 

And  this  corporeal  element,  my  friend,  is  heavy  and  weighty, 
and  earthy,  and  is  that  element  of  sight  by  which  such  a  soul 
is  depressed  and  dragged  down  again  into  the  visible  world, 
because  she  is  afraid  of  the  invisible  and  of  the  world  below. 
—  Phaedo,  I  409. 
Impure  and  pure,  gifts  of  the. 

Ath.  What  life  is  agreeable  to  God,  and  becoming  in  his 

followers  ?  One  only  according  to  an  old  saying,  that  "  like 
agrees  with  like,  with  measure  measure,"'  but  things  which 
have  no  measure  agree  neither  with  themselves  nor  with  the 
things  which  have  measure.  Now,  God  is  the  measure  of  all 
things,  in  a  sense  far  higher  than  any  man,  as  they  say,  can  ever 
hope  to  be.  And  he  who  would  be  dear  to  God  must,  as  far 
as  is  possible,  be  like  him  and  such  as  he  is.  Wherefore  the 
temperate  man  is  the  friend  of  God,  for  he  is  like  him  ;  and 
the  intemperate  man  is  unlike  him ;  and  different  from  him, 
and  unjust.  And  the  same  holds  of  other  things,  and  this  is 
the  conclusion,  which  is  also  the  noblest  and  truest  of  all  say- 
ings :  that  for  the  good  man  to  offer  sacrifice  to  the  Gods,  and 
hold  converse  with  them  by  means  of  prayers  and  offerings  and 
every  kind  of  service,  is  the  nc .  lest  and  besf  of  all  thirds,  and 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  245 

also  the  most  conducive  to  a  happy  life,  and  very  fit  and  meet. 
But  with  the  bad  man,  the  opposite  of  this  holds ;  for  the  bad 
man  has  an  impure  soul,  whereas  the  good  is  pure ;  and  from 
one  who  is  polluted,  neither  a  good  man  nor  God  is  right  in 
receiving  gifts.     And  therefore  the  unholy  waste  their  much 
service  upon  the  Gods,  which,  when  offered  by  any  holy  man, 
is  always  accepted  of  them. — Laws,  iv.  244. 
Individual ;  the  State  more  to  be  valued  than  the.     See  Citizen,  ob- 
ligation of  the. 
Individual,  the  State  greater  than  the. 

Justice,  which  is  the  subject  of  our  inquiry,  is,  as  you 

know,  sometimes  spoked  of   as  the  virtue  of   an  individual,  and 
sometimes  as  the  virtue  of  a  State. 

True,  he  replied. 

And  is  not  a  State  larger  than  an  individual  ? 

It  is. 

Then  in  the  larger  the  quantity  of  justice  will  be  larger  and 
more  easily  discernible.  I  propose,  therefore,  that  we  inquire 
into  the  nature  of  justice  and  injustice  as  appearing  in  the  State 
first,  and  secondly  in  the  individual,  proceeding  from  the  greater 
to  the  lesser  and  comparing  them. 

That,  he  said,  is  an  excellent  proposal. 

And  suppose  we  imagine  the  State  as  in  a  process  of  crea- 
tion, and  then  we  shall  see  the  justice  and  injustice  of  the  State 
in  process  of  creation  also. 

Very  likely. 

When  the  State  is  completed  there  may  be  a  hope  that  the 
object  of  our  search  will  be  more  easily  discovered. 

Yes,  more  easily. 

And  shall  we  make  the  attempt  ?  I  said  ;  although  I  cannot 
promise  you  that  the  task  will  be  a  light  one.  Reflect,  there- 
fore. 

I  have  reflected,  said  Adeimantus,  and  am  anxious  that  you 
should  proceed. 

A  State,  I  said,  arises,  as  I  conceive,  out  of  the  needs  of 
mankind ;  no  one  is  self-sufficing,  but  all  of  us  have  many 
wants.  Can  any  other  origin  of  a  State  be  imagined  ? 

There  can  be  no  other. 

Then,  as  we  have  many  wants,  and  many  persons  are  needed 
to  supply  them,  one  takes  a  helper  for  one  purpose  and  another 
for  another  :  and  when  these  helpers  and  partners  are  gathered 
together  in  one  habitation,  the  body  of  inhabitants  is  termed  a 
State. 


244  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

True,  he  jaid. 

And  they  exchange  with  one  another,  and  one  gives,  and  an- 
other receives,  under  the  idea  that  the  exchange  will  be  for 
their  good. 

Very  true. 

Then,  I  said,  let  us  begin  and  create  a  State ;  and  yet  the 
true  creator  is  necessity,  who  is  the  mother  of  our  invention.  — 
The.  Republic,  ii.  190. 
Individuality  and  unity. 

Pro.  Do  you  mean  when   a  person  says  that  I,  Protar- 

chus,  am  by  nature  one  and  also  many,  dividing  the  single 
"  me  "  in  many  "  me's,"  which  he  distinguishes  and  opposes  as 
great  and  small,  light  and  heavy,  and  in  ten  thousand  other 
ways? 

Soc.  Those,  Protarchus,  are  the  common  and  acknowledged 
paradoxes  about  the  one  and  many,  which  I  may  say  that  every- 
body has  by  this  time  agreed  to  dismiss  as  childish  and  obvious 
and  detrimental  to  the  true  course  of  thought ;  and  no  more  fa- 
vor is  shown  to  that  other  puzzle,  in  which  a  person  proves  the 
members  and  parts  of  anything  to  be  divided,  and  then  confess- 
ing that  they  are  all  one,  says  laughingly  in  disproof  of  his  own 
words,  —  why,  here  is  a  miracle,  the  one  is  many  and  infinite, 
and  the  many  are  only  one. 

Pro.  But  what,  Socrates,  are  those  other  marvels  which,  as 
you  imply,  have  not  yet  become  common  and  acknowledged, 
relating  to  the  same  principle  ? 

Soc.  When,  my  boy,  the  one  does  not  belong  to  the  class  of 
things  that  are  born  and  perish,  as  in  the  instances  which  we 
were  giving  for  in  those  cases,  and  when  unity  is  of  this  con- 
crete nature,  there  is,  as  I  was  saying,  a  universal  consent  that 
no  refutation  is  needed ;  but  when  the  assertion  is  made  that 
man  is  one,  or  ox  is  one,  or  beauty  one,  or  the  good  one,  then 
the  interest  which  attaches  to  these  and  similar  unities,  and  the 
attempt  which  is  made  to  divide  them,  —  gives  birth  to  a  con- 
troversy. 

Pro.  Of  what  nature  ? 

Soc.  In  the  first  place,  as  to  whether  these  unities  have  a 
real  existence  ;  and  then  how  each  individual  unity,  being  always 
the  same,  and  incapable  either  of  generation  or  of  destruction, 
but  retaining  a  permanent  individuality,  can  be  conceived  either 
as  dispersed  and  multiplied  in  the  infinity  of  the  world  of  gen- 
eration, or  as  still  entire  and  yet  derived  from  itself,  which  latter 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  245 

would   seem  to  be  the  greatest  impossibility  of  all,  for  how  can 
one  and  the  same  thing  be  at  the  same  time  in  one  and  in  many 
things  ?     These,  Protarchus,  are  the  real  difficulties,  and  this  is 
the  one  and  many  to  which  they  relate ;  they  are  the  source  of 
great  perplexity  if  ill  decided,  and  the  right  determination  of 
them  is  very  helpful.  —  Philebus,  iii.  149. 
Indivisible  essence.     See  Essence. 
Inequality  aud  Equality.     See  Equality. 
Infinite  and  finite.      See  Finite. 
Inheritances  and  heirships. 

I  would  not  have  any  one  fond  of  heaping  up  riches  for 

the  sake  of  his  children,  in  order  that  he  may  leave  them  as 
rich  as  possible.  For  the  possession  of  great  wealth  is  of  no 
use,  either  to  them  or  to  the  State.  The  condition  of  youth 
"hich  is  free  from  flattery,  and  at  the  same  time  not  in  need  of 
the  necessaries  of  life,  is  the  best  and  most  harmonious  of  all, 
being  in  accord  and  agreement  with  our  nature,  and  making 
life  to  be  most  entirely  free  from  sorrow.  Let  parents,  then, 
bequeath  to  their  children,  not  riches,  but  the  spirit  of  rever- 
ence. We,  indeed,  fancy  that  they  will  inherit  reverence  from 
us,  if  we  rebuke  them  when  they  show  a  want  of  reverence. 
But  this  quality  is  not  really  imparted  to  them  by  the  present 
style  of  admonition,  which  oaly  tells  them  that  the  young  ought 
always  to  be  reverential.  A  sensible  legislator  will  rather  ex- 
hort the  elders  to  reverence  the  younger,  and  above  all  to  take 
heed  that  no  young  man  sees  or  hears  him  doing  or  saying  any- 
thing base ;  for  where  old  men  have  no  shame,  there  young 
men  will  most  certainly  be  devoid  of  reverence.  —  Laws,  iv.  254. 
Iniquity,  concealment  of.  See  Concealment. 
Injustice. 

Consider  further,  most  foolish  Socrates,  that  the  just  is 

always  a  loser  in  comparison  with  the  unjust.  First  of  all,  in 
private  contracts :  wherever  the  unjust  is  the  partner  of  the 
just  you  will  find  the  unjust  man  has  always  more  and  the  just 
less.  Next,  in  their  dealings  with  the  State  :  when  there  is  an 
income-tax,  the  just  man  will  pay  more  and  the  unjust  less  on 
the  same  amount  of  income  ;  and  when  there  is  anything  to  be 
received  the  one  gains  nothing  and  the  other  much.  Observe 
also  that  when  they  come  into  office,  there  is  the  just  man  neg- 
lecting his  affairs  and  perhaps  suffering  other  losses,  but  he  will 
not  compensate  himself  out  of  the  public  purse  because  he  is 
just  :  moreover  he  is  hated  by  his  friends  and  acquaintance  for 


246  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

refusing  to  serve  them  in  unlawful  ways.  Now  all  this  is  re- 
versed in  the  case  of  the  unjust  man.  I  am  speaking,  as  before, 
of  injustice  on  a  large  scale  in  which  the  advantage  of  the  unjust 
is  most  apparent,  and  my  meaning  will  be  most  clearly  seen  if 
we  turn  to  that  highest  form  of  injustice  in  which  the  criminal 
is  the  happiest  of  men,  as  the  sufferers  or  those  who  refuse  to 
do  injustice  are  the  most  miserable  —  I  mean  tyranny,  which  by 
fraud  and  force  takes  away  the  property  of  others,  not  retail 
but  wholesale  ;  comprehending  in  one,  things  sacred  as  well  as 
profane,  private  and  public  ;  for  any  one  of  which  acts  of  wrong, 
if  he  were  detected  perpetrating  them  singly,  he  would  be  pun- 
ished and  incur  great  dishonor ;  since  they  who  are  guilty  of 
any  of  these  crimes  in  single  instances  are  called  robbers  of 
temples,  and  man-stealers  and  burglars  and  swindlers  and  thieves. 
But  when  a  man  besides  taking  away  the  money  of  the  citizens 
has  made  slaves  of  them,  then,  instead  of  these  dishonorable 
names,  he  is  called  happy  and  blessed,  not  only  by  the  citizens 
but  by  all  who  hear  of  his  having  achieved  the  consummation 
of  injustice.  For  injustice  is  censured  because  the  censurers 
are  afraid  of  suffering,  and  not  from  any  fear  which  they  have 
of  doing  injustice.  And  thus,  as  I  have  shown,  Socrates,  in- 
justice, when  on  a  sufficient  scale,  has  more  strength  and  free- 
dom and  mastery  than  justice  ;  and,  as  I  said  at  first,  justice  is 
the  interest  of  the  stronger,  whereas  injustice  is  a  man's  own 
profit  and  interest.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  165. 
Injustice,  doing  and  suffering. 

Pol.  At  any  rate  you  will  allow   that  he  who  is  unjustly 

put  to  death  is  wretched,  and  to  be  pitied  ? 

Soc.  Not  so  much,  Polus,  as  he  who  kills  him,  and  not  so 
much  as  he  who  is  justly  killed. 

Pol.  How  can  that  be,  Socrates  ? 

Soc.  That  may  very  well  be,  inasmuch  as  doing  injustice  is 
the  greatest  of  evils. 

Pol.  But  is  that  the  greatest  ?     Is  not  suffering  injustice  a 
greater  evil  ? 

Soc.  Certainly  not. 

Pol.  Then  would  you  rather  suffer  than  do  injustice  ? 

Soc.  I  should  not  like  either,  but  if  I  must  choose  between 
them,  I  would  rather  suffer  than  do.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  55. 
Injustice,  penalty  of. 

• Soc.  The  unrighteous  man.  or  the  sayer  and  doer  of  unholy 

things,  had  far  better  not  yield  to  the  illusion  that  his  roguery 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  247 

is  clever  ;  for  men  glory  in  their  shame  —  they  fancy  that 
they  hear  others  saying  of  them,  "  These  are  not  mere  good- 
for-nothing  persons,  burdens  of  the  earth,  but  such  as  men 
should  be  who  mean  to  dwell  safely  in  a  State."  Let  us  tell 
them  that  they  are  all  the  more  truly  what  they  do  not  know 
that  they  are ;  for  they  do  not  know  the  penalty  of  injustice, 
which  above  all  things  they  ought  to  know  —  not  stripes  and 
death,  as  they  suppose,  which  evil-doers  often  escape,  but  a 
penalty  which  cannot  be  escaped. 

Theod.  What  is  that  ? 

Soc.  There  are  two  patterns  eternally  set  before  them  in 
nature :  the  one  blessed  and  divine,  the  other  godless  and 
wretched ;  and  they  do  not  see,  in  their  utter  folly  and  infatu- 
ation, that  they  are  growing  like  the  one  and  unlike  the  other, 
by  reason  of  their  evil  deeds  ;  and  the  penalty  is,  that  they 
lead  a  life  answering  to  the  pattern  which  they  resemble. 
And  if  we  tell  them  that  unless  they  depart  from  their  cun- 
ning, the  place  of  innocence  will  not  receive  them  after  death ; 
and  that  here  on  earth  they  will  live  ever  in  the  likeness  of 
their  own  evil  selves,  and  with  evil  friends  —  when  they  hear 
this,  they  in  their  superior  cunning  will  seem  to  be  listening  to 
fools. 

Theod.  Very  true,  Socrates.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  379. 
Injustice  and  envy.     See  Envy. 
Injustice,  what  is  called. 

I  can  define  to  you  clearly,  and  without  ambiguity,  what 

I  mean  by  the  just  and  unjust,  according  to  my  notion  of 
them :  When  anger  and  fear,  and  pleasure  and  pain,  and  jeal- 
ousies and  desires,  tyrannize  over  the  soul,  whether  they  do 
any  harm  or  not  —  I  call  them  all  injustice.  But  when  the 
opinion  of  the  best,  whatever  States  or  individuals  may  suppose 
that  to  be,  has  dominion  in  the  soul  and  orders  the  life  of  every 
man,  even  if  it  be  sometimes  mistaken,  yet  what  is  done  in 
accordance  therewith,  and  the  principle  in  individuals  which 
obeys,  this  rule,  and  is  best  for  the  whole  life  of  man,  is  to  be 
called  just ;  although  the  action,  done  in  error,  is  thought  by 
the  multitude  to  be  involuntary  injustice.  —  Laws,  iv.  377. 
Injustice.  See  Wrong-doing. 
Inner  voice,  the. 

Soc.  This  is  the  voice  which  I  seem  to  hear  murmuring  in 

my  ears,  like  the  sound  of  the  flute  in  the  ears  of  the  mystic  -, 
that  voice,  I  say,  is  humming  in  my  ears,  and  prevents  me 


248  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

from  hearing  any  other.  And  I  know  that  anything  more 
which  you  may  say  will  be  vain.  Yet  speak,  if  you  have  any- 
thing to  say. 

Or.  I  have  nothing  to  say,  Socrates. 

Soc.  Leave  me  then  to  follow  whithersoever  God  leads.  — 
Crito,  i.  359. 

Inner  life,  harmony  of  the.     See  Harmony  of  the  inner  man. 
Innovations,  jests  no  bar  to. 

I  should  rather  expect,  I  said,  that  several  of  our  propo*- 

a*s,  if  they  are  carried  out,  being  unusual,  may  appear  ridicu- 
lous. 

No  doubt  of  it. 

Yes,  and  the  most  ridiculous  thing  of  all  will  be  the  sight  of 
women  naked  in  the  palaestra,  exercising  with  the  men,  espe- 
cially when  they  get  old  ;  they  certainly  will  not  be  a  vision  of 
beauty  any  more  than  the  wrinkled  old  men,  who  have  any- 
thing but  an  agreeable  appearance  when  they  take  to  gymnas- 
tics ;  this,  however,  does  not  deter  them. 

Yes,  indeed,  he  said :  according  to  present  notions  the  pro- 
posal would  appear  ridiculous. 

But  then,  I  said,  as  we  have  determined  to  speak  our  minds, 
we  must  not  fear  the  jests  of  the  wits  which  will  be  directed 
against  this  sort  of  innovation  ;  how  they  will  talk  of  women's 
attainments  in  music  as  well  as  in  gymnastic,  and  above  all 
about  their  wearing  armor  and  riding  upon  horseback  ! 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

Yet  having  begun,  we  must  go  on  and  attack  the  difficulty  ; 
at  the  same  time  begging  of  these  gentlemen  for  once  in  their 
life  to  be  serious.  Not  long  ago,  as  we  shall  remind  them,  the 
Greeks  were  of  the  opinion,  which  is  still  generally  received 
among  the  barbarians,  that  the  sight  of  a  naked  man  was  ridic- 
ulous and  improper ;  and  when  first  the  Cretans  and  then  the 
Lacedaemonians  introduced  naked  exercises,  the  wits  of  that 
day  might  have  ridiculed  them  equally. 

No  doubt. 

But  when  experience  showed  that  to  let  all  things  be  uncov- 
ered was  far  better  than  to  cover  them  up,  and  the  ludicrous 
effect  to  the  outward  eye  vanished  before  the  approval  of  rea- 
fcon,  then  the  man  was  seen  to  be  a  fool  who  laughs  or  directs 
the  shafts  of  his  ridicule  at  any  other  sight  but  that  of  folly 
and  vice,  or  seriously  inclines  to  measure  the  beautiful  by  any 
other  standard  but  that  of  the  good. 

Very  true,  he  replied. —  The  Republic,  ii.  276. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  249 

Innovations  forbidden  in  Egypt. 

Cle.  And  what  are  the  laws  about  music  and  dancing  ? 

Ath.  You  will  wonder  when  I  tell  you  :  Long  ago  they  ap- 
peared to  have  recognized  the  very  principle  of  which  we  are 
now  speaking  —  that  their  young  citizens  must  be  habituated  to 
forms  and  strains  of  virtue.  These  they  fixed  and  exhibited 
the  patterns  of  them  in  their  temples  ;  and  no  painter  or  artist 
is  allowed  to  innovate  upon  them,  or  to  leave  the  traditional 
forms  and  invent  new  ones.  To  this  day,  no  alteration  is  al- 
lowed either  in  these  arts,  or  in  music  at  all.  And  you  will 
find  that  their  works  of  art  are  painted  or  moulded  in  the  same 
forms  which  they  had  ten  thousand  years  ago ;  this  is  literally 
true  and  no  exaggeration,  —  their  ancient  paintings  and  sculpt- 
ures are  not  a  whit  better  or  worse  than  the  work  of  to-day, 
but  are  made  with  just  the  same  skill. 

Cle.  How  extraordinary ! 

Ath.  I  should  rather  say,  how  wise  and  worthy  of  a  great 
legislator  !  I  know  that  other  things  in  Egypt  are  not  so  good. 
But  what  I  am  telling  you  about  music  is  true  and  deserving 
of  consideration,  because  showing  that  a  lawgiver  may  institute 
melodies  which  have  a  natural  truth  and  correctness  without 
any  fear  of  failure.  To  do  this,  however,  must  be  the  work  of 
God,  or  of  a  divine  person ;  in  Egypt  they  have  a  tradition 
that  their  ancient  chants  are  the  composition  of  the  Goddess 
Isis.  And  therefore,  as  I  was  saying,  if  a  person  can  only  find 
in  any  way  the  natural  melodies,  he  might  confidently  embody 
them  in  a  fixed  and  legal  form.  For  the  love  of  novelty  which 
arises  out  of  pleasure  in  the  new,  and  weariness  of  the  old,  has 
not  strength  enough  to  vitiate  the  consecrated  song  and  dance, 
under  the  plea  that  they  have  become  antiquated.  At  any  rate 
they  are  far  from  being  antiquated  in  Egypt.  —  Laws,  iv.  186. 
Inordinate  ambition. 

My  love,  Alcibiades,  which  I  hardly  like  to  confess,  would 

long  ago  have  passed  away,  as  I  flatter  myself,  if  I  saw  you 
loving  your  good  things,  or  thinking  that  you  ought  to  live  in 
the  enjoyment  of  them.  But  I  know  that  you  entertain  other 
thoughts  ;  and  I  will  prove  to  you  that  I  have  always  had  my 
eye  on  you  by  declaring  them.  Suppose  that  at  this  moment 
some  God  came  to  you  and  said :  O  Alcibiades,  will  you  live  aa 
you  are,  or  die  in  an  instant  if  you  are  forbidden  to  make  any 
further  acquisition  ?  —  I  verily  believe  that  you  would  choose 
death.  And  I  will  tell  you  the  hope  in  which  you  are  at  pres- 


250  PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS. 

ent  living  :  Before  many  days  have  elapsed,  you  think  that  you 
will  come  before  the  Athenian  assembly,  and  will  try  to  prove 
to  them  that  you  are  more  worthy  of  honor  than  Pericles, 
or  any  other  man  that  ever  lived,  and  having  proved  this,  yo ; 
will  have  the  greatest  power  in  the  State  ;  and  when  you  have 
got  the  greatest  power  among  us,  you  will  go  on  to  other 
Hellenic  states,  and  not  only  to  Hellenes,  but  to  all  the  bar- 
barians who  inhabit  the  same  continent  with  us.  And  if  the 
God  were  then  to  say  to  you  again :  Here  in  Europe  is  to 
be  your  seat  of  empire,  and  you  must  not  cross  over  into  Asia 
or  meddle  with  Asiatic  affairs,  I  do  not  believe  that  you  would 
choose  to  live  upon  these  terms  ;  but  the  world,  as  I  may 
say,  must  be  filled  with  your  power  and  name  —  no  man  less 
than  Cyrus  and  Xerxes  is  of  any  account  with  you.  —  Alcibi- 
ades  I.  iv.  516. 
Inquiry,  the  spirit  of. 

Soc.  Some  things  I  have  said  of  which  I  am  not  alto- 
gether confident.  But  that  we  shall  be  better  and  braver  aud 
less  helpless  if  we  think  that  we  ought  to  inquire,  than  we 
should  have  been  if  we  indulged  in  the  idle  fancy  that  there 
was  no  knowing  and  no  use  in  searching;  after  what  we  do  not 

O  C3 

know  :  —  that  is  a  theme  upon  which  I  am  ready  to  fight,  in 
word  and  deed,  to  the  utmost  of  my  power. 

Men.  That  again,  Socrates,  appears  to  me  to  be  well  said. 
Meno,  i.  262. 

Inquiry  forbidden  as  ruinous  to  Arts.  See  Arts,  inquiry  ruinous  to. 
Insane,  two  kinds  of  the. 

Soc.  There  were  two  kinds  of  madness  ;    one  produced 

by  human  infirmity,  the  other  by  a  divine  release  from  the 
ordinary  ways  of  men. 

Phaedr.  True. 

Soc.  The  divine  madness  was  subdivided  into  four  kinds, 
prophetic,  initiatory,  poetic,  erotic,  having  four  Gods  presiding 
over  them ;  the  first  was  the  inspiration  of  Apollo,  the  second 
that  of  Dionysus,  the  third  that  of  the  Muses,  the  fourth  that 
of  Aphrodite  and  Eros.  In  the  description  of  the  last  kind  of 
madness,  which  was  also  the  best,  being  a  sort  of  figure  of 
love,  we  introduced  a  tolerably  credible  and  possibly  true, 
though  partly  erring  myth,  which  was  also  a  hymn  in  honor  of 
Eros,  who  is  your  lord  and  also  mine,  Phaedrus,  and  the  guar- 
dian of  fair  children,  and  to  him  we  sung  the  hymn  in  meas 
ured  and  solemn  strain. — Phaedrus,  i.  570. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  251 

Inspiration  of  the  poet.     See  Divine  power. 
Inspiration  of  the  Statesman.     See  Statesman,  called  civine. 
Instability  of  youth.     See  Chang edbleness. 
Instinctive  divining  of  truth. 

Soc.  They  say  that  what  the    school  of    Philebus    calls 

pleasures  are  all  of  them  only  avoidances  of  pain. 

Pro.  And  would  you,  Socrates,  have  us  agree  with  them  ? 

Soc.  "Why,  no,  I  would  rather  use  them  as  a  sort  of  diviners, 
who  are  enabled  to  divine  the  truth,  not  by  any  rules  of  art, 
but  by  an  instinctive  repugnance  and  extreme  detestation  which 
a  noble  nature  has  of  the  power  of  pleasure,  in  which  they 
think  that  there  is  nothing  sound,  and  whose  seductive  influ- 
ence is  declared  by  them  to  be  witchcraft,  and  not  pleasure. 
This  is  the  use  which  you  may  make  of  them  ;  you  shall  con- 
sider the  various  grounds  of  their  dislike,  and  then  you  shall 
hear  from  me  what  I  deem  to  be  true  pleasures  ;  and  when  the 
nature  of  pleasures  has  been  examined  from  both  points  of  view, 
we  will  bring  her  up  for  judgment. 

Pro.  True.  —  Philebus,  iii.  183. 
Intelligence  and  knowledge. 

When  reason,  which  works  with  equal  truth   both   in  the 

circle  of  the  diverse  and  of  the  same,  —  in  the  sphere  of  the 
self-moved  in  voiceless  silence  moving,  —  when  reason,  I  say, 
is  hovering  around  the  sensible  world,  and  the  circle  of  the  di- 
verse also  moving  truly  imparts  the  imitations  of  sense  to  the 
whole  soul,  then  arise  fixed  and  true  opinions  and  beliefs.  But 
when  reason  is  dwelling  in  the  rational,  and  the  circle  of  the 
same  moving  smoothly  indicates  this,  then  intelligence  and 
knowledge  are  of  necessity  perfected.  And  if  any  one  affirms 
that  in  which  these  are  found  to  be  other  than  the  soul,  he  wiL 
say  the  very  opposite  of  the  truth.  —  Timaeus,  ii.  530. 
Intelligence,  pleasures  of  the. 

But  since    experience    and  wisdom  and  reason  are    the 

judges,  the  inference  of  course  is,  that  the  truest  pleasures  are 
those  which  are  approved  by  the  lover  of  wisdom  and  reason. 
And  so  we  arrive  at  the  result,  that  the  pleasure  of  the  intel- 
ligent part  of  the  soul  is  the  pleasantest  of  the  three,  and  that 
he  of  us  in  whom  this  is  the  ruling  principle  has  the  pleasant- 
est life? 

Unquestionably,  he  said,  the  wise  man  speaks  with  authority 
when  he  approves  of  his  own  life.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  413. 


252  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Intemperance  and  temperance. 

Soc.  I  wish,  my  good  friend,  that  you  would  tell  rne,  once 

for  all,  whom  you  affirm  to  be  the  better  and  superior,  and  in 
what  they  are  better  ? 

Col.  I  have  already  told  you  that  I  mean  those  who  are 
wise  and  courageous  in  the  administration  of  a  State  ;  they 
ought  to  be  the  rulers  of  their  States,  and  justice  consists  in 
their  having  more  than  their  subjects. 

Soc.  But  whether  rulers  or  subjects,  wi.l  they  or  will  they 
not  have  more  than  themselves,  my  friend  ? 

Col.  How  do  you  mean  ? 

Soc.  I  mean  that  every  man  is  his  own  ruler  ;  but  perhaps 
you  think  that  there  is  no  necessity  for  him  to  rule  himself ; 
he  is  only  required  to  rule  others  ? 

Cal.  What  do  you  mean  by  his  "  ruling  over  himself  "  ? 

Soc.  A  simple  thing  enough  ;  just  what  is  commonly  said, 
that  a  man  should  be  temperate  and  master  of  himself,  and 
ruler. of  his  own  pleasures  and  passions. 

Cal.  What  innocence  !  you  mean  those  fools,  —  the  tem- 
perate ? 

Soc.   Certainly :  any  one  may  know  that  to  be  my  meaning. 

Cal.  Quite  so,  Socrates  ;  and  they  are  really  fools  —  for  ho^f 
can  a  man  be  happy  who  is  the  servant  of  anything  ?  On  the 
contrary,  I  plainly  assert,  that  he  who  would  truly  live  ought 
to  allow  his  desires  to  wax  to  the  uttermost,  and  not  to  chas- 
tise them  ;  but  when  they  have  grown  to  their  greatest  he 
should  have  courage  and  intelligence  to  minister  to  them  and 
to  satisfy  all  his  longings.  And  this  I  affirm  to  be  natural 
justice  and  nobility.  To  this  the  many  cannot  attain,  and  they 
blame  the  strong  man,  because  they  are  ashamed  of  their  own 
weakness,  which  they  desire  to  conceal,  and  hence  they  say 
that  intemperance  is  base.  As  I  was  saying  before,  they  en- 
slave the  nobler  natures,  and  being  unable  to  satisfy  their 
pleasures,  they  praise  temperance  and  justice  out  of  cowardice. 
For  if  a  man  had  been  originally  the  son  of  a  king,  or  had  a 
nature  capable  of  acquiring  an  empire  or  a  tyranny  or  exclu- 
sive power,  what  could  be  more  truly  base  or  evil  than  tem- 
perance—  to  a  man  like  him,  I  say,  who  might  freely  be  en- 
joying every  good,  and  has  no  one  to  hinder  him,  and  yet  has 
admitted  custom  and  reason  and  the  opinion  of  other  men  to  be 
lord  over  him  ? —  must  not  he  be  in  a  miserable  plight  whom 
the  reputation  of  justice  and  temperance  hinders  from  giving 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  258 

more  to  his  friends  than  to  his  enemies,  even  though  he  be  a 

'  O 

ruler  in  his  city  ?  Nay,  Socrates,  for  you  profess  to  be  a 
votary  of  the  truth,  and  the  truth  is  that  luxury  and  intem- 
perance and  license,  if  they  are  duly  supported,  are  happiness 
and  virtue  ;  all  the  rest  is  a  mere  bauble,  custom  contrary  to 
nature,  foiid  inventions  of  men  nothing  worth.  —  Gorgias,  iii. 
80. 

Intemperate  and  temperate  life.     See  Temperate,  etc. 
Intermediate  state  of  pleasure  and  pain. 

Soc.  Let  me  make  a  further  observation  ;  the  argument 

appears  to  me  to  imply  that  there  is  a  kind  of  life  which  con- 
sists in  these  affections. 

Pro.  Of  what  affections,  and  of  what  kind  of  life,  are  you 
speaking  ? 

Soc.  I  am  speaking  of  emptiness  and  replenishment,  and  all 
that  relates  to  the  preservation  and  destruction  of  living  be- 
ings, and  of  the  alternations  of  pain  and  joy  which  accompany 
them  in  their  transitions. 

Pro.  True. 

Soc.  And  what  would  you  say  of  the  kind  of  life  which  is 
intermediate  between  them  ? 

Pro.  What  do  you  mean  by  "  intermediate  ?  " 

Soc.  I  mean  when  a  person  is  in  actual  suffering  and  yet  re- 
members the  pleasures  which,  if  they  would  only  come,  would 
relieve  him  ;  but  as  yet  he  has  them  not.  May  we  not  say  of 
him  that  he  is  in  an  intermediate  state  ? 

Pro.   Certainly. 

Soc.  Would  you  say  that  he  was  in  pain  or  in  pleasure  ? 

Pro.  Nay  I  should  say  that  he  has  two  pains ;  in  his  body 
there  is  the  actual  experience  of  pain,  and  in  his  soul  longing 
ad  expectation. 

Soc.  What  do  you  mean,  Protarchus,  by  the  two  pains  ? 
May  not  a  man  who  is  empty  have  at  one  time  a  sure  hope  of 
being  filled,  and  at  other  times  be  quite  in  despair  ? 

Pro.  Very  true. 

Soc.  And  has  he  not  the  pleasure  of  memory  when  he  is 
hoping  to  bo  filled,  and  yet  in  that  he  is  empty  is  he  not  at 
the  same  time  in  pain  ? 

Pro.  Certainly. 

Soc.  Then  man  and  the  other  animals  have  at  ons  tima  both 
pleasure  and  pain  ? 

Pro.  I  suppose  so.  —  Philebus,  iii.  172. 


254  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Intoxication.     See  Drunkenness. 
Inventors,  not  good  judges. 

0  most  ingenious  Theuth,  he  who  has  the  gift  of  inven- 
tion is  not  always  the  best  judge  of  the  utility  or  inutility  of 
his  own  inventions  to  the  users  of  them.  And  in  this  instance 
a  paternal  love  of  your  own  child  has  led  you  to  say  what  is 
not  the  fact ;  for  this  invention  of  yours  will  create  forgetful- 
ness  in  the  learners'  souls,  because  they  will  not  use  their  mem- 
ories ;  they  will  trust  to  the  external  written  chai'acters  and 
not  remember  of  themselves.  You  have  found  a  specific,  not 
for  memory  but  for  reminiscence,  and  you  give  your  disciples 
only  the  pretense  of  wisdom  ;  they  will  be  hearers  of  many 
things  and  will  have  learned  nothing  ;  they  will  appear  to  be 
omniscient  and  will  generally  know  nothing  ;  they  will  be  tire- 
some company,  having  the  show  of  wisdom  without  the  reality. 
—  Phaedrus,  i.  580. 
lolaus.  See  Heracles. 
Irritability  of  musicians. 

Did  you  never  observe,  I  said,  the  effect  on  the  mind  of 

exclusive  devotion  to  gymnastic,  or  the  opposite  effect  of  an 
exclusive  devotion  to  music  ? 

In  what  way  shown  ?  he  said. 

In  producing  a  temper  of  hardness  and  ferocity,  or  again  of 
softness  and  effeminacy,  I  replied. 

Yes,  he  said,  I  am  quite  aware  that  your  mere  athlete  be- 
comes too  much  of  a  savage,  and  that  the  musician  is  melted 
and  softened  beyond  what  is  good  for  him 

And,  when  a  man  allows  music  to  play  and  pour  over  his 
soul  through  the  funnel  of  his  ears,  those  sweet  and  soft  and 
melancholy  airs  of  which  we  were  just  now  speaking,  and  his 
whole  life  is  passed  in  warbling  and  the  delights  of  song  ;  in 
the  first  stage  of  the  process  the  passion  or  spirit  which  is  in 
him  is  tempered  like  iron,  and  made  useful,  instead  of  brittle 
and  useless.  But,  if  he  carries  on  the  softening  process,  in  the 
next  stage  he  begins  to  melt  and  waste,  until  he  has  wasted  away 
his  spirit  and  cut  out  the  sinews  of  his  soul ;  and  he  makes  a 
feeble  warrior. 

Very  true. 

If  the  element  of  spirit  is  naturally  weak  in  him  this  is  soon 
accomplished,  but  if  he  have  a  good  deal,  then  the  power  of 
music  weakening  the  spirit  renders  him  excitable ;  he  soon 
Games  up,  and  is  f-peedily  extinguished ;  instead  of  having 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  255 

spirit  he  becomes  irritable  and  violent  and  very  discontented. 
—  The  Republic,  ii.  235. 

Jest,  imitation  a  form  of.     See  Imitation. 
Jests,  no  bar  to  innovations.     See  Innovations. 
Judge,  the  virtuous. 

But  with  the  judge  the  case  is  different ;  he  governs  mind 

by  mind,  and  he  ought  not  therefore  to  have  been  reared 
among  vicious  minds,  and  to  have  associated  with  them  from 
youth  upwards,  in  order  that,  having  gone  through  the  whole 
calendar  of  crime,  he  may  quickly  infer  the  crimes  of  others, 
like  their  diseases,  from  the  knowledge  of  himself ;  but  the 
honorable  mind  which  is  to  form  a  healthy  judgment  ought 
rather  to  have  had  no  experience  or  contamination  of  evil  hab- 
its when  young.  And  this  is  the  reason  why  in  youth  good 
men  often  appear  to  be  simple,  and  are  easily  practiced  upon 
by  the  evil,  because  they  have  no  examples  of  what  evil  is  in 
their  own  souls. 

Yes.  he  said,  that  very  often  happens  with  them. 

Therefore,  I  said,  the  judge  should  not  be  young  ;  he  should 
have  learned  to  know  evil,  not  from  his  own  soul,  but  from 
late  and  long  observation  of  the  nature  of  evil  in  others ; 
knowledge,  and  not  his  own  experience,  should  be  his  guide. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  the  ideal  of  a  judge. 

Yes,  I  replied,  and  he  will  be  a  good  man  (which  is  my  an- 
swer) ;  for  he  is  good  whose  soul  is  good.  Whereas  your  cun- 
ning and  suspicious  character,  who  has  committed  many  crimes, 
and  fancies  himself  to  be  a  master  in  wickedness,  when  he  is 
among  men  who  are  like  himself,  is  wonderful  in  his  precautions 
against  others,  because  he  judges  of  them  by  himself ;  but 
when  he  gets  into  the  company  of  men  of  virtue,  who  have 
the  experience  of  age,  he  appears  to  be  a  fool  again,  owing  to 
his  unseasonable  suspicion ;  he  cannot  recognize  an  honest 
man,  because  he  has  nothing  in  himself  which  will  tell  him 
what  an  honest  man  is  like  ;  at  the  same  time,  as  the  bad  are 
more  numerous  than  the  good,  and  he  meets  with  them  oftener, 
he  thinks  himself,  and  others  think  him,  rather  wise  than 
foolish. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

Then  the  good  and  wise  judge  whom  we  are  seeking  is  not 
this  man  ;  the  other  is  better  suited  to  us  ;  for  vice  cannot 
know  virtue,  but  a  virtuous  nature,  educated  by  time  will  ao 


256  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

qaire  a  knowledge  both  of  virtue  and  vice;  the  virtuous,  and 
not  the  vicious  man,  has  wisdom,  in  my  opinion. 

And  in  mine  also.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  233. 
Judge,  the  reconciling.     See  Reconciling. 
Judge,  the  righteous. 

Str.  Once  more  let  us  consider  the  nature  of  the  right- 
eous judge. 

T.  Soc.  Very  good. 

Str.  Does  he  do  anything  but  decide  the  dealings  of  men 
with  one  another  to  be  just  or  unjust  in  accordance  with  the 
standard  which  he  receives  from  the  king  and  legislator,  — 
showing  his  own  peculiar  virtue  only  in  this,  that  he  is  not  per- 
verted by  gifts,  or  fears,  or  pity,  or  any  sort  of  love  or  hatred, 
into  deciding  the  suits  of  men  with  one  another  contrary  to 
Jie  appointment  of  the  legislator  ? 

Y.  Soc.  No ;  his  office  is  such  as  you  describe. 

Str.  Then  the  inference  is  that  the  power  of  the  judge  is 
not  royal,  but  only  the  power  of  a  guardian  of  the  law  which 
ministers  to  the  royal  power  ? 

Y.  Soc.  True. —  Statesman,  iii.  591. 
Judges,  true. 

The  judges  will  require  virtue  —  they  must  possess  wis- 
dom and  also  courage ;  for  the  true  judge  ought  not  to  learn 
from  the  theatre,  nor  ought  he  to  be  panic-stricken  at  the 
clamor  of  the  many  and  his  own  incapacity  ;  nor  again,  know- 
ing the  truth,  ought  he  through  cowardice  and  unmanliness  care- 
lessly to  deliver  a  lying  judgment,  out  of  the  very  same  lips 
which  have  just  appealed  to  the  Gods  before  he  judged.  He 
is  sitting,  not  as  the  disciple  of  the  theatre,  but,  in  his  proper 
place,  as  their  instructor,  and  he  ought  to  be  the  enemy  of  all 
pandering  to  the  pleasure  of  the  spectators.  —  Laws,  iv.  1 88- 
i  udges  and  true  opinion. 

Soc.  When,  therefore,  judges  are  justly  persuaded  about 

matters  which  you  can  know  only  by  seeing  them,  and  not  in 
any  other  way,  and  when  thus  judging  of  them  from  report 
they  attain  a  true  opinion  about  them,  they  judge  without 
knowledge,  and  yet  are  rightly  persuaded,  if  they  have  judged 
well. 

Tkeaet.   Certainly. 

Soc.  And  yet,  O  my  friend,  if  true  opinion  in  law  courts 
and  knowledge  are  the  same,  the  perfect  judge  could  not  have 
judged  rightly  without  knowledge ;  and  therefore  I  must  infer 
that  they  are  not  the  same.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  408. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  257 

Judges,  three  kinds  of. 

Atli.  Now,  which  would  be  the  better  jud^e,  —  one  who 

destroyed  the  bad,  and  let  the  good  govern  themselves;  or  one 
who,  while  allowing  the  good  to  govern,  let  the  bad  live,  and 
made  them  voluntarily  submit  ?  Or,  lastly,  tb ere  might  be  a 
third  excellent  judge,  who,  finding  the  family  distracted,  not 
only  did  not  destroy  any  one,  but  reconciled  them  to  one  an- 
other forever  after,  and  gave  them  laws  wh'ch  they  mutually 
observed,  and  was  able  to  keep  them  friends. 

Cle.  The  last  would  be  by  far  the  best  sort  of  judge  and 
legislator.  — Laws,  iv.  158. 

Just  man,  Christ  unconsciously  described  as  the,  in  contrast  with 
the  unjust. 

I  say  that  in  the  perfectly  unjust  man  we  must  assume 

the  most  perfect  injustice;  there  is  to  be  no  deduction,  and  we 
must  allow  him,  while  doing  the  most  unjust  acts,  to  have 
gained  the  greatest  reputation  for  justice.  If  he  has  taken 
a  false  step  he  must  be  able  to  retrieve  himself,  being  one 
who  can  speak  with  effect,  if  any  of  his  deeds  come  to  light, 
and  force  his  way  where  force  is  required,  and  having  gifts 
of  courage  and  strength,  and  command  of  money  and  friends. 
And  at  his  side  let  us  place  the  just  man  in  his  nobleness 
and  simplicity,  being,  as  Aeschylus  says,  and  not  seeming. 
There  must  be  no  seeming,  for  if  he  seem  to  be  just  he 
will  be  honored  and  rewarded,  and  then  we  shall  not  know 
whether  he  is  just  for  the  sake  of  justice  or  for  the  sake  of 
honors  and  rewards  ;  therefore,  let  him  be  clothed  in  justice 
only,  and  have  no  other  covering ;  and  he  must  be  imagined  in 
a  state  of  life  very  different  from  that  of  the  last.  Let  him 
be  the  best  of  men,  and  be  esteemed  to  be  the  worst ;  then  let 
us  see  whether  his  virtue  is  proof  against  infamy  and  its  con- 
sequences. And  let  him  continue  thus  to  the  hour  of  death  ; 
being  just,  and  seeming  to  be  unjust.  Then  when  both  have 
reached  the  uttermost  extreme,  the  one  of  justice  and  the 
other  of  injustice,  let  judgment  be  given  which  of  them  is  the 
happier  of  the  two.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  183. 
Just  man,  the. 

Justice  was  the  reality  and  was  concerned  not  with   the 

outward  man,  but  with  the  inward,  which  is  the  true  self  and 
concernment  of  man  ;  for  the  just  man  does  not  permit  the 
several  elements  within  him  to  interfere  with  one  another,  or 
any  of  them  to  do  the  work  of  others,  but  he  sets  in  order  his 
17 


258  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

own  inner  life,  and  is  his  own  master,  and  at  peace  "^ith  him- 
eelf ;  and  when  he  has  bound  together  the  three  principles 
within  him,  which  may  be  compared  to  the  higher,  lower,  and 
middle  notes  of  the  scale,  and  the  intermediate  intervals  —  when 
he  has  bound  together  all  these,  and  is  no  longer  many,  but  has 
become  one  entirely  temperate  and  perfectly  adjusted  nature, 
then  he  will  begin  to  act,  if  he  has  to  act,  whether  in  a  matter 
of  property,  or  in  the  treatment  of  the  body,  or  some  affair  of 
politics  or  private  business ;  in  all  which  cases  he  will  think 
and  call  that  which  preserves  and  cooperates  with  this  har- 
monious condition,  just  and  good  action,  and  the  knowledge 
which  presides  over  it  wisdom  ;  and  that  which  at  any  time 
destroys  this  condition,  he  will  call  unjust  action,  and  the 
opinion  which  presides  over  it  ignorance. 

You  have  said  the  precise  truth,  Socrates. 

Very  good ;  and  if  we  were  to  affirm  that  we  had  discov- 
ered the  just  man  and  the  just  State,  and  the  place  of  justice 
in  each  of  them,  we  should  not  be  telling  a  falsehood  ? 

Most  certainly  not.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  270. 
Just  and  wise  soul,  the. 

Str.  Do  they  not  say  that  one  soul  is  just,  and  another 

unjust,  and  that  one  soul  is  wise,  and  another  foolish  ? 

Theaet.  Certainly. 

Str.  And  that  the  just  and  wise  soul  becomes  just  and  wise 
by  the  possession  and  presence  of  justice,  and  the  opposite  by 
the  opposite? 

Theaet.  Yes,  they  do. 

Str.  But  surely  that  which  may  be  present  or  may  be  ab- 
sent will  be  admitted  by  them  to  exist? 

Theaet.  Certainly. 

Str.  And  allowing  that  these  qualities  of  virtue,  justice,  ana 
the  like  all  exist,  as  well  as  the  soul  in  which  they  inhere,  do 
they  affirm  any  of  them  to  be  visible  and  tangible,  or  are  they 
all  invisible  ? 

Theaet.  None  of  them  surely  are  invisible. 

Str.  And  would  they  say  that  they  are  corporeal  ? 

Theaet.  They  would  distinguish  ;  the  soul  would  be  said  by 
them  to  have  a  body  ;  but  as  to  the  other  qualities  of  justice, 
wisdom,  and  the  like,  about  which  you  asked,  they  would  not 
venture  either  to  deny  their  existence,  or  to  maintain  that  they 
were  all  corporeal.  -  Sophist,  iii.  484. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  259 

Just  judge.     See  Judge,  righteous. 

Ath.  The  view  which  identifies  the  pleasant  and  the  just 

and  the  good  and  the  noble  has  an  excellent  moral  and  relig- 

o  o 

ious  tendency.  And  the  opposite  view  is  most  at  variance 
with  the  designs  of  the  legislator,  and,  in  his  opinion,  infa- 
mous ;  for  no  one,  if  he  can  help,  will  be  persuaded  to  do  that 
which  gives  him  more  pain  than  pleasure.  But  as  distant 
prospects  are  apt  to  be  dimly  seen,  especially  in  childhood,  the 
legislator  will  try  to  purge  away  the  darkness  and  exhibit  the 
truth  ;  he  will  persuade  the  citizens,  in  some  way  or  other,  by 
customs  and  praises  and  words,  that  just  and  unjust  are  opposed 
to  one  another  as  shadow  and  light,  and  that,  seen  from  the 
point  of  view  of  a  man's  own  evil  and  injustice,  the  unjust  ap- 
pears pleasant  and  the  just  unpleasant ;  but  that,  seen  from  the 
just  man's  point  of  view,  the  very  opposite  is  the  appearance 
which  they  wear. —  Laws,  iv.  192. 
Justice  resembling  holiness.  See  Holiness. 
Justice  among  thieves.  See  Honor  among,  etc. 
Justice  and  temperance  in  the  State. 

Two  virtues  remain  to  be  discovered  in  the  State,  —  first, 

temperance,  and  then  justice,  which  is  the  great  object  of  our 
search. 

Very  true. 

Now,  can  we  find  justice  without  troubling  ourselves  about 
temperance  ? 

I  do  not  know  how  that  can  be  accomplished,  he  said,  nor 
do  I  desire  that  justice  should  be  brought  to  light  and  tem- 
perance lost  sight  of ;  and  therefore  I  wish  that  you  would  do 
me  the  favor  of  considering  temperance  first. 

Certainly,  I  replied,  I  cannot  be  wrong  in  granting  you  a 
favor. 

Then  do  as  I  ask,  he  said. 

Yes,  I  replied,  I  will ;  —  and  as  far  as  I  can  at  present  see, 
the  virtue  of  temperance  has  more  of  the  nature  of  symphony 
and  harmony  than  the  preceding. 

How  so  ?  he  asked. 

Temperance,  1  replied,  is  the  ordering  or  controlling  of 
certain  pleasures  and  desires ;  this  is  implied  in  the  saying  of 
"  a  man  being  his  own  master ; "  and  tb0*10  are  other  traces  of 
the  same  notion. 

No  doubt,  he  said.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  255. 


260  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Justice  conducing  to  the  excellence  of  the  State.     See  State,  what 

most  conduces,  etc. 
Justice,  what  is  it. 

I  said,  when  we  first  began,  ages  ago,  there  was  justice 

tumbling  about  our  feet,  and  we,  fools  that  we  were,  failed  to 
see  her,  like  people  who  go  about  looking  for  what  they  have 
in  their  hands :  and  that  was  the  way  with  us  ;  we  looked 
away  into  the  far  distance,  and  this  I  suspect  was  the  reason 
why  we  never  saw  her. 

What  do  you  mean  ? 

I  mean  to  say  that  we,  having  been  long  speaking  and  hear- 
ing of  her,  failed  to  recognize  her. 

I  get  impatient  at  the  length  of  your  exordium. 

Well,  then,  tell  me,  I  said,  whether  I  am  right  or  not ;  you 
remember  the  original  principle  of  which  we  spoke  at  the 
foundation  of  the  State,  that  every  man,  as  we  often  insisted, 
should  practice  one  thing  only,  that  being  the  thing  to  which 
his  nature  was  most  perfectly  adapted  ;  now  justice  is  this 
principle  or  a  part  of  it. 

Yes,  we  often  said  that  one  man  should  do  one  thing 
only. 

Further,  we  affirmed  that  justice  was  doing  one's  own  busi- 
ness, and  not  being  a  busybody ;  we  said  so  again  and  again, 
and  many  others  have  said  the  same. 

Yes,  we  said  so. 

Then  this  doing  in  a  certain  way  one's  own  business  may  be 
assumed  to  be  justice.  Do  you  know  why  ? 

I  do  not,  and  should  like  to  be  told. 

Because  I  think  that  this  alone  remains  in  the  State  when 
the  other  virtues  of  temperance  and  courage  and  wisdom  are 
abstracted ;  and  this  is  the  ultimate  cause  and  condition  of  the 
existence  of  all  of  them,  and  while  remaining  in  them  is  also 
their  preservative  ;  and  we  were  saying  that  if  the  three  were 
discovered  by  us,  justice  would  be  the  fourth  or  remaining  one. 

That  follows  of  necessity.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  258. 
Justice,  approximate. 

Let  me  begin  by  reminding  you  that  we  found  our  way 

hither  in  the  search  after  justice  and  injustice. 

True,  he  replied  ;  but  what  of  this  ? 

I  was  only  going  to  ask  whether,  if  we  have  discovered 
them,  we  are  to  require  that  the  just  man  should  in  nothing 
fail  of  absolute  justice  ;  or  may  we  be  satisfied  with  an  ap- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  261 

proximation,  and  the  attainment  of  a  higher  degree  of  justice 
than  is  to  be  found  in  other  men  ? 

The  approximation  will  be  enough. 

And  we  inquired  into  the  nature  of  absolute  justice  and  into 
the  character  of  the  perfectly  just,  and  the  possibility  of  his  ex- 
istence, and  into  injustice  and  the  perfectly  unjust,  only  that  we 
joi^ht  have  an  ideal.  We  were  to  look  at  them  in  order  that 

O 

we  might  judge  of  our  own  happiness  and  unhappiness  according 
to  the  standard  which  they  exhibited  and  the  degree  in  which 
we  resembled  them,  not  with  any  view  of  showing  that  they 
could  exist  in  fact. 

True,  he  said.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  299. 
Justice,  natural. 

Soc.  Tell  me  what  you  and  Pindar  mean  by  natural  jus- 
tice :  do  you  not  mean  that  the  superior  should  take  the  prop- 
erty of  the  inferior  by  force  ;  that  the  better  should  rule  the 
worse,  the  noble  have  more  than  the  mean  ?  Am  I  not  right 
in  my  recollection  ? 

Cal.  Yes ;  that  is  what  I  was  saying,  and  what  I  still  main- 
tain. 

Soc.  And  do  you  mean  by  the  better  the  same  as  the  supe- 
rior ?  for  I  could  not  make  out  what  you  were  saying  at  the 
time  —  whether  you  meant  by  the  superior  the  stronger,  and 
that  the  weaker  must  obey  the  stronger,  as  you  seemed  to  im- 
ply when  you  said  that  great  cities  attack  small  ones  in  accord 
ance  with  natural  right,  because  they  are  superior  and  stronger, 
as  though  the  superior  and  stronger  and  better  were  the  same , 
or  whether  the  better  may  be  also  the  inferior  and  weaker,  and 
the  superior  the  worse,  or  whether  better  is  to  be  defined  in 
the  same  way  as  superior:  —  this  is  the  point  which  I  want  to 
have  clearly  explained.  Are  the  superior  and  better  and 
stronger  the  same  or  different  ? 

Cal.  Well ;  I  say  unequivocally  that  they  are  the  same.  — 
Gorgias,  iii.  76. 
Justice  and  Virtue,  rewards  of. 

We  have  fulfilled  our  obligations  to  the  argument,  putting 

aside  the  rewards  and  glories  of  justice,  such  as  you  were  say- 
ing that  Homer  and  Hesiod  introduced ;  and  justice  in  her  own 
nature  has  been  shown  to  be  best  for  the  soul  in  her  nature :  let 
her  do  what  is  just,  whether  she  have  the  ring  of  Gyges  or  not, 
and  besides  the  ring  of  Gyges,  the  helmet  of  Hades. 

Very  true. 


SU5J  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

And  now,  Glaucon,  there  will  be  no  harm  in  further  enumer- 
ating, how  many  and  how  great  are  the  rewards  which  justice 
and  the  other  virtues  procure  to  the  soul  from  Gods  and  men, 
both  in  life  and  after  death. 

Certainly  not,  he  said. 

Will  you  repay  me,  then,  what  you  borrowed  in  the  argu- 
ment ? 

What  did  I  borrow  ? 

The  assumption  that  the  just  man  should  appear  unjust  and 
the  unjust  just :  for  you  were  of  opinion  that  even  if  the  true 
state  of  the  case  could  not  possibly  escape  the  eyes  of  Gods  and 
men,  still  this  admission  ought  to  be  made  for  the  sake  of  the 
argument,  in  order  that  pure  justice  might  be  weighed  against 
pure  injustice.  Do  you  remember? 

You  would  have  reason  to  complain  of  me  if  I  had  forgotten. 

Then,  as  the  cause  is  decided,  I  demand  on  behalf  of  justice 
that  the  glory  which  she  receives  from  Gods  and  men  be  also 
allowed  to  her  by  you ;  having  been  shown  to  have  reality,  and 
not  to  deceive  those  who  truly  possess  her,  she  may  now  have 
appearance  restored  to  her,  and  thus  obtain  the  other  crown  of 
victory  which  is  hers  also. 

The  demand,  he  said,  is  just.  — •  The  Republic,  ii.  444. 
Justice,  Courts  of,  establishment  of.     See  Courts,  etc. 

King,  the,  a  Priest. 

Sir.  There  are  also  priests  who,  as  the  law  declares,  know 

how  to  give  the  Gods  gifts  from  men  in  the  form  of  sacrifices, 
which  are  acceptable  to  them,  and  to  ask  for  us  a  return  of 
blessings  from  them.  Now  both  these  are  branches  of  the 
servile  or  ministerial  art. 

Y.  Soc.  Yes,  clearly. 

Str.  And  here  I  think  that  we  seem  to  be  getting  on  the 
right  track  ;  for  the  priest  and  the  diviner  also  are  full  of  pride 
and  prerogative  —  this  is  due  to  the  greatness  of  their  employ- 
ments; and  in  Egypt,  the  kiug  himself  is  not  allowed  to  reign, 
unless  he  have  priestly  powers  ;  and  if  he  should  be  of  another 
class,  and  has  thrust  himself  in,  he  must  get  enrolled  in  the 
priesthood.  In  many  parts  of  Hellas,  the  duty  of  offering  the 
most  solemn  propitiatory  sacrifices  is  assigned  to  the  highest 
magistracies,  and  here,  at  Athens,  the  most  solemn  and  national 
of  the  ancient  sacrifices  are  supposed  to  be  celebrated  by  the 
King  Archon  of  the  year.  —  Statesman,  iii.  576. 


PLATO  S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  263 

King  and  tyrant  distinguished. 

•  Sir.  When  an  individual  truly  possessing  knowledge  rules, 

his  name  will  surely  be  the  same  —  he  will  be  called  a  king ; 
and  thus  the  five  names  of  governments,  as  they  are  now  reck- 
oned, become  one. 

T.  Soc.  That  is  true. 

Sir.  And  when  an  individual  ruler  governs  neither  by  law 
nor  by  custom,  but  following  in  the  steps  of  the  true  man  of 
science,  pretends  that  he  can  only  act  for  the  best  by  violating 
the  laws,  while  in  reality  appetite  and  ignorance  direct  the 
imitation,  may  not  such  an  one  be  called  a  tyrant  ? 

T.  Soc.  Certainly. 

Str.  And  this  we  believe  to  be  the  origin  of  the  tyrant  and 
the  king,  of  oligarchies,  and  aristocracies,  and  democracies  ;  be- 
cause men  are  offended  at  the  one  monarch,  and  can  never  be 
made  to  believe  that  any  one  can  be  worthy  of  such  authority, 
or  can  unite  the  will  and  the  power  in  the  spirit  of  virtue  and 
knowledge  to  do  justly  and  holily  to  all  ;  they  fancy  that  he 
will  be  a  despot  who  will  wrong  and  harm  and  slay  whom  he 
pleases  of  us  ;  for  if  there  could  be  such  a  despot  as  we  describe, 
they  would  acknowledge  that  we  ought  to  be  too  glad  to  have 
him,  and  that  he  alone  would  be  the  happy  ruler  of  a  true  and 
perfect  State. 

T.  Soc.  Certainly.  —  Statesman,  iii.  587. 
Kingly  art,  the. 

Soc.  At  last  we   came   to  the  kingly  art,  and  inquired 

whether  that  gave  and  caused  happiness,  and  then  we  got  into 
a  labyrinth,  and  when  we  thought  we  were  at  the  end,  came  out 
again  at  the  beginning,  having  still  to  seek  as  much  as  ever. 

Ori.  How  did  that  happen,  Socrates  ? 

Soc.  I  will  tell  you ;  the  kingly  art  was  identified  by  us  with 
the  political. 

Ori.  Well,  and  what  came  of  that? 

Soc.  To  this  royal  or  political  art  all  the  arts,  including  that 
of  the  general,  seemed  to  render  up  the  supremacy,  as  to  the 
only  one  which  knew  how  to  use  that  which  they  created. 
Here  obviously  was  the  very  art  which  we  were  seeking  —  the 
art  which  is  the  source  of  good  government,  and  which  may  be 
described,  in  the  language  of  Aeschylus,  as  alone  sitting  at  the 
helm  of  the  vessel  of  state,  piloting  and  governing  all  things, 
and  utilizing  them. 


2C4  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Ori.  And  were  you  not  right,  Socrates? 

Soc.  You  shall  judge,  Crito,  if  you  are  willing  to  hear  what 
followed ;  for  we  resumed  the  inquiry,  and  a  question  of  this 
sort  was  asked  :  Does  this  kingly  art,  having  this  supreme 
authority,  do  anything  for  us  ?  To  be  sure,  was  the  answer. 
And  would  not  you,  Crito,  say  the  same  ? 

Ori.  Yes,  I  should. 

Soc.  And  what  would  you  say  that  the  kingly  art  does  ?  If 
medicine  were  supposed  to  have  supreme  authority  over  the 
subordinate  arts,  and  I  were  to  ask  you  a  similar  question 
about  that,  you  would  say  that  it  produces  health  ? 

Cri.  I  should. 

Soc.  And  what  of  your  own  art  of  husbandry,  supposing 
that  to  have  supreme  authority  over  the  subject  arts  —  what 
does  that  do  ?  Does  it  not  supply  us  with  the  fruits  of  the 
earth  ? 

Cri.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  what  does  the  kingly  art  do  when  invested  with 
supreme  power  ?  Perhaps  you  may  not  be  ready  with  an 
answer  ? 

Cri.  Indeed  I  am  not,  Socrates. 

Soc.  No  more  were  we,  Crito.  But  at  any  rate  you  know 
that  if  this  is  the  art  which  we  were  seeking,  it  ought  to  be 
useful. 

Cri.  Certainly. — JEuthydemus,  i.  194. 
Kings.     See  Riders,  Legislators. 
Kings,  Dorian,  their  ruin.     See  Dorian. 
Kissing  of  the  hero  by  all.     See  Heroic  men. 
Knowledge,  on  buying. 

Is  not  a  Sophist,  Hippocrates,  one  who  deals  wholesale  or 

retail  in  the  food  of  the  soul  ?     To  me  that  appears  to  be  the 
sort  of  man. 

And  what,  Socrates,  is  the  food  of  the  soul  ? 

Surely,  I  said,  knowledge  is  the  food  of  the  soul ;  and  we 
must  take  care,  my  friend,  that  the  Sophist  does  not  deceive  us 
when  he  praises  what  he  sells,  like  the  dealers,  wholesale  or  re- 
tail, who  sell  the  food  of  the  body  ;  for  they  praise  indiscrimi- 
nately all  their  goods,  without  knowing  what  are  really  bene- 
ficial or  hurtful  :  neither  do  their  customers  know,  with  the 
exception  of  any  trainer  or  physician  who  may  happen  to  buy 
of  them.  In  like  manner  those  who  carry  about  the  wares  of 
knowledge,  and  make  the  round  of  the  cities,  and  sell  or  retail 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  265 

them  to  any  customer  who  is  in  want  of  them,  praise  them  all 
alike  ;  though  I  should  not  wonder,  0  my  friend,  if  many  of 
them  were  really  ignorant  of  their  effect  upon  the  soul ;  and 
their  customers  equally  ignorant,  unless  he  who  buys  of  them 
happens  to  be  a  physician  of  the  soul.  If,  therefore,  you  have 
understanding  of  what  is  good  and  evil,  you  may  safely  buy 
knowledge  of  Protagoras  or  of  any  one ;  but  if  not,  then,  O 
my  friend,  pause,  and  do  not  hazard  your  dearest  interests  at  a 
game  of  chance.  For  there  is  far  greater  peril  in  buying 
knowledge  than  in  buying  meat  and  drink :  the  one  you  pur- 
chase of  the  wholesale  or  retail  dealer,  and  carry  them  away 
in  other  vessels,  and  before  you  receive  them  into  the  body  as 
food,  you  may  deposit  them  at  home  and  call  in  any  ex- 
perienced friend  who  knows  what  is  good  to  be  eaten  or 
drunken,  and  what  not,  and  how  much  and  when  ;  and  hence 
the  danger  of  purchasing  them  is  not  so  great.  But  when  you 
buy  the  wares  of  knowledge  you  cannot  carry  them  away  in 
another  vessel ;  they  have  been  sold  to  you,  and  you  must  take 
them  into  the  soul  and  go  your  way,  either  greatly  harmed  or 
greatly  benefited  by  the  lesson  ;  and  therefore  we  should  de- 
liberate and  take  counsel  with  our  elders  ;  for  we  are  still 
young  —  too  young  to  determine  such  a  matter.  —  Protag- 
oras, i.  114. 

Knowledge,  certain,  Science  necessary  to.     See  Science. 
Knowledge  and  opinion. 

We  seem  to  have  discovered  that   the  many  things  which 

are  esteemed  beautiful  or  good  by  the  multitude,  are  tossing 
about  in  some  region  which  is  half-way  between  pure  being 
and  pure  non-being. 

We  have. 

Yes ;  and  we  had  before  agreed  that  anything  of  this  kind 
which  we  might  find  was  to  be  described  as  matter  of  opinion, 
and  not  as  matter  of  knowledge ;  being  the  intermediate  flux 
which  is  caught  and  detained  by  the  intermediate  faculty. 

Granted. 

Then  those  who  see  the  many  beautiful,  and  who  yet  neither 
&fce,  nor  can  be  taught  to  see,  absolute  beauty ;  who  see  the 
many  just,  and  not  absolute  justice,  and  the  like,  —  such  per- 
sons may  be  said  to  have  opinion  but  not  knowledge  ? 

That  is  certain. 

But  those  who  see  the  absolute  and  eternal  and  immutable 
may  be  said  to  know,  and  not  to  have  opinion  only  ? 


266  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Neither  can  that  be  denied. 

The  one  love  and  embrace  the  subjects  of  knowledge,  the 
other  those  of  opinion  ?  The  latter  are  the  same,  as  I  dare 
say  you  will  remember,  who  listened  to  sweet  sounds  and  gazed 
upon  fair  colors,  but-'-would  not  tolerate  the  existence  of  ab- 
solute beauty. 

Yes,  I  remember. 

Shal!  we  then  be  guilty  of  any  impropriety  in  calling  them 
lovers  of  opinion  rather  than  lovers  of  wisdom,  and  will  they 
be  very  angry  with  us  for  thus  describing  them  ? 

I  shall  tell  them  that  they  ought  not  to  be  angry  at  a  de- 
scription of  themselves  which  is  true. 

But  those  who  love  the  truth  of  each  thing  are  to  be  called 
lovers  of  wisdom  and  not  lovers  of  opinion  ? 

Assuredly.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  308. 

Knowledge,  the  highest,  the  idea  of  good.    See  Good,  the  idea  of,  etc. 
Knowledge  and  Intellect.     See  Intellect,  etc. 
Knowledge,  pleasures  of. 

Soc.  To  these  may  be  added  the  pleasures  of  knowledge, 

if  they  appear  to  us  to  have  no  hunger  of  knowledge  or  pains 
of  hunger  attaching  to  them. 

Pro.  And  they  have  not. 

Soc.  Well,  but  are  there  not  pains  of  forgetfulness,  if  a  man 
is  full  of  knowledge  and  his  knowledge  is  lost  ? 

Pro.  They  are  not  natural  or  necessary,  but  there  may  be 
times  of  reflection,  when  he  feels  grief  at  the  loss  of  his  knowl- 
edge. 

Soc.  Yes,  my  friend,  but  at  present  we  are  enumerating 
only  the  natural  perceptions,  and  have  nothing  to  do  with  re- 
flections. 

Pro.  In  that  case  you  are  right  in  saying  that  the  loss  of 
knowledge  is  not  attended  with  pain. 

Soc.  These  pleasures  of  knowledge,  then,  are  unmixed  with 
pain  ;  and  they  are  not  the  pleasures  of  the  many  but  of  a  very 
few.  —  Philebus,  iii.  191. 
Knowledge,  the  truest. 

1  am  sure   that  all  men  who  have  a  grain  of  intelligence 

will  admit  that  the  knowledge  which  has  to  do  with  being  and 

reality,  and    sameness  and    unchangeableness,    is    by  far    the 

truest  of  all.  —  Philebus,  iii.  198. 

Knowledge,  superhuman. 

Soc.  Let  us  suppose  a  man  who  understands  justice,  and 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  267 

has  reanon  as  well  as  understanding  about  the  true  nature  of 
this  and  of  all  other  things. 

Pro.  Let  that  be  supposed. 

Soc.  Will  such  an  one  have  enough  of  knowledge  if  he  is 
acquainted  only  with  the  divine  circle  ard  sphere,  and  knows 
nothing  of  our  human  spheres  and  circles,  and  with  a  like  igno- 
rance uses  these  or  any  other  figures  or  rules  in  the  building  of 
a  house  ? 

Pro.  The  knowledge  which  is  only  superhuman,  Socrates,  is 
ridiculous  in  man. 

Soc.  What  do  you  mean  ?  Do  you  mean  that  you  are  to 
throw  into  the  cup  and  mingle  the  impure  and  uncertain  art 
;vhich  uses  the  false  rule  and  the  false  circle  ? 

Pro.  Yes,  that  must  be  done,  if  any  of  us  is  ever  to  find  his 
way  home.  —  Philebus,  iii.  203. 
Knowledge,  absolute  in  God.     See  Absolute. 
Knowledge,  definition  needed  for.     See  Definition. 

Lacedaemon,  government  of,  doubtful.     See  Government  of  Sparta, 

etc. 
Landmarks,  removal  of. 

Let  us  first  of  all,  then,  have  a  class  of  laws  which  shall 

be  called  the  laws  of  husbandmen.  And  let  the  first  of  them 
be  the  law  of  Zeus,  the  God  of  boundaries.  Let  no  one  shift 
the  boundary  line  either  of  a  fellow-citizen  who  is  a  neighbor, 
or,  if  he  dwells  at  the  extremity  of  the  land,  of  any  stranger 
who  is  contiguous  to  him,  considering  that  this  is  truly  "  to 
move  the  immovable,"  and  every  one  should  be  more  willing 
to  move  the  largest  rock,  which  is  not  a  landmark,  than  the 
least  stone  which  is  the  sworn  arbiter  of  friendship  and  hatred 
between  neighbors  ;  for  Zeus,  the  God  of  kindred,  is  the  wit- 
ness of  the  citizen  and  Zeus,  the  God  of  strangers,  of  the  stran- 
ger, and  when  aroused,  terrible  is  their  wrath.  He  who  obeys 
the  law  will  never  know  the  fatal  consequences  of  disobedience, 
but  he  who  despises  the  law  shall  be  liable  to  a  double  penalty, 
the  first  coming  from  the  Gods,  and  the  second  from  the  law. 
For  let  no  one  voluntarily  remove  the  boundaries  of  his  neigh- 
bor's land,  and  if  any  one  does,  let  him  who  will,  inform  the 
landowners,  and  let  them  bring  him  into  court,  and  if  he  De 
convicted  of  redividing  the  land  by  stealth  or  by  force,  let  the 
court  determine  what  he  ought  to  suffer  or  pay.  In  the  next 
place,  many  small  injuries  done  by  neighbors  to  one  another 


268  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

through  their  multiplication,  may  cause  a  weight  of  enmity, 
and  make  neighborhood  a  very  disagreeable  and  bitter  thing. 
Wherefore  a  man  ought  to  be  very  careful  of  committing  any 
offense  against  his  neighbor,  and  especially  of  encroaching  on 
his  neighbor's  land  ;  for  any  man  may  easily  do  harm,  but  not 
every  man  can  do  good  to  another.  He  who  encroaches  on 
his  neighbor's  land,  and  transgresses  his  boundaries,  shall  make 
good  the  damage,  and,  to  cure  him  of  his  impudence  and  also 
of  his  meanness,  he  shall  pay  a  double  penalty  to  the  injured 
party.  —  Laws,  iv.  357. 
Laughter  condemned. 

Neither    ought  our  guardians    to  be  given    to  laughter. 

For  a  fit  of  laughter  which  has  been  indulged  to  excess  almost 
always  produces  a  violent  reaction. 

So  I  believe. 

Then  persons  of  worth,  even  if  only  mortal,  must  not  be 
represented  as  overcome  by  laughter,  and  still  less  must  such  a 
representation  of  the  Gods  be  allowed. 

Still  less  of  the  Gods,  as  you  say,  he  replied. 

Then  we  shall  not  suffer  such  an  expression  to  be  used  about 
the  Gods  as  that  in  which  Homer  describes  how  — 

"  Inextinguishable  laughter  arose  among  the  blessed  Gods,  when  they  saw  He- 
phaestus bustling  about  the  mansion." 

On  your  views,  we  must  not  admit  them. 

On  my  views,  if  you  like  to  father  them  on  me  ;  that  we 
must  not  admit  them  is  certain. —  The  Republic,  ii.  211. 
Laughter  at  self-conceit. 

Soc.  The  vain  conceits  of  our  friends  about  their  beauty, 

wisdom,  wealth,  of  which  we  made  three  divisions,  are  ridicu- 
lous if  they  are  weak,  and  detestable  when  they  are  powerful  : 
May  we  not  say,  as  I  was  saying  before,  that  our  friends  who 
are  in  this  state  of  mind,  when  harmless  to  others,  are  simply 
ridiculous  ? 

Pro.  They  are  ridiculous. 

Soc.  And  do  we  not  acknowledge  this  ignorance  of  theirs  to 
be  a  misfortune  ? 

Pro.  Certainly. 

Soc.  And  do  we  feel  pain  or  pleasure  in  laughing  at  it  ? 

Pro.   Clearly  we  feel  pleasure. 

Soc.  And  wa>s  not  envy  the  source  _>f  this  pleasure  which  we 
feel  at  the  misfortunes  of  friends  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  269 

Pro.   Certainly. 

Soc.  Then  the  argument  shows  that  when  we  laugh  at  the 
folly  of  our  friends,  pleasure,  in  mingling  with  envy,  mingles 
with  pain,  for  envy  has  been  acknowledged  by  us  to  be  mental 
pain,  and  laughter  is  pleasant,  arid  we  envy  and  laugh  at  the 
same  instant.  —  Philebus,  iii.  189. 

Law,  preamble  to,  distinguished  from  the  matter  of.     See  Preamble^ 

etc. 

Laws,  makers  of. 

Even  if  a  man  has  good  parts,  still,  if  he  carries  philoso- 
phy into  later  life,  he  is  necessarily  ignorant  of  all  those  things 
which  a  gentleman  and  a  person  of  honor  ought  to  know;  for 
he  is  inexperienced  in  the  laws  of  the  State,  aod  in  the  lan- 
guage which  ought  to  be  used  in  the  dealings  of  man  with  man, 
whether  private  or  public,  and  altogether  ignorant  of  the  pleas- 
ures and  desires  of  mankind  and  of  human  character  in  general. 
And  people  of  this  sort,  when  they  betake  themselves  to  politics 
or  business,  are  as  ridiculous  as  I  imagine  the  politicians  to  be, 
when  they  make  their  appearance  in  the  arena  of  philosophy. 
For,  as  Euripides  says,  — 

"  Every  man  shines  in  that  and  pursues  that  and  devotes  the  greatest  portion  of 
the  day  to  that  in  which  he  thinks  himself  to  excel  most." 

And  anything  in  which  he  is  inferior  he  avoids  and  depreciates, 
and  praises  the  opposite  from  partiality  to  himself,  and  because 
he  thinks  that  he  will  thus  praise  himself.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  73. 
Laws  answering  to  virtue. 

Cle.  What  ought  we  to  say,  then  ? 

Ath.  What  truth  and  what  justice  require  of  us,  if  I  am 
not  mistaken,  when  speaking  in  behalf  of  divine  excellence ; 
that  the  legislator  when  making  his  laws,  had  in  view  not  a 
part  only,  and  this  the  lowest  part  of  virtue,  but  all  virtue, 
and  that  he  devised  classes  of  laws  answering  to  the  kinds  of 
virtue  ;  not  in  the  way  in  which  modern  inventors  of  laws 
make  the  classes,  for  they  only  investigate  and  offer  laws  of 
which  the  want  is  being  felt,  arid  one  man  has  a  class  of  laws 
about  inheritances  in  part  or  sole,  another  about  assault ;  oth- 
ers about  ten  thousand  other  matters  of  a  similar  nature.  But 
we  say  that  the  right  way  of  inquiry  is  to  proceed  as  we  have 
now  done,  and  I  admired  the  spirit  of  your  exposition ;  for  yor. 
are  quit}  right  in  beginning  with  virtue,  and  saying  that  this 
was  the  aim  of  the  giver  of  the  law,  but  I  thought  that  you 


270  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

went  wrong  when  you  added  that  he  referred  all  to  a  part,  and 
a  most  inferior  part  of  virtue,  and  my  subsequent  observatons 
had  a  bearing  on  this.  —  Laws,  iv.  161. 
Laws  and  music.     See  Music,  different  kinds  of. 
Laws,  three  classes  of. 

Ath.  The  general  division  of  laws  according  to  their  im- 
portance into  a  first,  a  second,  and  a  third  class,  we  who  are 
lovers  of  laws  may  make  ourselves. 

Meg.  Very  good. 

Ath.  We  maintain,  then,  that  a  State  which  would  be  safe 
and  happy,  as  far  as  the  nature  of  man  allows,  must  and  ought 
to  distribute  honor  and  dishonor  in  the  right  way.  And  the 
right  way  is  to^place  the  goods  of  the  soul  first  and  highest  in 
the  scale,  always  assuming  temperance  as  a  condition  of  them ; 
and  in  the  second  place,  the  goods  of  the  body ;  and  in  the 
third  place,  those  of  money  and  property.  And  if  any  legis- 
lator or  State  departs  from  this  rule  by  giving  money  the  place 
of  honor,  or  in  any  way  preferring  that  which  is  really  last, 
may  we  not  say,  that  he  or  the  State  is  doing  an  unholy  and 
unpatriotic  thing  ? 

Meg.  Yes;  let  that  be  plainly  asserted.  — Laws,  iv.  226. 
Laws  annulled  by  unsuitable  officer?. 

Ath.  In  the  government  of  a  State  there  are  two  parts 

First,  the  number  of  the  magistrates,  and  the  mode  of  appoint- 
ing them ;  and  secondly,  when  they  have  been  appointed,  laws 
will  have  to  be  provided  for  each  of  them,  in  nature  and  num- 
ber suitable  to  them.  But  before  electing  the  magistrates,  let 
us  stop  a  little  and  say  a  word  in  season. 

Cle.  What  have  you  got  to  say  ? 

Ath.  This  is  what  I  have  to  say ;  every  one  can  see,  that 
although  the  work  of  legislation  is  a  most  important  matter,  yet 
if  a  well  ordered  city  superadd  to  good  laws  unsuitable  officers, 
there  will  be  no  use  in  having  the  good  laws ;  not  only  are 
they  ridiculous  and  useless,  but  the  greatest  political  injury  and 
evil  accrues  from  them. 

Cle.  Of  course.  —  Laws,  iv.  273. 
Laws  not  received  when  first  imposed. 

Ath.  I  had  in  my  mind  the  free  and  easy  manner  in  which 

we  are  ordaining  that  the  inexperienced  colonists  shall  receive 
our  laws.  Now  a  man  need  not  be  very  wise,  Cleinias,  in  or- 
der to  see  that  no  one  can  easily  receive  laws  at  their  first  im- 
position. But  if  we  could  anyhow  wait  until  those  who  have 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  271 

been  imbued  with  them  from  childhood,  aud  have  been  nurtured 
in  them,  and  become  habituated  to  them,  take  their  part  in  the 
public  elections  ;  I  say,  if  this  could  be  accomplished,  and  rightly 
accomplished  by  any  way  or  contrivance,  —  then,  I  think  that 
there  would  be  very  little  danger,  at  the  end  of  the  time,  of  a 
State  thus  trained  not  being  permanent.  —  Laws,  iv.  274. 
Laws  against  sensual  love. 

Was  I  not  just  now  saying  that  I  had  a  way  to  make  men 

use  natural  love  and  abstain  from  unnatural,  not  intentionally 
destroying  the  seeds  of  human  increase,  or  sowing  them  in 
stony  places,  in  which  they  will  take  no  root ;  and  that  I  would 
command  them  to  abstain,  too,  from  any  female  field  of  increase 
in  which  that  which  is  sown  is  not  likely  to  grow  ?  Now,  if  a 
law  to  this  effect  could  only  be  made  perpetual,  and  gain  an  au- 
thority such  as  already  prevents  intercourse  of  parents  and 
children  —  such  a  law  extending  to  other  sensual  desires,  and 
conquering  them,  would  be  the  source  of  ten  thousand  blessings. 
For,  in  the  first  place,  moderation  is  the  appointment  of  nature, 
and  deters  men  from  all  frenzy  and  madness  of  love,  and  from 
all  adulteries  and  immoderate  use  of  meats  and  drinks,  and 
makes  them  good  friends  to  their  own  wives.  And  innumera- 
ble other  benefits  would  result  if  such  a  law  could  only  be  en- 
forced. I  can  imagine  some  lusty  youth  who  is  standing  by, 
and  who,  on  hearing  this  enactment,  declares  in  scurrilous  terms, 
that  we  are  making  foolish  and  impossible  laws,  and  fills  the 
world  with  his  outcry.  Therefore  I  said  that  I  knew  a  way  of 
enacting  and  perpetuating  such  a  law,  which  was  very  easy  in 
one  respect,  but  in  another  most  difficult.  There  is  no  difficulty 
in  seeing  that  such  a  law  is  possible,  and  in  what  way ;  for  as  I 
was  saying,  the  ordinance  once  consecrated  would  master  the 
soul  of  every  man,  and  terrify  him  into  obedience.  But  mat- 
ters have  now  come  to  such  a  pass  that  the  enactment  of  the 
law  seems  to  be  impossible  and  never  likely  to  take  place  just 
as  the  continuance  of  an  entire  state  in  the  practice  of  com- 
mon meals  is  also  deemed  impossible.  And  although  this  lat- 
ter is  partly  disproveu  by  the  fact  of  their  existence  among  you, 
still  even  in  your  cities  the  common  meals  of  women  would  be 
regarded  as  unnatural  and  impossible.  I  was  thinking  of  the  re- 
belliousness of  the  human  heart  when  I  said  that  the  permanent 
establishment  of  these  things  is  very  difficult.  —  Laws,  iv.  354. 
Laws,  necessity  for. 
Mankind  must  have  laws  and  conform  to  them,  or  their 


272  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

life  would  be  as  bad  as  that  of  the  most  savage  beast.  And 
the  reason  of  this  is,  that  no  man's  nature  is  able  to  know 
what  is  best  for  the  social  state  of  man  ;  or  knowing,  always 
able  to  do  what  is  best.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  a  difficulty 
in  apprehending  that  the  true  art  of  politics  is  concerned,  not 
with  private  but  with  public  good;  for  public  good  binds  to- 
gether States,  but  private  only  distracts  them, — nor  do  men 
always  see  that  the  gain  is  greater  both  to  the  individual  and 
the  State,  when  the  State  and  not  the  individual  is  first  consid- 
ered. In  the  second  place,  even  if  a  person  know  as  a  matter 
of  science  that  this  is  the  truth,  but  is  possessed  of  absolute  and 
irresponsible  power,  he  will  never  be  able  to  abide  in  this  prin- 
ciple or  to  persist  in  regarding  the  public  good  as  primary  in  the 
State,  and  the  private  good  as  secondary.  Human  nature  will 
be  always  drawing  him  into  avarice  and  selfishness,  avoiding 
pain  and  pursuing  pleasure  without  any  reason,  and  will  bring 
these  to  the  front,  obscuring  the  juster  and  better ;  and  so 
working  darkness  in  his  soul  will  at  last  fill  with  evils  both  him 
and  the  whole  city.  For  if  a  man  were  born  so  divinely 
gifted  that  he  could  naturally  apprehend  the  truth  he  would 
have  no  need  of  laws  to  rule  over  him  ;  for  there  is  no  law  or 
order  which  is  above  knowledge,  nor  can  mind,  without  im- 
piety, be  deemed  the  subject  or  slave  of  any  man,  but  rather 
the  lord  of  all.  I  speak  of  mind,  true  and  free  and  in  harmony 
with  nature.  But  then  there  is  no  such  mind  anywhere,  or  at 
least  not  much  ;  and  therefore  we  must  choose  law  and  order, 
which  are  the  second  best.  —  Laws,  iv.  388. 
Laws  framed  for  whom. 

Laws  are  partly  framed  for  the  sake  of  good   men,  in 

order   to    instruct   them   how  they  may  live   on  friendly  terms 
with  one  another,  and  partly  for  the  sake  of  those  who  refuse 
to  be  instructed,  whose  spirit  cannot  be  subdued,  or  softened, 
or  hindered  from  plunging  into  evil.     These  are  the  persons 
who  cause  the  word  to  be  spoken  which  I  am  about  to  utter  ; 
for  them  the  legislator  legislates  of  necessity,  and  in  the  hope 
that  there  may  be  no  need  of  his  laws.  —  Laws,  iv.  394. 
Lawyer,  the,  a  slavish  man.     See  Freedom  of  Philosophy. 
Lawyers  —  and  courts  of  law.     See  Courts,  etc. 
Lawyers  not  teachers. 

Soc.  The  trail  soon  comes  to  an  end,  for  a  whole*  profes- 
sion is  against  us. 

Theaet.  How  is  that,  and  what  profession  do  you  mean  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  273 

Soc.  The  profession  of  the  great  wise  ones  who  are  called 
orators  and  lawyers ;  for  these  persuade  men  by  their  art  and 
do  not  teach  them,  but  make  them  think  whatever  they  like, 
Do  you  imagine  that  there  are  any  teachers  in  the  world  so 
clever  as  to  be  able  to  convey  to  others  the  truth  about  acts  of 
robbery  or  violence,  of  which  they  were  not  eye-witnesses, 
while  a  litt.'e  water  is  flowing  ? 

Theaet.  Certainly  not,  they  can  only  persuade  them. 

Soc.  And  would  you  not  say  that  persuading  them  is  mak- 
ing them  have  an  opinion  ? 

Theaet.  To  be  sure. 

Soc.  When,  therefore,  judges  are  justly  persuaded  about 
matters  which  you  can  know  only  by  seeing  them,  and  not  in 
any  other  way,  and  when  thus  judging  of  them  from  report 
they  attain  a  true  opinion  about  them,  they  judge  without 
knowledge,  and  yet  are  rightly  persuaded,  if  they  have  judged 
well. 

Theaet.  Certainly. 

Soc.  And  yet,  0  my  friend,  if  true  opinion  in  law  courts 
and  knowledge  are  the  same,  the  perfect  judge  could  not  have 
judged  rightly  without  knowledge  ;  and  therefore  I  must  infer 
that  they  are  not  the  same.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  407. 

Lawyers,  as  advocates  corrupting  the  State.     See  State,  corrupting 

the,  etc. 
Learning,  the  word  as  used. 

Imagine  then  that  you   have  gone  through  the  first  part 

of  the  sophistical  ritual,  which,  as  Prodicus  says,  begins  with 
initiation  into  the  correct  use  of  terms.  The  two  strange 
gentlemen  wanted  to  explain  to  you,  as  you  do 'not  know,  that 
the  word  "  to  learn  "  has  two  meanings,  and  is  used,  first,  in 
the  sense  of  acquiring  knowledge  of  some  matter  of  which 
you  previously  have  no  knowledge,  and  also,  when  you  have 
the  knowledge,  in  the  sense  of  reviewing  this  same  matter  done 
or  spoken  by  the  light  of  this  knowledge ;  this  last  is  gener- 
ally called  ''knowing"  rather  than  "learning;"  but  the  word 
"  learning  "  is  also  used,  and  you  did  not  see  that  the  term  is 
employed  of  two  opposite  sorts  of  men,  of  those  who  know,  and 
of  those  who  do  not  know,  as  they  explained.  — JSuthydemus,  i 
180. 
Learning,  a  process  of  recollection. 

The  soul,  then,  as  being  immortal,  and  having  been  boru 

again  many  times,  and  having   seen  all  things   that  there  are, 
18 


274  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

whether  in  this  world  or  in  the  world  below,  has  knowledge  < 
them  all ;  and  it  is  no  wonder  that  she  should  be  able  to  call 
to  remembrance  all  that  she  ever  knew  about  virtue,  and  about 
everything;  for  as  all  nature  is  akin,  and  the  soul  has  learned 
all  things,  there  is  uo  difficulty  in  her  eliciting,  \jf  as  men  say 
learning,  all  out  of  a  single  recollection,  if  a  man  is  strenuous 
and  does  not  faint;  for  all  inquiry  and  all  learning  is  but  rec- 
ollection. —  Meno,  i.  255. 
Learning,  the  lover  of,  must  be  truthful. 

Let    us   assume    that   philosophical    minds    always    love 

knowledge  of  a  sort  which  shows  them  the  eternal   nature  in 
which  is  no  varying  from  generation  and  corruption. 

Agreed. 

And  further,  I  said,  let  us  admit  that  they  are  lovers  of  all 
true  being  ;  there  is  no  part,  whether  greater  or  less,  or  more 
or  less  honorable,  which  they  are  willing  to  renounce  ;  as  we 
said  before  of  the  lover  and  the  man  of  ambition. 

True. 

There  is  another  quality  which  they  will  also  need  if  they 
are  to  be  what  we  were  saying. 

What  quality  ? 

Truthfulness  ;  they  will  never  intentionally  receive  false- 
hood, which  is  their  detestation,  and  they  will  love  the  truth. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  may  be  affirmed  of  them. 

"  May  be,"  my  friend,  I  replied,  is  not  the  word ;  say  rather ; 
"  must  be  affirmed ; "  for  he  whose  nature  is  amorous  of  any 
thing  cannot  help  loving  all  that  belongs  or  is  akin  to  the  ob- 
ject of  his  affections. 

Right,  he  said. 

And  is  there  anything  more  akin  to  wisdom  than  truth  ? 

How  can  there  be  ? 

Or  can  the  same  nature  be  a  lover  of  wisdom  and  a  lover  of 
falsehood  ? 

Never. 

The   true  lover   of  learning,  then,  must  from    his   earliest 
youth,  as  far  as  in  him  lies,  desire  all  truth.  —  The  Republic,  ii. 
311. 
Learning  and  belief. 

Soc.  Let  me  raise  this  question ;   you   would   say  tha; 

there  is  such  a  thing  as  "  having  learned  ?  " 
Gor.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  there  is  also  "  having  believed  ?  " 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  275 

Gor.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  is  the  "  having  learned  "  the  same  as  having  be- 
lieved," and  are  learning  and  belief  the  same  things  ? 

Gor.  In  my  judgment,  Socrates,  they  are  not  the  same. 

Soc.  And  your  judgment  is  right,  as  you  may  ascertain  in 
this  way :  if  a  person  were  to  say  to  you,  "  Is  there,  Gorgias, 
a  false  belief  as  well  as  a  true  ?  "  you  would  reply,  if  I  am  not 
mistaken,  that  there  is. 

Gor.  Yes. 

Soc.  Well,  but  is  there  a  false  knowledge  as  well  as  a  true  ? 

Gor.  No. 

Soc.  No,  indeed ;  and  this  again  proves  that  knowledge  and 
belief  differ. 

Gor.  That  is  true. 

Soc.  And  yet  those  who  have  learned  as  well  as  those  who 
have  believed  are  persuaded  ? 

Gor.  That  is  so. 

Soc.  Shall  we  then  assume  two  sorts  of  persuasion,  —  one 
which  is  the  source  of  belief  without  knowledge,  as  the  other 
is  of  knowledge  ? 

Gor.  By  all  means. 

Soc.  And  which  sort  of  persuasion  does  rhetoric  create  in 
courts  of  law  and  other  assemblies  about  the  just  and  unjust, 
the  sort  of  persuasion  which  gives  belief  without  knowledge, 
or  that  which  gives  knowledge  ? 

Gor.   Clearly,  Socrates,  that  which  only  gives  belief. 

Soc.  Then  rhetoric,  as  would  appear,  is  the  artificer  of  a 
persuasion  which  creates  belief  about  the  just  and  unjust,  but 
gives  no  instruction  about  them  ? 

Gor.  True.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  39. 
Learning,  facility  in. 

"Which,  I  said,  is  better  —  facility  in  learning,  or  difficulty 

in  learning  ? 

Facility. 

Yes,  I  said ;  and  facility  in  learning  is  learning  quickly,  and 
difficulty  in  learning  is  learning  quietly  and  slowly  ? 

True. 

And  is  it  not  better  to  teach  one  another  quickly  and  ener- 
getically, rather  than  quietly  and  slowly  ? 

Yes. 

And  to  call  to  mind,  and  to  remember,  quickly  and  readily 
—  that  is  also  better  than  to  remember  quietly  and  slowly  ? 


276  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Yes. 

And  is  not  shrewdness  a  quickness  or  cleverness  of  the  soul, 
and  not  a  quietness  ? 

True. 

And  is  it  not  best  to  understand  what  is  said,  whether  at  the 
writing-master's  or  the  music-master's,  or  anywhere  else,  not  as 
quietly  as  possible,  but  as  quickly  as  possible  ? 

Yes. 

And  when  the  soul  inquires,  and  in  deliberations,  not  the 
quietest,  as  I  imagine,  and  he  who  with  difficulty  deliberates 
and  discovers,  is  thought  worthy  of  praise,  but  he  who  does  this 
most  easily  and  quickly? 

That  is  true,  he  said. 

And  in  all  that  concerns  either  body  or  soul,  swiftness  and 
activity  are  clearly  better  than  slowness  and  quietness  ? 

That,  he  said,  is  the  inference. —  Charmides,  i.  14. 

Legacies  of  wealth  to  children  an  evil.     See    Children,  riches  an 

evil  left  to. 
Legislation,  the  true  aim  of. 

Soc.  Whatever  name  he  gives  to    the    thing,  he  would 

allow  that  the  good  or  expedient  is  the  aim  of  legislation,  and 
that  the  State  as  far  as  possible  imposes  all  laws  with  a  view 
to  the  greatest  expediency  ;  can  legislation  have  any  other  aim  ? 

Theod.   Certainly  not. 

Soc.  But  is  the  aim  attained  always?  may  not  mistakes 
often  happen  ? 

Theod.  Yes,  I  think  that  there  are  mistakes. 

Soc.  The  possibility  of  error  will  be  more  distinctly  recog- 
nized, if  we  put  the  question  in  reference  to  the  whole  class 
under  which  the  good  or  expedient  falls.  That  whole  class  has 
to  do  with  the  future,  and  laws  are  passed  under  the  idea  that 
they  will  be  useful  in  after  time ;  which,  in  other  words,  is  the 
future. 

Theod.  Very  true.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  380. 
Legislation  cannot  be  particular. 

Sir.  Let  us  consider,  further,  that  the  legislator  who  has 

to  preside  over  the  herd,  and  to  enforce  justice  in  their  deal- 
ings with  one  another,  will  not  be  able,  in  enacting  for  the 
general  good,  to  provide  exactly  what  is  suitable  for  each  par- 
ticular case. 

T.  Soc.  He  cannot  be  expected  to  do  this. 

Str.  He  will  lay  down  laws  in  a  general  form  for  the  major- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  277 

:ty,  roughly  meeting  the  cases  of  individuals ;  and  some  of  them 
he  will  deliver  in  writing,  and  others  will  be  unwritten  ;  and 
these  last  will  be  traditional  customs  of  the  country. 

T.  Soc.  That  will  be  right. 

Str.  Yes,  that  will  be  right ;  for  how  can  he  sit  at  every 
man's  side  all  through  his  life,  and  prescribe  for  him  the  exact 
particulars  of  his  duty  ?  Who,  Socrates,  would  be  sufficient  for 
such  a  task  ?  No  one  who  really  had  the  royal  science,  if  he 
had  been  able  to  do  this,  would  have  imposed  upon  himself  the 
restriction  of  having  a  written  code  of  laws.  —  Statesman,  lii. 
580. 

Legislation,  comprehensive.     See  Laws  answering  to  virtue. 
Legislation,  the  beginning  of. 

Atli.    There    is    another     thing    which    would    probably 

happen. 

Cle.  What  is  that  ? 

Ath.  When  these  larger  habitations  grew  up  out  of  the 
lesser  original  ones,  each  of  the  lesser  ones  would  survive  in 
the  larger  ;  every  family  would  be  under  the  rule  of  the  eld- 
est, and,  owing  to  their  separation  from  one  another,  would 
have  peculiar  customs  in  things  divine  and  human,  which  they 
would  have  received  from  their  several  parents  who  had  edu- 
cated them  ;  and  these  customs  would  incline  them  to  order, 
when  the  parents  had  the  element  of  order  in  them  ;  and  to 
courage,  when  they  had  the  element  of  courage  in  them.  And 
they  would  naturally  stamp  upon  their  children,  and  upon  their 
children's  children,  their  own  institutions  ;  and,  as  we  are  say- 
ing, they  would  find  their  way  into  the  larger  society,  having 
already  their  own  peculiar  laws. 

Gle.   Certainly. 

Ath.  And  every  man  surely  likes  his  own  laws  best,  and  the 
laws  of  others  not  so  well. 

Cle.  True. 

Ath.  Then  now  we  seem  to  have  stumbled  upon  the  begin- 
nings of  legislation  ? 

Cle.  Exactly. 

Ath.  The  next  step  will  be  that  these  persons,  who  meet  to- 
gether, must  choose  some  arbiters,  who  will  inspect  the  laws  of 
all  of  them,  and  will  publicly  present  such  of  them  as  they 
approve  to  the  chiefs  who  lead  the  tribes,  and  are  in  a  manner 
their  kings,  and  will  give  them  the  choice  of  them.  These 
will  themselves  be  called  legislators,  and  will  appoint  the  mag- 


278  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

istrates,  framing  some  sort  of  aristocracy,  or  perhaps  monarchy 
out  of  the  dynasties  or  lordships,  and  in  this  altered  state  oi 
the  government  they  will  live. 

Cle.  Yes,  they  would  be  appointed  in  the  order  which  you 
mention.  —  Laws,  iv.  210. 
Legislation,  chance  in. 

Aih.  I   was  going  to  say  that   man  never  legislates,  but 

that  accidents  of  all  sorts  legislate  for  us  in  all  sorts  of  ways. 
The  violence  of  war  and  the  hard  necessity  of  poverty  are 
constantly  overturning  governments  and  changing  laws.  And 
the  power  of  disease  has  often  caused  innovations  in  the  State, 
when  there  have  been  pestilences,  and  bad  seasons  continuing 
during  many  years.  Any  one  who  sees  all  this,  naturally 
rushes  to  the  conclusion  of  which  I  was  speaking,  that  no  mor- 
tal legislates  in  anything,  but  that  in  human  affairs  chance  is 
almost  everything.  —  Laws,  iv.  236. 
Legislation,  force  and  persuasion  in.  See  Persuasion. 

• Legislators  never  appear  to  have  considered  that  whereas 

they  have  two  instruments  which  they  might  use  in  legislation, 
—  persuasion  and  force,  in    so  far   as   a  rude  and  uneducated 
multitude  are  capable  of  being  affected  by  them,  they  use  one 
only  ;  for  they  do  not  mingle  persuasion  with  antagonism,  but 
employ  force  pure  and  simple.  —  Laws,  iv.  249. 
Legislative  ignorance  destroying  States.     See  Ignorance,  etc. 
Legislative  purification. 

Take,  for  example,  the  purification  of  a  city  —  there  are 

many  kinds  of  purification,  some  easier  and  others  more  diffi- 
cult ;  and  some  of  them,  and  the  best  and  most  difficult  of 
them,  the  legislator,  if  he  be  also  a  despot,  may  be  able  to 
effect ;  but  he  who  without  a  despotism  sets  up  a  new  govern- 
ment and  laws,  even  if  he  attempt  the  mildest  of  purgations, 
may  think  himself  happy  if  he  can  complete  his  work.  When 
best  the  purification  is  painful,  like  similar  cures  in  medicine, 
involving  righteous  punishment  and  inflicting  death  or  exile  in 
the  last  resort.  For  in  this  way  we  commonly  dispose  of 
great  sinners  who  are  incurable,  and  are  the  greatest  injury  of 
the  whole  State.  But  the  milder  form  of  purification  is  as  fol- 
lows :  When  men  who  have  nothing,  and  are  in  want  of  food, 
show  a  disposition  to  follow  their  leaders  in  an  attack  on  the 
property  of  the  rich  —  these,  who  are  the  natural  plague  of 
the  State,  are  sent  away  by  the  legislator  in  a  friendly  spirit  as 
far  as  he  is  able  ;  and  this  dismissal  of  them  is  euphemist'cally 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  279 

termed  a  colony  And  every  legislator  should  contrive  to  do 
this  at  once.  Our  present  case,  however,  is  peculiar.  For 
there  is  no  need  to  devise  any  colony  or  purifying  separation 
under  the  circumstances  in  which  we  are  placed.  But,  as 
when  many  streams  flow  together  from  springs  and  mountain 
torrents  into  a  single  lake,  we  ought  to  attend  and  take  care 
that  the  confluence  of  water  should  be  perfectly  clear ;  and  in 
order  to  effect  this,  should  pump  and  draw  off  and  divert  im 
purities,  so  in  every  political  arrangement  there  may  be  trouble 
and  danger.  But,  seeing  that  we  are  discoursing  and  not  act- 
ing, let  our  selection  be  supposed  to  be  completed,  and  the  de- 
sired purity  attained.  Touching  evil  men,  who  want  to  join 
and  be  citizens  of  our  State,  we  will  not  allow  them  to  come 
until  we  have  tested  them  by  persuasion  and  time ;  but  the 
good  we  will  to  the  utmost  of  our  ability  receive  as  friends 
with  open  arms.  —  Laws,  iv.  260. 
Legislator  Homer  not  a. 

I   think  that  we  must  put    a   question   to    Homer ;    not 

about  medicine,  or  any  of  the  arts  to  which  his  poems  only  it- 
cidentally  refer ;  we  are  not  going  to  ask  him,  or  any  othei 
poet,  whether  he  has  cured  patients  like  Asclepius,  or  left  be- 
hind him  a  school  of  medicine  such  as  the  Asclepiads  were,  or 
whether  he  only  talks  about  medicine  and  other  arts  at  second- 
hand, but  we  have  a  right  to  know  respecting  military  tactics, 
politics,  education,  which  are  the  chiefest  and  noblest  subjects 
of  his  poems,  and  we  may  fairly  ask  him  about  them.  ';  Friend 
Homer,"  then  we  say,  "  if  you  are  only  in  the  second  remove 
from  truth  in  what  you  say  of  virtue,  and  not  in  the  third  — 
not  an  image-maker  or  imitator  —  and  if  you  are  able  to  dis- 
cern what  pursuits  make  men  better  or  worse  in  private  or 
public  life,  tell  us  what  State  was  ever  better  governed  by  your 
help  ?  The  good  order  of  Lacedaemon  is  due  to  Lycurgus, 
and  many  other  cities  great  and  small  have  been  similarly  ben- 
efited by  others ;  but  who  says  that  you  have  been  a  good 
legislator  to  them  and  have  done  them  any  good  ?  Italy  and 
Sicily  can  tell  of  Charondas,  and  there  is  Solon  who  is  re- 
nowned among  us ;  but  what  city  has  anything  to  say  about 
you  ?  "  Is  theve  any  city  which  he  might  name  ? 

I  think  not,  said  Glaucon  ;  not  even  the  Homeridae  them- 
selves pretend  that  he  was  a  legislator. 

Well,  but  is  there  any  war  on  record  which  was  carried  on 
successfully  by  him,  or  aided  by  his  counsels,  when  he  was 
alive  ? 


280  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS 

There  is  not. 

Or  is  there  any  invention  of  his  applicable  to  the  arts,  or 
to  human  life,  such  as  Thales  the  Milesian,  or  Anacharsis  the 
Scythian,  and  other  ingenious  men  have  made,  which  is  at- 
tributed to  him  ? 

There  is  nothing  at  all  of  the  kind. 

But,  if  Homer  never  did  any  public  service,  was  he  privately 
a  guide  or  teacher  of  any  ?  Had  he  in  his  life-time  friends 
and  associates  who  loved  him,  and  handed  down  to  posterity  an 
Homeric  way  of  life,  as  Pythagoras  was  beloved  and  his  suc- 
cessors, who  at  this  day  call  their  way  of  life  by  his  name,  and 
do  appear  to  have  a  certain  distinction  above  other  men  ? 

Nothing  of  the  kind  is  recorded  of  him.  For  surely,  Soc- 
rates, Creophylus,  the  companion  of  Homer,  that  child  of 
flesh,  whose  name  always  makes  us  laugh,  might  be  more 
justly  ridiculed  for  his  want  of  education,  if,  as  is  said,  Homer 
was  greatly  neglected  by  him  and  others  in  his  own  day  when 
he  was  alive  ? 

Yes,  I  replied,  that  is  the  tradition.  But  can  you  imagine, 
Glaucon,  that  if  Homer  had  really  been  able  to  educate  and 
improve  mankind,  if  he  had  possessed  knowledge  and  not  been 
a  mere  imitator  —  can  you  imagine,  I  say,  that  he  would  not 
have  had  many  followers,  and  been  honored  and  loved  by 
them  ?  Protagoras  of  Abdera,  and  Prodicus  of  Ceos,  and  a 
host  of  others,  have  only  to  suggest  to  their  contemporaries 
that  they  will  never  be  able  to  manage  either  their  own  house 
or  their  State  unless  they  are  made  by  them  presidents  of  edu- 
cation ;  and  for  this  wisdom  of  theirs  they  are  so  much  be- 
loved that  their  companions  all  but  carry  them  about  on  their 
heads.  And  are  we  to  believe  that  the  contemporaries  of 
Homer,  or  again  of  Hesiod,  would  have  allowed  either  of  them 
to  beg  their  way  as  rhapsodists,  if  they  had  really  been  able  to 
improve  mankind?  Would  they  not  have  been  as  unwilling  to 
part  with  them  as  with  gold,  and  have  compelled  them  to  stay  at 
hoir.  3  with  them  ?  Or,  if  the  master  would  not  stay,  then  the 
disciples  would  have  followed  him  about  everywhere  until  they 
had  got  education  enough  ? 

Yes,  Socrates,  that,  I  think,  is  quite  true.  —  The  Republic, 
ii.  430. 
Legislator,  compared  to  a  physician.     See  Rulers ,  compared  to,  etc. 

Str.  Let  us  put  to  ourselves  the  case  of  a  physician,  or 

trainer,  who  is  about  to  go  into  a  far  country,  and  is  expecting 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  281 

to  bo  a  long  time  away  from  his  patients  ;  he  leaves  written  in- 
structions for  the  patients  or  pupils,  under  the  idea  that  they 
will  not  be  remembered  unless  they  are  written  down. 

Y.  Soc.  True. 

Str.  But  what  would  you  say,  if  he  came  back  sooner  than  he 
intended,  and,  owing  to  an  unexpected  change  of  the  winds  or 
other  celestial  influences,  some  other  remedies  happened  to  b» 
better  for  them,  —  would  he  not  venture  to  suggest  those  other 
remedies,  although  differing  from  his  former  prescription  ? 
Would  he  persist  in  observing  the  original  law.  neither  himself 
giving  any  new  commandments,  nor  the  patient  daring  to  do 
otherwise  than  was  prescribed,  under  the  idea  that  this  course 
only  was  healthy  and  medicinal,  all  others  noxious  and  hetero- 
dox ?  Viewed  in  the  light  of  science  and  true  art,  would  not 
all  such  regulations  be  utterly  ridiculous  ? 

Y.  Soc.   Quite  true. 

Str.  And  if  he  who  gave  laws,  written  or  unwritten,  deter- 
mining what  was  good  or  bad,  honorable  or  dishonorable,  just 
or  unjust  to  the  tribes  of  men  who  herd  in  their  several  cities, 
and  are  governed  in  accordance  with  them ;  if,  I  say,  the  wise 
legislator  were  suddenly  to  come  again,  or  another  like  to  him, 
is  he  to  be  prohibited  from  changing  them ;  would  not  this 
prohibition  be  in  reality  quite  as  ridiculous  as  the  other  ? 

Y.   Soc.  Certainly.  —  Statesman,  iii.  581. 

Legislators  not  always  to  obey  their  constituency.     See  Constitu- 
ency. 

Leveling  of  anarchy.     See  Anarchy. 

Liberal  education,  a  sign  of.     See  Education,  sign  of  a,  etc. 

Liberty  allowed  the  lover. 

Consider,  how  great  is  the  encouragement  which  all  the 

world  gives  to  the  lover  ;  neither  is  he  supposed  to  be  doing 
anything  dishonorable  ;  but  if  he  succeeds  he  is  praised,  and  if 
he  fail  he  is  blamed.  And  in  the  pursuit  of  his  love  the  cus- 
tom of  mankind  allows  him  to  do  many  strange  things,  which 
philosophy  would  bitterly  censure  if  they  were  done  from  any 
motive  of  interest,  or  wish  for  office  or  power.  He  may  pray, 
and  entreat,  ind  supplicate,  and  swear,  and  be  a  servant  of  ser 
vants,  and  lie  on  a  mat  at  the  door ;  in  any  other  case  friends 
and  enemies  would  be  equally  ready  to  prevent  him,  but  now 
there  is  no  friend  who  will  be  ashamed  of  him  and  admonish 
him,  and  no  enemy  will  charge  him  with  meanness  or  flattery  ; 
the  actions  of  a  lover  have  a  grace  which  ennobles  them  ;  and 


282  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

custom  has  decided  that  they  are  highly  commendable  and  that 
there  is  no  loss  of  character  in  them  ;  and  what  is  strangest  of 
all  he  only  may  swear  and  forswear  himself   (this  is  what  the 
world  says),  and  the   Gods  will  forgive  his  transgression,  for 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  lover's  oath.     Such  is  the  entire 
liberty  which  Gods  and  men  have  allowed  the  lover,  according 
to  the  custom  which  prevails  in  our  part  of  the  world.  —  The 
Symposium,  i.  477. 
Liberty,  popular.     See  Democracy. 
Liberty  and  license.     See  Anarchy. 
License,  spirit  of. 

Damon   tells  me,  and  I  can  quite  believe  him ;  he  saya 

that  when  modes  of  music  change,  the  fundamental  laws  of  the 
State  always  change  with  them. 

Yes,  said  Adeimautus  ;  and  you  may  add  my  suffrage  to 
Damon's  and  your  own. 

Then,  I  said,  our  guardians  must  lay  the  foundations  of  their 
fortress  in  music? 

Yes,  he  said  ;  and  the  license  of  which  you  speak  very 
easily  creeps  in. 

Yes,  I  replied,  in  the  form  of  amusement;  and  at  first  sight 
appears  harmless. 

Why,  yes,  he  said,  and  there  is  no  harm  ;  were  it  not  that  lit- 
tle by  little,  the  spirit  of  license,  finding  a  home,  penetrates  into 
manners  and  customs  ;  whence,  issuing  with  greater  force,  it  in- 
vades agreements  between  man  and  man,  and  from  agreements 
goes  on  to  laws  and  constitutions,  in  utter  recklessness,  and 
ends,  Socrates,  by  an  overthrow  of  all  things,  private  as  well 
as  public. 

Is  that  true  ?  I  said. 

That  is  my  belief,  he  replied. 

Then,  as  I  was  saying,  our  youth  should  be  educated  in  a 
stricter  rule  from  the  first,  for  if  education  becomes  lawless, 
and  the  youths  themselves  become  lawless,  they  can  never  grow 
up  into  well-conducted  and  meritorious  citizens. 

Very  true,  he  said.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  248. 
License,  freedom  growing  to.     See  Freedom  growing  to,  etc. 
Lie,  a,  when  committed.     See  Fiction. 
Lie,  God  cannot  utter  a.     See  Deception. 
Lies  for  the  good  of  the  State. 

Truth  should  be  highly  valued ;  if,  as  we  were  saying, 

a  lie  is  useless  to  the  Gods,  and  useful  only  as  a  medicine  to 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  283 

men,  then  the  use  of  such  medicines  will  have  to  be  restricted 
to  physicians ;  private  individuals  have  no  business  with  them. 

Clearly  not,  he  said. 

Then  if  any  persons  are  to  have  the  privilege  of  lying, 
either  at  home  or  abroad,  they  will  be  the  rulers  of  the  State  ; 
they  may  be  allowed  to  lie  for  the  public  good.  But  nobody 
else  is  to  meddle  with  anything  of  the  kind ;  and  for  a  private 
man  to  lie  in  return  to  the  rulers  is  to  be  deemed  a  more 
heinous  fault  than  for  a  patient  or  the  pupil  of  a  gymnasium 
not  to  speak  the  truth  about  his  own  bodily  illnesses  to  the 
physician  or  trainer,  or  for  a  sailor  not  to  tell  the  captain 
truly  how  matters  are  going  on  in  a  ship. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

If,  then,  the  ruler  catches  anybody  beside  himself  lying  in 
the  State,  — 

"  Any  of  the  craftsmen,  whether  he  be  priest  or  physician  or  carpenter," 

he  will  punish  him  for  introducing  a  practice  which  is  equally 
subversive  of  ship  or  State. 

Yes,  he  said,  if  our  theory  is  carried  into  execution.  —  The 
Republic,  ii.  211. 
Life  a  valued  good. 

Soc.  If,  acting  under  the  advice  of  men  who  have  no  un- 
derstanding, we  destroy  that  which  is  improved  by  health  and 
deteriorated  by  disease  —  would  life  be  worth  having  ?  And 
that  which  has  been  destroyed  is  the  body  ? 

dr.  Yes. 

Soc.   Could  we  live,  having  an  evil  and  corrupted  body  ? 

Cr.   Certainly  not. 

Soc.  And  will  life  be  worth  having,  if  that  higher  part  of 
man  be  destroyed,  which  is  improved  by  justice  and  deteriorated 
by  injustice  ?  Do  we  suppose  that  principle,  whatever  it  may 
be  in  man,  which  has  to  do  with  justice  and  injustice,  to  be  in- 
ferior to  the  body  ? 

Cr.   Certainly  not. 

Soc.  More  honored,  then  ? 

Cr.  Far  more  honored. 

Soc.  Then,  my  friend,  we  must  not  regard  what  the  many 
say  of  us :  but  what  he,  the  one  man  who  has  understanding  of 
just  and  unjust,  will  say,  and  what  the  truth  will  say.  And 
therefore  you  begin  in  error  when  you  advise  that  we  should 
regard  the  opinion  of  the  many  about  just  and  unjust,  good  and 


284  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

evil,  honorable  and  dishonorable.      Well,  some  one  will   say 
"  But  the  many  can  kill  us." 

Gr.  Yes,  Socrates  ;  that  will  clearly  be  the  answer. 

Soc.  That  is  true  :  but  still  I  find  with  surprise  that  the  old 
argument  is,  as  I  conceive,  unshaken  as  ever.     And  I  should 
like   to  know  whether  I  may  say  the  same  of  another  proposi 
tion  —  that  not  life,  but  a  good  life,  is  to  be  chiefly  valued  ? 

Gr.  Yes,  that  also  remains. 

Soc.  And  a  good  life  is  equivalent  to  a  just  and  honorable 
one  —  that  holds  also  ? 

Gr.  Yes,  that  holds.  —  Grito,  i.  352. 
Life  of  the  body,  the  soul  the.     See  Soul  giving  life. 
Life   and  death  not  to  be  considered  in  questions  of  duty.     See 

Death  and  life,  etc. 
Life,  when  unendurable. 

In  my  judgment,  Socrates,  the  question  has  now  become 

ridiculous.  If,  when  the  bodily  constitution  is  gone,  life  is  no 
longer  endurable,  though  pampered  with  all  kinds  of  meats 
and  drinks,  and  having  all  wealth  and  all  power,  shall  we  be 
told  that,  when  the  very  essence  of  the  vital  principle  is  un- 
dermined and  corrupted,  even  though  a  man  be  allowed  to  do 
whatever  he  pleases,  life  is  still  worth  having  to  him,  if  he  be 
forbidden  to  escape  from  vice  and  injustice,  or  attain  justice 
and  virtue,  seeing  that  we  now  know  the  true  nature  of  each  ? 

Yes,  I  said,  the  question  is,  as  you  say,  ridiculous.      Still,  as 
we  are  near  the  spot  at  which  we  may  see   the   truth  with 
our  own  eyes,  let  us  not  faint  by  the  way.  —  The  Republic, 
ii.  272. 
Life  a  fearful  thing. 

Soc.  There  is  a  noble  freedom,  Callicles,  in  your  way  of 

approaching  the  argument ;  for  what  you  say  is  what  the  rest 
of  the  world  think,  but  are  unwilling  to  say.  And  I  must  beg 
of  you  to  persevere  that  the  true  rule  of  human  life  may  be- 
come manifest.  Tell  me,  then :  you  say,  do  you  not,  that  in 
the  rightly  developed  man  the  passions  ought  not  to  be  con- 
trolled, but  that  we  should  let  them  grow  to  the  utmost  and 
somehow  or  other  satisfy  them,  and  that  this  is  virtue  ? 

Cal.  Yes  ;  that  is  what  I  say. 

Soc.  Then  those  who  want  nothing  are  not  truly  said  to  be 
happy  ? 

Cal.  No,  indeed,  for  then  stones  und  dead  men   would  be 
the  happiest  of  all. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  28.S 

Sot,.   But  surely  according  to  you  life  is  an  awful  thing  ;  and 
I  think  that  Euripides  may  have  been  right  in  saying,  — 

"  Who  knows  if  life  be  not  death  and  death  life;  " 

for  ]  think  that  we  are  very  likely  dead  ;  and  I  have  heard  a 
wise  man  say  that  at  this  very  moment  we  are  dead,  and  that 
the  body(o-w/xa)  is  a  tomb  (o-^/xa),  and  that  the  part  of  the  soul 
which  is  the  seat  of  the  desires  is  liable  to  be  blown  and  tossed 
about. — Gorgias,  iii.  81. 
Life,  protracted,  not  to  be  desired. 

0  my  friend  !     I  want  you  to  see  that  the  noble  and  the 

good  may  possibly  be  something  different  from  saving  and  be- 
ing saved,  and  that  he  who  is  truly  a  man  ought  not  to  care 
about  living  a  certain  time  :  he  knows,  as  women  say,  that  we 
must  all  die,  and  therefore  he  is  not  fond  of  life  ;  he  leaves  all 
that  with  God,  and  considers  in  what  way  he  can  best  spend 
his  appointed  term.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  104. 
Life,  spontaneous. 

Str.  It  is  evident,  Socrates,  that  there  was  no  such  thing 

in  the  then  order  of  nature  as  the  procreation  of  animals  from 
one  another  ;  what  we  have  heard  of  as  the  earth-born  race 
was  the  one  which  existed  in  that  second  cycle  —  they  sprang 
out  of  the  ground  in  which  they  were  sown  ;  and  of  this  tradi- 
tion, which  is  nowadays  often  unduly  discredited,  our  ances- 
tors, who  came  into  being  immediately  after  the  end  of  the  last 
period  and  at  the  beginning  of  this,  are  the  heralds  to  us.  For 
mark  how  consistent  the  sequel  of  the  tale  is ;  after  the  return 
of  age  to  youth,  follows  the  return  of  the  dead,  who  are  lying 
in  the  earth,  to  life  ;  the  wheel  of  their  existence  has  been 
turned  back,  and  they  come  together  and  rise  and  live  in  the 
opposite  order,  unless  God  has  carried  any  of  them  away  to 
some  other  lot.  Such  is  the  tradition  of  the  so-called  earth- 
born  men  and  so  of  necessity  they  came  into  being.  —  States- 
man, iii.  555. 

Life,  goods  of.     See  Goods,  etc. 
Life,  progression  of.     See  Progression,  etc. 
Life,  reason  the  rule  of. 

• May  we  not  regard  every  living  being  as  a  puppet  of  the 

Gods,  either  their  plaything  only,  or  created  with  a  pur- 
pose which  of  the  two  we  cannot  certainly  know  ?  But 
this  we  know,  that  these  affections  in  us  are  like  cords  and 
strings,  which  pull  us  different  and  opposite  ways,  and  to  oppo- 


286  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

site  actions  ;  and  herein  lies  the  difference  between  virtue  and 
vice.  According  to  the  argument  there  is  one  among  these 
cords  which  every  man  ought  to  grasp  and  never  let  go,  but 
to  pull  with  it  against  all  the  rest ;  and  this  is  the  sacred  and 
golden  cord  of  reason,  called  by  us  the  common  law  of  the 
State  ;  there  are  others  which  are  hard  and  of  iron,  but  this  is 
soft  because  golden  ;  and  there  are  several  other  kinds.  Xow 
we  ought  always  to  cooperate  with  the  lead  of  the  best,  which 
is  law.  For  inasmuch  as  reason  is  beautiful  and  gentle,  and 
not  violent,  her  rule  must  needs  have  ministers  in  order  to  help 
the  golden  principle  in  vanquishing  the  other  principles.  And 
thus  the  moral  tale  about  our  being  puppets  will  not  be  lost, 
and  the  meaning  of  the  expression  "  superior  or  inferior  to  a 
man's  self"  will  become  clearer  ;  as  also  that  in  this  matter  of 
pulling  the  strings  of  the  puppet,  cities  as  well  as  individuals 
should  live  according  to  reason  ;  which  the  individual  attains 
in  himself,  and  the  city  receives  from  some  God,  or  from  the 
legislator  and  makes  it  her  law  in  her  dealings  with  herself  and 
with  other  States.  In  this  way  virtue  and  vice  will  be  more 
clearly  distinguished  by  us.  And  when  they  have  become 
clearer,  education  and  other  institutions  will  in  like  manner  be- 
come clearer  ;  and  in  particular  that  question  of  convivial  en- 
tertainment, which  may  seem,  perhaps,  to  have  been  a  very 
trifling  matter,  and  to  have  taken  a  great  many  more  words 
than  were  necessary.  — Laws,  iv.  175. 
Life,  the  nobler. 

Enough   has  now  been   said  of  divine  matters,  both   as 

touching  the  practices  which  men  ought  to  follow,  and  the 
several  characters  which  they  ought  to  cultivate.  But  of 
human  things  we  have  not  as  yet  spoken,  and  we  must  ;  for  to 
men  we  are  discoursing  and  not  to  Gods.  Pleasures  and  pains 
and  desires  are  a  part  of  human  nature,  and  on  them  every 
mortal  being  must  of  necessity  hang  and  depend  with  the  most 
eager  interest.  And  therefore  we  must  praise  the  noblest  life, 
not  only  as  the  fairest  in  appearance,  but  if  a  man  will  only 
taste,  and  not  as  in  the  days  of  youth  run  away  to  another,  he 
will  find  that  this  nobler  life  surpasses  also  in  the  very  thing 
which  we  all  of  us  desire,  —  I  mean  in  having  the  greatest 
pleasure  and  the  least  pain  during  the  whole  of  life.  And  this 
will  be  plain,  and  will  be  quickly  and  clearly  seen,  if  a  man 
has  a  true  taste  of  them.  But  what  is  a  true  taste?  That  we 
have  to  learn  from  the  argument,  —  the  point  being  what  is 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  287 

according  to  nature,  and  what  is  not  according  to  nature.  One 
life  must  be  compared  with  another  the  more  pleasurable 
with  the  more  painful,  after  this  manner :  We  desire  to  have 
pleasure,  but  we  neither  desire  nor  choose  pain  ;  and  the  neu- 
tral state  we  are  ready  to  take  in  exchange,  not  for  pleasure, 
but  for  pain  ;  and  we  also  choose  less  pain  and  greater 
pleasure,  but  less  pleasure  and  greater  pain  we  do  not  choose ; 
and  an  equal  balance  of  either  we  cannot  venture  to  assert 
that  we  should  desire.  And  all  these  differ  or  do  not  differ 
severally  in  number  and  magnitude  and  intensity  and  equality, 
and  in  the  opposites  of  these  when  regarded  as  objects  of 
choice,  in  relation  to  the  will.  And  such  being  the  necessary 
order  of  things,  we  choose  that  life  in  which  there  are  many 
great  and  intense  elements  of  pleasure  and  pain,  and  in  which 
the  pleasures  are  in  excess,  and  do  not  choose  that  in  which 
the  opposites  exceed  ;  nor,  again,  do  we  choose  that  in  which 
the  elements  of  either  are  small  and  few  and  feeble,  and  the 
pains  exceed.  And  when,  as  I  said  before,  there  is  a  balance 
of  pleasure  and  pain  in  life,  this  is  to  be  regarded  by  us  as  the 
balanced  life;  while  other  lives  are  preferred  by  us  because 
they  exceed  in  what  we  like,  or  are  rejected  by  us  because 
they  exceed  hi  what  we  dislike.  All  the  lives  of  men  may  be 
regarded  by  us  as  bound  up  in  these,  and  we  must  also  consider 
what  sort  of  lives  we  by  nature  choose.  And  if  we  wish  for 
any  others,  I  say  that  we  choose  them  only  through  some 
ignorance  and  inexperience  of  the  lives  which  actually  exist. 

Now,  what  lives  are  they,  and  how  many  in  which,  having 
searched  out  and  beheld  the  objects  of  will  and  desire  and  their 
opposites,  and  making  of  them  a  law,  choosing,  I  say,  the  dear 
and  the  pleasant  and  the  best  and  noblest,  a  man  may  live  in 
the  happiest  way  possible  ?  Let  us  say  that  the  temperate  Ufa 
is  one  kind  of  life,  and  the  rational  another,  and  the  courageous 
another,  and  the  healthful  another ;  and  to  these  four  let  us 
oppose  four  other  lives,  —  the  foolish,  the  cowardly,  the  intem- 
perate, the  diseased.  He  who  knows  the  temperate  life  will 
describe  it  as  in  all  things  gentle,  having  gentle  pains  and 
gentle  pleasures,  and  placid  desires  and  loves  not  insane 
whereas  the  intemperate  life  is  impetuous  in  all  things,  and  hai 
violent  pains  and  pleasures,  and  vehement  and  stinging  desires, 
and  loves  utterly  insane ;  and  in  the  temperate  life  the  pleas- 
ures exceed  the  pains,  but  in  the  intemperate  life  the  pains  ex- 
ceed the  pleasures  in  greatness  and  number  and  intensity. 


288  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Hence  one  of  the  two  lives  is  naturally  and  necessarily  more 

pleasant  and  the  other  more  painful,  and  he  who  would  liv^ 

pleasantly    cannot    possibly  choose    to    live    intemperately.  — 

Laws,  iv.  258. 

Likeness  of  the  world.     See  Animal,  etc. 

Likeness-making. 

Str.  I  think  that  I  can  discern   two  divisions  of  the  imi- 

tati/e  art,  but  I  am  not  as  yet  able  to  see  in  which  of  them  the 
desired  form  is  to  be  found. 

Theaet.  Will  you  tell  me  first  what  are  the  two  divisions  of 
which  you  are  speaking  ? 

Str  One  is  the  art  of  likeness-making ;  generally  a  likeness 
is  made  by  producing  a  copy  which  is  executed  according  to 
the  proportions  of  the  original,  similar  in  length  and  breadth 
and  depth,  and  also  having  colors  answering  to  the  several 
parts. 

Theaet.  But  is  not  this  always  the  case  in  imitation  ? 

Str.  Not  always ;  in  works  either  of  sculpture  or  of  paint- 
ing, which  are  of  any  magnitude,  there  is  a  certain  degree  of 
deception  ;  for  if  the  true  proportions  were  given,  the  upper 
part,  which  is  farther  off,  would  appear  to  be  out  of  proportion 
in  comparison  with  the  lower,  which  is  nearer  ;  and  so  our 
artists  give  up  the  truth  in  their  images  and  make  only  the 
proportions  which  appear  to  be  beautiful,  disregarding  the  real 
ones. 

Theaet.  Quite  true. 

Str.  And  that  which  being  other  is  also  like,  may  we  not 
fairly  call  a  likeness  or  image  ? 

Tlieaet.  Yes. 

Str.  And  may  we  not,  as  I  did  just  now,  call  that  part  of 
the  imitative  art  which  is  concerned  with  making  such  images 
the  art  of  likeness-making? 

Theaet.  Let  that  be  the  name. 

Str.  And  what  shall  we  call  that  resemblance  of  the  beauti- 
ful, which  is  due  to  the  unfavorable  position  of  the  spectator, 
but  if  a  person  had  the  power  of  seeing  the  great  works  of 
which  I  was  speaking  as  they  truly  are,  would  appear  not 
CVCL  like  that  to  which  it  professes  to  be  like  ?  May  we  not 
cull  this  an  appearance,  since  it  appears  only  and  is  not  really 
like? 

Theaet.  Certainly. 

Str.  There  is  a  great  deal  of  this  in  painting,  and  iu  all  im- 
itation ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  TH  ',UGHTS.  289 

TJieaet.  Of  course. 

Str.  And  may  we  not  fairly  call  the  sort  of  ait  whicn  pro- 
duces an  appearance  and  not  an  image,  phantastic  art  ? 

Theaet.  That  is  very  fair. 

Str.  Then  there  are  two  kinds  of  image-making  —  the  art 
of  making  likenesses  and  phantastic,  or  the  art  of  making  ap- 
pearances,? 

Tfieaet.  True. —  Sophist,  iii.  470. 
Limit  and  cause  in  the  universe. 

Soc.  Should  we  not  be  wise  in  maintaining  that  there  is 

in  the  universe  a  mighty  infinite   and  an    adequate    limit  of 
which  we  have  often  spoken,  as  well  as  a  cause  of  no  mean 
power,    which    orders   and    arranges    years    and  seasons    and 
months,  and  may  be  justly  called  wisdom  and  mind  ? 

Pro.  Most  justly. 

Soc.  And  wisdom  and  mind  cannot  exist  without  soul  ? 

Pro.  Certainly  not. 

Soc.  And  in  the  divine  nature  of  Zeus  would  you  not  say 
that  there  is  the  soul  and  mind  of  a  king,  because  there  is  in 
him  the  power  of  the  cause  ?  And  other  Gods  have  other 
noble  attributes,  whereby  they  love  severally  to  be  called. 

Pro.  Very  true. 

Soc.  Do  not  then  suppose  that  these  words  are  rashly  spoken 
by  us,  O  Protarchus,  for  they  are  in  harmony  with  the  tes- 
timony of  those  who  said  of  old  time  that  mind  rules  the  uni- 
verse. 

Pro.  True.  —  Philebus,  iii.  166. 
Limitation  of  law  and  order.      See  Order  and  Law. 
Little  things,  God  attends  to. 

Ath.  Let  us  not   deem  God  inferior  to  human  workmen, 

who,  in  proportion  to  their  skill,  finish  and  perfect  their  works, 
small  as  well  as  great,  by  one  and  the  same  art ;  or  that  God, 
the  wisest  of  beings,  who  is  willing  and  able  to  extend  his 
care  to  all  things,  like  a  lazy  good-for-nothing,  wants  a  holi- 
day, and  takes  no  thought  of  smaller  and  easier  matters,  but 
of  the  greater  only. — Laws,  iv.  415. 

Love  the  eldest  of  the  Gods  and  the  source  of  the  greatest  bene- 
fits. 

Phaedrus  began  by  affirming  that  Love  is  a  mighty  God, 

and  wonderful  among  Gods  and  men,  but  especially  wonderful 
in  his  birth.      For   that   he   is   the  eldest  of  the  Gods   is    an 
honor  to  him ;  and  a  proof  of  this  is,  that  of  his  parents  there 

19 


290  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

is  no  memorial ;  neither  poet  nor  prose-writer  has  ever  af- 
firmed that  he  had  any.  As  Hesiod  says  :  — 

"  First  Chaos  came,  and  then  broad-bosomed  Earth, 
The  everlasting  seat  of  all  that  is, 
And  Love." 

In  other  words,  after  Chaos,  the  Earth  and  Love,  these  tw»i 
3ame  into  being.  Also  Parmenides  sings  of  the  generation  of 
the  Gods :  — 

"  First  in  the  train  of  Gods,  he  fashioned  Love." 

And  Acusilaus  agrees  with  Hesiod.  Thus  numerous  are  the 
witnesses  which  acknowledge  Love  to  be  the  eldest  of  the 
Gods.  And  not  only  is  he  the  eldest,  he  is  also  the  source  of 
the  greatest  benefits  to  us.  For  I  know  not  any  greater  bless- 
ing to  a  young  man  beginning  life  than  a  virtuous  lover,  or  to 
the  lover  than  a  beloved  youth.  For  the  principle  which  ought 
to  be  the  guide  of  men  who  would  nobly  live  —  that  principle, 
I  say,  neither  kindred,  nor  honor,  nor  wealth,  nor  any  other 
motive  is  able  to  implant  so  well  as  love.  Of  what  am  I 
speaking  ?  Of  the  sense  of  honor  and  dishonor,  without 
which  neither  States  nor  individuals  ever  do  any  good  or  great 
work.  —  The  Symposium,  i.  473. 
Love,  courage  increased  by.  See  Courage. 
Love,  honor  and  dishonor  in. 

There  is  dishonor  in  yielding  to  the  evil,  or  in  an  evil 

manner  ;  but  there  is  honor  in  yielding  to  the  good,  or  in  an 
honorable  manner.  Evil  is  the  vulgar  lover  who  loves  the 
body  rather  than  the  soul,  and  who  is  inconstant  because  he  is 
a  lover  of  the  inconstant ;  and  therefore  when  the  bloom  of 
youth  which  he  was  desiring  is  over,  he  takes  wing  and  flies 
away,  in  spite  of  all  his  words  and  promises ;  whereas  the 
love  of  the  noble  mind,  which  is  one  with  the  unchanging,  is 
life-long.  The  custom  of  our  country  would  have  them  both 
proven  well  and  truly,  and  would  have  us  yield  to  the  one  sort 
of  lover  and  avoid  the  other,  and  therefore  encourages  some  to 
pursue  and  others  to  fly  ;  testing  both  the  lover  and  the  be- 
loved in  contests  and  trials,  which  will  show  to  which  of  the 
two  classes  they  respectively  belong.  —  The  Symposium,  i. 
478. 

Love,  virtue  the  basis  of. 

There  remains,  then,  only  one  way  of  honorable  attach- 
ment which  custom  allows  in  the  beloved,  and  this  is  the  way 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  291 

of  virtue  ;  for  as  we  admitted  ihat  any  service  which  the  lever 
does  to  him  is  not  to  be  accounted  flattery  or  dishonor,  so  the 
beloved  has  also  one  way  of  voluntary  service  which  is  not 
dishonorable,  and  this  is  virtuous  service. 

For  we  have  a  custom,  and  according  to  our  custom,  any 
one  who  does  service  to  another  under  the  idea  that  he  will  be 
improved  by  him  either  in  wisdom,  or  in  some  other  particular 
of  virtue  —  such  a  voluntary  service,  I  say,  is  not  regarded  as 
a  dishonor,  and  is  not  open  to  the  charge  of  flattery.  And 
these  two  customs,  one  the  love  of  youth,  and  the  other  the 
practice  of  philosophy  and  virtue  in  general,  ought  to  meet  in 
one,  and  then  the  beloved  may  honorably  indulge  the  lover. 
For  when  the  lover  and  beloved  come  together,  having  each  of 
them  a  law,  and  the  lover  thinks  that  he  is  right  in  doing  any 
service  which  he  can  to  his  gracious  loving  one  ;  and  the  other 
that  he  is  right  in  showing  any  kindness  which  he  can  to  him 
who  is  making  him  wise  and  good  ;  the  one  capable  of  com- 
municating wisdom  and  virtue,  the  other  seeking  to  acquire 
them  with  a  view  to  education  and  wisdom  ;  when  the  two 
laws  of  love  are  fulfilled  and  meet  in  one  —  then,  and  then 
only,  may  the  beloved  yield  with  honor  to  the  lover.  Nor 
when  love  is  of  this  disinterested  sort  is  there  any  disgrace  in 
being  deceived,  but  in  every  other  case  there  is  equal  disgrace 
in  being  or  not  being  deceived.  For  he  who  is  gracious  to 
his  lover  under  the  impression  that  he  is  rich,  and  is  disap- 
pointed of  his  gains  because  he  turns  out  to  be  poor,  is  dis- 
graced all  the  same  ;  for  he  has  done  his  best  to  show  that  he 
would  turn  himself  to  any  one's  base  uses  for  the  sake  of 
money,  and  this4  is  not  honorable.  But  on  the  same  principle 
he  who  lives  for  the  sake  of  virtue,  and  in  the  hope  that  he 
will  be  improved  by  his  lover's  company,  shows  himself  to  be 
virtuous,  even  though  the  object  of  his  affection  be  proved  to 
be  a  villain,  and  to  have  no  virtue  ;  and  if  he  is  deceived  he 
has  committed  a  noble  error.  For  he  has  proved  that  for  his 
part  he  will  do  anything  for  anybody  for  the  sake  of  virtue 
and  improvement,  than  which  there  can  be  nothing  nobler. 
Thus  noble  in  every  case  is  the  acceptance  of  another  for  the 
sake  of  virtve.  This  is  that  love  which  is  the  love  of  the 
heavenly  goddess,  and  is  heavenly,  and  of  great  price  to  indi- 
viduals and  cities,  making  the  lover  and  the  beloved  alike  eager 
hi  the  work  of  their  own  improvement.  But  all  other  loves 
are  the  offspring  of  the  other  who  is  a  common  goddess.  — 
The  Symposium,  i.  478. 


292  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Love,  double  in  all  things. 

Eryximachus  spoke  as  follows :    Seeing  that   Pausamai 

made  a  fair  beginning,  and  but  a  lame  ending,  I  must  endeavor 
to  supply  his  deficiency.  I  think  that  he  has  rightly  distin- 
guished two  kinds  of  love.  But  my  art  further  informs  me 
that  a  double  love  is  to  be  found  in  all  animals  and  plants,  and 
I  may  say  in  all  that  is  ;  and  is  not  merely  an  affection  of  the 
soul  of  man  towards  the  fair,  or  towards  anything ;  that,  I  say, 
is  a  view  of  the  subject  which  I  seem  to  have  gathered  from 
my  own  art  of  medicine,  which  shows  me  how  great  and  won- 
derful and  universal  is  the  deity  of  love  whose  empire  extends 
over  all  that  is,  divine  as  well  as  human.  And  from  medicine 
I  will  begin  that  I  may  do  honor  to  my  art.  For  there  are  in 
the  human  body  two  loves,  which  are  confessedly  different  and 
unlike,  and  being  unlike,  have  loves  and  desires  which  are  un- 
like ;  and  the  desire  of  the  healthy  is  one,  and  the  desire  of  the 
diseased  is  another ;  and,  as  Pausanias  says,  to  indulge  good 
men  is  honorable  and  bad  men  dishonorable ;  and  so  too  in  the 
body  the  good  and  healthy  elements  are  to  be  indulged,  and  the 
bad  elements  and  the  elements  of  desire  are  not  to  be  indulged, 
but  discouraged.  And  this  is  what  the  physician  has  to  do,  and 
in  this  the  art  of  medicine  consists  :  for  medicine  may  be  regarded 
generally  as  the  knowledge  of  the  loves  and  desires  of  the  body, 
and  how  to  satisfy  them  or  not ;  and  the  good  physician  is  he 
who  is  able  to  separate  fair  love  from  foul,  or  to  convert  one 
into  the  other;  and  he  who  knows  how  to  eradicate  and  how 
to  implant  love,  whichever  is  required,  and  can  reconcile  the 
most  hostile  elements  in  the  constitution,  and  make  them  friends, 
is  a  skillful  practitioner.  —  The  Symposium,  i.  480. 
Love,  divination  as  to.  See  Dicination. 
Love,  the  youngest. 

I  would  rather  praise  the  God  first,  and  then  speak  of  his 

gifts  ;  this  is  always  the  right  way  of  praising  everything.  May 
I  say  without  impiety  or  offense,  that  of  all  the  blessed  Gods 
he  is  the  blessedest  because  he  is  the  fairest  and  best  ?  And 
he  is  the  fairest,  because,  in  the  first  place,  Phaedrus,  he  is  the 
youngest,  and  of  his  youth  he  is  himself  the  witness,  fleeing  out 
of  the  way  of  age,  who  is  swift  enough  surely,  swifter  than 
most  of  us  like  :  love  hates  him  and  will  not  come  near  him, 
but  youth  and  love  live  and  move  together,  —  like  to  like,  as 
'/he  proverb  says.  There  are  many  things  which  Phaedrus  said 
about  Love  in  which  I  agree  with  him :  but  I  cannot  agree  that 


LJLTO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

he  is  older  than  lapetus  and  Kronos  —  that  is  not  the  truth ; 
as  I  maintain,  he  is  the  youngest  of  the  Gods,  and  youthful 
ever.  The  ancient  things  of  which  Hesiod  and  Parmeuides 
speak,  if  they  were  done  at  all,  were  done  of  Necessity  and  not 
of  Love;  had  Love  been  in  those  days,  there  would  have  been 
no  chaining  or  mutilation  of  the  Gods,  or  other  violence,  but 
peace  and  sweetness,  as  there  is  now  in  heaven,  since  the  rule 
of  Love  began.  —  The  Symposium,  i.  488. 
Love,  tenderness  and  flexibility  of. 

Love  is  young  and  also  tender ;  he  ought  to  have  a  poet 

like   Homer  to  describe   his  tenderness,  as  Homer  says  of  Ate, 
that  she  is  a  goddess  and  tender  :  — 

"  Her  feet  are  tender,  for  she  sets  her  steps 
Not  on  the  ground  but  on  the  heads  of  men:  " 

which  is  an  excellent  proof  of  her  tenderness,  because  she  walks 
not  upon  the  hard  but  upon  the  soft.  Let  us  adduce  a  similar 
proof  of  the  tenderness  of  Love  ;  for  he  walks  not  upon  the 
earth,  nor  yet  upon  the  skulls  of  men,  which  are  not  so  very 
soft,  but  in  the  hearts  and  souls  of  men  :  in  them  he  walks  and 
dwells  and  has  his  home.  Not  in  every  soul  without  excep- 
tion, for  where  there  is  hardness  he  departs,  where  there  is 
softness  there  he  dwells ;  and  nestling  always  with  his  feet  and 
in  all  manner  of  ways  in  the  softest  of  soft  places,  how  can  he 
be  other  than  the  softest  of  all  things  ?  And  therefore  he  is 
the  tenderest  as  well  as  the  youngest,  and  also  he  is  of  flexile 
form  ;  for  if  he  were  hard  and  without  flexure  he  could  not  en- 
fold all  things,  or  wind  his  way  into  and  out  of  every  soul  of 
man  undiscovered.  And  a  proof  of  his  flexibility  and  symme- 
try of  form  is  his  grace,  which  is  universally  admitted  to  be  in 
an  especial  manner  the  attribute  of  Love  ;  ungrace  and  love 
are  always  at  war  with  one  another.  The  fairness  of  his  com- 
plexion is  revealed  by  his  habitation  among  the  flowers  ;  for  he 
dwells  not  amid  bloomless  or  fading  beauties,  whether  of  body 
or  soul  or  aught  else,  but  in  the  place  of  flowers  and  scents, 
there  he  sits  and  abides.  Enough  of  his  beauty,  —  of  which, 
however,  there  is  more  to  tell.  But  I  must  now  speak  of  his 
virtue  :  his  greatest  glory  is  that  he  can  neither  do  nor  suffer 
wrong  to  or  from  any  God  or  any  man ;  for  he  suffers  not  by 
force  if  he  suffers  ;  force  comes  not  near  him,  neither  does  he 
act  by  force.  For  all  men  in  all  things  serve  him  of  then1 
own  free-will,  and  where  there  is  voluntary  agreement,  there,  - 
as  the  laws  which  are  the  lords  of  the  city  say,  is  justice.  And 


294  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

not  only  is  he  just  but  exceedingly  temperate,  for  Temperance 
is  the  acknowledged  ruler  of  the  pleasures  and  desires,  and  no 
pleasure  ever  masters  Love  ;  he  is  their  master  and  they  are 
his  servants ;  and  if  he  conquers  them  he  must  be  temperate 
indeed.  As  to  courage,  even  the  God  of  War  is  no  match  for 
him  ;  he  is  the  captive  and  Love  is  the  lord,  for  love,  the  love 
of  Aphrodite,  masters  him,  as  the  tale  runs  ;  and  the  master  is 
stronger  than  the  servant.  And  if  he  conquers  the  bravest  of 
all  others  he  must  be  himself  the  bravest.  Of  his  courage  and 
justice  and  temperance  I  have  spoken  ;  but  I  have  yet  to  speak 
of  his  wisdom,  and  I  must  try  to  do  my  best,  according  to  the 
measure  of  my  ability.  For  in  the  first  place  he  is  a  poet  (and 
here,  like  Eryximachus,  I  magnify  my  art),  and  he  is  also  the 
source  of  poesy  in  others,  which  he  could  not  be  if  he  were  not 
himself  a  poet.  And  at  the  touch  of  him  every  one  becomes  a 
poet,  even  though  he  had  no  music  in  him  before  ;  this  also  is 
a  proof  that  Love  is  a  good  poet  and  accomplished  in  all  the 
fine  arts  ;  for  no  one  can  give  to  another  that  which  he  has 
not  himself,  or  teach  that  of  which  he  has  no  knowledge.  Who 
will  deny  that  the  creation  of  the  animals  is  his  doing  ?  Are 
they  not  all  the  works  of  his  wisdom,  born  and  begotten  of  him  ? 
And  as  to  the  artists,  do  we  not  know  that  he  only  of  them 
whom  love  inspires  has  the  light  of  fame  ?  —  he  whom  love 
touches  not  walks  in  darkness.  —  The  Symposium,  i.  488. 
Love  a  spiritual  power. 

"  What  then  is  Love  ?  "  I  asked  ;  "  Is  he  mortal  ?  "  «  No." 

"  What  then  ?  "  "  As  in  the  former  instance,  he  is  neither 
mortal  nor  immortal,  but  in  a  mean  between  the  two."  "  What 
is  he  then,  Diotima  ? "  "  He  is  a  great  spirit  ((W/xwi/),  and 
like  all  spirits  he  is  intermediate  between  the  divine  and  the 
mortal."  "And  what,"  I  said,  "is  his  power?"  "He  inter- 
prets," she  replied,  "  between  Gods  and  men,  conveying  to  the 
Gods  the  prayers  and  sacrifices  of  men,  and  to  men  the  com- 
mands and  replies  of  the  Gods  ;  he  is  the  mediator  who  spans 
the  chasm  which  divides  them,  and  in  him  all  is  bound  together, 
and  through  him  the  arts  of  the  prophet  and  the  priest,  their 
sacrifices  and  mysteries  and  charms,  and  all  prophecy  and  in- 
cantation, find  their  way.  For  God  mingles  not  with  man  ; 
but  through  Love  all  the  intercourse  and  speech  of  God  with 
man,  whether  awake  or  asleep,  is  carried  on.  The  wisdom 
which  understaids  this  is  spiritual ;  all  other  wisdom,  such  as 
that  of  arts  or  handicrafts,  is  mean  and  vulgar.  Now  these 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  296 

spirits  or  intermediate  powers  are  many  and  diverse,  and  one  cf 

them  is  Love."  —  The  Symposium,  i.  495.1 

Love  escaped  from  in  age.     See  Age. 

Love   sensual,  laws  against,  impossible.      See  Laws  against  sensual 

lore. 

Love,  a  madness.     See  Madness. 
Loves,  the  two. 

The  old  tale  has  to  be  repeated  of  fair  and  heavenly  love 

—  the  love  of  Urania  the  fair  and  heavenly  muse,  and  of  the 
duty  of  accepting  the  temperate,  and  those  who  are  as  yet  in- 
temperate only  that  they  may  become  temperate,  and   of  pre- 
serving their  love ;  and  again,  of  the  vulgar  Polyhymnia,  who 
must  be  used  with   circumspection   that  the  pleasure  may  not 
generate  licentiousness  ;  just  as  in   my  own  art  it  is  a  great 
matter  to  regulate  the  desires  of  the  epicure  that  he  may  grat- 
ify his  tastes  without  the  attendant  evil  of  disease.     The  con- 
clusion is,  that  in  music,  in  medicine,  in  all  other  things  human 
as  well  as  divine,  both  loves  ought  to  be  noted  as  far  as  may 
be,  for  they  are  both  present.  —  The  Symposium,  i.  481. 
Lover,  liberty  allowed  the.     See  Liberty  allowed. 
Lover,  madness  of  the.     See  Madness  of  the  prophet. 
Lover,  wise  and  unwise,  the. 

O  Hippothales,  thou  son  of  Hieronymus  !  do  not  say  that 

you  are.  or  that  you  are  not  in  love ;  the  confession  is  too  late ; 
for  I  see  not  only  that  you  are  in  love,  but  that  you  are  already 
far  gone  in  your  love.  Simple  and  foolish  as  I  am,  the  Gods 
have  given  me  the  power  of  understanding  this  sort  of  affections. 

At  this  he  blushed  more  and  more. 

Ctesippus  said  :  I  like  to  see  you  blushing,  Hippothales,  and 
hesitating  to  tell  Socrates  the  name  ;  when,  if  he  were  with 
you  but  for  a  very  short  time,  he  would  be  plagued  to  death 
by  hearing  of  nothing  else.  Indeed,  Socrates,  he  has  literally 
deafened  us,  and  stopped  our  ears  with  the  praises  of  Lysis ; 
and  if  he  is  a  little  intoxicated,  there  is  every  likelihood  that 
we  may  have  our  sleep  murdered  with  a  cry  of  Lysis.  His 
performances  in  prose  are  bad  enough,  but  nothing  at  all  in 
comparison  with  his  verse  ;  and  when  he  drenches  us  with  his 
poems  and  other  compositions,  that  is  really  too  bad ;  and 
what  is  even  worse,  is  his  manner  of  singing  them  to  his  love ; 
this  he  does  in  a  voice  which  is  truly  appalling,  and  we  cannot 

i  In  order  to  appreciate  the  full  beauty  and  force  of  Plato's  discourse  upon  Love, 
his  "  Symposium"  should  be  read  throughout.  Only  a  few  passages  could  here 
be  given. 


296  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

help  hearing  him  ;  and  MOW  he  has  a  question  put  to  him  by 
you,  and  lo  !  he  is  blushing. 

Who  is  Lysis  ?  I  said  :  I  suppose  that  he  must  be  young, 
for  the  name  does  not  recall  any  one  to  me. 

Why,  he  said,  his  father  being  a  very  well-known  man,  he 
retains  his  patronymic,  and  is  not  as  yet  commonly  called  by 
his  own  name  ;  but,  although  you  do  not  know  his  name,  I  am 
sure  that  you  must  know  his  face,  for  that  is  quite  enough  to 
distinguish  him. 

But  tell  me  whose  son  he  is,  I  said. 

He  is  the  eldest  son  of  Democrates,  of  the  deme  of  Aexone. 

Ah,  Hippothales,  I  said  ;  what  a  noble  and  really  perfect 
love  you  have  found  !  I  wish  that  you  would  favor  me  with 
the  exhibition  which  you  have  been  making  to  the  rest  of  the 
company,  and  then  I  shall  be  able  to  judge  whether  you  know 
what  a  lover  ought  to  say  about  his  love,  either  to  the  youth 
himself,  or  to  others. 

Nay,  Socrates,  he  said ;  you  surely  do  not  attach  any  weight 
to  what  he  is  saying. 

Do  you  mean,  I  said,  that  you  disown  the  love  of  the  person 
whom  he  says  that  you  love  ? 

No ;  but  I  deny  that  I  make  verses  or  address  compositions 
to  him. 

He  is  not  in  his  right  mind,  said  Ctesippus  ;  he  is  talking 
nonsense,  and  is  stark  mad. 

O  Hippothales,  I  said,  if  you  have  ever  made  any  verses  or 
songs  in  honor  of  your  favorite,  I  do  not  want  to  hear  them  ; 
but  I  want  to  know  the  purport  of  them,  that  I  may  be  able 
to  judge  of  your  mode  of  approaching  your  fair  one. 

Ctesippus  will  be  able  to  tell  you,  he  said ;  for  if,  as  he 
avers,  I  talk  to  him  of  nothing  else,  he  must  have  a  very  ac- 
curate knowledge  and  recollection  of  that. 

Yes.  indeed,  said  Ctesippus  ;  I  know  only  too  well ;  and 
very  ridiculous  the  tale  is :  for  although  he  is  a  lover,  and  very 
devotedly  in  love,  he  has  nothing  particular  to  talk  about  to  his 
beloved  which  a  child  might  not  say.  Now  is  not  that  ridicu- 
lous ?  He  can  only  speak  of  the  wealth  of  Democrates,  which 
the  whole  city  celebrates,  and  grandfather  Lysis,  and  the  other 
ancestors  of  the  youth,  and  their  stud  of  horses,  and  their  vic- 
tory at  the  Pythian  games,  and  at  the  Isthmus,  and  at  Nemea 
with  four  horses  and  single  horses  ;  and  these  he  sings  and 
says,  and  greater  twaddle  still.  For  the  day  before  yesterday 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  297 

he  made  a  poem  in  which  he  described  how  Heracles,  who  was 
a  connection  of  the  family,  was  entertained  by  an  ancestor  of 
Lysis  as  his  relation  ;  this  ancestor  was  himself  the  sen  of 
Zeus  and  the  daughter  of  the  founder  of  the  deme.  And  these 
are  the  sort  of  old  wives'  tales  which  he  sings  and  recites  to 
us,  and  we  are  obliged  to  listen  to  him. 

When  I  heard  this,  I  said  :  O  ridiculous  Hippothales  !  how 
can  you  be  making  and  singing  hymns  in  honor  of  yourself  be- 
fore you  have  won  ? 

But  my  songs  and  verses,  he  said,  are  not  in  honor  of  my- 
self, Socrates. 

You  think  not,  I  said. 

But  what  are  they,  then  ?  he  replied. 

Most  assuredly,  I  said,  those  songs  are  all  in  your  own 
honor  ;  for  if  you  win  your  beautiful  love,  your  discourses  and 
songs  will  be  a  glory  to  you,  and  may  be  truly  regarded  as 
hymns  of  praise  composed  in  honor  of  you  who  have  con- 
quered and  won  such  a  love ;  but  if  he  slips  away  from  you, 
the  more  you  have  praised  him,  the  more  ridiculous  you  will 
look  at  having  lost  this  fairest  and  best  of  blessings  ;  and  this 
is  the  reason  why  the  wise  lover  does  not  praise  his  beloved 
until  he  has  won  him,  because  he  is  afraid  of  accidents.  There 
is  also  another  danger  ;  the  fair,  when  any  one  praises  or  mag- 
nifies them,  are  filled  with  the  spirit  of  pride  and  vainglory. 
Is  not  that  true  ? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  the  more  vain-glorious  they  are,  the  more  difficult  is  the 
capture  of  them? 

I  believe  that. 

What  should  you  say  of  a  hunter  who  frightened  away  his 
prey,  and  made  the  capture  of  the  animals  which  he  is  hunting 
more  difficult  ? 

He  would  be  a  bad  hunter,  that  is  clear. 

Yes ;  and  if,  instead  of  soothing  them,  he  were  to  infuriate 
them  with  words  and  songs,  that  would  show  a  great  want  of 
wit :  do  you  not  agree  with  me  ? 

Yes. 

And  now  reflect,  Hippothales,  and  see  whether  you  are  not 
guilty  of  all  these  errors  in  writing  poetry.  For  I  can  hardly 
suppose  that  you  will  affirm  a  man  to  be  a  good  poet  who  in- 
jures himself  by  his  poetry. 

Assuredly  not,  he  said  :  I  should  be  a  fool  if  I  said  that ; 


298  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

and  this  makes  me  desirous,  Socrates,  of  taking  you  into  my 
counsels,  and  I  shall  be  glad  of  any  further  advice  which  you 
may  have  to  offer.  Will  you  tell  me  by  what  words  or  actions 
I  may  become  endeared  to  my  love? 

That  is  not  easy  to  determine,  I  said  ;  but  if  you  will  bring 
your  love  to  me,  and  will  let  me  talk  with  him,  I  may  perhaps 
be  able  to  show  you  how  to  converse  with  him,  instead  of  sing- 
ing and  reciting  in  the  fashion  of  which  you  are  accused.  — 
Zysis,  i.  42. 
Lovers  universal. 

1  dare  say  that  you  remember,  and  therefore  I  need  not 

remind  you,  that  a  lover,  if  he  is  worthy  of  the  name,  ought 
to  show  his  love,  not  to  some  one  part  of  that  which  he  loves, 
but  to  the  whole. 

I  believe  that  I  must  ask  you  to  explain,  for  I  really  do  not 
understand. 

Another,  I  replied,  might  fairly  answer  thus  ;  but  a  man  of 
pleasure  like  you  ought  to  know  that  all  who  are  in  the  flower 
of  their  youth  do  somehow  or  other  raise  a  pang  or  emotion  in 
a  lover's  breast,  and  are  thought  by  him  to  be  worthy  of  his  af- 
fectionate regards.  Is  not  this  a  way  which  you  have  with  the 
fair :  one  has  a  snub  nose,  and  you  praise  his  pleasant  face, 
another's  beak,  as  you  say,  has  a  royal  look ;  while  he  who  is 
neither  snub  or  hooked  has  the  grace  of  regularity :  the  dark 
visage  is  manly,  the  fair  are  angels :  and  as  to  the  sweet, 
"  honey  pale,"  as  they  are  called,  what  is  the  very  name  but  the 
invention  of  a  lover  who  uses  these  pet  names,  and  is  not  averse 
to  paleness  on  the  cheek  of  youth  ?  In  a  word,  there  is  no  ex- 
cuse which  you  will  not  make,  and  nothing  which  you  will  not 
say,  in  order  to  preserve  for  your  use  every  flower  that  has  the 
bloom  of  youth. 

If  you  are  determined  to  make  me  an  authority  in  matters 
of  love,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  I  assent.  —  The  Republic, 
ii.  302. 
Loyalty  to  the  State.     See  Obligation,  individual. 

Madness,  two  kinds  of. 

Soc.  I  said,  "  love  is  a  madness." 

Phaedr.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  there  were  two  kinds  of  madness ;  one  produced 
by  human  infirmity,  the  other  by  a  divine  release  from  the  or 
dinary  ways  of  men. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  299 

Phaedr.  True. 

Soc.  The  divine  madness  was  subdivided  into  four  kinds, 
pi<*t»ietic,  initiatory,  poetic,  erotic,  having  four  Gods  presiding 
ove»  ehem  ;  the  first  was  the  inspiration  of  Apollo,  the  second 
that  of  Dionysus,  the  third  that  of  the  Muses,  the  fourth  that 
of  Aphi-odite  and  Eros.  In  the  description  of  the  last  kind 
of  madness,  which  was  also  the  best,  being  a  figure  of  love,  we 
introduced  »  tolerably  credible  and  possibly  true,  though  partly 
erring  myth,  which  was  also  a  hymn  in  honor  of  Eros,  who  is 
your  lord  and  also  mine,  Phaedrus,  and  the  guardian  of  fair 
children,  and  to  him  we  sung  the  hymn  in  measured  and  solemn 
strain.  —  Phaedrus,  i.  570. 
Madness  of  the  prophet,  poet,  and  lover. 

That  was  a  lie  in  which  I  said  that  the  beloved  ought  to 

accept  the  non-lover  and  reject  the  lover,  because  the  one  is 
sane,  and  the  other  mad.  For  that  might  have  been  truly  said 
if  madness  were  simply  an  evil ;  but  there  is  also  i  madness 
which  is  the  special  gift  of  Heaven,  and  the  source  of  the 
chiefest  blessings  among  men.  For  prophecy  is  a  madness, 
and  the  prophetess  at  Delphi  and  the  priestesses  at  Dodona. 
when  out  of  their  senses  have  conferred  great  benefits  on 
Hellas,  both  in  public  and  private  life,  but  when  in  their 
senses  few  or  none.  And  I  might  also  tell  you  how  the  Sibyl 
and  other  persons,  who  have  had  the  gift  of  prophecy,  have 
told  the  future  of  many  an  one  and  guided  them  aright ;  but 
that  is  obvious,  and  would  be  tedious. 

There  will  be  more  reason  in  appealing  to  the  ancient  in- 
ventors of  names,  who,  if  they  had  thought  madness  a  disgrace 
or  dishonor,  would  never  have  called  prophecy  (fj.avrt.Krj),  which 
is  the  noblest  of  arts,  by  the  very  same  name  as  madness, 
(/j.ai'LKfy  thus  inseparably  connecting  them ;  but  they  must 
have  thought  that  there  was  an  inspired  madness  which  was  no 
disgrace  ;  for  the  two  words,  /AO.VTIK?)  and  fjLo.vi.Kr),  are  really  the 
same,  and  the  letter  T  is  only  a  modern  and  tasteless  insertion. 
And  this  is  confirmed  by  the  name  which  they  gave  to  the 
rational  investigation  of  futurity,  whether  made  by  the  help  of 
birds  or  of  other  signs ;  this  because  supplying  from  the  reason- 
ing faculty  insight  (vovs)  and  information  (toropta)  to  human 
thought  ("fyo-ts),  they  originally  termed  otovoiortK^,  but  the 
word  has  been  lately  altered  and  made  sonorous  by  the  modern 
introduction  of  the  letter  Omega  (OIOI'OMTTIKT)  and  oia>i/icm>oy), 
and  in  proportion  as  prophecy  (jaaimKr/)  is  higher  and  more 
perfect  than  divination  both  in  name  and  reality,  in  the  same 


300  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

proportion  as  the  ancien  ts  testify,  is  madness  superior  to  a  sane 
mind  (crw^poo-iVr/) ,  for  the  one  is  only  of  human,  but  the  other 
of  divine  origin.  Again,  where  plagues  and  mightiest  woes 
have  bred  in  a  race,  owing  to  some  ancient  wrath,  there  mad- 
ness enters  with  holy  prayers  and  rites,  and  by  inspired  utter- 
ances finds  a  way  of  deliverance  for  those  who  are  in  need ; 
and  he  who  has  part  in  this  gift,  and  is  truly  possessed  and 
duly  out  ot  his  mind,  is  by  the  use  of  purifications  and  mys- 
teries made  whole  and  exempt  from  evil,  future  as  well  as 
present,  and  has  a  release  from  the  calamity  which  afflicts  him. 
There  is  also  a  third  kind  of  madness,  which  is  a  possession  of 
the  Muses  ;  which  enters  into  a  delicate  and  virgin  soul,  and 
there  inspiring  frenzy,  awakens  lyrical  and  all  other  numbers  ; 
with  these  adorning  the  myriad  actions  of  ancient  heroes  for 
the  instruction  of  posterity.  But  he  who,  having  no  touch  of 
the  Muses'  madness  in  his  soul,  comes  to  the  door  and  thinks 
that  he  will  get  into  the  temple  by  the  help  of  art  —  he,  I  say, 
and  his  poetry  are  not  admitted;  the  sane  man  is  nowhere  at 
all  when  he  enters  into  rivalry  with  the  madman. 

I  might  tell  of  many  other  noble  deeds  which  have  sprung 
from  inspired  madness.  And  therefore  let  no  one  frighten  or 
flutter  us  by  saying  that  temperate  love  is  preferable  to  mad 
love,  but  let  him  further  show,  if  he  would  carry  off  the  palm, 
that  love  is  not  sent  by  the  Gods  for  any  good  to  lover  or  be- 
loved. And  we,  on  our  part,  will  prove  in  answer  to  him  that 
the  madness  of  love  is  the  greatest  of  Heaven's  blessings,  and 
the  proof  shall  be  one  which  the  wise  will  receive,  and  the 
witling  disbelieve.  — Phaedrus,  i.  549. 
Magistrates  and  rulers,  —  qualities  and  choice  of.  See  Rulers. 

Ath.  Let  us  observe  what  will  happen  in  the  constitution 

of  our  intended  State.  In  the  first  place,  you  will  acknowl- 
edge that  those  who  are  duly  appointed  to  magisterial  power, 
and  their  families,  should  severally  give  satisfactory  proof  of 
what  they  are,  from  their  youth  upward  until  the  time  of  their 
election  ;  in  the  next  place,  those  who  are  to  elect  should  be 
trained  in  habits  of  law,  and  be  well  educated,  that  they  may 
have  a  right  judgment,  and  may  be  able  to  select  or  reject 
men  whom  they  approve  or  disapprove,  as  they  are  worthy  of 
either.  But  how  can  we  imagine  that  those  who  are  brought 
together  for  the  first  time,  and  are  strangers  to  one  another, 
and  also  uneducated,  can  avoid  making  mistakes  in  the  choice 
of  magistrates  ? 

Cle.  Impossible.  —  Lawf,  iv.  273. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  301 

Man,  absolute  unity  not  in 

In  the  life  of  the  same  individual  there  is  succession  and 

not  absolute  unity  ;  a  man  is  called  the  same  ;  and  yet  in  the 
short  interval  which  elapses  between  youth  and  age,  and  in 
which  every  animal  is  said  to  have  life  and  identity,  he  is  under- 
going a  perpetual  process  of  loss  and  reparation  —  hair,  flesh, 
bones,  blood,  and  the  whole  body  are  always  changing.  Which 
is  true  not  only  of  the  body,  but  also  of  the  soul,  whose  habits, 
tempers,  opinions,  desires,  pleasures,  pains,  fears,  never  remain 
the  same  in  any  one  of  us,  but  are  always  coming  and  going. 
And  equally  true  of  knowledge,  which  is  still  more  surprising  — 
for  not  only  do  the  sciences  in  general  come  and  go,  so  that  in 
respect  to  them  we  are  never  the  same  ;  but  each  of  them 
individually  experiences  a  like  change.  —  The  Symposium,  i. 
500. 

Man,  transformation  of. 

He  who  lived  well  during  his  appointed  time  was  to  re- 
turn to  the  star  which  was  his  habitation,  and  there  he  would 
have  a  blessed  and  suitable  existence.  But  if  he  failed  in  at- 
taining this,  in  the  second  generation  he  would  pass  into  a 
woman,  and  should  he  not  desist  from  evil  in  that  condition, 
he  would  be  changed  into  some  brute  who  resembled  him  in 
his  evil  ways,  and  would  not  cease  from  his  toils  and  transfor- 
mations until  he  followed  the  original  principle  of  sameness 
and  likeness  within  him,  and  overcame,  by  the  help  of  reason, 
the  later  accretions  of  turbulent  and  irrational  elements  com- 
posed of  fire  and  air  and  water  and  earth,  and  returned  to  the 
form  of  his  first  and  better  nature.  Having  given  all  these 
laws  to  his  creatures,  that  he  might  be  guiltless  of  their  future 
evil,  the  creator  sowed  some  of  them  in  the  earth,  and  some 
in  the  moon,  and  some  in  the  other  stars  which  are  the  vessels 
of  time ;  and  when  he  had  sown  them  he  committed  to  the 
younger  Gods  the  fashioning  of  their  mortal  bodies,  and  desired 
them  to  furnish  what  was  still  lacking  to  the  human  soul,  and 
make  all  the  suitable  additions,  and  rule  and  pilot  the  mortal 
animal  in  the  best  and  wisest  manner  which  they  could,  and 
avert  from  him  all  but  self-inflicted  evils.  —  Tirnaeus,  ii.  535. 
Man,  his  soul  truly  his  own. 

Listen,  all  ye  who  have  just  now  heard  the  laws  abou. 

Gods,  and  about  our  dear  forefathers  :  Of  all  the  things  which 
a  man  has,  next  to  the  Gods  his  soul  is  the  most  divine  and 
most  truly  his  own.  — Laws,  iv.  252. 


302  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS 

Many  —  opinion  of  the.     See  Opinion. 

Many,  the  Science  of  Government  not  attained  by  thr-     See  Govern 

ment  not  attained. 

Marathon,  the  men  and  battle  of. 

Darius  had  a  quarrel  against  us  aiid  the  Eretrians,  be- 
cause, as  he  said,  we  had  conspired  against  Sardis,  and  he  sent 
500,000  men  in  transports  and  vessels  of  war,  and  300  ships, 
and  Datis  as  commander,  telling  him  to  bring  the  Eretrians 
and  Athenians  to  the  king,  if  he  wished  to  keep  his  head  on 
his  shoulders.  They  sailed  against  the  Eretrians,  who  were 
reputed  to  be  amongst  the  noblest  and  most  warlike  of  the 
Hellenes  of  that  day,  and  they  were  numerous,  but  he  con- 
quered them  all  in  three  days  ;  and  when  he  had  conquered 
them,  in  order  that  no  one  might  escape,  he  searched  the 
whole  country  after  this  manner :  his  soldiers,  coming  to  the 
borders  of  Eretria  and  spreading  from  sea  to  sea,  joined  hands 
and  passed  through  the  whole  country,  in  order  that  they 
might  be  able  to  tell  the  king  that  no  one  had  escaped  them. 
And  from  Eretria  they  went  to  Marathon,  expecting  to  bind 
the  Athenians  in  the  same  yoke  of  necessity  in  which  they 
had  bound  the  Eretrians.  Having  effected  one  half  of  their 
purpose,  they  were  in  the  act  of  attempting  the  other,  and  nono 
of  the  Hellenes  dared  to  assist  either  the  Eretrians  or  the 
Athenians,  except  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  they  only  came  the 
day  after  the  battle ;  but  the  rest  were  panic-stricken  and  re- 
mained quiet,  happy  that  they  had  escaped  for  a  time.  He 
who  has  present  to  him  that  conflict,  will  know  what  manner 
of  men  they  were  who  received  the  onset  of  the  barbarians  at 
Marathon,  and  chastened  the  pride  of  the  whole  of  Asia,  and 
by  the  victory  which  they  gained  over  the  barbarians  first 
taught  other  men  that  the  power  of  the  Persians  was  not  in- 
vincible, but  that  hosts  of  men  and  the  multitude  of  riches 
alike  yield  to  virtue.  And  I  assert  that  those  men  are  the 
fathers  not  only  of  ourselves,  but  of  our  liberties  and  of  the 
liberties  of  all  who  are  on  the  continent,  for  that  was  the 
action  to  which  the  Hellenes  looked  back  when  they  ventured 
to  fight  for  their  own  safety  in  the  battles  which  followed : 
they  became  disciples  of  the  men  of  Marathon.  To  them, 
therefore,  I  assign  in  my  speech  the  first  place,  and  the  second 
to  those  who  fought  and  conquered  in  the  sea  fights  at  Salamis 
and  Artemisium,  for  of  them,  too,  one  might  have  many  things 
to  say ;  of  the  assaults  which  they  endured  by  sea  and  land, 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  303 

and  how  they  repelled  them.  But  I  will  mention  only  that 
act  of  theirs  which  appears  to  me  to  be  the  noblest,  and  which 
was  next  in  order  of  succession  to  Marathon,  for  the  men  of 
Marathon  only  showed  the  Hellenes  that  it  was  possible  to 
ward  off  the  barbarians  by  land,  the  many  by  the  few;  but 
there  was  no  proof  that  they  could  be  defeated  by  ships,  and 
at  sea  the  Persians  retained  the  reputation  of  being  invincible 
in  numbers  and  wealth  and  skill  and  strength.  This  is  the 
glory  of  the  men  who  fought  at  sea,  that  they  dispelled  the 
second  fear  which  had  hitherto  possessed  the  Hellenes,  and  so 
made  the  fear  of  numbers,  whether  of  men  or  ships,  to  cease 
among  them.  This  was  the  effect,  and  thus  the  soldiers  of 
Marathon  and  the  sailors  of  Salamis  became  the  schoolmasters 
of  Hellas ;  the  one  teaching  and  habituating  the  Hellenes  not 
to  fear  the  barbarians  at  sea,  and  the  others  not  to  fear  them 
by  land.  —  Afenexenus,  iv.  570. 
Marriage,  law  of.  See  Immortality  in  time. 
Marriage  approved  and  regulated. 

O  my  son,  he  who  is  born  of  good  parents  ought  to  make 

such  a  marriage  as  wise  men  would  approve.  Now  they  would 
advise  you  neither  to  avoid  a  poor  marriage,  nor  specially  to 
desire  a  rich  one ;  but  if  other  things  are  equal,  always  to 
honor  inferiors,  and  with  them  to  form  connections ;  this  will 
be  for  the  benefit  of  the  city  and  of  the  families  which  are 
united  ;  for  the  equable  and  symmetrical  tends  infinitely  more 
to  virtue  than  the  unmixed.  And  he  who  is  conscious  of  be- 
ing too  headstrong,  and  carried  away  more  than  is  fitting  in  all 
his  actions,  ought  to  desire  to  become  the  relation  of  orderly 
parents  ;  and  he  who  is  of  the  opposite  temper  ought  to  seek 
the  opposite  alliance.  Let  there  be  one  word  concerning  all 
marriages:  Every  man  shall  follow,  not  after  the  marriage 
which  is  most  pleasing  to  himself,  but  after  that  which  is  most 
beneficial  to  the  State.  For  somehow  every  one  is  by  nature 
prone  to  that  which  is  likest  to  himself,  and  in  this  way  the 
whole  city  becomes  unequal  in  property  and  in  disposition  ; 
and  hence  there  arise  in  most  States  results  which  we  least  de- 
sire to  happen.  Now,  to  add  to  the  law  an  express  provision, 
not  only  that  the  rich  man  shall  not  marry  into  the  rich  fam 
ily,  nor  the  powerful  into  the  family  of  the  powerful,  but  that 
the  slower  natures  shall  be  compelled  to  enter  into  marriage 
witL  the  quicker,  and  the  quicker  with  the  slower,  may  awaken 
anger  as  well  as  laughter  in  the  minds  of  many  ;  for  there  is  a 


804  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

difficulty  in  perceiving  that  the  city  ought  to  be  well  mingled 
like  a  cup,  in  which  the  maddening  wine  is  hot  and  fiery  ;  but 
when  chastened  by  a  soberer  God,  receives  a  fair  admixture 
and  becomes  an  excellent  and  temperate  drink.  Yet  in  mar- 
riage no  one  is  able  to  see  the  necessity  of  this.  Wherefore 
also  the  law  must  leave  such  matters,  and  try  to  charm  the 
spirits  of  men  into  believing  the  equability  of  their  children's 
disposition  of  more  importance  than  equality  in  excessive  for- 
tune when  they  marry ;  and  him  who  is  too  desirous  of  form- 
ing a  rich  marriage  they  should  endeavor  to  turn  aside  by  re- 
proaches, not,  however,  by  any  compulsion  of  written  law. 
Let  this  then  be  our  exhortation  concerning  marriage,  not  for- 
getting what  was  said  before  —  that  man  should  cling  to  im- 
mortality —  and  leave  behind  him  posterity  who  shall  be  ser- 
vants of  the  God  in  his  place.  All  this  and  yet  more  may 
truly  be  said  about  the  duty  of  marrying  in  the  way  of  pre- 
lude. —  Laws,  iv.  294. 

Masses  swayed  by  rulers.     See  Rulers  swaying,  etc. 
Melody  and  figure,  beauty  of.     See  Figure. 
Memory  and  forgetful  ness.     See  Forgetfulness. 
Memory,  waxen  tablet  of. 

Soc.  I  would  have  you  imagine,  then,  that  there  exists 

in  the  mind  of  man  a  block  of  wax,  which  is  of  different  sizes 
in  different  men  ;  harder,  moister,  and  having  more  or  less  of 
purity  in  one  than  another,  and  in  some  of  an  intermediate 
quality. 

Theaet.  I  see. 

Soc.  Let  us  say  that  this  tablet  is  a  gift  of  Memory,  the 
mother  of  the  Muses  ;  and  that  when  we  wish  to  remember 
anything  which  we  have  seen,  or  heard,  or  thought  in  our  own 
minds,  we  hold  the  wax  to  the  perceptions  and  thoughts,  and 
in  that  receive  the  impression  of  them  as  from  the  seal  of  a 
ring  ;  and  that  we  remember  and  know  what  is  imprinted  as 
long  as  the  image  lasts  ;  but  when  the  image  is  effaced,  or  can- 
not be  taken,  then  we  forget  and  do  not  know. —  Theaetetus, 
iii.  396. 

Men,  compulsory  care  of.     See  Compulsory. 
Mental  and  bodily  habit. 

Soc.  And  is  not  the  bodily  habit  spoiled  by  rest  and  idle- 
ness, but  preserved  for  a  long  time  by  motion  and  exercise  ? 

Theaet.  True. 

Soc.  And  what  of  the  mental   habit  ?     Is  not  the  soul  in 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOU  CUTS  305 

formed,  and  improved,  and  preserved  by  thought  and  attention, 
which  are  motions  ;  but  when  at  rest,  which  in  the  soul  means 
only  want  of  thought  and  attention,  is  uninformed,  and  speedily 
forgets  whatever  she  has  learned? 

Theaet.  True.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  353. 
Metallic  symbols  of  races. 

In  the  succeeding  generation  rulers  will  be  appouted  who 

have  lost  the  guardian  power  of  testing  the  metal  of  your  dif- 
ferent races,  which,  like  Hesiod's,  are  of  gold,  and  silver,  and 
brass,  and  iron.  And  so  iron  will  be  mingled  with  silver,  and 
brass  with  gold,  and  hence  there  will  arise  inequality  and  ir- 
regularity, which  always  and  in  all  places  are  causes  of  enmity 
and  war.  Such  is  the  origin  of  discord,  wherever  arising  ;  ani 
this  is  the  answer  of  the  Muses  to  us. 

Yes,  and  we  may  assume  that  they  answer  truly. 

Why,  yes,  I  said,  of  course  they  answer  truly ;  the  Muses 
cannot  do  otherwise. 

And  what  do  the  Muses  say  next  ? 

When  discord  arose,  then  the  two  races  were  drawn  different 
ways :  the  iron  and  brass  fell  to  acquiring  money  and  land  and 
houses  and  gold  and  silver  ;  but  the  gold  and  silver  races,  hav- 
ing the  true  riches  in  their  own  nature,  inclined  towards  virtue 
and  the  ancient  order  of  things.  There  was  a  battle  between 
them,  and  at  last  they  agreed  to  distribute  their  land  and 
houses  among  individual  owners :  and  they  enslaved  their 
friends  and  maintainers,  whom  they  had  formerly  protected  in 
the  condition  of  freemen,  and  made  of  them  subjects  and  ser- 
vants ;  and  they  themselves  were  engaged  in  fighting  and  keep- 
ing watch  against  them.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  374. 
Might  makes  right.  See  Natural  justice. 
Military  art,  youths  instructed  in. 

Lys.  What  say    you  of    the  matter  of   which  we  were 

beginning  to  speak  —  the  art  of  fighting  in  armor  ?  Is  that  a 
practice  in  which  the  lads  may  be  advantageously  instructed  ? 

Soc.  I  will  endeavor  to  advise  YOU,  Lysimachus,  as  far  as  I 
can  in  this  matter,  and  also  in  every  way  will  comply  with 
your  wishes  ;  but  as  I  am  younger  and  not  so  experienced,  I 
think  that  I  ought  certainly  to  hear  first  what  my  elders  have 
to  say,  and  to  learn  of  them,  and  if  I  have  anything  to  add, 
then  I  may  venture  to  give  my  opinion  to  them  as  well  as  to 
you.  Suppose,  Xicias,  that  one  of  you  speaks  first. 

Nic.  I  have  no  objection,  Socrates ;  and  my  opinion  is   that 
20 


306  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

the  acquirement  of  this  art  is  in  many  ways  useful  to  young 
men.  There  is  an  advantage  in  their  being  employed  during 
their  leisure  hours  in  a  way  which  tends  to  improve  their 
bodily  constitution,  and  not  in  the  way  in  which  young  men 
are  too  apt  to  be  employed.  No  gymnastics  could  be  better  or 
harder  exercise ;  and  this,  and  the  art  of  riding,  are  of  all  arts 
most  befitting  to  a  freeman  ;  for  they  only  who  are  thus  trained 
in  the  use  of  arms  are  the  athletes  of  our  military  profession, 
trained  in  that  on  which  the  conflict  turns.  Moreover,  in  act- 
ual battle,  when  you  have  to  fight  in  a  line  with  a  number  of 
others,  this  sort  of  acquirement  will  be  of  some  use ;  and  will 
be  of  the  greatest,  when  the  ranks  are  broken  and  you  have  to 
fight  singly  ;  either  in  pursuit,  when  you  are  attacking  some 
one  who  is  defending  himself,  or  in  flight,  when  you  have  to 
defend  yourself  against  an  assailant.  Certainly  he  who  pos- 
sessed the  art  could  not  meet  with  any  harm  at  the  hands  of 
a  single  person,  or  perhaps  of  several ;  and  in  any  case  he 
would  have  a  great  advantage.  Further,  this  sort  of  skill  in- 
clines a  man  to  other  noble  lessons ;  for  every  man  who  has 
learned  how  to  fight  in  arms  will  desire  to  learn  the  proper  ar- 
rangement of  an  army,  which  is  the  sequel  of  the  lesson  ;  and 
when  he  has  learned  this,  and  his  ambition  is  once  fired,  he  will 
go  on  to  learn  the  complete  art  of  the  general.  There  is  no 
difficulty  in  seeing  that  the  knowledge  and  practice  of  other 
military  arts  will  be  useful  and  valuable  to  a  man  ;  and  this 
lesson  may  be  the  beginning  of  them.  Let  me  add  a  further 
advantage,  which  is  by  no  means  a  slight  one,  —  that  this  sci- 
ence will  make  any  man  a  great  deal  more  valiant  and  self- 
possessed  in  the  field.  And  I  will  not  disdain  to  mention, 
what  to  some  may  appear  to  be  a  small  matter,  that  he  will 
make  a  better  appearance  at  the  right  time  ;  that  is  to  say,  at 
the  time  when  his  appearance  will  strike  terror  into  his  ene- 
mies. My  opinion  then,  Lysimachus,  is,  as  I  say,  that  the 
youths  should  be  instructed  in  this  art,  »'  I  for  the  reasons 
which  I  have  given.  —  Laches,  i.  74. 
Mind,  a  cause. 

I  heard  some  one  who  had  a  book  of  Anaxagoias,  as  he 

said,  out  of  which  he  read  that  mind  was  the  disposer  and 
cause  of  all,  and  I  was  quite  delighted  at  this  notion,  which  ap- 
peared admirable,  and  I  said  to  myself :  If  mind  is  the  dis- 
poser, mind  will  dispose  all  for  the  best,  and  put  each  particu- 
lar in  the  best  place ;  and  I  argued  that  if  any  one  desired  to 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  307 

find  out  the  cause  of  the  generation  or  destruction  or  existence 
of  anything,  he  must  find  out  what  state  of  being  or  suffering 
or  doing  was  best  for  that  thing,  and  therefore  a  man  had  only 
to  consider  the  best  for  himself  and  others,  and  then  he  wovld 
also  know  the  worse,  for  that  the  same  science  comprised  both. 
And  I  rejoiced  to  think  that  I  had  found  in  Anaxagoras  a 
teacher  of  the  causes  of  existence  such  as  I  desired,  and  I  im- 
agined that  he  would  tell  me  first  whether  the  earth  is  flat  or 
round  ;  and  then  he  would  further  explain  the  cause  and  the 
necessity  of  this,  and  would  teach  me  the  nature  of  the  best 
and  show  that  this  was  best ;  and  if  he  said  that  the  earth  was 
in  the  centre,  he  would  explain  that  this  position  was  the  best, 
and  I 'should  be  satisfied  with  the  explanation  given,  and  not 
want  any  other  sort  of  cause.  And  I  thought  that  I  would 
then  go  on  and  ask  him  about  the  sun  and  moon  and  stars,  and 
that  he  would  explain  to  me  their  comparative  swiftness,  and 
their  returnings  and  various  states,  active  and  passive,  and  how 
all  of  them  were  for  the  best.  For  I  could  not  imagine  that 
when  he  spoke  of  mind  as  the  disposer  of  them,  he  would 
give  any  other  account  of  their  being  as  they  are,  except  that 
this  was  best ;  and  I  thought  that  when  he  had  explained  to 
me  in  detail  the  cause  of  each  and  the  cause  of  all,  he  would 
go  on  to  explain  to  me  what  was  best  for  each  and  what  was 
best  for  all.  I  had  hopes  which  I  would  not  have  sold  for 
much,  and  I  seized  the  books  and  read  them  as  fast  as  I  could 
in  my  eagerness  to  know  the  better  and  the  worse. 

What  hopes  I  had  formed,  and  how  grievously  was  I  disap- 
pointed !  As  I  proceeded,  I  found  my  philosopher  altogether 
forsaking  mind  or  any  other  principle  of  order,  but  having  re- 
course to  air,  and  ether,  and  water,  and  other  eccentricities.  — 
Phaedo,  i.  426. 
Mind,  disorders  of  the. 

The  disorders  of  the  soul  which  originate  in  the  body  are 

as  follows :  We  must  acknowledge  disease  of  the  mind  to  be  a 
want  of  intelligence ;  and  of  this  there  are  two  kinds ;  to  wit, 
madness  and  ignorance ;  and  whatever  affection  gives  rise  to 
either  of  them  may  be  called  disease.  Excessive  pains  and 
pleasures  are  justly  to  be  regarded  as  the  greatest  diseases  of 
the  soul,  for  a  man  who  is  in  great  joy  or  in  great  pa'  a,  in  his 
irrational  eagerness  to  attain  the  one  and  to  avoid  the  other,  is 
not  truly  able  to  see  or  to  hear  anythir.g ;  but  he  is  mad,  and 
is  at  the  same  time  quite  incapable  of  any  participation  in 


308  PLATO'S  BEzT  THOb  GETS. 

reason.  He  who  has  the  seed  about  the  spinal  marrow  too 
plentiful  and  overflowing,  like  a  tree  overladen  v.'ifch  fruit,  has 
many  throes,  and  also  obtains  many  pleasures  in  his  desires  and 
their  gratifications,  and  is  for  the  most  part  of  his  life  mad,  be- 
cause his  pleasures  and  pains  are  so  very  great ;  his  soul  is 
rendered  foolish  and  disordered  by  his  body  ;  and  he  is  regarded 
not  as  one  diseased,  but  as  one  who  is  voluntarily  bad,  which  is 
*  bad  mistake.  For  the  truth  is  that  the  intemperance  of  love 
for  the  most  part  grows  into  a  disease  of  the  soul,  owing  to  the 
moisture  and  fluidity  which  is  produced  in  one  of  the  elements, 
by  the  loose  consistency  of  the  bones.  And  in  general,  all  that 
which  is  termed  the  intemperance  of  pleasure  is  unjustly  charged 
upon  those  who  do  wrong,  as  if  they  did  wrong  voluntarily.  For 
no  man  is  voluntarily  bad  ;  but  the  bad  become  bad  by  reason 
of  an  ill  disposition  of  the  body  and  bad  education,  things 
which  to  every  man  are  an  involuntary  evil  ;  and  in  like  man- 
ner the  soul  is  often  hurt  by  bodily  pain.  For  where  the  sharp 
and  briny  phlegm  and  other  bitter  and  bilious  humors  wander 
over  the  body,  and  find  no  exit  or  escape,  but  are  compressed 
within  and  mingle  their  own  vapors  with  the  motions  of  the 
soul,  and  are  blended  with  them,  they  produce  an  infinite  va- 
riety of  diseases  in  all  sorts  of  degrees,  and  being  carried  to 
the  three  places  of  the  soul  on  which  any  of  them  may  sev- 
erally chance  to  alight,  they  create  infinite  varieties  of  trouble 
and  melancholy,  of  tempers  rash  and  cowardly,  and  also  of 
forgetfulness  and  stupidity.  Further,  when  to  this  evil  consti- 
tution of  body  evil  forms  of  government  are  added,  and  evil 
discourses  are  uttered  in  private  as  well  as  in  public,  and  no 
sort  of  instruction  is  given  in  youth  which  may  heal  these  ills, 
here  is  another  source  of  evil;  and  so  the  bad  becomes  bad, 
through  two  things  which  are  wholly  out  of  their  power.  In 
such  cases  the  planters  are  to  blame  rather  than  the  plants,  the 
educators  rather  than  the  educated.  Still  we  should  endeavor 
as  far  as  we  can  by  education,  and  studies,  and  learning,  to 
avoid  vice  and  attain  virtue.  —  Timaeus,  ii.  577. 
Mind,  the  life  of. 

Pro.  And  what  is  this  life  of  mind  ? 

Soc.  I  want  to  know  whether  any  one  of  us  would  consent 
to  live,  having  wisdom  and  mind  and  knowledge  and  memory 
of  all  things,  but  having  no  fraction  of  a  sense  of  pleasure 
or  pain,  and  wholly  unaffected  by  these  and  the  like  feel- 
ings? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  309 

Pro.  Neither  life,  Socrates,  appears  eligible  to  me,  nor  is 
likely,  as  I  should  imagine,  to  be  chosen  by  any  one  else. 

Soc.  What  would  you  say,  Protarchus,  to  both  of  these  in 
one,  or  to  one  that  was  made  out  of  the  union  of  the  two  ? 

Pro.  Out  of  the  union,  that  is,  of  pleasure  with  mind  and 
wisdom  ? 

Soc.  Yes.  —  Philebus,  iii.  156. 
Mind,  good  in  the.     See  Good,  in  the  mind,  etc. 
Mind,  depth  and  greatness  of,  reverenced. 

I  have  a  kind  of  reverence  ;  not  so  much  for  Melissua 

and  the  others,  who  say  that  "  all  is  one  and  at  rest,"  as  for 
the  great  leader  himself,  Parmenides,  venerable  and  av»iul,  as 
in  Homeric  language  he  may  be  called ;  him  I  should  be 
ashamed  to  approach  in  a  spirit  unworthy  of  him.  I  met  him 
when  he  was  an  old  man,  and  I  was  a  mere  youth,  and  he  ap- 
peared to  me  to  have  a  glorious  depth  of  mind.  —  Theaetetus, 
iii.  387. 
Mind,  movement  of. 

Ath.  And  what  is  the  definition  of  that  which  is  named 

"  soul  ?  "      Can  we  conceive  of  any  other  than  that  which  has 
been  already  given  —  the  motion  which  is  self -moved  ? 

Cle.  You  mean  to  say  that  the  essence  which  is  defined  aa 
the  self-moved  is  identical  with  that  which  we  call  soul  ? 

Ath.  Yes  ;  and  if  this  is  true,  do  we  still  maintain  that  there 
is  anything  wanting  in  the  proof  that  the  soul  is  the  first  origin 
and  moving  power  of  all  that  is,  or  has  been,  or  will  be,  and 
their  contraries,  when  she  has  been  clearly  shown  to  be  the 
source  of  change  and  motion  in  all  things  ? 

Cle.  Certainly  not ;  the  soul  as  being  the  source  of  motion, 
has  been  most  satisfactorily  shown  to  be  the  oldest  of  all 
things. 

Ath.  And  is  not  that  motion  which  takes  place  in  another, 
or  by  reason  of  another,  but  never  has  any  self-moving  powei 
at  all,  being  in  truth  the  change  of  an  inanimate  body,  to  be 
reckoned  in  the  second  degree,  or  in  any  lower  degree  which 
you  may  prefer? 
Cle.  Very  true. 

Ath.  Then  ws  are  right,  and  speak  the  most  perfect  and  ab- 
solute truth,  when  we  say  that  the  soul  is  prior  to  the  body, 
and  that  the  body  is  second  and  comes  afterwards,  and  is  born 
to  obey  the  soul  which  is  the  ruler  ? 

Cle.  Nothing  can  be  more  true. —  Laws,  iv.  408. 


310  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Minority,  the  government  of  the.     See  Few. 
Minos,  and  naval  warfare. 

I   was  saying  that  the  imitation  of  enemies  was  a  bad 

thing ;  and  I  was  thinking  of  a  case  in  which  a  maritime  people 
are  harassed  by  enemies,  as  the  Athenians  were  by  Minos  (I 
do  not  speak  from  any  desire  to  recall  past  grievances)  ;  but  he, 
as  we  know,  was  a  great  naval  potentate,  who  compelled  the 
inhabitants  of  Attica  to  pay  him  a  cruel  tribute  ;  and  in  those 
days  they  had  no  ships  of  war  as  they  now  have,  nor  was  the 
country  filled  with  ship  timber,  and  therefore  they  could  not 
readily  build  them.  Hence  neither  could  they  learn  how  to 
imitate  their  enemy  at  sea,  or  become  sailors  themselves,  and 
in  this  way  directly  repel  their  enemies.  Better  for  them  to 
have  lost  many  times  over  the  seven  youths,  than  that  heavy- 
armed  and  stationary  troops  should  have  been  turned  into 
sailors,  and  accustomed  to  leap  quickly  on  shore,  and  again  to 
hurry  back  to  their  ships;  or  should  have  fancied  that  there 
was  no  disgrace  in  not  awaiting  the  attack  of  an  enemy  and 
dying  boldly  ;  and  that  there  were  good  reasons,  and  plenty  of 
them,  for  a  man  throwing  away  his  arms,  and  betaking  himself 
to  flight ;  which  is  not  dishonorable  as  people  say,  at  certain 
times.  This  is  the  language  of  naval  warfare,  and  is  anything 
but  worthy  of  extraordinary  praise.  For  we  should  not  teach 
bad  habits,  least  of  all  to  the  best  part  of  the  citizens.  You 
may  learn  the  evil  of  such  a  practice  from  Homer,  by  whom 
Odysseus  is  introduced,  rebuking  Agamemnon,  because  he  de- 
sires to  draw  down  the  ships  to  the  sea  at  a  time  when  the 
Achaeans  are  hard  pressed  by  the  Trojans  :  he  gets  angry  with 
him,  and  says  :  — 

"  Who,  at  a  time  when  the  battle  is  in  full  cry,  biddest  to  drag  the 
well-oared  ships  into  the  sea,  that  the  prayers  of  the  Trojans  may 
be  accomplished  yet  more,  and  high  ruin  fall  upon  us  ?  For  the 
Achaeans  will  not  maintain  the  battle,  when  the  ships  are  drawn 
into  the  sea,  but  they  will  look  behind  and  will  cease  from  strife : 
in  that  the  counsel  which  you  give  will  prove  injurious." 

You  see  that  he  quite  knew  triremes  on  the  sea,  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  fighting  men,  to  be  an  evil  ;  lions  might  be  trained 
in  that  way  to  fly  from  a  herd  of  deer.  Moreover,  naval  pow- 
ers which  owe  their  safety  to  ships,  do  not  honor  that  sort  of 
warlike  excellence  which  is  most  deserving  of  honor.  For  he 
who  owes  his  safety  to  the  pilot,  and  the  captain,  and  the  oars- 
man, and  all  sorts  of  rather  good-for-nothing  persons,  cannot 
rightly  give  honor  to  whom  honor  is  due.  —  Laws,  iv.  233 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  311 

Mirth -giver  to  be  rewarded. 

Ath.  May  not  the  true  use  of  music  and  choral  festivities 

be  described  as  follows :   we  rejoice  when  we  think  that  we 
prosper,  and  again  we   think  that  we  prosper  when  we  rejoice? 

Cle.  Exactly. 

Ath.  And  when  rejoicing  is  onr  good  fortune  we  are  unable 
to  be  still  ? 

Cle.  True. 

Ath.  Our  young  men  break  forth  into  dancing  and  singing, 
and  we  who  are  their  elders  deem  that  we  are  fulfilling  our 
part  in  life  when  we  look  on  at  them.  Having  lost  the  agility 
of  youth,  we  delight  in  their  sports  and  merry-making ;  because 
we  love  to  think  of  our  former  selves,  and  gladly  institute  con- 
tests for  those  who  are  able  to  awaken  in  us  the  memory  of 
what  we  once  were. 

Cle.  Very  true. 

Ath.  People  say  that  we  ought  to  regard  him  as  the  wisest 
of  men,  and  the  winner  of  the  palm,  who  gives  us  the  greatest 
amount  of  pleasure  and  mirth.  For  when  mirth  is  to  be  the 
order  of  the  day,  he  ought  to  be  honored  most,  and,  as  I  was 
saying,  bear  the  palm,  who  gives  most  mirth  to  the  greatest 
number.  Now  I  want  to  know  whether  this  is  a  true  way  of 
speaking  or  of  acting  ? 

Cle.  Possibly.  — Laws,  iv.  187. 
Misanthropists  and  Misologists. 
Let  us  take  care  that  we  avoid  a  danger. 

And  what  is  that  ?  I  said. 

The  danger  of  becoming  misologists,  he  replied,  which  is 
one  of  the  very  worst  things  that  can  happen  to  us.  For  as 
there  are  misanthropists  or  haters  of  men,  there  are  also  mis- 
ologists or  haters  of  ideas,  and  both  spring  from  the  same  cause, 
which  '.a  ignorance  of  the  world.  Misanthropy  springs  out  of 
the  too  great  confidence  of  inexperience  ;  you  trust  a  man  and 
think  him  altogether  true  and  sound  and  faithful,  and  then  in  a 
little  while  he  turns  out  to  be  false  and"knavish ;  and  then  an- 
other and  another,  and  when  this  has  happened  several  titnes 
to  a  man,  especially  within  the  circle  of  his  own  most  trusted 
friends,  as  he  would  deem  them,  and  he  haps  often  quarreled 
with  them,  he  at  last  hates  all  men,  and  believes  that  no  one 
has  any  good  in  him  at  all.  I  dare  say  that  you  must  have 
observed  this. 

Yes,  I  said. 


312  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

And  is  not  the  feeling  discreditable?  Such  an  one  having 
to  deal  with  other  men,  had  clearly  no  experience  of  them  ; 
for  experience  would  have  taught  him  the  true  state  of  the 
case,  that  few  are  the  good  and  few  the  evil,  and  that  the  great 
majority  are  in  the  interval  between  them.  —  Phaedo,  i.  418. 
Miserly  men  and  oligarchies. 

His  fear  has  taught  him  to  knock  ambition  and  passion 

headforemost  from  his  bosom's  throne  :  humbled  by  poverty  he 
takes  to  money-making,  and  by  mean  and  miserly  savings  and 
hard  work  gets  a  fortune  together.  Is  not  this  man  likely  to 
seat  the  concupiscent  and  covetous  elements  on  that  vacant 
throne  ?  They  will  play  the  great  king  within  him,  and  he 
will  array  them  with  tiara  and  collar  and  scimitar. 

Most  true,  he  replied. 

And  when  he  has  made  the  reason  and  spirit  sit  on  the 
ground  obediently  on  either  side,  and  taught  them  to  know 
their  place,  he  compels  the  one  to  think  only  of  the  method  by 
which  lesser  sums  may  be  converted  into  larger  ones,  and 
schools  the  other  into  the  worship  and  admiration  of  riches  and 
rich  men  ;  and  to  be  ambitious  only  of  wealth  and  of  the 
means  which  lead  to  this. 

Of  all  conversions,  he  said,  there  is  none  so  speedy  or  so 
sure  as  when  the  ambitious  youth  changes  into  the  avaricious 
one. 

And  the  avaricious,  I  said,  is  the  oligarchical  youth  ? 

Yes,  he  said ;  at  any  rate  the  individual  out  of  whom  he 
came  is  like  the  State  out  of  which  oligarchy  came. 

Let  us  then  consider  whether  there  is  any  likeness  between 
them. 

Very  good. 

First,  then,  they  resemble  one  another  in  the  value  which 
they  set  upon  wealth  ? 

Certainly. 

Also  in  their  penurious,  laborious  character  ;  the  individual 
only  satisfies  his  necessary  appetites,  and  confines  his  expendi- 
ture to  them ;  his  other  desires  he  subdues,  under  the  idea  that 
there  is  no  use  in  them? 

True. 

He  is  a  shabby  fellow,  I  said,  who  saves  something  out  of 
everything  and  makes  a  purse  for  himself ;  and  this  is  the  sort 
of  man  whom  the  vulgar  applaud.  Is  he  not  like  the  State 
which  he  represents  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  313 

That  would  be  my  view  of  him,  he  replied ;  at  any  rate, 
money  is  highly  valued  by  him  as  well  as  by  the  State. 

Why.  he  is  not  a  man  of  cultivation,  I  said.  .  .  . 

The  man,  then,  will  be  at  war  with  himself ;  he  will  be  two 
men,  and  not  one  ;  but,  in  general,  his  better  desires  will  be 
found  to  prevail  over  his  inferior  ones. 

True. 

For  these  reasons  such  an  one  will  be  more  decent  than 
many  are ;  yet  the  true  virtue  of  a  unanimous  and  harmonious 
soul  will  be  far  out  of  his  reach. 

I  should  expect  so. 

And  surely,  the  miser  individually  will  be  an  ignoble  com- 
petitor in  a  State  for  any  prize  of  victory,  or  other  object  of 
honorable  ambition  ;  he  is  so  afraid  of  awakening  his  expen- 
sive appetites  and  inviting  them  to  help  and  join  in  the  strug- 
gle ;  in  true  oligarchical  fashion  he  fights  with  a  small  part 
only  of  his  resources,  and  the  result  commonly  is  that  he  kises 
the  prize  and  saves  his  money. 

Very  true. 

Can  we  any  longer  doubt,  then,  that  the  miser  and  money- 
maker answers  to  the  oligarchical  State  ?  There  can  be  no 
doubt.  —  Republic,  ii.  381. 

Yes,  I  said  ;  and  men  of  this  stamp  will  be  covetous  of 
money,  like  those  who  live  in  oligarchies  ;  they  will  have  a 
fierce  secret  longing  after  gold  and  silver,  which  they  will 
hoard  in  dark  places,  having  magazines  and  treasures  of  their 
own  for  the  deposit  and  concealment  of  them ;  also  castles 
which  are  just  nests  for  their  eggs,  and  in  which  they  will 
spend  large  sums  on  their  wives,  or  on  any  others  whom  they 
please. 

That  is  most  true,  he  said. 

And  they  are  miserly  because  they  have  no  means  of  openly 
acquiring  the  money  which  they  prize ;  they  will  spend  that 
which  is  another  man's  in  their  lust ;  stealing  their  pleasures 
and  running  away  like  children  from  the  law,  their  father  : 
they  have  been  schooled  not  by  gentle  influences  but  by  force ; 
caring  nothing  about  the  Muse,  the  companion  of  reason  and 
philosophy,  and  honoring  gymnastic  before  music. 

Undoubtedly,  he  said,  the  form  of  government  which  you 
describe  is  a  mixture  of  good  and  evil.  —  The  Republic,  ii. 
375. 


314  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Misery  of  the  unjust. 

Soc.  The  matters  at  issue  between  us  are  not  trifling;  to 

know  or  not  to  know  happiness  and  misery  —  that  is  the  sum  of 
them.  And  what  knowledge  can  be  nobler  than  this?  or  \rhat 
ignorance  more  disgraceful  than  this  ?  And  therefore  I  will 
begin  by  asking  you  whether  you  do  not  think  that  a  man  who 
is  unjust  and  doing  injustice  can  be  happy,  seeing  that  you  think 
Archelaus  unjust  and  yet  happy?  Am  I  not  right  in  supposing 
that  to  be  your  meaning? 

Pol.   Quite  right. 

Soc.  And  I  say  that  this  is  an  impossibility,  and  here  is  one 
point  about  which  we  are  at  issue :  very  good.  But  do  you 
mean  to  say  also  that  if  he  meets  with  retribution  and  punish- 
ment he  will  still  be  happy  ? 

Pol.   Certainly  not ;  in  that  case  he  will  be  most  miserable. 

Soc.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  unjust  be  not  punished,  then, 
according  to  you,  he  will  be  happy  ? 

Pol.  Yes. 

Soc.  But  in  my  opinion,  Polus,  the  unjust  or  doer  of  unjust 
actions  is  miserable  in  any  case,  —  more  miserable,  however,  if 
he  be  not  punished  and  does  not  meet  with  retribution,  and  less 
miserable  if  he  be  punished  and  meets  with  retribution,  at  the 
hands  of  God  and  men.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  59. 

Mixtures  of  pleasures  and  pains,  of  body  and  of  soul.     See  Body 

and  soid,  etc. 
Modesty  and  temperance. 

Then  once  more,  Charmides,  I  said,  fix  your  attention,  and 

look  within ;  consider  the  effect  which  temperance  has  upon 
yourself,  and  the  nature  of  that  which  has  the  effect.  Think 
over  all  this,  and,  like  a  brave  youth,  tell  me  —  What  is  temper- 
ance. 

After  a  moment's  pause,  in  which  he  made  a  real  manly  ef- 
fort to  think,  he  said  :  My  opinion  is,  Socrates,  that  temper- 
ance makes  a  man  ashamed  or  modest,  and  that  temperance  is 
the  same  as  modesty. 

Very  good  I  said ;  and  did  you  not  admit,  just  now,  that 
temperance  is  noble. 

Yes,  certainly,  he  said. 

And  the  temperate  are  also  good  ? 

Yes. 

And  can  that  be  good  which  does  not  make  men  good  ? 

Certainly  not. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS  815 

And  you  would  infer  that  temperance  is  not  only  noble,  but 
also  good  ? 

That  is  my  opinion. 

Well,  I  said ;  and  surely  you  would  agree  with  Homer  when 

he  says, 

"  Modesty  is  not  good  for  a  needy  man  "  ? 

Yes,  he  said  ;  I  agree  to  that. 

Then  I  suppose  that  modesty  is  and  is  not  good  ? 

That  is  plain. 

But  temperance,  whose  presence  makes  men  only  good,  and 
not  bad,  is  always  good  ? 

That  appears  to  me  to  be  as  you  say. 

And  the  inference  is,  that  temperance  cannot  be  modesty  — 
if  temperance  is  a  good,  and  if  modesty  is  as  much  an  evil  &a 
a  good  ? 

All  that,  Socrates,  appears  to  me  to  be  true.  —  Charmidet, 
i.  15. 

Modesty  promoted  by  refutation     See  Purification. 
Modesty  and  self-conceit.     See  Self-conceit. 
Modesty,  excess  of.     See  Courage  untempered,  etc. 
Money  not  to  be  valued  above  friendship.     See  Friendship. 
Money,  making  of.     See  Miserly  men. 
Money,  a  ruler  in  the  State. 
What  manner  of  government  do  you  term  oligarchy  ? 

A  government  resting  on  a  valuation  of  property,  in  which 
the  rich  have  power  and  the  poor  are  deprived  of  power. 

I  understand,  he  replied. 

Ought  I  not  to  describe,  first  of  all,  how  the  change  from 
timocracy  to  oligarchy  arises  ? 

Yes. 

Well,  I  said,  no  eyes  are  required  in  order  to  see  how  the 
one  passes  into  the  other. 

How? 

The  accumulation  of  gold  in  the  treasury  of  private  individ- 
uals is  the  ruin  of  timocracy  ;  they  invent  illegal  modes  of  ex- 
penditure, but  what  do  they  or  their  wives  care  about  the  law  ? 

Very  true. 

And  then  one  seeing  another  prepares  to  rival  him,  and  thus 
the  whole  body  of  the  citizens  acquires  a  similar  character- 
Likely  enough. 

After  that  they  get  on  in  trade,  and  the  more  they  think  of 
making  a  fortune,  the  less  they  think  of  virtue ;  for  when  riches 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

and  virtue  are  placed  together  in  the  scales  of  the  balance,  the 
one  always  rises  as  the  other  falls. 

True. 

And  in  proportion  as  riches  and  rich  men  are  honored  in  the 
State,  virtue  and  the  virtuous  are  dishonored. 

Clearly. 

And  what  is  honored  is  cultivated,  and  that  which  has  no 
honor  is  neglected. 

That  is  the  case. 

And  so  at  last,  instead  of  loving  contention  and  glory,  men 
become  lovers  of  trade  and  money,  and  they  honor  and  rever- 
ence the  rich  man,  and  make  a  ruler  of  him,  and  dishonor  the 
poor  man. 

They  do  so. 

Whereupon  they  proceed  to  make  a  law  which  fixes  a  sum 
of  money  as  the  qualification  of  citizenship ;  the  money  is  more 
or  less  accordingly  as  the  oligarchy  is  more  or  less  exclusive ; 
and  any  one  whose  property  is  below  the  amount  fixed  is  not 
allowed  to  share  in  the  government ;  which  changes  in  the  con- 
stitution they  effect  by  force  of  arms,  if  intimidation  has  not 
already  done  their  work. 

Very  true.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  377. 
Money,  enslaving  power  of.     See  Enslaving,  etc. 
Money  not  to  have  the  place  of  power  in  the  State. 

Ath.  We  maintain,  then,  that  a  State  which  would  be  safe 

and  happy,  as  far  as  the  nature  of  man  allows,  must  and  ought 
to  distribute  honor  and  dishonor  in  the  right  way.  And  the 
right  way  is  to  place  the  goods  of  the  soul  first  and  highest  in 
the  scale,  always  assuming  temperance  as  a  condition  of  them  ; 
and  in  the  second  place,  the  goods  of  the  body  ;  and  in  the 
third  place,  those  of  money  and  property.  And  if  any  legis- 
lator or  State  departs  from  this  rule  by  giving  money  the  place 
of  honor,  or  in  any  way  preferring  that  which  is  really  last, 
may  we  not  say,  that  he  or  the  State  is  doing  an  unholy  and 
unpatriotic  thing  ? 

Meg.  Yes  ;  let  that  be  plainly  asserted.  —  Laws,  iv.  226. 
Money.     See  Wealth,  Riches,  Property,  Possession. 
Money-sting  of  business  men.     See  Business  men. 
Monsters,  filial.     See  Filial,  etc. 
Mother,  ambitious.     See  Woman,  etc. 
Motherhood  of  country. 
Their  ancestors  were  not  strangors,  nor  are  these  their 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  317 

descendants  sojourners  only,  whose  fathers  have  come  from 
another  country;  but  they  are  the  children  of  the  soil,  dwell- 
ing and  living  in  their  o\vn  land.  And  the  country  which 
brought  them  up  is  not  like  other  countries,  a  step-mother  to 
her  children,  but  their  own  true  mother ;  she  bore  them  and 
nourished  them  and  received  them,  and  in  her  bosom  they  now 
repose.  It  is  meet  and  right,  therefore,  that  we  should  begin 
by  praising  the  land  which  is  their  mother,  and  that  will  be  a 
way  of  praising  their  noble  birth. 

The  country  is  worthy  to  be  praised,  not  only  by  us,  but  by 
all  mankind ;  first,  and  above  all,  as  being  dear  to  the  Gods. 
This  is  proved  by  the  strife  and  contention  of  the  Gods  respect- 
ing her.  And  ought  not  that  country  which  the  Gods  praise  to 
be  praised  by  all  mankind  ?  The  second  praise  which  may  be 
fairly  claimed  by  her,  is  that  at  the  time  when  the  whole  earth 
was  sending  forth  and  creating  diverse  animals,  tame  and  wild, 
she  our  mother  was  free  and  pure  from  savage  monsters,  and 
out  of  all  animals  selected  and  brought  forth  man,  who  is 
superior  to  the  rest  in  understanding,  and  alone  has  justice  and 
religion.  And  a  great  proof  that  she  was  the  mother  of  us 
and  of  our  ancestors,  is  that  she  provided  the  means  of  support 
for  her  offspring.  For  as  a  woman  proves  her  motherhood  by 
giving  milk  to  her  young  ones  (and  she  who  has  no  fountain  of 
milk  is  not  a  mother),  so  did  this  our  land  prove  that  she  was 
going  to  be  the  mother  of  men,  for  in  those  days  she  alone  and 
first  of  all  brought  forth  wheat  and  barley  for  human  food, 
which  is  the  best  and  noblest  sustenance  for  man,  whom  she 
regarded  as  her  true  offspring.  And  these  are  truer  proofs  of 
motherhood  in  a  country  than  in  a  woman,  for  the  woman  in 
her  conception  and  generation  is  but  the  imitation  of  the  earth, 
and  not  the  earth  of  the  woman.  And  of  the  fruit  of  the  earth 
she  gave  a  plenteous  supply,  not  only  to  her  offspring,  but  to 
others  also ;  and  after  that  she  made  the  olive  to  spring  up  to 
be  a  boon  to  her  children,  and  to  help  them  in  their  toils.  And 
when  she  had  herself  niu-sed  them  and  brought  them  up  to  man- 
hood, she  gave  them  Gods  to  be  their  rulers  and  teachers,  whose 
names  are  well  known,  and  need  not  now  be  repeated.  They 
are  the  Gods  who  first  ordered  our  lives,  and  gave  us  arts  to 
supply  our  daily  needs,  and  taught  us  the  possession  and  use  of 
arms  for  the  guardianship  of  the  country.  —  MenexenKs,  iv.  568. 
Motion  and  rest  of  things.  See  Rest. 
Multitude,  the  Science  of  Government  not  attained  by  the.  See 

Government,  -Science  of. 


318  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Music,  enervating  power  of.     See  Irritability. 
Music,  most  celebrated. 

Music  is  more  celebrated  than  any  other  kind  of  imitation, 

and  therefore  requires  the  greatest  care  of  them  all.  For  if  a 
man  makes  a  mistake  here,  he  may  do  himself  the  greatest  in- 
jury by  welcoming  evil  dispositions,  and  the  mistake  may  be 
very  difficult  to  discern,  because  the  poets  are  artists  very  infe- 
rior in  character  to  the  Muses  themselves,  who  would  never  fall 
into  the  monstrous  error  of  assigning  to  the  words  of  men  the 
gestures  and  songs  of  women  ;  nor  combine  the  melodies  and 
gestures  of  freemen  with  the  rhythms  of  slaves  and  men  of  the 
baser  sort ;  or,  beginning  with  the  rhythms  and  gestures  of  free- 
men, assign  to  them  a  melody  or  words  which  are  o?  an  oppo- 
site character  ;  nor  would  they  mix  up  the  voices  and  sounds 
of  animals  and  of  men  and  instruments,  and  every  other  sort 
of  noise,  as  if  they  were  all  one.  But  human  poets  are  fond 
of  introducing  this  sort  of  inconsistent  mixture,  and  thus  make 
themselves  ridiculous  in  the  eyes  of  those  who,  as  Orpheus  says, 
"  are  ripe  for  pleasure."  The  experienced  see  all  this  confusion, 
and  yet  the  poets  go  on  and  make  still  further  havoc  by  sepa- 
rating the  rhythm  and  the  figure  of  the  dance  from  the  melody, 
setting  words  to  metre  without  music,  and  also  separating  the 
melody  and  rhythm  from  the  words,  using  the  lyre  or  the  flute 
alone.  For  when  there  are  no  words,  it  is  very  difficult  to 
recognize  the  meaning  of  the  harmony  and  rhythm,  or  to  see 
that  any  worthy  object  is  imitated  by  them.  And  we  must  ac- 
knowledge that  all  this  sort  of  thing,  which  aims  only  at  swift- 
ness and  smoothness  and  a  brutish  noise,  and  uses  the  flute  and 
the  lyre  not  as  the  mere  accompaniments  of  the  dance  and  song, 
is  exceedingly  rude  and  coarse.  The  use  of  either,  when  un- 
accompanied by  the  others,  leads  to  every  sort  of  irregularity 
and  trickery.  —  Laws,  iv.  199. 
Music,  different  kinds  of. 

Ath.  Let  us  speak  of  the  laws  about  music ;  that  is  to 

say,  such  music  as  then  existed ;  in  order  that  we  may  trace  the 
growth  of  the  excess  of  freedom  from  the  beginning  ;  for  music 
was  early  divided  among  us  into  certain  kinds  and  manners. 
One  sort  consisted  of  prayers  to  the  Gods,  which  were  called 
hymns ;  and  there  was  another  and  opposite  sort  called  lamen- 
tations, and  another  termed  paeans,  and  another  called  dithy- 
rambs ;  of  which  latter  the  subject,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  was 
the  birth  of  Dionysus.  And  they  used  the  actual  word  "  laws," 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOl  GHTS.  t,19 

or  vo/xoi,  meaning  "  song,"  only  adding  such  and  such  an  instru- 
ment, of  the  harp  for  example,  when  they  wanted  to  denote  a 
particular  strain.  All  these  and  others  were  duly  distinguished, 
nor  were  they  allowed  to  intermingle  one  sort  of  music  with 
another.  And  the  authority  which  determined  and  gave  judg- 
ment, and  punished  the  disobedient,  was  not  expressed  in  a 
hiss,  nor  in  the  most  unmusical  "sweet  voices  "  of  the  multi- 
tude, as  in  our  days ;  nor  in  applause  and  clappings  of  the 
hands.  But  the  directors  of  public  instruction  insisted  that 
the  spectators  should  listen  in  silence  to  the  end  ;  and  boys  and 
their  tutors,  and  the  multitude  in  general,  were  kept  quiet  by  the 
touch  of  the  wand.  Such  was  the  good  order  which  the  mul- 
titude were  willing  to  observe;  they  would  not  have  dared  to 
give  judgment  by  noisy  cries.  And  then,  as  time  went  on,  the 
poets  themselves  introduced  the  reign  of  ignorance  and  misrule. 
They  were  men  of  genius,  but  they  had  no  knowledge  of  what 
is  just  and  lawful  in  music ;  raging  like  Bacchanals  and  pos- 
sessed with  inordinate  delights  —  mingling  lamentations  with 
hymns,  and  paeans  with  dithyrambs  ;  imitating  the  sounds  of  the 
flute  on  the  lyre,  and  making  one  general  confusion ;  igLo- 
rantly  affirming  that  music  has  no  truth,  and,  whether  good  or 
bad,  can  only  be  judged  of  rightly  by  the  pleasure  of  the 
nearer.  And  by  composing  such  licentious  poems,  and  adding 
to  them  words  as  licentious,  they  have  inspired  the  multitude 
with  lawlessness  and  boldness,  and  made  them  fancy  that  they 
can  judge  for  themselves  about  melody  and  song.  And  in  this 
way,  the  theatres  from  being  mute  have  become  vocal,  as 
though  they  had  understanding  of  good  and  bad  in  music  and 
poetry ;  and  instead  of  an  aristocracy,  an  evil  sort  of  theat- 
rocracy  has  grown  up.  —  Laws,  iv.  229. 
Musical  training. 

Musical  training  is  a  more  potent  instrument  than  any 

other,  because  rhythm  and  harmony  find  their  way  into  the  secret 
places  of  the  soul,  on  which  they  mightily  fasten,  imparting  grace 
and  making  the  soul  graceful  of  him  who  is  rightly  educated, 
or  ungraceful  of  him  who  is  ill-educated ;  and  also  because  he 
who  has  received  this  true  education  of  the  inner  being  will 
most  shrewdly  perceive  omissions  or  faults  in  art  and  nature, 
and  with  a  true  taste,  while  he  praises  and  rejoices  over  and 
receives  into  his  soul  the  good,  and  becomes  noble  and  good, 
he  will  justly  blame  and  hate  the  bad,  now  in  the  days  of  his 
youth,  evfm  before  he  is  able  to  know  the  reason  why ;  and 


320  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

when  reason  comes  he  will  recognize  and  salute  her  as  a  friend 
with  whom   his  education   has  made  him  long  familiar.  —  The 
Republic,  ii.  225. 
Musician,  the  true. 

When  I  hear  a  man  discoursing  of  virtue,  or  of  any  sort 

of  wisdom,  who  is  a  true  man  and  worthy  of  his  theme,  I  am 
delighted  beyond  measure  ;  and  I  compare  the  man  and  his 
words,  and  note  the  harmony  and  correspondence  of  them. 
And  such  an  one  I  deem  to  be  the  true  musician,  attuned  to  a 
fairer  harmony  than  that  of  the  lyre,  or  any  pleasant  instru- 
ment of  music  ;  for  truly  he  has  in  his  own  life  a  harmony  of 
words  and  deeds  arranged,  not  in  the  Ionian,  or  in  the  Phry- 
gian mode,  nor  yet  in  the  Lydian,  but  in  the  true  Hellenic 
mode,  which  is  the  Dorian,  and  no  other.  Such  an  one  makes 
me  merry  with  the  sound  of  his  voice  ;  and  when  I  hear  him 
I  am  thought  to  be  a  lover  of  discourse  ;  so  eager  am  I  in  drink- 
ing in  his  words.  But  a  man  whose  actions  do  not  agree  with 
his  words  is  an  annoyance  to  me ;  and  the  better  he  speaks  the 
more  I  hate  him,  and  then  I  seem  to  be  a  hater  of  discourse. 
—  Laches,  i.  81. 
Musician,  becoming  soft.  See  Irritability. 

National  peace,  degenerating. 

The  orderly  class  are  always  ready  to  lead  a  peaceful  life, 

and  do  their  own  business  ;  this  is  their  way  of  living  with  all 
men  at  home,  and  they  are  equally  ready  to  keep  the  peace 
with  foreign  States.  And  on  account  of  this  fondness  of 
theirs  for  peace,  which  is  often  out  of  season  where  their  in- 
fluence prevails,  they  become  by  degrees  unwarlike,  and  bring 
up  their  young  men  to  be  like  themselves  ;  they  are  at  the 
command  of  others ;  and  hence  in  a  few  years  they  and  their 
children  and  the  whole  city  often  pass  imperceptibly  from  the 
condition  of  freemen  into  that  of  slaves.  —  Statesman,  iii.  594. 
Nations.  See  States  destroyed,  etc. 

Nature,  counterparts  and  antagonisms  in.     See  Antagonisms,  etc. 
Nature,  reversal  of  the  order  of. 

Str.  The  life  of  all  animals  first  came  to  a  stand,  and  the 

mortal  nature  ceased  to  be  or  look  older,  and  was  then  reversed 
and  grew  young  and  delicate  ;  the  white  locks  of  the  aged 
darkened  again,  and  the  cheeks  of  the  bearded  man  became 
smooth,  and  he  was  restored  to  his  original  youth  ;  the  bodies 
of  the  young  grew  finer  and  smaller,  continually  by  day  and 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  321 

nigh  returning  £nd  becoming  assimilated  to  the  nature  of  a 
newly-born  child  in  mind  as  well  as  body ;  in  the  succeeding 
stage  they  waste  1  away  and  wholly  disappeared.  And  the 
bodies  of  those  who  had  died  by  violence  quickly  passed 
through  the  like  changes,  and  in  a  few  days  were  no  more 
seen.  —  Statesman,  iii.  555. 
Nature  and  chance. 

Ath.  They  say  that   the  greatest   and  fairest   things  are 

done  by  nature  and  chance,  and  the  lesser  by  art,  which  re- 
ceives from  nature  all  the  greater  and  primeval  creations,  and 
fashions  them  in  detail ;  and  these  lesser  works  are  generally 
termed  artificial. 

Cle.  What  do  you  and  they  mean  ? 

Ath.  You  will  understand  their  meaning  better,  if  I  take 
the  elements  as  an  example  ;  they  mean  to  say  that  fire  and 
water,  and  earth  and  air,  all  exist  by  nature  and  chance,  and 
not  by  art ;  and  that  as  to  the  bodies  which  come  next  in 
order,  —  earth,  and  sun,  and  moon,  and  stars,  —  they  are  cre- 
ated by  the  help  of  these  absolutely  inanimate  existences,  and 
that  they  are  severally  moved  by  chance  and  some  inherent  in- 
fluence according  to  certain  affinities  of  hot  with  cold,  or  of 
dry  with  moist,  or  of  soft  with  hard,  and  other  chance  admixt- 
ures of  opposites  which  have  united  of  necessity,  and  that  on 
this  manner  the  whole  heaven  has  been  created,  and  all  that  is 
in  the  heaven,  including  animals  and  all  plants,  and  that  all  the 
seasons  come  from  these  elements,  not  by  the  action  of  mind, 
as  they  say,  or  of  any  God,  or  from  art,  but  as  I  was  saying, 
by  nature  and  chance  only  ;  and  that  art  sprang  up  after  these 
and  out  of  them,  mortal  and  of  mortal  birth,  and  produced  in 
play  certain  images  and  very  partial  imitations  of  the  truth, 
having  an  affinity  to  one  another,  such  as  music  and  painting 
create  and  their  companion  arts.  And  there  are  other  arts 
which  have  a  serious  purpose,  and  these  cooperate  with  nature, 
such,  for  example,  as  medicine,  and  husbandry,  and  gymnastic. 
And  they  say  that  politics  cooperate  with  nature,  but  in  a  less 
degree,  and  have  more  of  art ;  also  that  legislation  is  entirely 
a  work  of  art,  and  is  based  on  assumptions  which  are  not 
true. 

Cle.  How  do  you  mean  ? 

Ath.  In  the  firs"  place,  my  dear  friend,  they  would  say  that 
the  Gods  exist  neither  by  nature  nor  by  art,  but  only  by  the 
laws  oj  States,  which  are  different  in  different  places,  according 
21 


322  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

to  the  agreement  of  those  who  make  them;  and  that  the  hon- 
orable is  one  thing  by  nature  and  another  thing  by  law,  and 
that  the  principles  of  justice  have  no  existence  at  all  in  nature, 
but  that  mankind  are  always  disputing  about  there  and  altering 
them  ;  and  that  the  alterations  which  are  made  by  art  and  by 
law  have  no  basis  in  nature,  but  are  of  authority  for  the  mo- 
ment  and   at   the    time  at  which  they  are  made  :    these,  my 
friends,  are  the  sayings  of  wise  men,  poets  and  prose  writers, 
which  find  a  way  into  the  minds  of  youth.      They  are   told 
by  them  that  the  highest  right  is  might,  and  in  this  way  the 
young  fall  into  impieties,  under  the  idea  that  the  Gods  are  not 
such  as  the  law  bids  them  imagine  them  ;  and  hence  arise  con- 
tentions—  the  philosophers  inviting  them  to  lead  a  true  life 
according  to  nature,   which  is   to  live  in    real  dominion  over 
others,  and  not  in  legal  subjection  to  them.  —  Laws,  iv.  400. 
Natural  gifts.     See  Talents,  etc. 
Natural  justice.     See  Justice,  natural. 
Natural  appetite.     See  Appetites. 
Naval  warfare  and  potentate.     See  Minos. 
Noble  and  just,  the. 

To  him  who  maintains  that  it  is  profitable  for  the  human 

creature  to  be  unjust,  and  unprofitable  to  be  just,  let  us  reply, 
that  if  he  be  right,  it  is  profitable  for  this  creature  to  feast  the 
multitudinous  monster  and  strengthen  the  lion  and  the  lion-like 
qualities  and  to  starve  arid  weaken  the  man  ;  who  is  conse- 
quently at  the  mercy  of  either  of  the  other  two,  and  he  is  not 
to  attempt  to  familiarize  or  harmonize  them  with  one  another  : 
he  ought  rather  to  suffer  them  to  fight  and  bite  and  devour  one 
another. 

Certainly,  he  said  ;  that  is  what  the  approver  of  injustice 
says. 

To  him  the  supporter  of  justice  makes  answer  that  he  ought 
rather  to  aim  in  all  he  says  and  does  at  strengthening  the  man 
within  him,  in  order  that  he  may  be  able  to  govern  the  many- 
headed  monster.  Like  a  good  husbandman  he  should  be 
watching  and  tending  the  gentle  shoots,  and  preventing  the 
wild  ones  from  growing ;  making  a  treaty  with  the  lion-heart, 
and  in  common  care  of  them  all  uniting  the  several  parts  with 
one  another  and  with  himself. 

Yed,  he  said,  that  is  quite  what  the  maintainer  of  justice  will 
say. 

And   from  every  point  of  view,  whether  of  pleasure,  honor. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  323 

or  advantage,  the  approver  of  justice  is  r  ght  and  speaks  the 
truth,  and  the  disapprover  is  wrong,  and  fa  fee,  and  ignorant? 

Yes,  from  every  point  of  view.  —  The  Hepublic,  ii.  420. 
Noble,  man,  the  rich. 

From  what  point  of  view  then,  and  on  what  ground,  shall 

a  man  be   profited  by  injustice  or  intemperance  or  other  base- 
ness, even  though  he  acquire  money  or  power  ? 

From  no  point  of  view  at  all. 

What  shall  he  profit,  if  his  injustice  be  undetected  ?  for  he 
who  is  undetected  only  gets  worse,  whereas  he  who  is  detected 
and  punished  has  the  brutal  part  of  his  nature  silenced  and 
humanized  ;  the  gentler  element  in  him  is  liberated,  and  his 
whole  soul  is  perfected  and  ennobled  by  the  acquirement  of 
justice  and  temperance  and  wisdom,  more  than  the  body  ever 
is  by  receiving  gifts  of  beauty,  strength,  and  health,  in  propor- 
tion as  the  soul  is  more  honorable  than  the  body. 

Certainly,  he  said.' 

On  this  higher  end,  then,  the  man  of  understanding  will  con- 
centrate the  energies  of  his  life.  And  in  the  first  place,  he 
will  honor  studies  which  impress  these  qualities  on  his  soul, 
and  will  disregard  others  ? 

Clearly,  he  said. 

In  the  next  place,  he  will  regulate  his  bodily  habit,  and  so 
far  will  he  be  from  yielding  to  brutal  and  irrational  pleasures, 
that  he  will  regard  even  health  as  quite  a  secondary  matter  ; 
his  first  object  will  be  not  that  he  may  be  fair  or  strong  or 
well,  unless  he  is  likely  thereby  to  gain  temperance,  but  he 
will  be  always  desirous  of  preserving  the  harmony  of  the  body 
for  the  sake  of  the  concord  of  the  soul  ? 

Certainly  he  will,  he  replied,  if  he  has  true  music  in  him. 

And  there  is  a  principle  of  order  and  harmony  in  the  acqui- 
sition of  wealth  ;  this  also  he  will  observe,  and  will  not  allow 
himself  to  be  dazzled  by  the  opinion  of  the  world,  and  heap  up 
riches  to  his  own  infinite  harm  ? 

I  think  not,  he  said. 

He  will  look  at  the  city  which  is  within  h:'m,  and  take  care 
to  avoid  any  change  of  his  own  institutions,  sv  th  as  might  arise 
either  from  superfluity  or  from  want ;  and  wLh  a  view  to  this 
only  he  will  gain  or  spend  in  so  far  as  he  is  able  ? 

Very  true. 

And,  for  the  same  reason,  he  will  accept  such  honors  as  he 
deems  likely  to  make  him  a  better  man  ;  but  those  which  are 


324  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

likely  to  disorder  his  constitution,  whether  private  >r  public 
honors,  he  will  avoid? 

Then,  if  that  is  his  motive,  he  will  not  be  a  politician  ? 

By  the  dog  of  Egypt,  he  will  !  in  the  city  which  is  hk  own, 
though  in   the  land  of  his  birth  perhaps  not,  unless  by  some 
providential  accident.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  422. 
Noble,  no  rhetorician  is. 

Soc.  I  am  contented  with  the  admission  that  rhetoric  is 

of  two  sorts  ;  one,  which  is  mere  flattery,  and  disgraceful  dec- 
lamation ;  the  other,  which  is  noble  and  aims  at  the  training 
und  improvement  of  the  souls  of  the  citizens,  and  strives  to 
say  what  is  best,  whether  welcome  or  unwelcome,  to  the  audi- 
ence;  but  have  you  ever  known  such  a  rhetoric;  or  if  you 
have,  and  can  point  out  any  rhetorician  who  is  of  this  stamp, 
will  you  tell  me  who  he  is? 

Gal.  But,  indeed,  I  am  afraid  that  I  cannot  tell  you  of  any 
such  among  the  orators  who  are  at  present  living. 

Soc.  Well,  then,  can  you  mention  any  one  of  a  former  gen- 
eration, who  may  be  said  to  have  improved  the  Athenians,  who 
found  them  worse  and  made  them  better,  from  the  day  that  he 
began  to  make  speeches  ?  for,  indeed,  I  do  not  know  of  such  a 
man. 

Gal.  What !  did  you  never  hear  that  Themistocles  was  a 
good  man,  and  Cimon  and  Miltiades  and  Pericles,  who  is  just 
lately  dead,  and  whom  you  heard  yourself? 

Soc.  Yes,  Gallicles,  they  were  good  men,  if,  as  you  said  at 
first,  true  virtue  consists  only  in  the  satisfaction  of  our  own 
desires  and  those  of  others ;  but  if  not,  and  if,  as  we  were  af- 
terwards compelled  to  acknowledge,  the  satisfaction  of  some 
desires  makes  us  better  and  of  others  worse,  and  we  ought  to 
gratify  the  one  and  not  the  other,  and  there  is  an  art  in  dis- 
tinguishing them  —  can  you  tell  me  of  any  of  these  statesmen 
who  did  distinguish  them. 

Gal.  No,  indeed,  I  cannot. —  Gorgias,  iii.  94. 
Nobler  life.     See  Life,  the  nobler. 
Novelty,  the  love  of.     See  Innovations. 
Novelty,  the  world  jealous  of. 

Euth.  I  understand,   Socrates ;  he  means  to  attack  you 

about  the  familUr  sign  which  occasionally,  as  you  say,  comes 
to  you.  He  thinks  that  you  are  a  neologian,  and  he  is  going  to 
have  you  up  befo-e  the  court  for  this.  He  knows  that  such  a 
charge  is  readily  received  by  the  world.  I  can  tell  you  ihat. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  325 

for  when  I  myself  speak  in  the  assembly  about  divine  things, 
and  foretell  the  future  to  them,  they  laugh  at  me  as  a  mad- 
man ;  and  yet  every  word  that  I  say  is  true.  But  they  are 
jealous  of  all  of  us.  I  suppose  that  we  must  be  brave  and  not 
mind  them. 

Soc.  Their  laughter,  friend  Euthyphro,  is  not  a  matter  of 
much  consequence.  For  a  man  may  be  thought  wise  ;  but 
the  Athenians,  I  suspect,  do  not  trouble  themselves  about  him 
until  he  begins  to  impart  his  wisdom  to  others ;  and  then  for 
some  reason  or  other,  perhaps,  as  you  say,  from  jealousy,  they 
are  angry.  —  Euthyphro,  i.  286. 
Numbers  no  argument. 

Soc.  O  Polus,  I  am  not  a  public  man,  and  only  last  year, 

when  my  tribe  were  serving  as  Prytanes,  and  the  lot  fell  upon 
me  and  I  was  made  a  senator,  and  had  to  take  the  votes,  there 
was  a  laugh  at  me,  because  I  was  unable  to  take  them.  And 
as  I  failed  then,  you  must  not  ask  me  to  count  the  suffrages  of 
the  company  now ;  but  if ,  as  I  was  saying,  you  have  no  better 
argument  than  numbers,  let  me  have  a  turn,  and  do  you  make 
trial  of  the  sort  of  proof  which,  as  I  think,  ought  to  be  given  ; 
for  I  shall  produce  one  witness  only  of  the  truth  of  my  words, 
and  he  is  the  person  with  whom  I  am  arguing ;  his  suffrage  I 
know  how  to  take ;  but  with  the  many  I  have  nothing  to  do, 
and  do  not  even  address  myself  to  them.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  60. 

Oaths,  false. 

Every  man  should  regard   adulteration   as  a   particular 

kind  of  falsehood,  concerning  which  the  many  are  too  fond  of 
saying,  that  at  proper  times,  the  practice  may  often  be  right. 
But  they  leave  the  time  and  place  and  occasion  undefined  and 
unregulated,  and  from  this  want  of  definiteness  in  their  lan- 
guage they  do  a  great  deal  of  harm  to  themselves  and  to  others. 
Now,  a  legislator  ought  not  to  leave  the  matter  undefined ;  he 
ought  to  prescribe  some  limit,  either  greater  or  less.  Let  this, 
then,  be  the  limit  prescribed :  no  one  shall  call  the  Gods  to  wit- 
ness, when  he  says  or  does  anything  false  or  deceitful  or  dis- 
honest, unless  he  would  be  the  most  hateful  of  mankind  to  them. 
And  he  is  most  hateful  to  them  who  takes  a  false  oath,  and  never 
thinks  of  the  Gods  ;  and  in  the  second  place,  he  who  tells  a 
falsehood  in  the  presence  of  his  superiors.  Now,  better  men 
are  the  superiors  of  worse  men,  and  in  general  elders  are  the 
superiors  of  the  young  ;  wherefore,  also,  parents  are  the  superiors 


326  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

of  their  ch.ldren,  and  men  of  women  and  children,  and  rulers 
of  their  subjects  ;  for  all  men  ought  to  reverence  any  one  who 
is  in  any  position  of  authority,  and  especially  those  who  are  in 
State  offices.  And  this  is  the  reason  why  I  have  spoken  of 
these  matters.  For  every  one  who  is  guilty  of  adulteration  in 
the  agora  tells  a  falsehood,  and  deceives,  and  when  he  invokes 

O  '  * 

the  Gods,  according  to  the  customs  and  cautions  of  the  wardens 
of  the  agora,  he  is  perjured,  and  has  no  respect  either  for  God 
or  man.  —  Laws,  iv.  428. 
Office-seeking  disgraceful. 

Of  course  you  know  that  ambition  and  avarice  are  said 

to  be  and  are  a  disgrace  ? 

Very  true. 

And  for  this  reason  money  and  honor  have  no  attraction  for 
them  ;  they  do  not  wish  to  be  directly  paid  for  governing  and 
so  get  the  name  of  hirelings,  nor  by  indirectly  helping  them- 
selves out  of  the  public  revenues  to  get  the  name  of  thieves. 
And  not  being  ambitious  they  do  not  care  about  honor  ;  and 
therefore  necessity  must  be  laid  upon  them,  and  they  must  be 
induced  to  serve  from  the  fear  of  punishment.  And  this,  as  I 
imagine,  is  the  reason  why  the  forwardness  to  take  office,  in- 
stead of  waiting  to  be  compelled,  has  been  thought  dishonora- 
ble. Now  he  who  refuses  to  rule  is  liable  to  be  ruled  by  one 
who  is  worse  than  himself,  than  which  no  punishment  can  be 
greater.  And  the  fear  of  this,  as  I  conceive,  induces  the  good 
to  take  office,  not  because  they  would,  but  because  they  cannot 
help ;  nor  under  the  idea  that  they  are  going  to  have  any  ben- 
efit or  enjoyment  themselves,  but  as  a  necessity,  and  because 
they  are  not  able  to  commit  the  task  of  ruling  to  any  one  who 
is  better  than  themselves,  or  indeed  as  good.  For  the  proba- 
bility is  that  if  a  city  were  composed  entirely  of  good  men, 
then  to  avoid  office  would  be  as  much  an  object  of  contention 
as  to  obtain  office  is  at  present ;  then  we  should  have  plain 
proof  that  the  true  ruler  is  not  meant  by  nature  to  regard  his 
own  interest,  but  that  of  his  subjects ;  and  every  wise  man  will 
therefore  choose  rather  to  receive  a  benefit  from  another  than 
to  have  the  trouble  of  conferring  one.  —  The  Republic,  ii. 
169. 
Office-seekers. 

You  must  contrive  for  your  future  rulers  another  and  a 

better  life  than  that  of  a  ruler,  then  you  may  have  a  well- 
ordered  State ;  for  only  in  the  State  which  offers  this  will  they 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS  327 

rule  who  are  truly  rich,  not  in  silver  and  gold,  but  in  virtue 
and  wisdom,  which  are  the  true  blessings  of  life.  Whereas  if 
they  go  to  the  administration  of  public  affairs,  poor  and  hun- 
gering after  their  own  private  advantage,  thinking  that  hence 
they  are  to  snatch  away  the  good  of  life,  order  there  can  never 
be ;  for  they  will  be  fighting  about  office,  and  the  civil  and  do- 
mestic broils  which  thus  arise  will  be  the  ruin  of  the  rulers 
themselves  and  of  the  whole  State. —  The  Republic,  ii.  347. 
Oligarchy.  See  Miserly  men ;  Government,  property  in;  and  Money. 
Opinion,  true. 

Soc.  If  a  man  knew  the  way  to  Larisa,  or  anywhere  else, 

and  went  to  the  place  and  led  others  thither,  would  he  not 
be  a  right  and  good  guide  ? 

Men.    Certainly. 

Soc.  And  a  person  who  had  a  right  opinion  about  the  way, 
but  had  never  been  and  did  not  know,  might  be  a  good  guide 
also,  might  he  not  ? 

Men.  Certainly. 

Soc.  And  while  he  has  true  opinion  about  that  which  the 
other  knows,  he  will  be  just  as  good  a  guide  if  he  thinks  the 
truth,  as  if  he  knows  the  truth  ? 

Men.  Exactly. 

Soc.  Then  true  opinion  is  as  good  a  guide  to  correct  action 
as  wisdom  ;  and  that  was  the  point  which  we  omitted  in  our 
speculation  about  the  nature  of  virtue,  when  we  said  that  wis- 
dom only  is  the  guide  of  right  action  ;  whereas  there  is  also 
right  opinion. 

Men.  True. 

Soc.  Then  right  opinion  is  not  less  useful  than  knowledge  ? 

Men.  The  difference,  Socrates,  is  only  that  he  who  has 
knowledge  will  always  be  right ;  but  he  who  has  right  opinion 
will  sometimes  be  right,  and  sometimes  not  right. 

Soc.  What  do  you  mean  ?  Can  he  be  wrong  who  has  right 
opinion,  as  long  as  he  has  right  opinion  ? 

Men.  I  admit  the  cogency  of  that,  and  therefore,   Socrates, 
I  wonder  that  knowledge  should  be  preferred  to  right  opinion 
—  or  why  they  should  ever  differ.  —  Meno,  i.  273. 
Opinion,  right. 

"  Is  that  which  is  not  wise,  ignorant  ?  do  you  not  see  that 

there  is  a  mean  between  wisdom  and  ignorance  ? "  "  And 
what  may  that  be  ?  "  I  said.  ';  Right  opinion,"  she  replied  ; 
"which,  as  you  know,  being  incapable  of  giving  a  reason,  is  not 


328  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

knowledge  (for  how  can  knowledge  be  devoid  of  r^a^o^  ?  iior 
again,  ignorance,  for  neither  can  ignorance  attain  the  truth), 
but  is  clearly  something  which  is  a  mean  between  ignorance 
and  wisdom."  —  The  Symposium,  i.  494.  - 
Opinion,  popular,  not  to  be  heeded. 

Soc.  But  why,  my  dear  Crito,  should  we  care  about  the 

opinion  of  the  many?      Good  men,  and  they  are  the  only  per- 
sons who  are  worth  considering,  will  think  of  these  things  truly 
as  they  occurred. 

Cr.  But  you  see,  Socrates,  that  the  opinion  of  the  many 
must  be  regarded,  for  what  is  now  happening«shows  that  they 
can  do  the  greatest  evil  to  any  one  who  has  lost  their  good 
opinion. 

Soc.  I  only  wish,  Crito,  that  they  could  ;  for  then  they  could 
also  do  the  greatest  good,  and  that  would  be  well.  But  in 
reality  they  can  do  neither :  for  they  cannot  either  make  a 
man  wise  or  make  him  foolish ;  and  whatever  they  do  is  the 
result  of  chance.  —  Crito,  i.  348. 
Opinion  of  the  many  and  the  wise. 

Soc.  In  questions  of  just  and  unjust,  fair  and  foul,  good 

and  evil,  which  are  the  subjects  of  our  present  consultation, 
ought  we  to  follow  the  opinion  of  the  many  and  to  fear  them  ; 
or  the  opinion  of  the  one  man  who  has  understanding?  ought 
we  not  to  fear  and  reverence  him  more  than  all  the  rest  of  the 
world :  and  if  we  desert  him  shall  we  not  destroy  and  injure 
that  principle  in  us  which  may  be  assumed   to  be  improved 
by  justice  and   deteriorated    by  injustice  ;  —  there    is  such  a 
principle  ? 

Cr.  Certainly  there  is,  Socrates 

Soc.  Then,  my  friend,  we  must  not  regard  what  the  many 
say  of  us  ;  but  what  he,  the  one  man  who  has  understanding  of 
just  and  unjust,  will  say,  and  what  the  truth  will  say.  And 
therefore  you  begin  in  error  when  you  suggest  that  we  should 
regard  the  opinion  of  the  many  about  just  and  unjust,  good 
and  evil,  honorable  and  dishonorable.  "  Well,"  some  one  will 
say,  "  but  the  many  can  kill  us." 

Cr.  Ye^,  Socrates ;  that  will  clearly  be  the  answer. 

Soc.  That  is  true :  but  still  I  find  with  surprise  that  the  old 
argument  is,  as  I  conceive,  unshaken  as  ever.  —  Crito,  i.  352. 
Opinion  and  knowledge.     See  Knowledge,  etc. 
Opinion,  public,  compared  to  a  great  beast. 
Let  me  crave  your  assent,  also,  to  a  further  observatiou. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  329 

All  those  mercenary  individuals,  whom  the  world  calls  Soph- 
ists and  esteems  rivals,  do  but  teach  the  collective  opinion 
of  the  many,  which  are  the  opinions  of  their  assemblies  ;  and 
this  is  their  wisdom.  I  might  compare  them  to  a  man  who 
should  study  the  tempers  and  desires  of  a  mighty  strong  beast 
who  is  fed  by  him  —  he  would  learn  how  to  approach  and 
handle  him,  also  at  what  times  and  from  what  causes  he  is 
dangerous  or  the  reverse,  and  what  is  the  meaning  of  his  sev- 
eral cries,  and  by  what  sounds,  when  another  utters  them,  he  is 
soothed  or  infuriated  ;  and  you  may  suppose,  further,  that  when, 
by  constantly  living  with  him,  he  has  become  perfect  in  all 
this  he  calls  his  knowledge  wisdom,  and  makes  a  system  or 
art,  which  he  proceeds  to  teach,  not  that  he  has  any  real  notion 
of  what  he  is  teaching,  but  he  names  this  honorable  and  that 
dishonorable,  or  good  or  evil,  or  just  or  unjust,  all  in  accord- 
ance with  the  tastes  and  tempers  of  the  great  brute,  when  he 
has  learnt  the  meaning  of  his  inarticulate  grunts.  Good  he 
pronounces  to  be  what  pleases  him,  and  evil  what  he  dislikes  ; 
and  he  can  give  no  other  account  of  them  except  that  the  just 
and  noble  are  the  necessary,  having  never  himself  seen,  and 
having  no  power  of  explaining  to  others,  the  nature  of  either, 
or  the  immense  difference  between  them.  Would  not  he  be  a 
rare  educator  ? 

Indeed,  he  would. 

And  in  what  respects  does  he  who  thinks  that  wisdom  is  the 
discernment  of  the  tastes  and  pleasures  of  the  assembled  multi- 
tude, whether  in  painting  or  music,  or,  finally,  in  politics,  differ 
from  such  an  one  ?  For  I  suppose  you  will  agree  that  he  who 
associates  with  the  many,  and  exhibits  to  them  his  poem  or 
other  work  of  art,  or  the  service  which  he  has  done  the  State, 
making  them  his  judges,  except  under  protest,  will  also  experi- 
ence the  fatal  necessity  of  producing  whatever  they  praise. 
And  yet  the  reasons  are  utterly  ludicrous  which  they  give  in 
confirmation  of  their  notions  about  the  honorable  and  good 
Did  you  ever  hear  any  of  them  which  were  not  ? 

No,  nor  am  I  likely  to  hear. 

You  recognize  the  truth  of  what  has  been  said  ?  Then  let 
me  ask  you  to  consider,  further,  whether  the  world  will  ever  be 
induced  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  absolute  beauty  rather 
than  of  the  many  beautiful,  or  of  the  absolute  in  each  kind 
rather  than  of  the  many  in  each  kind? 

Certainly  not 


330  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Then  the  world  cannot  possibly  be  a  philosopher  ? 

Impossible. 

And  therefore  philosophers  must  inevitably  fall  under  th« 
censure  of  the  world  ? 

They  must.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  319. 
Opinion,  right,  differences  as  to.     See  Differences. 
Opinion,  false.     See  False  and  Heterodoxy. 
Opinions  and  beliefs,  true.     See  Beliefs. 
Opposites,  generation  of.     See  Generation. 
Order  and  Harmony,  wealth  acquired  according  to.     See  Noble  rich 

man. 

Order  and  harmony  in  the  soul.     See  Harmony. 
Order  and  Law,  limitation  of. 

Soc.  I  omit  to  speak  of  ten  thousand  other  things,  such 

as  beauty  and  health  and  strength,  and  of  the  many  beauties 
and  high  perfections  of  the  soul ;  methinks,  0  my  fair  Philebus, 
that  the  goddess  saw  the  universal  wantonness  and  wickedness 
of  all  things,  having  no  limit  of  pleasure  or  satiety,  and  she  de- 
vised the  limit  of  law  and  order,  tormenting,  as  you  say,  Phile- 
bus, or,  as  I  affirm,  saving  the  soul.  — Philebus,  iii.  161. 
Order  of  nature  reversed.  See  Nature,  etc. 

Pain  and  pleasure  related. 

How  singular  is  the  thing  called  pleasure,  and  how  curi- 
ously related  to  pain,  which  might  be  thought  to  be  the  oppo- 
site of  it ;  for  they  never  will  come  to  a  man  together,  and  yet 
he  who  pursues  either  of  them  is  generally  compelled  to  take 
the  other.  Their  bodies  are  two  and  yet  they  are  joined  to  a 
single  head ;  and  I  cannot  help  thinking  that  if  Aesop  had 
noticed  them,  he  would  have  made  a  fable  about  God  trying  to 
reconcile  their  strife,  and  how,  when  he  could  not,  he  fastened 
their  heads  together  ;  and  this  is  the  reason  why  when  one 
comes  the  other  follows,  as  I  find  in  my  own  case,  pleasure 
comes  following  after  the  pain  in  my  leg  which  was  caused  by 
the  chain.  — Phaedo,  i.  386. 
Pain  and  pleasure  simultaneous. 

Soc.  Do  you  see  the  inference :  —  that  pleasure  and  pain 

are  simultaneous,  when  you  say  that  being  thirsty,  you  drink? 
For  are  they  not  simultaneous,  and  do  they  not  affect  at  the 
same  time  the  same  part,  whether  of  the  soul  or  the  body  ; 
which  of  them  is  affected,  cannot  be  supposed  to  be  of  any 
consequence  ?  Is  that  true  or  not  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  331 

Cal.  True 

Soc.  I  envy  you,  Callicles,  for  having  been  initiated  in  th« 
great  mysteries  before  you  were  initiated  into  the  little.  I 
thought  that  was  not  allowable.  But  to  return  to  our  argu- 
ment :  —  does  not  a  man  cease  from  thirsting  and  from  the 
pleasure  of  drinking  at  the  same  moment  ? 

Cal.  True. 

Soc.  And  if  he  is  hungry,  or  has  any  other  desire,  does  he 
not  cease  from  the  desire  and  the  pleasure  at  the  same  moment  ? 

Cal.  Very  true. 

Soc.  Then  he  ceases  from  pain  and  pleasure  at  the  same 
moment  ? 

Cal  Yes. 

Soc.  But  he  does  not  cease  from  good  and  evil  at  the  same 
moment,  as  you  have  admitted,  —  do  you  not  still  admit  that  ? 

Cal.  Yes,  I  do ;  but  what  is  the  inference  ? 

Soc.  Why,  my  friend,  the  inference  is  that  the  good  is  not 
the  same  as  the  pleasant,  or  the  evil  the  same  as  the  painful, 
for  there  is  a  cessation  of  pleasure  and  pain  at  the  same  moment ; 
but  not  of  good  and  evil.  How  then  can  pleasure  be  the  same 
as  good,  or  pain  as  evil  ?  And  I  would  have  you  look  at  the 
matter  in  another  point  of  view,  which  could  hardly,  I  think, 
have  been  considered  by  you  when  you  identified  them :  Are 
not  the  good  good  because  they  have  good  present  with  them, 
as  the  beautiful  are  those  who  have  beauty  present  with  them  ? 

Cal.  Yes.  —  Gorgias.  iii.  86. 
Pain  and  pleasure,  qualities  of. 

Soc.  But  there  is  no  difficulty  in  seeing  that  pleasure  and 

pain  as  well  as  opinion  have  qualities,  for  they  are  great  or 
small,  and  have  various  degrees  of  intensity  ;  as  was  indeed 
said  long  ago  by  us. 

Pro.   Quite  true. 

Soc.  And  if  there  is  badness  in  any  of  them,  Protarchus,  then 
we  should  speak  of  a  bad  opinion  or  of  a  bad  pleasure  ? 

fro.  Quite  true,  Socrates. 

Soc.  And  if  there  is  rightness  in  any  of  them,  should  we  not 
speak  of  a  right  opinion  or  right  pleasure ;  and  in  like  manner 
of  the  reverse  of  rightness  ? 

Pro.   Certainly. 

Soc.  And  if  the  thing  opined  be  erroneous,  might  we  not  say 
that  the  opinion  is  erroneous,  and  not  rightly  opined  ? 

Pro.   Ceriainly. 


332  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Soc.  And  if  we  see  a  pleasure  or  pain  which  errs  in  respect 
of  the  object  of  pleasure  or  pain,  shall  we  call  that  right  or 
good,  or  by  any  honorable  name  ? 

Pro.  Not  if  the  pleasure  is  mistaken ;  we  could  not. 

Soc.  And  surely  pleasure  often  appears  to  accompany  an 
opinion  which  is  not  true,  but  false  ? 

Pro.  That  is  quite  correct ;  and  in  that  case,  Socrates,  we 
call  the  opinion  false,  but  no  one  could  call  the  actual  pleasure 
false. 

Soc.  How  eagerly,  Protarchus,  do  you  rush  to  the  defense  of 
pleasure  ! 

Pro.  Nay,  Socrates,  I  only  say  what  I  hear. 

Soc.  And  is  there  no  difference,  my  friend,  between  that 
pleasure  which  is  associated  with  right  opinion  and  knowledge, 
and  that  which  is  often  found  in  us  associated  with  falsehood 
and  ignorance  ? 

Pro.  There  must  be  a  very  great  difference  between  them. 
—  Philebus,  Hi.  175. 
Painter,  the  Poet  like  the.     See  Poet,  etc. 
Painting  and  writing. 

Soc.  I  cannot  help  feeling,  Phaedrus,  that  writing  is  un- 
fortunately like  painting ;  for  the  creations  of  the  painter  have 
the  attitude  of  life,  and  yet  if  you  ask  them  a  question  they 
preserve  a  solemn  silence.  And  the  same  may  be  said  of 
speeches.  You  would  imagine  that  they  had  intelligence,  but 
if  you  want  to  know  anything  and  put  a  question  to  one  of 
them,  the  speaker  always  gives  one  unvarying  answer.  And 
when  they  have  been  once  written  down  they  are  tumbled  about 
anywhere  among  those  who  do  and  among  those  who  do  not 
understand  them.  And  they  have  no  reticences  or  proprieties 
towards  different  classes  of  persons ;  and,  if  they  are  unjustly 
assailed  or  abused,  their  parent  is  needed  to  protect  his  offspring, 
for  they  cannot  protect  or  defend  themselves. 

Phaedr.  That  again  is  most  true. 

Soc.  May  we  not  imagine  another  kind  of  writing  or  speak- 
ing far  better  than  this  is,  and  having  far  greater  power,  — 
which  is  one  of  the  same  family,  but  lawfully  begotten  ?  Let 
us  see  what  his  origin  is. 

Phaedr.  Who  is  he,  and  what  do  you  mean  about  his  origin  ? 

Soc.  I  am  speaking  of  an  intelligent  writing  which  is  graven 
in  the  soul  of  him  who  has  learned,  and  can  defend  itself,  and 
knows  when  to  speak  and  when  to  be  silent. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  333 

Phaedr.  You  mean  the  word  of  knowledge  which  has  a  Diving 

o  o 

goul.  and  of  which  the  written  word  is  properly  no  more  than 
an  image  ? 

Soc.  Yes,  of  course  that  is  what  I  mean.  —  Phaedrus,'\.  581. 
Painting,  imitation.      See  Imitation,  etc. 
Painting,  deception  in.     See  Likeness  of  the  world. 
Parents,  what  the  children  owe  to  the.     See  Children,  etc. 

Ath.  Neither  God,  nor  a  man  who  has  understanding,  will 

ever  advise  any  one  to  neglect  his  parents.  To  a  discourse  con- 
cerning the  honor  and  dishonor  of  parents,  a  prelude  such  as 
the  following,  about  the  service  of  the  Gods,  will  be  a  suitable 
introduction:  —  There  are  ancient  customs  about  the  Gods 
which  are  universal,  and  they  are  of  two  kinds;  some  of  the 
Gods  we  see  with  our  eyes  and  honor  them,  of  others  we 
honor  the  images  ;  raising  statues  of  them  which  we  adore  ; 
and  though  they  be  lifeless,  yet  we  imagine  that  the  living 
Gods  have  a  good  will  and  gratitude  to  us  on  this  account. 
Now,  if  a  man  has  a  father  or  mother,  or  their  father  or  mother 
treasured  up  in  his  house  stricken  in  years,  let  him  consider 
that  no  statue  can  be  more  potent  to  grant  his  requests  than 
they  are,  who  are  sitting  at  his  hearth,  if  only  he  knows  how 
to  show  true  service  to  them. 

Cle.  And  what  do  you  call  the  true  mode  of  service  ? 

Ath.  I  will  tell  you,  0  my  friend,  for  such  things  are  worth 
listening  to. 

Cle.  Proceed. 

Ath.  Oedipus,  as  tradition  says,  when  dishonored  by  his  sons, 
invoked  on  them  the  fulfillment  of  those  curses  from  the  God 
which  every  one  declares  to  have  been  heard  and  ratified  by 
the  Gods ;  and  Amyntor  in  his  wrath  invoked  curses  on  his 
son  Phoenix,  and  Theseus  upon  Hippolytus,  and  innumerable 
others  have  also  called  down  wrath  upon  their  children,  which 
is  a  plain  proof  that  the  Gods  listen  to  the  imprecations  of 
parents ;  for  the  curses  of  a  parent  are,  as  they  ought  to  be, 
mighty  against  his  children  as  no  others  are.  And  shall  we 
suppose  that  the  prayers  of  a  father  or  mother  who  is  spe- 
cially dishonored  by  his  or  her  children,  are  heard  by  the  Gods 
in  accordance  with  nature  ;  and  that  if  a  man  is  honored  by 
hem,  and  in  the  gladness  of  his  heart  earnestly  entreats  the 
Gods  in  his  prayers  to  do  them  good,  he  is  not  equally  heard, 
and  that  they  do  not  minister  to  his  request?  If  not,  they 
would  be  very  unjust  ministers  of  good,  and  that  we  affirm  to 
be  contrary  to  their  nature. 


834  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Cle.  Certainly. 

Ath.  May  we  not  think,  as  I  was  saying  just  now,  that  we 
can  possesss  no  image  which  is  more  honored  by  the  Gods,  than 
that  of  a  father  or  grandfather,  or  of  a  mother  stricken  in 
years?  whom  when  a  man  honors,  the  heart  of  the  God  re- 
joices, and  he  is  ready  to  answer  their  prayers.  And,  truly, 
the  figure  of  an  ancestor  is  a  wonderful  thing,  far  higher  than 
that  of  a  lifeless  image.  For  when  they  are  honored  by  us, 
they  join  in  our  prayers,  and  when  they  are  dishonored,  they 
utter  imprecations  against  us ;  but  lifeless  objects  do  neither. 
And,  therefore,  if  a  man  makes  a  right  use  of  his  father  and 
grandfather  and  other  aged  relations,  he  will  have  the  best  of 
all  images  which  can  procure  him  the  favor  of  the  Gods. 

Cle.  Excellent. 

Ath.  Every  man   of  understanding  fears  and   respects   the 
prayers  of  his  parents,  knowing  well   that  many  times  and  to 
many  persons  they  have  been  accomplished.     Now,  these  things 
being  thus  ordered  by  nature,  good  men  think  that  they  are  the 
gainers  by  having  aged  parents  living,  to  the  end  of  their  life, 
or  if  they   depart   early,  they  are  deeply  lamented   by   them ; 
and  to  the  bad  they  are  very  terrible.      Wherefore   let  every 
man  honor  with   every  sort   of  lawful  honor,  his  own  parents 
agreeably  to  what  has  now  been  said.  —  Laws,  iv.  442. 
Parents,  brave  sons  of  brave.     See  State,  heroes,  etc. 
Parental  sorrow  to  be  lightly  borne.     See  Sorrow. 
Parricides. 

But  what  if  the  people  go  into  a  passion,  and  aver  that  a 

grown-up  sou  ought  not  to  be  supported  by  his  father,  but  that 
the  father  should  be  supported  by  the  son  ?  He  did  not  bring 
him  into  the  world  in  order  that  when  he  was  grown  up  he 
himself  should  be  the  servant  of  his  own  servants,  and  should 
support  him  and  his  rabble  of  slaves  and  companions ;  but  that, 
having  such  a  protector,  he  might  be  emancipated  from  the 
government  of  the  rich  and  aristocratic,  as  they  are  termed. 
And  so  he  bids  him  and  his  companions  depart,  just  as  any 
other  father  might  drive  out  of  the  house  a  riotous  son  and 
his  party  of  revelers. 

By  heaven,  he  said,  then  the  parent  will  discover  what  a 
monster  he  has  been  fostering  in  his  bosom  ;  and  when  he 
wants  to  drive  him  out,  he  will  find  that  he  is  weak  and  his 
son  strong. 

Why,  you  do  not  mean  to  say  that  the  tyrant  will  use  vio- 
lence ?  What !  beat  his  father  if  he  opposes  him  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  335 

Yes,  he  will ;  and  he  will  begin  by  taking  away  his  arms. 

Then  he  is  a  parricide,  and  a  cruel,  unnatural  son  to  an  aged 
parent  whom  he  ought  to  cherish ;  and  this  is  real  tyranny, 
about  which  there  is  no  mistake  ;  as  the  saying  is,  the  people 
who  would  escape  the  smoke  which  is  the  slavery  of  freemen, 
has  fallen  into  the  fire  which  is  the  tyranny  of  slaves.  Thus 
liberty,  getting  out  of  all  order  and  reason,  passes  into  the 
harshest  and  bitterest  form  of  slavery. —  The  Republic^  ii. 
398. 
Parties,  political. 

Atli.  Consider,  then,  to  whom  our  State  is  to  be  intrusted. 

For  there  is  a  thing  which  has  occurred  times  without  number 
in  States  — 

Cle.  What? 

Ath.  That  when  there  has  been  a  contest  for  power,  and  the 
conquerors  have  monopolized  the  government,  and  have  re- 
fused all  share  to  the  defeated  party  and  their  descendants,  they 
have  lived  watching  one  another,  in  perpetual  fear  that  some 
one  will  come  into  power  who  has  a  recollection  of  former 
wrongs,  and  will  rise  up  against  them.  Now,  according  to  our 
view,  such  governments  are  not  polities  at  all,  nor  are  laws 
right  which  are  passed  for  the  good  of  particular  classes  and 
not  for  the  good  of  the  whole  State.  States  which  have  such 
laws  are  not  polities  but  parties,  and  their  notion  of  justice  is 
simply  unmeaning.  I  say  this,  because  I  am  going  to  assert 
that  we  must  not  intrust  the  government  in  your  State  to  any 
one  because  he  is  rich,  or  because  he  possesses  any  advantage, 
such  as  strength,  or  stature,  or  again  birth  ;  but  he  who  is 
most  obedient  to  the  laws  of  the  State,  he  shall  win  the  palm; 
and  to  him  who  is  victorious  in  the  first  degree,  shall  be  given 
the  highest  office  and  chief  ministry  of  the  Gods ;  and  tLe 
second  to  him  who  bears  the  second  palm  ;  and  in  a  similar 
ratio  shall  all  the  other  offices  be  assigned  to  their  holder*. 
And  when  I  call  the  rulers  servants  or  ministers  of  the  law,  * 
give  them  this  name  not  for  the  sake  of  novelty,  but  because  I 
certainly  believe  that  upon  their  service  or  ministry  depends 
the  well  or  ill-being  of  the  State.  For  that  State  in  which 
the  law  is  subject  and  has  no  authority,  I  perceive  to  be  on  the 
highway  to  ruin  ;  but  I  see  that  the  State  in  which  the  law  is 
above  the  rulers,  and  the  rulers  are  the  inferiors  of  the  law, 
has  salvation,  and  every  blessing  which  the  Gods  can  confer. 
—  Laws,  iv.  24'Z. 


S36  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Passion,  incorrupt,  the  end  of  reason. 

You   remember  that  passion   or  spirit  appeai-ed  at  first 

sight  to  be  a  kind  of  desire,  but  now  we  should  say  the  con- 
trary ;  for  in  the  conflict  of  the  soul,  spirit  is  arrayed  on  the 
side  of  the  rational  principle. 

Most  assuredly. 

But  a  further  question  arises :  Is  spirit  different  from 
reason  also,  or  only  a  kind  of  reason ;  in  which  latter  case,  in- 
stead  of  three  principles  in  the  soul,  there  will  be  only  two, 
the  rational  and  the  concupiscent ;  or  rather,  as  the  State  was 
composed  of  three  classes,  traders,  auxiliaries,  counselors,  so  may 
there  not  be  in  the  individual  soul  a  third  element  which  is 
passion  or  spirit,  and  when  not  corrupted  by  education,  is  the 
auxiliary  of  reason  ? 

Yes,  he  said,  there  must  be  a  third.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  267. 
Patients  and  doctors.     See  Doctors. 
Patriarchal  State. 

Ath.  They  could  hardly  have  wanted  lawgivers  as  yet ; 

nothing  of  that  sort  was  likely  to  have  existed  in  their  days, 
for  they  had  no  letters  at  this  early  stage  ;  they  lived  by  habit 
and  the  customs  of  their  forefathers,  as  they  are  called. 

Ck.  Probably. 

Ath.  But  there  was  already  existing  a  form  of  government 
which,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  is  generally  termed  a  lordship,  and 
this  still  remains  in  many  places,  both  among  Hellenes  and 
barbarians,  and  is  the  government  which  is  declared  by  Homer 
to  have  prevailed  among  the  Cyclopes :  — 

"  They  have  neither  councils  nor  judgments,  but  they  dwell  in 
hollow  rocks  on  the  tops  of  high  mountains,  and  every  one  is  the 
judge  of  his  wife  and  children,  and  they  do  not  trouble  themselves 
about  one  another." 

Cle.  That  must  be  a  charming  poet  of  yours ;  I  have  read 
some  other  verses  of  his,  which  are  very  clever ;  but  I  do  not 
know  much  of  him,  for  foreign  poets  are  not  much  read  among 
the  Cretans. 

Meg.  But  they  are  in  Lacedaemon,  and  he  appears  to  be 
the  prince  of  them  all ;  the  manner  of  life,  however,  which  he 
describes  is  not  Spartan,  but  rather  Ionian,  and  he  seems  quite 
to  confirm  what  you  are  saying,  carrying  back  the  ancient  state 
of  mankind  by  the  help  of  tradition,  to  barbarism. 

Ath.  Yes ;  and  we  may  accept  his  witness  to  the  fact  that 
there  was  a  time  when  primitive  societies  had  this  form. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  337 

Cle.  Very  true. 

Aih.  And  lid  not  such  States  spring  out  of  single  habita- 
tions and  families  who  were  scattered  and  thinned  in  the  de- 
vastations ;  and  the  eldest  of  them  was  their  ruler,  because 
with  them  government  originated  in  the  authority  of  a  father 
and  a  mother,  whom,  like  a  flock  of  birds,  they  followed,  form- 
ing one  troop  under  the  patriarchal  rule  and  sovereignty  of 
their  parents,  which  of  all  sovereignties  is  the  most  just? 

die.  Very  true.  —  Laws,  iv.  209. 
Patriotism.     See  Individual,  the  State  greater,  etc. 
Patroclus  and  Achilles.     See  Achilles. 
Paupers  and  criminals  co-existing.     See  Criminals. 
Peace  in  view  of  death.     See  Calmness. 
Peace,  national.     See  National. 
People  swayed  by  rulers.     See  Rulers,  swaying,  etc. 
Persian  princes,  how  cared  for. 

After  the  birth  of  the  royal  child,  he  is  tended,  not  by  a 

good-for-nothing  woman-nurse,  but  by  the  best  of  the  royal 
eunuchs,  who  are  charged  with  the  care  of  him,  and  especially 
with  the  fashioning  and  formation  of  his  limbs,  in  order  that 
he  may  be  as  shapely  as  possible  ;  which  being  their  calling, 
they  are  held  in  great  honor.  And  when  the  young  prince  is 
seven  years  old  he  is  put  upon  a  horse  and  taken  to  the  riding- 
masters  and  begins  to  go  out  hunting.  And  at  fourteen  years 
of  age  he  is  handed  over  to  the  royal  schoolmasters,  as  they 
are  termed ;  these  are  four  chosen  men,  reputed  to  be  the  best 
among  the  Persians  of  a  certain  age ;  and  one  of  them  is  the 
wisest,  another  the  justest,  a  third  the  most  temperate,  and 
a  fourth  the  most  valiant.  The  first  instructs  him  in  the  ma- 
gianism  of  Zoroaster  the  son  of  Oromasus,  which  is  the  wor- 
ship of  the  Gods,  and  teaches  him  also  the  duties  of  his 
royal  office  ;  the  second,  who  is  the  justest,  teaches  bim  always 
to  speak  the  truth  ;  the  third,  or  most  temperate,  forts!  ^  him 
to  allow  any  pleasure  to  be  lord  over  him,  that  he  may  oe 
customed  to  be  a  freeman  and  king  indeed,  —  lord  of  himsen 
first,  and  not  a  slave  ;  the  most  valiant  makes  him  bold  and 
fearless,  telling  him  that  if  he  fears  he  is  to  deem  himself  a 
slave.  —  Alcibiades  I.  iv.  538. 

Persian  State,  freedom  in  the.     See  Freedom  in  the,  etc. 
Persuasion  better  than  force.     See  Legislation. 
In   the  days  of  old  the   Gods  had  the  whole  earth  dis- 
tributed among  them  by  allotment  ;   there  was  no  quarreling 
22 


338  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

and  you  cannot  suppose  that  the  Gods  did  not  know  what  was 
proper  for  each  of  them  to  have ;  or,  knowing  this,  that  they 
would  seek  to  procure,  for  themselves  by  contention  that  which 
more  properly  belonged  to  others.  Each  of  them  by  just  ap- 
portionment obtained  what  they  wanted,  and  peopled  their  own 
districts  ;  and  when  they  had  peopled  them  they  tended  us  human 
beings  who  belonged  to  them  as  shepherds  tend  their  flocks, 
excepting  only  that  they  did  not  use  blows  or  bodily  force,  as 
shepherds  do,  but  governed  us  like  pilots  from  the  stern  of  the 
vessel,  which  is  an  easy  way  of  guiding  animals,  holding  our 
souls  by  the  rudder  of  persuasion,  according  to  their  own  pleas- 
ure ;  thus  did  they  guide  all  mortal  creatures.  —  Critias,  ii. 
595. 
Persuasion  the  crown  of  rhetoric. 

Soc.  What  is  that  which,  as  you  say,  is  the  greatest  good 

of  man,  and  of  which  you  are  the  creator  ?     Answer  us.< 

Gor.  That  good,  Socrates,  which  is  truly  the  greatest,  being 
that  which  gives  to  men  freedom  in  their  own  persons,  and  to 
rulers  the  power  of  ruling  over  others  in  their  several  States. 

Soc.  And  what  would  you  consider  this  to  be  ? 

Gor.  "What  is  there  greater  than  the  word  which  persuades 
the  judges  in  the  courts,  or  the  senators  in  the  council,  or  the 
citizens  in  the  assembly,  or  at  any  other  political  meeting?  — 
if  you  have  the  power  of  uttering  this  word,  you  will  have  the 
physician  your  slave,  and  the  trainer  your  slave,  and  the 
money-maker  of  whom  you  talk  will  be  found  to  gather  treas- 
ures, not  for  himself,  but  for  you  who  are  able  to  speak  and 
persuade  the  multitude. 

Soc.  Now  I  think,  Gorgias,  that  you  have  very  accurately 
explained  what  you  conceive  to  be  the  art  of  rhetoric  ;  and 
you  mean  to  say,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  that  rhetoric  is  the  arti 
ficer  of  persuasion,  having  this  and  no  other  business,  and  that 
this  is  her  crown  and  end.  Do  you  know  any  other  effect  of 
rhetoi'ic  over  and  above  that  of  producing  persuasion  ? 

Gor.  No:   the  definition  seems  to  me  very  fair,   Socrates-, 
for  persuasion  is  the  crown  of  rhetoric.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  37. 
Persuasion  the  greatest  art. 

Pro.  I  have  often  heard  Gorgias  maintain,  Socrates,  that 

the  art  of  persuasion  far  surpassed  every  other ;  this,  as  he 
says,  is  by  far  the  best  of  them  all,  for  to  it  all  things  sub- 
mit, not  by  compulsion,  but  of  their  own  free  will.  —  Philebus 
ui  198. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  339 

Persuasion,  the  art  of. 

Sir.  But  the  art  of  the  lawyer,  of  the  populai   orator, 

and  the  art  of  conversation  may  be  called  in  one  word  the  art 
of  persuasion. 

Theaet.  True. 

Str.  And  of  persuasion,  there  may  be  aaid  to  bo  two 
kinds  ? 

Theaet.  What  are  they  ? 

Str.  One  is  private,  and  the  other  public 

But  that  sort  of  hireling  whose  conversation  is  pleasing  and 
who  baits  his  hook  with  pleasure  and  only  exacts  his  main- 
temmce  as  the  price  of  his  flattery,  we  should  all,  if  I  am  not 
mistaken,  describe  as  possessing  an  art  of  sweetening,  or  mak- 
ing things  pleasant.  —  Sophist,  iii.  456. 
Philosopher  willing  to  die.  See  Boldness. 

I  must  try  to  make  more  successful  defense  before  you 

than  I  did  before  the  judges.  For  I  am  quite  ready  to  ac- 
knowledge, Simmias  and  Cebes,  that  I  ought  to  be  grieved  at 
death,  if  I  were  not  persuaded  that  I  am  going  to  other  Gods 
who  are  wise  and  good  (of  this  I  am  as  certain  as  I  can  be  of 
anything  of  the  sort),  and  to  men  departed  (though  I  am  not 
so  certain  of  this  last)  who  are  better  than  those  whom  I  leave 
behind  ;  and  therefore  I  do  not  grieve  as  I  might  have  done, 
for  I  have  good  hope  that  there  is  yet  something  remaining  for 
the  dead,  and  as  has  been  said  of  old,  some  far  better  thing  for 
the  good  than  for  the  evil 

And  now  I  will  make  answer  to  you,  O  my  judges,  and 
show  that  he  who  has  lived  as  a  true  philosopher  has  reason  to 
be  of  good  cheer  when  he  is  about  to  die,  and  that  after  death 
he  may  hope  to  receive  the  greatest  good  in  the  other  world. 
And  how  this  may  be,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  I  will  endeavor  to 
explain.  For  I  deem  that  the  true  disciple  of  philosophy  is 
likely  to  be  misunderstood  by  other  men  ;  they  do  not  perceive 
that  he  is  ever  pursuing  death  and  dying  ;  and  if  this  is  true, 
why,  having  had  the  desire  of  death  all  his  life  long,  should  he 
repine  at  the  arrival  of  that  which  he  has  been  always  pursu- 
ing and  desiring  ? 

Simmias  laughed  and  said :  Though  not  in  a  laughing 
humor,  I  swear  that  I  cannot  help  laughing,  when  I  think 
what  the  wicked  world  will  say  when  they  hear  this.  They 
will  say  that  it  is  delightfully  true,  and  our  people  at  home 
will  agree  with  them  in  saying  that  the  life  which  philosophers 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

desire  is  in  reality  death,  and  that  they  have  fi  und  them  out 
to  be  deserving  of  the  death  which  they  desire. 

And  they  are  right,  Simmias,  in  saying  so,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  words  "  they  have  found  them  out ; "  for  they  have 
not  found  out  what  is  the  nature  of  that  death  which  the  true 
philosopher  desires,  or  how  he  deserves  or  desires  death.  But 
let  us  leave  them  and  have  a  word  with  ourselves  :  Do  we  be- 
lieve that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  death  ? 

To  be  sure,  replied  Simmias. 

And  is  this  anything  but  the  separation  of  soul  and  body  ? 
And  being  dead  is  the  completion  of  the  separation  when  the 
soul  exists  in  herself,  and  is  parted  from  the  body  and  the  body 
is  parted  from  the  soul  —  that  is  death  ? 

Exactly  :  that  and  nothing  else,  he  replied.  —  Phaedo,  \ 
389. 

Philosopher,  curiosity  does  not  make  a.     See  Curiosity. 
Philosopher  characterized. 

Soc.  Then,    as  this    is    your  wish,   I   will    describe    the 

leaders  ;  for  there  is  no  use  in  talking  about  the  inferior  sort. 
In  the  first  place,  the  lords  of  philosophy  have  never,  from 
their  youth  upwards,  known  their  way  to  the  Agora,  or  the 
dicastery,  or  the  council,  or  any  other  political  assembly  ;  they 
neither  see  nor  hear  the  laws  or  votes  of  the  State  written  or 
recited ;  the  eagerness  of  political  societies  in  the  attainment 
of  offices.  —  clubs,  and  banquets,  and  revels,  and  singing- 
maidens,  do  not  enter  even  into  their  dreams.  Whether  any 
event  has  turned  out  well  or  ill  in  the  city,  what  disgrace  may 
have  descended  to  any  one  from  his  ancestors,  male  or  female, 
are  matters  of  which  the  philosopher  no  more  knows  than  he 
can  tell,  as  they  say,  how  many  pints  are  contained  in  the 
ocean.  Neither  is  he  conscious  of  his  ignorance.  For  he 
does  not  hold  aloof  in  order  that  he  may  gain  a  reputation  ; 
but  the  truth  is,  that  the  outer  form  of  him  only  is  in  the  city  ; 
his  mind,  disdaining  the  littlenesses  and  nothingnesses  of  human 
things,  is  "'  flying  all  abroad,"  as  Pindar  says,  measuring  with 
line  and  rule  the  things  which  are  under  and  on  the  earth  and 
above  the  heaven,  interrogating  the  whole  natute  of  each  and 
all,  but  not  condescending  to  anything  which  is  within  reach. 

Theod.  What  do  you  mean,  Socrates  ? 

Soc.  I  will  illustrate  my  meaning,  Theodorus,  by  the  jest 
which  the  clever,  witty  Thracian  handmaid  made  about  Thales, 
when  he  fell  into  a  well  as  he  was  looking  up  at  the  stars. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOLGHTS.  &U 

She  said,  that  he  was  so  eager  to  know  what  was  going  on  in 
heaven,  that  he  could  not  see  what  was  before  his  feet.  This 
is  a  jest  which  is  equally  applicable  to  all  philosophers.  For 
the  philosopher  is  wholly  unacquainted  with  his  next  door 
neighbor  ;  he  is  ignorant,  not  only  of  what  he  is  doing,  but  he 
hardly  knows  whether  he  is  a  man  or  an  animal ;  he  is  search- 
ing into  the  essence  of  man,  and  busy  in  inquiring  what  be- 
longs to  such  a  nature  to  do  or  suffer  different  from  any  other  ; 
I  think  that  you  understand  me,  Theodorus  ? 

Theod.  I  do,  and  what  you  say  is  true. 

Soc.  And  thus,  my  friend,  on  every  occasion,  private  as 
well  as  public,  as  I  said  at  first,  when  he  appears  in  a  law- 
court,  or  in  any  place  in  which  he  has  to  speak  of  things  which 
are  at  his  feet  and  before  his  eyes,  he  is  the  jest,  not  only  of 
Thracian  handmaids  but  of  the  general  herd,  tumbling  into 
wells  and  every  sort  of  disaster  through  his  inexperience.  His 
awkwardness  is  fearful,  and  gives  the  impression  of  imbecil- 
ity. When  he  is  reviled,  he  has  nothing  personal  to  say 
in  answer  to  the  civilities  of  his  adversaries,  for  he  knows 
no  scandals  of  any  one,  and  they  do  not  interest  him ;  and 
therefore  he  is  laughed  at  for  his  sheepishness ;  and  when 
others  are  being  praised  and  glorified,  in  the  simplicity  of  his 
heart  he  cannot  help  laughing  openly  and  unfeignedly ;  and 
this  again  makes  him  look  like  a  fool.  When  he  hears  a 
tyrant  or  king  eulogized,  he  fancies  that  he  is  listening  to  the 
praises  of  some  keeper  of  cattle,  —  a  swineherd,  or  shepherd, 
or  cowherd,  who  is  congratulated  on  the  quantity  of  milk 
which  he  squeezes  from  them  ;  and  he  remarks  that  the  creat- 
ure whom  they  tend,  and  out  of  whom  they  squeeze  the  wealth 
is  of  a  less  tractable  and  more  insidious  nature.  Then,  again, 
he  observes  that  the  great  man  is  of  necessity  as  ill-mannered 
and  uneducated  as  any  shepherd,  —  for  he  has  no  leisure,  and 
he  is  surrounded  by  a  wall,  which  is  his  mountain-pen.  Hear- 
ing of  enormous  landed  proprietors  of  ten  thousand  acres  and 
more,  our  philosopher  deems  this  to  be  a  trifle,  because  he  has 
been  accustomed  to  think  of  the  whole  earth  ;  and  when  they 
sing  the  praises  of  family,  and  say  that  some  one  is  a  gentleman 
because  he  has  had  seven  generations  of  wealthy  ancestors,  he 
thinks  that  their  sentiments  only  betray  a  dull  and  narrow 
vision  in  those  who  utter  them,  and  who  are  not  educated 
enough  to  look  at  the  whole,  nor  to  consider  that  every  man 
has  had  thousands  and  thousands  of  progenitors,  and  among 


342  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

them  have  been  rich  and  poor,  kings  and  slaves,  Hellenes  and 
barbarians,  many  times  over.  And  when  the  people  pride 
themselves  on  having  a  pedigree  of  twenty-five  ancestors,  which 
goes  back  to  Heracles,  the  son  of  Amphitryon,  he  cannot  un- 
derstand their  poverty  of  ideas.  Why  they  are  unable  to  cal- 
culate that  Amphitryon  had  a  twenty-fifth  ancestor,  who  might 
have  been  anybody,  and  was  such  as  fortune  made  him,  and  he 
had  a  fiftieth,  and  so  on  ?  He  amuses  himself  with  the  notion 
that  they  cannot  count,  and  thinks  that  a  little  arithmetic  would 
have  got  rid  of  their  senseless  vanity.  Now,  in  all  these  cases 
our  philosopher  is  derided  by  the  vulgar,  partly  because  he  is 
thought  to  despise  them,  and  also  because  he  is  ignorant  of 
what  is  before  him,  and  always  at  a  loss. 
Theod.  That  is  very  true,  Socrates. 

Soc.  But,  O  my  friend,  when  he  draws  the  other  into  upper 
air  and  gets  him  out  of  his  pleas  and  rejoinders  into  the  con- 
templation of  justice  and  injustice  in  their  own  nature  and  in 
their  difference  from  one  another  and  from  all  other  things  ; 
or  from  the  commonplaces  about  the  happiness  of  kings  to  the 
consideration  of  government,  and  of  human  happiness  and 
misery  in  general  —  what  they  are,  and  how  a  man  is  to  attain 
the  one  and  avoid  the  other  —  when  that  narrow,  keen,  little 
legal  mind  is  called  to  account  about  all  this,  he  gives  the  phi- 
losopher his  revenge  :  for  dizzied  by  the  height  at  which  he  is 
hanging,  whence  he  looks  into  space,  which  is  a  strange  ex- 
perience to  him,  he  being  dismayed  and  lost,  and  stammering 
out  broken  words,  is  laughed  at,  not  by  Thracian  handmaidens 
or  any  other  uneducated  persons,  for  they  have  no  eye  for  the 
situation,  but  by  every  man  who  has  not  been  brought  up  as  a 
slave.  Such  are  the  two  characters,  Theodorus :  the  one  of 
the  freeman  called  by  you  useless,  when  he  has  to  perform 
some  menial  office,  such  as  packing  up  a  bag,  or  flavoring  a 
sauce,  or  fawning  speech ;  the  other,  of  the  man  who  is  able 
to  do  all  this  kind  of  service  smartly  and  neatly,  but  knows 
not  how  to  wear  his  cloak  like  a  gentleman  ;  still  less  with  the 
music  of  discourse  can  he  hymn  the  true  life  which  is  lived  by 
immortals  or  men  blessed  of  heaven.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  376. 
Philosopher  and  Sophist. 

Str.  The  art  of  dialectic  would  be  attributed  by  you  only 

to  the  philosopher  pure  and  true  ? 

Theaet.  Who  but  he  can  be  worthy  ? 

Str.  This  is  the  region   in  which  we   shall  always  discover 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  343 

the  philosopher,  both  now  and  hereafter ;  like  the  Sophist,  he 
is  not  easily  discovered,  but  for  a  different  reason. 

Theaet.   For  what  reason  ? 

Sfr.  Because  the  Sophist  runs  away  into  the  darkness  of 
not-being,  in  which  he  has  learned  by  habit  to  feel  about,  and 
cannot  be  discovered  himself  because  of  the  darkness  of  the 
place.  Is  not  that  true  ? 

Theaet.   Quite  so. 

Str.  And  the  philosopher,  always  holding  converse  through 
reason  with  the  idea  of  being,  is  also  dark  from  excess  of  light ; 
for  the  eyes  of  the  soul  of  the  multitude  are  unable  to  endure 
the  vision  of  the  divine. 

Theaet.  Yes ;  that  is  quite  as  true  as  the  other. 

Str.  Well,  the  philosopher  may  hereafter  be  more  fully  con- 
sidered by  us,  if  we  are  disposed  ;  but  the  Sophist  plainly  must 
not  be  allowed  to  escape  until  we  have  had  a  good  look  at  him. 

Theaet.  Very  good.  —  Sophist  iii.  492. 
Philosophers  and  Statesmen,  border-ground  between. 

Soc.  What  manner  of   man  was  he  who  came  up  to  you 

and  censured  philosophy ;  was  he  an  orator  who  himself  prac- 
tices in  the  courts,  or  an  instructor  of  orators,  who  makes  the 
speeches  with  which  they  do  battle  ? 

Cri.  He  was  certainly  not  an  orator,  and  I  doubt  whether 
he  had  ever  been  into  court ;  but  they  say  that  he  knows  the 
business,  and  is  a  clever  man,  and  composes  wonderful  speeches. 

Soc.  Now  I  understand,  Crito  ;  he  is  one  of  an  amphibious 
class,  whom  I  was  on  the  point  of  mentioning  —  one  of  those 
whom  Prodicus  describes  as  on  the  border-ground  between 
philosophers  and  statesmen  —  they  think  that  they  are  the 
wisest  of  all  men,  and  that  they  are  generally  esteemed  the 
wisest ;  nothing  but  the  rivalry  of  the  philosophers  stands  in 
their  way ;  and  they  are  of  the  opinion  that  if  they  can  prove 
the  philosophers  to  be  good  for  nothing,  no  one  will  dispute 
their  title  to  the  palm  of  wisdom,  for  that  they  are  themselves 
really  the  wisest,  although  they  are  apt  to  be  mauled  by  Euthy- 
demus  and  his  friend,  when  they  get  hold  of  them  in  conversa- 
tion. This  opinion  which  they  entertain  of  their  own  wisdom 
is  very  natural ;  for  they  have  a  certain  amount  of  philosophy, 
and  a  certain  amount  of  political  wisdom  ;  there  is  reason  in 
what  they  say.  for  they  argue  that  they  have  just  enough  of 
both,  while  they  keep  out  of  the  way  of  all  risks  and  conflicts 
ind  reap  the  fruits  of  their  wisdom.  —  Euthydemus,  i.  211. 


344  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Philosopher,  despising  bodily  pleasures.     See  Bodily  pleasure. 
Philosophers,  dizzy. 

1  have  not  a  bad  notion  which   came  into  nay  head  only 

this  moment :  I  believe  that  the  primeval  givers  of  names  were 
undoubtedly  like  too  many  of  our  modern  philosophers,  who, 
in  their  search  after  the  nature  of  things,  are  always  getting 
diz/y  from  going  round  and  round  and  then  they  imagine  that 
the  world  is  going  round  and  round  and  moving  anyhow  ;  and 
this  appearance,  which  arises  out  of  their  own  internal  condi- 
tion, they  suppose  to  be  a  reality  of  nature  ;  they  think  that 
there  is  nothing  stable  or  permanent,  but  only  flux  and  motion, 
and  that  all  is  full  of  every  sort  of  motion  and  change.  — 
Cratylus,  i.  650. 
Philosophic  nature,  rare. 

Neither  is  there  any  reason   why  I  should  again  set  in 

array  the  philosopher's  virtues,  as  you  will  doubtless  remember 
that  courage,  magnanimity,  apprehension,  memory,  were  his 
natural  gifts.  And  you  objected  that,  although  no  one  could 
deny  what  I  then  said,  still,  if  you  leave  words  and  look  at 
facts,  the  persons  who  are  thus  described  are  some  of  them 
manifestly  useless,  and  the  greater  number  wholly  depraved ; 
we  were  then  led  to  inquire  into  the  grounds  of  these  accusa- 
tions, and  we  had  arrived  at  the  point  of  asking  why  are  the 
many  bad,  which  question  of  necessity  brought  us  back  to  the 
examination  and  definition  of  the  true  philosopher. 

Exactly. 

And  now  we  have  to  consider  the  corruptions  of  the  phil- 
osophical nature,  why  so  many  are  spoiled  and  so  few  escape 
spoiling  —  I  am  speaking  of  those  whom  you  call  useless  but 
not  wicked  ;  and  after  that  we  will  consider  the  imitators  of 
philosophy,  what  manner  of  natures  are  they  who  aspire  after 
a  profession  which  is  above  them  and  of  which  they  are  un- 
worthy, and  then,  by  their  manifold  inconsistencies,  bring  upon 
philosophy,  and  upon  all  philosophers,  that  universal  reproba- 
tion of  which  we  speak. 

What  are  these  corruptions,  he  said  ? 

I  will  see  if  I  can  explain  them  to  you,  I  said.  Every 
one  will  admit  that  a  nature  having  in  perfection  all  the  qual- 
ities which  make  a  philosopher,  is  a  plant  that  rarely  growi 
among  men  —  there  are  not  many  of  them. 

They  are  very  rare.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  317. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  345 

Philosophy  to  be  followed. 

Soc.  Do  you  then  be  reasonable,  Crito,  and  do  t.ot  mind 

whether  the  teachers  of  philosophy  are  good  or  bad,  but  think 
only  of  Philosophy  herself.  Try  and  examine  her  well  and 
truly,  and  if  she  be  evil  seek  to  turn  away  all  men  from  her, 
and  not  your  sons  only  ;  but  if  she  be  what  I  believe  that  she 
is,  then  follow  her  and  serve  her,  you  and  your  house,  as  the 
saying  is,  and  be  of  good  cheer.  —  Euthydemus,  i.  212. 
Philosophy  delivering  the  soul. 

He  who  is  a  philosopher  or  lover  of  learning,  and  is  en- 
tirely pure  at  departing,  is  alone  permitted  to  attain  to  the  di- 
vine nature.  And  this  is  the  reason,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  why 
the  true  votaries  of  philosophy  abstain  from  all  fleshly  lusts, 
and  endure  and  refuse  to  give  themselves  up  to  them,  —  not 
because  they  fear  poverty  or  the  ruin  of  their  families,  like  the 
lovers  of  money,  and  the  world  in  general ;  nor  like  the  lovers 
of  power  and  honor,  because  they  dread  the  dishonor  or  dis- 
grace of  evil  deeds. 
•  No,  Socrates,  that  would  not  become  them,  said  Cebes. 

No  indeed,  he  replied  ;  and  therefore  they  who  have  a  care 
of  their  own  souls,  and  do  not  merely  live  moulding  and  fash- 
ioning the  body,  say  farewell  to  all  this  ;  they  will  not  walk  in 
the  ways  of  the  blind :  and  when  Philosophy  offers  them  puri- 
fication and  release  from  evil,  they  feel  that  they  ought  not  to 
resist  her  influence,  and  whither  she  leads  they  turn  and  fol- 
low. —  Phaedo,  i.  411. 
Philosophy  in  early  youth. 

At  present,  I  said,  even   those  who  study  philosophy  in 

early  youth,  or  in  the  intervals  of  money-making  and  house- 
keeping, do  but  make  an  approach  to  the  most  difficult,  branch 
of  the  subject,  and  then  take  themselves  off  (I  am  speaking  of 
those  who  have  the  most  training,  and  by  the  most  difficult 
branch  I  mean  dialectic)  ;  and  in  after-life  they  perhaps  go  to 
a  discussion  which  is  held  by  others,  and  to  which  they  are  in- 
vited, and  this  they  deem  a  great  matter,  as  the  study  of  phi- 
osophy  is  not  regarded  by  them  as  their  proper  business :  then, 
ai  years  advance,  in  most  cases  their  light  is  quenched  more 
truly  than  Heracleitus'  sun,  for  they  never  rise  again. 

But  what  ought  to  be  their  course  ? 

Just  the  opposite.  In  childhood  and  youth  their  study,  and 
what  philosophy  they  learn,  should  be  suited  to  their  tender 
age  :  let  their  bodies  be  taken  care  of  during  the  period  of 


846  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

growth,  M  be  hereafter  the  servants  of  philosophy ;  as  the  man 
advances  to  mature  intelligence  he  should  increase  the  gymnas- 
tics of  the  soul ;  but  when  the  strength  of  our  citizens  fails, 
and  is  past  civil  and  military  duties,  then  let  them  range  at 
will  and  have  no  other  serious  employment,  as  we  intend  them 
to  live  happily  here,  and,  this  life  ended,  to  have  a  similar  hap- 
piness in  another.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  325. 
Philosophy  in  the  State. 

When  persons  who  are  unworthy  of  education  approach 

philosophy  and  make  an  alliance  with  her  who  is  in  a  rank 
above  them,  what  sort  of  ideas  and  opinions  are  likely  to  be 
generated  ?  "Will  they  not  be  sophisms  captivating  to  the  ear, 
yet  having  nothing  in  them  genuine  or  worthy  of  or  akin  to 
true  wisdom  ? 

No  doubt,  he  said. 

Then  there  is  a  very  small  remnant,  Adeimantus,  I  said,  of 
worthy  disciples  of  philosophy  :  perchance  some  noble  nature, 
brought  up  under  good  influences,  and  detained  by  exile  in  her 
service  who  in  the  absence  of  temptation  remains  devoted 
to  her ;  or  some  lofty  soul  born  in  a  mean  city,  the  politics 
of  which  he  contemns  or  neglects  ;  and  perhaps  there  may 
be  a  few  who,  having  a  gift  for  philosophy,  leave  other  arts, 
which  they  justly  despise,  and  come  to  her ;  and  peradventure 
there  are  some  who  are  restrained  by  our  friend  Theages'  bridle 
(for  Theages,  you  know,  has  had  everything  to  draw  him  away  ; 
but  his  ill-health  keeps  him  from  politics).  My  own  case  of 
the  internal  sign  is  indeed  hardly  worth  mentioning,  as  very 
rarely,  if  ever,  has  such  a  monitor  been  vouchsafed  to  any  one 
else.  Those  who  belong  to  this  small  class  have  tasted  how 
sweet  and  blessed  a  possession  philosophy  is,  and  have  also 
seen  and  been  satisfied  of  the  madness  of  the  multitude,  and 
known  that  there  is  no  one  who  ever  acts  honestly  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  States,  nor  any  helper  who  defends  the  cause 
of  the  just  by  whose  aid  he  may  be  saved.  Such  a  defender 
may  be  compared  to  a  man  who  has  fallen  among  wild  beasts ; 
he  would  not  join  in  the  wickedness  of  his  fellows,  but  neither 
would  he  be  able  alone  to  resist  all  their  fierce  natures,  and 
therefore  he  would  be  of  no  use  to  the  State  or  to  his  friends, 
and  would  have  to  throw  away  his  life  before  he  had  done  any 
good  to  himself  or  others.  When  he  reflects  upon  all  this,  he 
holds  his  peace,  and  does  his  own  business.  He  is  like  one 
who  retires  under  the  shelter  of  a  wall  in  the  storm  of  dust 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  347 

and  sleet  which  the  driving  wind  hurries  along ;  *nd  when  he 
sees  the  rest  of  mankind  full  of  wickedness,  he  is  content  if 
only  he  can  live  his  own  life  and  be  pure  from  evil  or  un- 
righteousness, and  depart  in  peace  and  good  will,  with  bright 
hopes. 

Yes,  he  said,  and  he  will  have  done  a  great  work  before  he 
departs. 

A  great  work,  —  yes  ;  but  not  the  greatest,  unless  he  find  a 
State  suitable  to  him ;  for  in  a  State  which  is  suitable  to  him 
he  will  have  a  larger  growth,  and  be  the  saviour  of  his  country 
as  well  as  of  himself. 

Enough,  then,  of  the  causes  \vhy  philosophy  is  in  such  an 
evil  name  ;  how  unjustly,  has  been  explained  :  and  now  is 
there  anything  more  which  you  wish  to  say  ? 

Nothing  more  on  that  subject,  he  replied ;  but  I  should  like 
to  know  which  of  the  governments  now  existing  is  in  your 
opinion  the  one  adapted  to  her. 

Not  any  of  them,  I  said  ;  and  that  is  the  very  accusation 
which  I  bring  against  them :  not  one  of  them  is  worthy  of  the 
philosophic  nature  ;  and  hence  that  nature  is  warped  and  de- 
formed ;  as  the  exotic  seed  which  is  sown  in  a  foreign  land  be- 
comes denaturalized,  and  is  vanquished  and  degenerates  into 
the  nature  stock,  even  so  this  growth  of  philosophy,  instead  of 
persisting,  receives  another  character.  But  if  philosophy  ever 
finds  in  the  State  that  perfection  which  she  herself  is,  then 
will  be  seen  that  she  is  in  truth  divine,  and  that  all  other 
things,  whether  natures  of  men  or  institutions,  are  but  hu- 
man ;  and  now,  I  know,  that  you  are  going  to  ask  what  that 
State  is. 

No,  he  said ;  there  you  are  wrong,  for  I  was  going  to  ask 
another  question — whether  it  is  the  State  of  which  we  are 
the  founders  and  inventors,  or  some  other? 

Yes,  I  replied,  ours  in  most  respects  ;  but  you  may  remember 
our  saying  before  that  some  living  authority  would  always  be 
required  in  the  State,  whose  idea  of  the  constitution  would  be 
the  sume  which  guided  you  originally  when  laying  down  the  laws. 

That  was  said,  he  replied. 

Yes,  but  imperfectly  said ;  .you  frightened  us  with  objec- 
tions, which  certainly  showed  that  the  discussion  would  be  long 
and  difficult ;  and  even  what  remains  is  the  reverse  of  easy 

What  is  that  ? 

The  question  how   the  study  of  philosophy  may  be  so  or- 


848  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

dered  as  to  be  consistent  with  the  preservation  of  the  State , 
for  all  great  things  are  attended  with  risk  :  as  the  saying  is, 
"  Hard  is  the  good." 

Still,  he  said,  let  the  point  be  cleared  up,  and  the  inquiry 
will  then  be  complete. 

I  shall  not  be  hindered,  I  said,  by  any  want  of  will,  but,  if 
at  all,  by  a  want  of  power  :  of  my  zeal  you  shall  have  ocular 
demonstration ;  and  please  to  remark  in  what  I  am  about  to  say 
how  courageously  and  unhesitatingly  I  affirm  that  a  State  ought 
not  to  have  philosophy  studied  after  the  present  fashion.  —  Tht 
Republic,  ii.  323. 
Philosophy,  too  much,  is  ruinous. 

Philosophy,  Socrates,  if  pursued  in  moderation  and  a,t  the 

proper  age,  is  an  elegant  accomplishment,  but  too  much  phi- 
losophy is  the  ruin  of  human  life.  Even  if  a  man  has  good 
parts,  still,  if  he  carries  philosophy  into  later  life,  he  is  neces- 
sarily ignorant  of  all  those  things  which  a  gentleman  and  a 
person  of  honor  ought  to  know ;  for  he  is  ignorant  of  the  laws 
of  the  State,  and  of  the  language  which  ought  to  be  used  in  the 
dealings  of  man  with  man,  whether  private  or  public,  and  alto- 
gether ignorant  of  the  pleasures  and  desires  of  mankind  and  of 
human  character  in  general.  And  people  of  this  sort,  when 
they  betake  themselves  to  politics  or  business,  are  as  ridiculous 
as  I  imagine  the  politicians  to  be,  when  they  make  their  ap- 
pearance in  the  arena  of  philosophy.  For,  as  Euripides  says,  — 

"  Every  man  shines  in  that  and  pursues  that,  and  devotes  the  greatest  portion  of 
the  day  to  that  in  which  he  thinks  himself  to  excel  most," 

and  anything  in  which  he  is  inferior,  he  avoids  and  depreci- 
ates and  praises  the  opposite  from  partiality  to  himself,  and 
because  he  thinks  that  he  will  thus  praise  himself.  The 
true  principle  is  to  unite  them.  Philosophy,  as  a  part  of  edu- 
cation, is  an  excellent  thing,  and  there  is  no  disgrace  to  a  man 
while  he  is  young  in  pursuing  such  a  study  ;  but  when  he  is 
more  advanced  in  years,  then  the  thing  becomes  ridiculous,  and 
I  feel  towards  philosophers  as  I  do  towards  those  who  lisp  and 
imitate  children.  For  when  I  love  to  see  a  little  child,  who  is 
not  of  an  age  to  speak  plainly,  lisping  at  his  play  ;  there  is  an 
appearance  of  grace  and  freedom  in  his  utterance,  which  is 
natural  to  his  childish  years.  And  when  I  hear  some  small 
creature  carefully  articulating  its  words,  I  am  offended  ;  the  sound 
is  disagreeable,  and  has  to  my  ears  the  twang  of  slavery.  But 
when  I  see  a  man  lisping  as  if  he  were  a  child,  that  appears  tc 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  349 

me  ridiculous  and  unmanly  and  worthy  of  stripes.  And  1  have 
the  same  feeling  about  students  of  philosophy  ;  when  I  see  a 
youth  so  engaged,  that  I  consider  to  be  quite  in  character,  and 
becoming  a  man  of  a  liberal  education,  and  him  who  neglects 
philosophy  I  regard  as  an  inferior  man,  who  will  never  aspire 
to  anything  great  or  noble.  But  if  I  see  him  continuing  the 
study  in  later  life,  and  not  leaving  off,  I  think  that  he  ought  to 
be  beaten,  Socrates ;  for,  as  I  was  saying,  such  an  one,  even 
though  he  have  good  natural  parts,  becomes  effeminate.  —  Gor- 
gias,  iii.  73. 

Philosophy,  freedom  of.      See  Freedom  of  Philosophy. 
Physical  force  inferior   to  persuasion.     See   Legislation   and   Per- 
suasion. 
Physician,  the  false  and  the  true. 

• Neither  will  he  be  able  to  distinguish   the  pretender  in 

medicine  from  the  true  physician,  nor  between  any  other  true 
and  false  professor  of  knowledge.  Let  us  consider  the  matter 
in  this  way  :  If  the  wise  man  or  any  other  man  wants  to  dis- 
tinguish the  true  physician  from  the  false,  what  is  he  to  do  ': 
He  will  not  talk  to  him  about  medicine  ;  and  that,  as  we  were 
saying,  is  the  only  thing  which  the  physician  understands. 

True. 

And  on  the  other  hand,  knows  nothing  of  science,  for  this 
has  been  assumed  to  be  the  province  of  wisdom. 

True. 

And  further,  since  medicine  is  science,  we  must  infer  that  he 
does  not  know  anything  of  medicine. 

Exactly. 

The  wise  man  will  indeed  know  that  the  physician  has  some 
kind  of  science  or  knowledge  ;  but  when  he  wants  to  discover 
the  nature  of  this  he  will  ask,  What  is  the  subject-matter  ?  For 
each  science  is  distinguished,  not  as  science,  but  by  the  nature 
of  the  subject.  Is  not  that  true  ? 

Yes  ;  that  is  quite  true. 

And  medicine  is  distinguished  from  other  sciences  as  having 
the  subject-matter  of  health  and  disease  ? 

Yes. 

And  he  who  would  inquire  into  the  nature  of  medicine  must 
pursue  the  inquiry  into  health  and  disease,  and  not  into  what 
is  extraneous  ? 

True. 

And  he  who  judges  rightly  will  judge  of  the  physician  as  » 
physician  in  what  relates  to  these  ? 


350  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

He  will. 

He  will  consider  whether  what  he  says  is  true,  and  whethei 
what  he  does  is  right  in  relation  to  these  ?  —  Charmides,  i.  27. 
Physician  for  the  State.     See  State,  physician  for  the,  etc. 
Physician,  legislator  compared  to  a.     See  Legislator. 
Physician,  tried  by  boys. 

I  shall  be  tried  just  as  a  physician  would  be  tried  in  a 

court  of  little  boys  at  the  indictment  of  the  cook.     What  would 
he  reply  in  such  a  case,  if  some  one  were  to  accuse  him,  say- 
ing, "  O  my  boys,  many  evil  things  has  this  man  done  to  you  : 
he  is   the  death  of  you,  especially  of  the  younger  ones  among 
you,  cutting  and  burning  and  starving    and    suffocating    you, 
until  you   know   not  what  to  do ;  he  gives  you  the  bitterest 
potions,  and  compels  you  to  hunger  and  thirst.      How  unlike 
the   variety  of  meats   and  sweets  on  which  I  feasted  y6u  !  " 
What  do  you  suppose  that  the  physician  would  reply  when  he 
found  himself  in  such  a  predicament  ?     If  he  told  the  truth 
he  could  only  say,  "  All  this,  my  boys,  I  did   with  a  view  to 
health,"  and  then   would  there  not  just  be  a  clamor  among  a 
jury  like  that  ?     How  they  would  cry  out !  —  Gorgias,  iii.  113. 
Physicians  aud  patients.     See  Doctors,  etc. 
Physicians  and  cookery.     See  Cookery. 
Piety,  conceptions  of.     See  Holiness,  etc. 
Pleasant,  just  and  good.      See  Just  judge. 
Pleasure  as  related  to  pain.     See  Pain. 
Pleasure  and  pain,  qualities  of.     See  Pain,  qualities  of,  etc. 
Pleasure  to  be  desired. 

Soc.  Let  us  next  assume  that  in  the  soul  herself,  there  is 

an  antecedent  hope  of  pleasure  which  is  sweet  and  consoling, 
and  an  expectation  of  pain,  fearful  aud  anxious. 

Pro.  Yes;  this  is  another  class  of  pleasures  and  pains,  which 
is  of  the  soul  only,  and  is  produced  by  expectation  without  the 
body. 

Soc.  Right ;  and  I  think  that  the  examination  of  these  two 
kinds,  unalloyed  as  I  suppose  them  to  be,  and  not  compounds 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  will  most  clearly  show  whether  the  whole 
class  of  pleasure  is  to  be  desired,  or  whether  this  quality  of  en- 
tire de&irableness  is  not  rather  to  be  attributed  to  another  of 
the  classes  which  have  been  mentioned ;  and  whether  pleasure 
and  pain,  like  heat  and  cold,  and  other  things  of  this  kind,  are 
not  sometimes  to  be  desired  and  sometimes  not  to  be  desired, 
as  being  not  in  themselves  good,  but  sometimes  and  in  some 
instances  admitting  of  the  nature  of  good. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  351 

Pro.  You  say  most  truly  that  this  is  the  track  which  the 
investigation  should  follow.  —  Philebus,  iii.  168. 
Pleasure,  victory  over. 

Ath.  Have  we  not  heard  of  Iccus  of  Tarentum,  who,  with 

a  view  to  the  Olympic  and  other  contests,  in  his  zeal  for  his 
art,  and  also  because  he  was  of  a  inauly  and  temperate  consti- 
tution, never 'had  any  connection  with  a  woman  or  a  youth 
during  the  whole  time  of  his  training  ?  And  the  same  is  said 
of  Crison  and  Astylus  and  Diopompus  and  many  others,  and 
yet,  Cleiuias,  they  were  far  worse  educated  in  their  minds  than 
your  and  my  fellow-citizens,  and  in  their  bodies  far  more  lusty, 

Cle.  No  doubt  this  fact  has  been  often  affirmed  positively  by 
the  ancients  of  these  athletes. 

Ath.  And  shall  they  be  willing  to  abstain  from  what  is  ordi- 
narily deemed  a  pleasure  for  the  sake  of  a  victory  in  wrestling, 
running,  and  the  like ;  and  our  young  men  be  incapable  of  a 
similar  endurance  for  the  sake  of  a  much  nobler  victory,  which 
is  the  noblest  of  all,  as  from  their  youth  upwards  we  will  tell 
them,  charming  them,  as  we  hope,  into  the  belief  of  this,  by 
tales  in  prose  and  verse  ? 

Cle.  Of  what  victory  are  you  speaking? 

Ath.  Of  the  victory  over  pleasure,  which  if  they  win  they 
will  live  happily,  or  if  conquered  the  reverse  of  happily.  And, 
further,  will  not  the  fear  of  impiety  enable  them  to  master  that 
which  other  inferior  people  have  mastered  ? 

Cle.  I  dare  say.  —  Laws,  iv.  355. 
Pleasures  of  the  body.     See  Bodily,  etc. 
Pleasures  of  the  intelligent.     See  Intelligence. 
Pleasures  and  pains  mixed  and  unmixed.     See  Body  and  Soul. 
Pleasures,  true. 

Pro.  Which  are  the  true  pleasures,  Socrates,  and  what  is 

the  right  conception  of  them? 

Soc.  True  pleasures  are  those  which  are  given  by  beauty  of 
color  and  form,  and  most  of  those  which  arise  from  smells  ; 
those  of  sound,  again,  and  in  general  those  of  which  the  want 
is  painless  and  unconscious,  and  the  gratification  afforded  by 
them  palpable  to  sense,  and  pleasant  and  unalloyed  with  pain, 
—  Philelus,  iii.  190. 

Pleasures  of  Knowledge.     See  Knowledge. 
Pleasures  as  hindrances. 

Soc.  Do  you  wish  to  have  the  greatest  and  most  vehement 

pleasures  for  your  companions  in  addition  to  the  true  ones  ? 


0&2  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Why,  Socrates,  they  will  say,  how  can  we  ?  seeing  that  they 
are  the  source  of  ten  thousand  hindrances  to  us  ;  they  trouble 
the  souls  of  men,  which  are  our  habitation,  with  their  madness ; 
they  prevent  us  from  coming  to  the  birth,  and  are  commonly 
the  ruin  of  our  children  when  they  do  come  to  the  birth,  caus- 
ing them  to  be  forgotten  and  unheeded ;  but  the  other  true  and 
pure  pleasures,  of  which  you  spoke,  know  to  be  of  our  kindred, 
and  the  pleasures  which  accompany  health  and  temperance, 
and  are  in  a  manner  the  handmaidens  and  inseparable  at> 
tendants  of  virtue  as  of  a  God,  —  mingle  these  and  not  the 
others ;  there  would  be  great  want  of  sense  in  any  one  who 
desires  to  see  the  fair  and  untroubled  stream,  and  to  find  in 
the  admixture  what  is  the  highest  good  in  man  and  in  the  uni- 
verse, and  to  divine  what  is  the  true  form  of  good  —  there 
would  be  great  want  of  sense  in  his  allowing  the  pleasures, 
which  are  always  in  the  company  of  folly  and  vice,  to  mingle 
with  mind  in  the  cup :  Is  not  this  a  very  rational  and  suitable 
reply,  which  mind  has  made,  both  on  her  own  behalf,  as  well 
as  on  that  of  memory  and  true  opinion,  to  the  question  which 
has  been  asked  of  us? 

Pro.  Most  certainly.  —  Philebus,  iii.  204. 
Pleasures,  harmless.     See  Amusements. 
Poetry,  imitative.     See  Imitative. 
Poetry  expelled  from  the  State. 

Poetry  feeds  and  waters  the  passions  instead  of  drying 

them  up  ;  she  lets  them  rule  instead  of  ruling  them  as  they 
ought  to  be  ruled,  with  a  view  to  the  happiness  and  virtue  of 
mankind. 

I  cannot  deny  it. 

Therefore,  Glaucon,  I  said,  whenever  you  meet  with  any  oc 
the  eulogists  of  Homer  declaring  that  he  has  been  the  educator 
of  Hellas,  and  that  he  is  profitable  for  the  management  and 
administration  of  human  things,  and  that  you  should  take  him 
up  and  get  to  know  him  and  regulate  your  whole  life  according 
to  him,  we  may  love  and  honor  the  intentions  of  these  excellent 
people,  as  far  as  their  lights  extend ;  and  we  are  ready  to  ac- 
knowledge that  Homer  is  the  greatest  of  poets  and  first  of 
tragedy  writers ;  but  we  must  remain  firm  in  our  conviction 
that  hymns  to  the  Gods  and  praises  of  famous  men  are  the 
only  poetry  which  ought  to  be  admitted  into  our  State.  For 
if  you  go  beyond  this  and  allow  the  honeyed  muse  to  enter, 
either  in  epic  or  lyric  verse,  not  law  and  the  reason  of  man- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  353 

kind,  which  by  common  consent  has  ever  been  deemed  the  best, 
but  pleasure  and  pain  will  be  the  rulers  in  our  State. 

That  is  most  true,  he  said. 

Let  this,  then,  be  our  excuse  for  expelling  poetry,  that  the 
argument  constrained  us  ;  but  let  us  also  make  an  apology  to 
her,  lest  she  impute  to  us  any  harshness  or  want  of  politeness. 
We  will  tell  her,  that  there  is  an  ancient  quarrel  between  phi- 
losophy and  poetry ;  of  which  there  are  many  proofs,  such  as 
the  saying  of  '"  the  yelping  hound  howling  at  her  lord,"  or  of 
one  "'  mighty  in  the  vain  talk  of  fools,"  and  "  the  mob  of  sages 
circumventing  Zeus,"  and  the  "•  subtle  thinkers  who  are  beg- 
gars after  all ;  "  and  there  are  ten  thousand  other  signs  of  an- 
cient enmity  between  them.  Notwithstanding  this,  let  us  as- 
sure our  sweet  friend,  and  the  sister  arts  of  imitation,  that  if 
she  will  only  prove  her  title  to  existence  in  a  well-ordered 
State  we  shall  be  delighted  to  receive  her,  knowing  that  we 
ourselves  also  are  very  susceptible  of  her  charms ;  but  we  may 
not  on  that  account  betray  the  truth.  I  dare  say,  Glaucon, 
that  you  are  as  much  charmed  by  her  as  I  am,  especially  when 
you  see  her  in  the  garb  of  Homer  ? 

Yes,  indeed,  I  am  greatly  charmed. 

Shall  I  propose,  then,  that  she  be  allowed  to  return  from 
exile,  on  this  condition  —  that  she  is  to  make  a  defense  of  her- 
self in  lyrical  or  some  other  metre  ? 

Certainly. 

And  to  those  of  her  defenders  who  are  lovers  of  poetry  and 
yet  not  poets  I  think  that  we  may  grant  a  further  privilege  ; 
they  shall  be  allowed  to  speak  in  prose  on  her  behalf :  let 
them  show  not  only  that  she  is  pleasant  but  also  useful  to 
States  and  to  human  life,  and  we  will  gladly  listen,  for  if  this 
can  be  proved  we  shall  surely  be  the  gainers,  that  is  to  say,  if 
there  is  a  use  in  poetry  as  well  as  a  delight  ? 

Certainly,  he  said,  we  shall  be  the  gainers. 

If  her  defense  fails,  then,  my  dear  friend,  though  much 
against  our  will,  we  must  give  her  up,  after  the  manner  of 
lovers  who  abstain  when  they  think  that  their  love  is  not  good 
for  them ;  for  we  too  are  inspired  by  that  love  of  poetry  which 
the  education  of  noble  States  has  implanted  in  us,  and  there- 
fore we  would  have  her  appear  at  her  best  and  truest ;  but  so 
long  as  she  is  unable  to  make  good  her  defense,  even  though 
our  ears  may  listen,  this  argument  of  ours  will  be  like  a  charm 
to  us,  and  into  the  childish  love  which  the  many  have  of  her 
23 


354  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

we  shall  take  care  not  to  fall  again,  for  we  see  that  poetry, 
being  such  as  she  is,  is  not  to  be  pursued  in  earnest  or  re- 
garded seriously  as  attaining  to  the  truth  ;  and  he  who  listens 
to  her  will  be  on  his  guard  against  her  seductions,  fearing  for 
the  safety  of  the  city  which  is  within  him,  and  he  will  attend 
to  our  words. —  The  Republic,  ii.  438. 
Poets,  poor. 

Ctesippus  said:  I  like  to  see  you  blushing,  Hippothales, 

and  hesitating  to  tell  Socrates  the  name  ;  when,  if  he  were 
with  you  but  for  a  very  short  time,  he  would  be  plagued  to 
death  by  hearing  of  nothing  else.  Indeed,  Socrates,  he  has 
literally  deafened  us,  and  stopped  our  ears  with  the  praises  of 
Lysis  ;  and  if  he  is  a  little  intoxicated,  there  is  every  likeli- 
hood that  we  may  have  our  sleep  murdered  with  a  cry  of  Ly- 
sis. His  performances  in  prose  are  bad  enough,  but  nothing 
at  all  in  comparison  with  his  verse  ;  and  when  he  drenches  us 
with  his  poems  and  other  compositions,  that  is  really  too  bad  ; 
and  what  is  even  worse,  is  his  manner  of  singing  them  to  his 
love ;  this  he  does  in  a  voice  which  is  truly  appalling,  and  we 
cannot  help  hearing  him  ;  and  now  he  has  a  question  put  to 
him  by  you,  and  lo  !  he  is  blushing.  —  Lysis,  i.  42. 
Poets  our  guides. 

Let  us  proceed  no  further  in  this  direction  (for  the  road 

seems  to  be  getting  troublesome),  but  take  the  other  in  which 
the  poets  will  be  our  guide ;  for  they  are  to  us  in  a  manner 
the  fathers  and  authors  of  wisdom,  and  they  speak  of  friends 
in  no  light  or  trivial  manner,  but  God  himself,  as  they  say, 
makes  them  and  draws  them  to  one  another ;  and  this  they 
express,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  in  the  following  words :  — 

*•  God  is  ever  drawing  like  towards  like,  and  making  them  acquainted." 

I  dare  say  that  you  have  heard  those  words. 

Yes,  he  said  ;  I  have.  —  Lysis,  i.  53. 
Poets,  madness  of  the.     See  Madness  of  the  prophet,  etc. 
Poets  like  painters. 

Must  we  not  infer  that  all  the  poets,  beginning  with  Homer, 

are  only  imitators ;  they  copy  images  of  virtue  and  the  like, 
but  the  truth  they  never  reach  ?  The  poet  is  like  a  painter 
who,  as  has  already  been  observed,  will  make  a  likeness  of  a 
cobbler  though  he  understands  nothing  of  cobbling ;  and  his 
picture  is  good  enough  for  those  who  know  no  more  than  he 
does,  and  judge  only  by  colors  and  figures.  Also  the  poet  lays 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  355 

over  his  words  and  expressions  certain  colors  taken  from  the 
several  arts,  himself  understanding  their  nature  only  enough  to 
imitate  them  ;  and  other  people  who  are  as  ignorant  as  he  is, 
and  judge  only  from  his  words,  imagine  that  if  he  speaks  of  cob- 
bling, or  of  military  tactics,  or  of  anything  else,  in  metre  and 
harmony  and  rhythm  he  speaks  very  well  —  such  is  the  sweet 
influence  which  melody  and  rhythm  by  nature  have.  And  I 
think  that  you  must  know,  for  you  have  often  seen  what  a 
poor  appearance  the  tales  of  poets  make  when  stripped  of  the 
colors  which  music  puts  upon  them,  and  recited  in  prose  ? 

Yes.  he  said. 

They  are  like  faces  which  were  never  really  beautiful,  but 
only  blooming  ;  and  now  the  bloom  of  youth  has  passed  away 
from  them  ? 

Exactly. —  The  Republic,  ii.  431. 
Poets,  the  talk  about  the. 

The  talk  about  the  poets  seems  to  uie  like  a  common- 
place entertainment  to  which  a  vulgar  company  have  recourse  ; 
who,  because  they  are  not  able  to  converse  or  amuse  one  an- 
other, while  they  are  drinking,  with  the  sound  of  their  own 
voices  and  conversation  by  reason  of  their  stupidity,  raise  the 
price  of  flute-girls  in  the  market,  hiring  for  a  great  sum  the 
voice  of  a  flute  instead  of  their  own  breath,  to  be  the  medium 
of  intercourse  among  them :  but  where  the  company  are  real 
gentlemen  and  men  of  education,  you  will  see  no  flute-girls, 
nor  dancing-girls,  nor  harp-girls ;  and  they  have  no  nonsense  or 
games,  but  are  contented  with  one  another's  conversation,  of 
which  their  own  voices  are  the  medium,  and  which  they  carry 
on  by  turns  and  in  an  orderly  manner,  even  though  they  are 
very  liberal  in  their  potations.  And  a  company  like  this  of 
ours,  and  men  such  as  we  profess  to  be,  do  not  require  the 
help  of  another's  voice,  or  of  the  poets  whom  you  cannot  in- 
terrogate about  the  meaning  of  what  they  are  saying ;  people 
who  cite  them  declaring,  some  that  the  poet  has  one  meaning, 
and  others  that  he  has  another ;  and  the  point  which  is  in  dis- 
pute can  never  be  decided.  This  sort  of  entertainment  they 
decline,  and  prefer  to  talk  with  one  another,  and  put  one  an- 
other to  the  proof  in  conversation.  —  Protagoras,  i.  147. 
Poets,  tragic,  promoters  of  tyranny. 

The  tragic  poets  being  wise  men  will  forgive  us  and  others 

who  have  the  perfect  form  of  government,  if  we  object  to  hav- 
ing them  in  our  State,  because  they  are  the  eulogists  of  tyr- 
anny. 


806  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Yes,  he  said,  those  who  have  the  wit  will  doubtless  foi  give 
us. 

But  still,  I  said,  they  go  about  to  other  cities  and  attract 
mobs,  and  hire  voices  fair  and  loud  and  persuasive,  and  draw 
the  cities  over  to  tyrannies  and  democracies. 

Very  true. 

Moreover,  they  are  paid  for  this  and  receive  honor  —  tbo 
greatest  honor  from  tyrants,  and  the  next  greatest  from  democ- 
racies ;  but  the  higher  they  ascend  our  constitution  hill,  the 
more  their  reputation  fails,  and  seems  unable  from  shortness  of 
breath  to  proceed  farther. 

True.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  398. 
Poets  destroyed  by  popular  demands. 

Ath.  The  true  legislator  will  persuade,  and,  if  he  cannot 

persuade,  will  compel  the  poet  to  express  as  he  ought,  by  fair 
and  noble  words,  in  his  rhythms,  the  figures,  and  in  his  melodies, 
the  music  of  temperate,  and  brave,  and  in  every  way  good  men. 

Gle.  And  do  you  really  imagine,  Stranger,  that  this  is  the 
way  in  which  poets  generally  compose  in  States  at  the  present 
day  ?  As  far  as  I  can  observe  there  is  nothing  of  the  sort, 
except  among  us  and  among  the  Lacedaemonians,  as  you  now 
tell  me ;  in  other  places  novelties  are  always  being  introduced 
in  dancing  and  in  music,  generally  not  under  the  authority  of 
any  law,  but  at  the  instigation  of  lawless  pleasures  ;  and  these 
pleasures  are  so  far  from  being  the  same,  as  you  describe  the 
Egyptian  to  be,  or  having  the  same  principles,  that  they  are 
never  the  same.  —  Laws,  iv.  189. 
Political  bond. 

When  the  foundation  of  politics  is  in  the  letter  only,  and 

in  custom,  and  knowledge  is  divorced  from  action,  can  we  won- 
der, Socrates,  at  the  miseries  that  there  are,  and  always  will 
be,  in  States  ?  Any  other  art,  built  on  such  a  foundation, 
would  be  utterly  undermined,  —  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  that. 
Ought  we  not  rather  to  wonder  at  the  strength  of  the  political 
bond  ?  For  States  have  endured  all  th'>,  time  out  of  mind, 
and  yet  some  of  them  still  remain  and  are  not  overthrown, 
though  many  of  them,  like  ships  foundering  at  sea,  are  perish- 
ing and  have  perished,  and  will  hereafter  perish,  through  the 
incapacity  of  their  pilots  and  crews,  who  have  the  worst  sort  of 
ignorance  of  the  highest  truths  —  I  mean  to  say,  that  they  are 
wholly  unacquainted  with  politics,  of  which,  above  all  other  sci- 
ences, they  believe  themselves  to  have  acquired  the  most  per- 
fect knowledge.  —  Statesman,  iii.  588. 


PLATO* S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  357 

Political  parties.     See  Parties. 

Politicians  as  philosophers.     See  Laws,  makers  of. 

Politicians  not  Statesmen. 

Str.  But  who  are  these  elected  kings  and  priests  who  now 

come  into  view  with  a  crowd  of  retainers,  as  the  former  class 
disappears  and  the  scene  changes  ? 

T.  Soc.  Whom  do  you  mean  ? 

Str.  How  strangely  they  look  ! 

Y.  Soc.  Why  strangely  ? 

Str.  A  minute  ago  I  thought  that  they  were  all  sorts  of  ani- 
mals ;  for  many  of  them  are  like  lions  and  centaurs,  and  many 
more  like  satyrs  and  the  weak  and  versatile  sort  of  animals,  — 
Protean  shapes  ever  changing  their  form  and  nature  ;  and  now, 
Socrates,  I  begin  to  see  who  they  are. 

T.  Soc.  Who  are  they  ?  You  seem  to  be  gazing  on  some 
strange  vision. 

Str.  Yes ;  every  one  looks  strange  when  you  do  not  know 
him  ;  and  at  first  sight,  coming  suddenly  upon  him,  I  did  not 
recognize  the  politician  and  his  troop. 

Y.  Soc.  Who  is  he  ? 

Str.  The  chief  of  Sophists  and  most  accomplished  of  wiz- 
ards, who  must  at  any  cost  be  separated  from  the  true  king  or 
Statesman,  if  we  are  ever  to  see  daylight  in  the  present  inquiry. 

Y.  Soc.  That  certainly  is  not  a  hope  to  be  lightly  renounced. 
—  Statesman,  iii.  576. 
Popular  liberty.     See  Democracy. 
Popular  opinion.     See  Opinion,  public. 
Popular  influence  on  Poetry.     See  Poetry,  etc. 
Possessing  and  having.     See  Having. 
Poverty  and  wealth  equally  deteriorating.     See  Wealth. 
Poverty  and  riches  in  Age. 

They  think  that  old  age  sits  lightly  upon  you,  not  because 

of  your  happy  disposition,  but  because  you  are  rich,  and  wealth 
is  well  known  to  be  a  great  comforter. 

That  is  true,  he  replied ;  they  do  not  believe  me :  and  there 
is  something  in  what  they  say ;  not,  however,  so  much  as  they 
imagine.  I  might  answer  them  as  Themistocles  answered  the 
Seriphiao  who  was  abusing  him  and  saying  that  he  was  famous, 
not  for  his  own  merits  but  because  he  was  an  Athenian  ;  "  If 
you  had  been  an  Athenian  and  I  a  Seriphian,  neither  of  us 
would  have  been  famous."  And  to  those  who  are  not  rich  and 
are  impatient  of  old  age,  the  same  reply  may  be  made  ;  for 


358  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

neither  can  a  good  poor  man  lightly  bear  age,  nor  can  a  bad  rich 
man  ever  be  at  peace  with  himself.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  150. 
Praise  and  esteem  distinguished.     See  Esteem. 
Prayer  with  every  enterprise. 

Soc.  I  see   that  I  shall  receive  in  my  turn  a  perfect  and 

splendid  feast  of  reason.  And  now,  Timaeus,  you,  I  suppose, 
ure  to  follow,  first  offering  up  a  prayer  to  the  Gods  according 
to  custom. 

Tim.  All  men,  Socrates,  who  have  any  degree  of  right  feel- 
ing, at  the  beginning  of  every  enterprise,  whether  small  or 
great,  always  call  upon  God.  And  we,  too,  who  are  going  to 
discourse  of  the  nature  of  the  universe,  how  created  or  how  ex- 
isting without  creation,  if  we  be  not  altogether  out  of  our  wits, 
must  invoke  and  pray  the  Gods  and  goddesses  that  we  may  say 
all  things  in  a  manner  pleasing  to  them  and  likewise  consistent 
with  ourselves.  Let  this,  then,  be  our  invocation  of  the  Gods, 
to  which  I  add  an  exhortation  of  myself  that  I  may  set  forth 
this  high  argument  in  the  manner  which  will  be  most  intelligi- 
ble to  you,  and  will  most  accord  with  my  own  intent.  —  Tim- 
aeus, ii.  523. 
Preamble  to  law,  distinguished  from  the  matter. 

All   this  time,  from  early  dawn  until  noon,  we  have  been 

talking  about  laws  in  this  charming  retreat :  now  we  are  going 
to  promulgate  our  laws,  and  what  has  preceded  was  only  the 
prelude  of  them.  Why  do  I  mention  this  ?  For  this  reason  : 
Because  all  discourses  and  vocal  exercises  have  preludes  and 
overtures,  which  are  a  sort  of  artistic  beginnings,  intended  to 
help  the  strain  which  is  to  be  performed ;  lyric  measures  and 
every  other  sort  of  music  have  preludes  framed  with  wonderful 
care.  But  of  the  truer  and  higher  strain  of  law  and  politics, 
no  one  has  ever  yet  uttered  any  prelude,  or  composed  or  pub- 
lished any,  as  though  there  was  no  such  thing  in  nature. 
Whereas  our  present  discussion  seems  to  me  to  imply  that  there 
is  —  these  double  laws,  of  which  we  were  speaking,  are  not 
exactly  double,  but  they  are  in  two  parts,  the  law  and  the  pre- 
lude of  the  law.  The  arbitrary  command,  which  was  compared 
to  the  commands  of  the  physicians,  whom  we  described  as  of 
the  meaner  sort,  was  the  law  pure  and  simple  ;  and  that  which 
preceded,  and  was  described  by  our  friend  as  hortatory  only, 
was,  in  fact,  an  exhortation,  and  is  analogous  to  the  preamble 
of  a  discourse.  For  I  imagine  that  all  this  language  of  concil- 
iation, which  the  legislator  has  been  uttering  in  the  preface  of 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  359 

the  law,  was  intended  to  create  good-will  in  the  person  whom 
he  addressed,  in  order  that,  by  reason  of  this  good-will,  he 
might  more  intelligently  receive  his  command,  that  is  to  say, 
the  law.  And  therefore,  in  my  way  of  speaking,  this  is  more 
rightly  described  as  the  preamble  than  as  the  matter  of  the 
law.  — Laws,  iv.  250. 
Presentiment  of  death  in  Socrates. 

Soc.  Do  not  repeat  the  old  story  —  that  he  who  likes  will 

kill  me  and  get  my  money  ;  for  then  I  shall  have  to  repeat  the 
old  answer  that  he  will  be  a  bad  man  and  will  kill  the  good, 
and  that  the  money  will  be  of  use  to  him  ;  but  that  he  will 
wrongly  use  that  which  he  wrongly  took,  and  if  wrongly,  basely, 
and  if  basely,  hurtfully. 

Gal.  How  confident  you  are,  Socrates,  that  you  will  never 
come  to  harm !  you  seem  to  think  that  you  are  living  in  an- 
other country,  and  can  never  be  brought  into  a  court  of  jus- 
tice, as  yon  very  likely  may  be  brought  by  some  miserable  and 
mean  person. 

Soc.  Then  I  nm.-t  indeed  be  a  fool,  Callicles,  if  I  do  not 
know  that  in  the  Athenian  State  any  man  may  suffer  anything. 
And  if  I  am  brought  to  trial  and  incur  the  dangers  of  which 
you  speak,  he  will  be  a  villain  who  brings  me  to  trial  —  of  that 
I  am  very  sure,  for  no  good  man  would  accuse  the  innocent. 
Nor  shall  I  be  surprised  if  I  am  put  to  death.  Shall  I  tell  you 
why  I  anticipate  this  ? 

Gal.  By  all  means. 

Soc.  I  think  that  I  am  the  only  or  almost  the  only  Athenian 
living  who  practices  the  true  art  of  politics  ;  I  am  the  only  poli- 
tician of  my  time.  Now,  seeing  that  when  I  speak  I  speak  not 
with  any  view  of  pleasing,  and  that  I  look  to  what  is  best  and 
not  to  what  is  most  pleasant,  having  no  mind  to  use  those  arts 
and  graces  which  you  recommend,  1  shall  have  nothing  to  say 

in  the  justice  court For  I  shall  not  be  able  to  rehearse 

to  the  people  the  pleasures  which  I  have  procured  for  them,  and 
which,  although  I  am  not  disposed  to  envy  either  the  procurers 
or  the  enjoyers  of  them,  are  deemed  by  them  to  be  benefits  and 
advantages.  And  if  any  one  says  that  I  corrupt  young  men, 
and  perplex  their  minds,  or  that  I  speak  evil  of  old  men,  and 
use  bitter  words  towards  them,  whether  in  private  or  public,  it 
is  useless  for  me  to  reply,  as  I  truly  might :  "  All  this  I  do  for 
the  sake  of  justice,  and  with  a  view  to  your  interest,  my  judges, 
and  of  that  only."  And  therefore  there  is  no  saying  what  may 
happen  to  me. 


360  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Gal.  And   do  you   think.  Socrates,  that  a  man,  who  is  thus 
defenseless,  is  in  a  good  position  ? 

Soc.  Yes,  Callicles,  if  he  have  that  defense  which  you  have 
often  admitted  that  he  should  have  ;  if  he  be  his  own  defense, 
and  have  never  said  or  done  anything  wrong,  either  in  respect 
of  Gods  or  men ;  for  that  has  often  been  acknowledged  by  us 
to  be  the  best  sort  of  defense.  And  if  any  one  could  convict 
me  of  inability  to  defend  myself  or  others  after  this  sort,  I 
should  blush  for  shame,  whether  I  was  convicted  before  many, 
or  before  a  few,  or  by  myself  alone  ;  and  if  I  died  for  want  of 
ability  to  do  so,  that  would  indeed  grieve  me.  But  if  I  died 
because  I  have  no  powers  of  flattery  or  rhetoric,  I  am  very  sure 
that  you  would  not  find  me  repining  at  death.  For  no  man 
but  an  utter  fool  and  coward  is  afraid  of  death  itself,  but  he  is 
afraid  of  doing  wrong.  For  to  go  to  the  world  below,  having 
one's  soul  full  of  injustice,  is  the  last  and  worst  of  all  evils.  — - 
Gorgias,  iii.  112. 
Pride,  personal. 

Soc.  I  dare  say  that  you  may  be  surprised  to  find,  0  SOD 

of  Cleiuias,  that  I,  who  am  your  first  lover,  not  having  spoken 
to  you  for  many  years,  when  the  rest  of  the  world  were  weary- 
ing you  with  their  attentions,  am  the  last  of  your  lovers  who 
still  speaks  to  you.  The  reason  was,  that  I  was  hindered  from 
speaking  to  you  by  a  power  —  not  human  but  divine,  the  nature 
of  which  I  will  some  day  explain  to  you ;  that  impediment  has 
been  now  removed,  and  I  present  myself  before  you,  hoping 
that  the  hindrance  will  not  again  occur.  Meanwhile,  I  have 
observed  that  your  pride  has  been  too  much  for  the  pride  of 
your  admirers  ;  they  were  very  numerous,  but  they  have  all 
run  away,  overpowered  by  your  superior  force  of  character ; 
not  one  of  them  remains.  And  I  want  you  to  understand  the 
reason  why  you  have  overpowered  them.  You  imagine  that 
you  have  no  need  of  any  other  man  at  all,  as  you  have  great 
possessions  and  abundance  of  all  things,  beginning  with  the 
body,  and  ending  with  the  soul.  In  the  first  place,  you  think 
that  you  are  the  fairest  and  tallest  of  the  citizens,  and  this  every 
one  who  has  eyes  sees  to  be  true  ;  in  the  second  place,  that 
you  are  among  the  noblest  of  them,  highly  connected  both  on  the 
lather's  and  the  mother's  side,  and  sprung  from  one  of  the  most 
distinguished  families  in  your  own  State,  which  is  the  greatest  in 
Hellas,  and  having  many  friends  and  kinsmen  of  the  best  sort, 
whc  can  assist  you  when  in  need  ;  and  there  's  one  potent  rela 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  361 

live,  who  is  more  to  you  than  all  the  rest,  Pericles,  the  son  of 
Xanthippus,  whom  your  father  left  guardian  of  you  and  your 
brother,  and  who  cannot  only  do  as  he  pleases  in  this  city,  but 
in  all  Hellas,  and  among  many  and  mighty  barbarous  nations 
Moreover,  you  are  rich  ;  but  I  must  say  that  you  value  your 
self  least  of  all  upon  your  possessions.  And  all  these  things 
have  lifted  you  up,  and  you  have  overcome  your  lovers,  and 
they  have  acknowledged  that  you  were  too  much  for  them 
Have  you  not  remarked  their  absence  ?  And  now  I  know  that 
you  wonder  why  I  have  not  gone  away  like  the  rest  of  them, 
and  what  can  be  my  motive  in  remaining.  —  Alcibiades  I.  iv 
515. 

Priest,  the,  a  King.     See  King,  etc. 

Primeval  race,  without  procreation.     See  Spontaneous  life. 
Primitive  Society.     See  Patriarchal  State. 
Prime  of  life,  the  age  of  begetting. 

What  is  the  prime  of  life  ?     May  not  that  be  defined  as 

a  period  of  about  twenty  years  in  a  woman's  life,  and  thirty  in 
a  man's. 

Which  years  do  you  mean  to  include  ? 

A  woman,  I  said,  may  begin  to  bear  children  to  the  State  at 
twenty  years  of  age,  and  continue  to  bear  until  forty  ;  a  man 
may  begin  at  five-and-twenty,  when  he  has  passed  the  point  at 
which  the  pulse  of  life  beats  quickest,  and  continue  to  beget 
children  until  he  be  fifty-five. 

Certainly,  he  said,  both  in  men  and  women  that  is  the  prime 
of  physical  as  well  as  of  intellectual  vigor. 

Any  one  above  or  below  the  prescribed  ages  who  takes  part 
in  the  public  hymeneals  shall  be  said  to  have  done  an  unholy 
and  unrighteous  thing ;  the  child  of  which  he  is  the  father,  if 
it  steals  into  life,  will  have  been  conceived  under  other  auspices 
than  those  of  sacrifice  and  prayers,  which  at  each  hymeneal 
priestesses  and  priests  and  the  whole  city  will  offer,  that  the 
new  generation  may  be  better  and  more  useful  than  their  good 
and  useful  parents :  whereas  his  child  will  be  the  offspring  of 
darkness  and  strange  lust.  —  TJie  Republic,  ii.  286. 
Principle  and  reason  to  be  our  guides. 

-  Soc.  Dear  Crito.  your  zeal  is  invaluable,  if  a  right  one ; 
but  if  wrong,  the  greater  the  zeal  the  greater  the  danger ;  and 
therefore  we  ought  to  consider  whether  I  shall,  or  shall  not 
do  as  you  say.  For  I  am  and  always  have  been  one  of  those 
natures  who  must  be  guided  by  reason,  whatever  the  reason 


302  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

may  be  which  upon  reflection  appears  to  me  to  be  the  best ; 
and  now  that  this  fortune  has  come  upon  me,  I  cannot  put 
away  the  conclusion  at  which  I  had  arrived :  the  principles 
which  I  have  hitherto  honored  and  revered  I  still  honor,  and 
unless  we  can  at  once  find  other  and  better  principles,  I  am 
certain  not  to  agree  with  you  ;  no,  not  even  if  the  power  of  the 
multitude  could  inflict  many  more  imprisonments,  confiscations, 
deaths,  frightening  us  like  children  with  hobgoblin  terrors.  — 
Onto,  i.  350. 

Procreation,  primeval  race  without.     See  Spontaneous  life. 
Production,  three  kinds  of. 
Str.  In  the  first  place,  there  are  two  kinds  of  creation. 

Theaet.  What  are  they  ? 

Str.  One  of  them  is  human  and  the  other  divine. 

Theaet.  I  do  not  follow. 

Str.  Every  power,  as  you  may  remember  our  saying  origi 
nally,  which  is  the  cause  of  things  afterwards  existing  which 
did  not  exist  before,  was  defined  by  us  as  creative. 

Theaet.  I  remember. 

Str.  Looking,  now,  at  the  world  and  all  the  animals  and 
plants  which  grow  upon  the  earth  from  seeds  and  roots,  and  at 
inanimate  substances  which  form  within  the  earth,  fusile  or 
non-fusile,  shall  we  say  that  they  come  into  existence  —  not 
having  existed  previously  —  by  the  creation  of  God,  or  shall 
we  agree  with  vulgar  opinion  about  them  ? 

Theaet.  What  is  that  ? 

Str.  The  opinion  that  nature  brings  them  into  being  from 
some  spontaneous  and  unintelligent  cause.  Shall  we  say  this, 
or  that  they  come  from  God,  and  are  created  by  divine  reason 
and  knowledge  ? 

Theaet.  I  dare  say  that,  owing  to  my  youth,  I  may  often 
waver  in  my  view,  but  when  I  look  at  you  and  see  that  you 
incline  to  refer  them  to  God,  at  present  I  defer  to  your 
authority. 

Str.  Nobly  said,  Theaetetus,  and  if  I  thought  that  you  were 
one  of  those  who  would  hereafter  change  your  mind,  I  would 
have  gently  argued  with  you,  and  forced  you  to  assent ;  but  as  I 
perceive  that  you  will  come  of  yourself  and  without  any  argu- 
ment of  man  to  that  belief  which,  as  you  say,  attracts  you,  I  will 
leave  time  to  do  the  rest.  Let  me  suppose,  then,  that  things 
which  are  made  by  nature  are  the  work  of  divine  art,  and  that 
things  which  are  made  by  man  out  of  these  are  works  of  human 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  363 

art      And  so  there  are  two  kinds  of   making  and  production, 
the  one  human  and  the  other  divine. —  Sophist,  iii.  506. 
Pi  egression  of  human  life. 

What  is  implied  in  the  word  "  recollection,"  but  the  de- 
parture of  knowledge,  which  is  ever  being  forgotten  and  is  re- 
newed and  preserved  by  recollection  and  appears  to  be  the  same 
although  in  reality  new,  according  to  that  law  of  succession 
by  which  all  mortal  things  are  preserved,  not  absolutely  the 
same  but  by  substitution,  the  old  worn-out  mortality  leaving 
another  new  and  similar  existence  behind  —  unlike  the  divine 
which  is  always  the  same  and  not  another?  And  in  this  way, 
Socrates,  the  mortal  body,  or  mortal  anything,  partakes  of  im- 
mortality ;  but  the  immortal  in  another  way.  Marvel  not  then 
at  the  love  which  all  men  have  of  their  offspring ;  for  that  uni- 
versal love  and  interest  is  for  the  sake  of  immortality.  —  The 
Symposium,  i.  500. 

Property  in  Government.     See  Government. 
Prophet,  madness  of  the.     See  Madness  of  the,  etc.    . 
Protector  become  a  tyrant. 

• The  people  have  always  some  champion  whom  they  nurse 

into  greatness. 

Yes,  that  is  their  way. 

This  and  no  other  is  the  root  from  which  a  tyrant  springs  ; 
when  he  first  appears  above  ground  he  is  a  protector. 

Yes,  that  is  quite  clear. 

How  then  does  a  protector  begin  to  change  into  a  tyrant  ? 

Clearly  when  he  does  what  the  man  is  said  to  do  in  the  tale 
of  the  Arcadian  temple  of  Lycaean  Zeus. 

What  tale  ? 

The  tale  is  that  he  who  has  tasted  the  entrails  of  a  single 
human  victim  minced  up  with  the  entrails  of  other  victims  is 
destined  to  become  a  wolf.  Did  you  never  hear  that  ? 

Oh,  yes. 

And  the  protector  of  the  people  is  like  him ;  having  a  mob 
entirely  at  his  disposal,  he  is  not  restrained  from  shedding  the 
blood  of  kinsmen  ;  by  the  favorite  method  of  false  accusation 
he  brings  them  into  court  and  murders  them,  making  the  life 
of  man  to  disappear,  and  with  unholy  tongue  and  lips  tasting 
the  blood  of  his  fellow  citizens  ;  some  of  whom  he  kills  and 
others  he  banishes,  at  the  same  time  proclaiming  abolition 
of  debts  and  partition  of  lands :  and  after  this,  what  can  be 
his  destiny  but  either  to  perish  at  the  hands  of  his  enemies,  or 
from  being  a  man  to  become  a  wolf  —  that  is  a  tyrant  ? 


364  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Inevitably. 

This,  I  said,  is  he  who  begins  to  make  a  party  against  the 
*nch. 

The  same. 

And  then  he  is  driven  out,  and  comes  back,  in  spite  of  his 
enemies,  a  tyrant  full  grown. 

That  is  clear. 

And  if  they  are  unable  to  drive  him  out,  or  get  him  con- 
demned to  death  by  public  opinion,  they  form  the  design  of 
putting  him  out  of  the  way  secretly. 

Yes,  he  said,  their  usual  way. 

Then  comes  the  famous  request  of  a  body-guard,  which  is 
made  by  all  those  who  have  got  thus  far  in  their  career,  "  Let 
not  the  people's  friend,"  as  they  say,  "  be  lost  to  them." 

Exactly. 

The  people  readily  assent ;  all  their  fears  are  for  him  — 
they  have  no  fear  for  themselves. 

Very  true. 

And  when  a  man  who  is  wealthy  and  is  also  accused  of 
being  an  enemy  of  the  people  sees  this,  then,  my  friend,  as  the 
oracle  said  to  Croesus,  — 

"  By  pebbly  Hennas'  shore  he  flees  and  rests  not,  and  is  not  ashamed  to  be  a 
coward." 

And  quite  right  too,  said  he,  for,  if  he  were,  he  would  never 
be  ashamed  again. 

But  if  he  is  caught  he  dies. 

Of  course. 

And  he,  the  protector  of  whom  we  spoke,  is  not  fallen  in  his 
might,  but  himself  the  overthrower  of  many,  is  to  be  seen 
standing  up  in  the  chariot  of  State  with  the  reins  in  his  hand, 
no  longer  protector,  but  tyrant  absolute.  —  The  Republic,  ii. 
394. 
Prudence  and  temperance. 

Cle.  I  suppose,  Megillus,  that  this  companion  virtue  of 

which  the  Stranger  speaks  must  be  temperance  ? 

Ath.  Yes,  Cleiuias,  temperance  in  the  vulgar  sense,  not  that 
which  in  the  exaggerated  language  of  some  philosophers  is 
demonstrated  to  be  prudence,  but  that  which  is  the  natural  gift 
of  children  and  animals,  and  makes  some  of  them  live  conti- 
nently and  others  incontinently,  but  when  isolated  was,  as  we 
said,  hardly  worth  reckoning  in  the  catalogue  of  goods.  I 
think  that  you  must  understand  my  meaning  ? 

Cle.   Certainly.  —  Laws,  iv.  237. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  365 

Public  opinion  compared  to  a  great  beast.     See  Opinion,  public, 

etc. 
Public  works,  construction  of. 

Soc.  Well,  then,  if  you  and  I,  Callicles,  were  engaged  in 

the  administration  of  political  affairs,  and  were  advising  one 
another  about  some  public  work,  such  as  walls,  docks,  or  tem- 
ples of  the  largest  size,  ought  we  not  to  examine  ourselves, 
first,  as  to  whether  we  know  or  do  not  know  the  art  of  building, 
and  who  taught  us  ?  —  would  not  that  be  necessary,  Callicles  ? 

Cal.  True. 

Soc.  In  the  second  place,  we  should  have  to  consider 
whether  we  had  ever  constructed  any  private  house,  either  of 
our  own  or  for  our  friends,  and  whether  this  building  was  a 
success  or  not ;  and  if  upon  consideration  we  found  that  we 
had  had  good  and  eminent  masters,  and  had  been  successful  in 
building,  not  only  with  their  assistance,  but  without  them,  by 
our  own  unaided  skill,  —  in  that  case  prudence  would  not  dis- 
suade us  from  proceeding  to  the  construction  of  public  works. 
But  if  we  had  no  master  to  show,  and  only  a  number  of  worth- 
less buildings  or  none  at  all,  then,  surely,  it  would  be  ridicu- 
lous in  us  to  attempt  public  works,  or  to  advise  one  another  to 
undertake  them.  Is  not  this  true  ? 

Cal.  Certainly.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  105. 
Public  men,  criminality  of.     See  Criminality, etc. 
Pugnacity,  a  motive  to  authorship.     See  Authorship. 
Punishment,  effect  of,  on  evil-doers. 

If  you  will  think,  Socrates,  of  the  effect  which  punish- 
ment has  on  evil-doers,  you  will  see  at  once  that  in  the  opinion 
of  mankind  virtue  may  be  acquired ;  no  one  punishes  the  evil- 
doer under  the  notion,  or  for  the  reason,  that  he  has  done 
wrong,  —  only  the  unreasonable  fury  of  a  beast  acts  in  that 
way.  But  he  who  desires  to  inflict  rational  punishment  does 
not  retaliate  for  a  past  wrong,  which  cannot  be  undone  ;  he 
has  regard  to  the  future,  and  is  desirous  that  the  man  who 
is  punished,  and  he  who  sees  him  punished,  may  be  detorred 
from  doing  wrong  again.  He  clearly  punishes  for  the  sake  of 
prevention,  thereby  implying  that  virtue  is  capable  of  being 
taught.  This  is  the  notion  of  all  who  retaliate  upon  others 
either  privately  or  publicly.  And  the  Athenians,  too,  your 
own  citizens,  like  other  men,  retaliate  on  all  whom  they  regard 
as  evil-doers ;  which  argues  them  to  be  of  the  number  of  those 
who  think  that  virtue  may  be  acquired  and  taught. — Pro 
tagoras,  i  124. 


366  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Punishment,  office  of  twofold.     See  Injustice. 

Now  the  proper  office  of  punishment  is  twofold ;  he  who 

is  rightly  punished  ought  either  to  become  better  and  profit  by 
it,  or  he  ought  to  be  made  an  example  to  his  fellows,  that  they 
may  see  what  he  suffers,  and  fear  and  become  better.  Those 
who  are  improved,  when  they  are  punished  by  Gods  and  men, 
are  those  whose  sins  are  curable  ;  and  they  are  improved,  as 
in  this  world  so  also  in  another,  by  pain  and  suffering  ;  for 
there  is  no  other  way  in  which  they  can  be  delivered  from 
their  evil.  But  they  who  have  been  guilty  of  the  worst 
crimes,  and  are  incurable  by  reason  of  their  crimes,  are  made 
examples  ;  for,  as  they  are  incurable,  the  time  has  passed  at 
which  they  can  receive  any  benefit  themselves.  But  others 
get  good  when  they  behold  them  forever  enduring  the  most 
terrible  and  painful  and  fearful  sufferings  as  the  penalty  of 
their  sins ;  there  they  are,  hanging  up  as  examples,  in  the 
prisou-hou-e  of  the  world  below,  a  spectacle  and  a  warning  to 
all  unrighteous  men  who  come  thither. —  Goryias,  iii.  116. 
Punishment  of  souls,  the.  See  Soul  af'er  death. 
Pure  and  impure  soul.  See  Impure. 
Purifications. 

Str.  As  to  the  question  which  you  were  asking  about  the 

name  which  was  to  comprehend  all  these  arts  of  purification, 
whether  of  animate  or  inanimate  substances,  the  spirit  of  dia- 
lectic is  in  no  wise  particular  about  fine  words,  if  she  may  be 
only  allowed  to  have  a  general  name  for  all  other  purifications, 
binding  them  up  together  and  separating  them  off  from  the 
purification  of  the  soul  or  intellect.  For  this  is  the  purifica- 
tion at  which  she  wants  to  arrive,  and  this  we  should  under- 
stand to  be  her  aim. 

Theaet.  Yes,  I  understand ;  and  I  agree  that  there  are  two 
sorts  of  purification,  and  that  one  of  them  is  concerned  with 
the  soul,  and  that  there  is  another  which  is  concerned  with  the 
body.  —  Sophist,  iii.  461. 
Purification  by  refutation. 

Str.  There  is  the  time-honored  mode  which  our  fathers 

commonly  practiced  towards  their  sons,  and  which  is  still  adopted 
by  many — either  of  roughly  reproving  their  errors,  or  of 
gently  advising  them,  which  may  be  called  by  the  general  term 
of  admonition. 

Tlieaet.  True. 

Str.  But  whereas  some  appear  to  have  arrived  at  the  con- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  367 

elusion  that  all  ignorance  is  involuntary,  and  that  no  one  who 
thinks  himself  wise  is  willing  to  learn  any  of  those  things,  iu 
which  he  is  conscious  of  his  own  cleverness,  and  that  the  ad- 
monitory sort  of  instruction  gives  much  trouble  and  does  little 
good  — 

Theaet.  There  they  are  quite  right. 

Str.  Accordingly,  they  set  to  work  to  eradicate  the  spirit  of 
conceit  in  another  way. 

TJieaet.  In  what  way. 

Str.  They  cross-examine  a  man  as  to  what  he  is  saying, 
when  he  thinks  that  he  is  saying  something  and  is  saying  noth- 
ing ;  he  is  easily  convicted  of  inconsistency  in  his  opinions  ; 
these  they  collect,  and  placing  them  side  by  side,  show  that 
they  contradict  one  another  about  the  same  things,  in  rela- 
tion to  the  same  things,  and  in  the  same  respect.  He  seeing 
this  is  angry  with  himself,  and  grows  gentle  towards  others, 
and  thus  is  entirely  delivered  from  great  prejudices  and  harsh 
notions,  in  a  way  which  is  most  entertaining  to  hear,  and  pro- 
duces the  most  lasting  good  effect  on  the  person  who  is  the 
subject  of  the  operation.  For  as  the  physician  considers  that 
the  body  will  receive  no  benefit  from  taking  food  until  the 
internal  obstacles  have  been  removed,  so  the  instructor  of  the 
soul  is  conscious  that  his  patient  will  receive  no  benefit  from 
the  applications  of  knowledge  until  he  is  refuted,  and  from  ref- 
utation learns  modesty ;  he  must  be  purged  of  his  prejudices, 
and  think  that  he  knows  only  what  he  knows,  and  no  more. 

Theaet.  That  is  certainly  the  best  and  most  temperate  state. 

Str.  For  all  these  reasons,  Tbeaetetus,  we  must  admit  that 
refutation  is  the  greatest  and  chiefest  of  purifications,  and  he 
who  has  not  been  refuted,  though  he  be  the  great  King  himself, 
is  in  the  highest  degree  impure  ;  he  is  uuinstructed  and  de- 
formed in  those  things  in  which  he  who  would  be  truly  blessed 
ought  to  be  pure  and  fair. 

Theaet.  Very  true.  —  Sophist,  iii.  464. 
Purification,  legislative.     See  Legislative,  etc. 
Purification,  Colonization  a  means  of. 

Another  piece  of  good  fortune  must  not  be  forgotten, 

which,  as  we  were  saying,  the  Heraclid  colony  had,  and  which 
is  also  ours,  —  that  we  have  escaped  division  of  land  and  the 
abolition  of  debts ;  for  these  are  always  a  source  of  dangerous 
contention,  and  a  city  which  is  driven  to  legislatipn  upon  such 
matters  can  neither  allow  the  old  ways  to  continue,  nor  yet 


368  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

venture  to  alter  them.  We  must  have  recourse  to  prayers,  as 
men  say,  and  hope  that  a  slight  change  may  be  cautiously  ef- 
fected in  a  length  of  time.  And  such  a  change  can  be  accom- 
plished by  those  who  have  abundance  of  land,  and  having  also 
many  debtors,  are  willing,  in  a  kindly  spirit,  to  share  with  those 
who  are  in  want,  sometimes  remitting  and  sometimes  giving, 
holding  fast  in  a  path  of  moderation,  and  deeming  poverty  to 
be  the  increase  of  a  man's  desires  and  not  the  diminution  of  his 
property.  For  this  is  the  chiefest  foundation  of  a  State,  and 
upon  this  lasting  basis  may  be  erected  afterwards  whatever 
political  order  is  suitable  under  the  circumstances ;  but  if  the 
change  be  based  upon  an  unsound  principle,  the  political  super- 
structure which  is  added  will  hardly  succeed.  That  is  a 
danger,  which,  as  I  am  saying,  is  escaped  by  us,  and  yet  we  had 
better  say  how  we,  if  we  had  not  escaped,  might  have  escaped ; 
and  we  may  venture  now  to  assert  that  no  other  way  of  escape, 
whether  narrow  or  broad,  can  be  devised  but  a  just  content- 
ment :  upon  this  rock  our  city  shall  be  built :  for  there  ought  to 
be  no  disputes  among  citizens  about  property.  If  there  are 
quarrels  of  long  standing  among  them,  no  legislator  of  any 
degree  of  sense  will  proceed  a  step  in  the  arrangement  of  the 
State  until  they  are  settled.  But  that  they  to  whom  God  has 
given,  as  he  has  to  us,  to  be  the  founders  of  a  new  State  free 
from  enmity  —  that  they  should  create  themselves  enmities,  by 
reason  of  their  mode  of  dividing  lands  and  houses,  would  be 
superhuman  folly  and  wickedness.  —  Laws,  iv.  261. 

Quarreling  unholy. 

Neither,  if  we  mean  our  future  guardians  to  regard  the 

habit  of  quarreling  as  dishonorable,  should  anything  be  said  of 
the  wars  in  heaven,  and  of  the  plots  and  fightings  of  the  Gods 
against  one  another,  which  are  quite  untrue.  Far  be  it  from 
us  to  tell  them  of  the  battles  of  the  giants,  and  embroider  them 
on  garments  ;  or  of  all  the  innumerable  other  quarrels  of  Gods 
and  heroes  with  their  friends  and  relations.  If  they  would 
only  believe  us  we  would  tell  them  that  quarreling  is  unholy, 
and  that  never  up  to  this  time  has  there  been  any  quarrel  be- 
tween citizens;  this  is  what  old  men  and  old  women  should 
begin  by  telling  children,  and  the  same  when  they  grow  up. — 
The  Republic,  ii.  201. 
Quietness,  temperance  is. 
In  order,  then,  that  I  may  form  a  conjecture  whether  you 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  369 

have  temperance  abiding  in  you  or  not,  tell  me,  I  said,  what, 
in  your  opinion,  is  Temperance  ? 

At  first  he  hesitated,  and  was  very  unwilling  to  answer  : 
then  he  said  that  he  thought  temperance  was  doing  things 
orderly  and  quietly,  such  things  for  example  as  walking  in  the 
streets,  and  talking,  or  anything  else  of  that  nature.  In  a 
word,  he  said,  I  should  answer  that,  in  my  opinion,  temperance 
is  quietness. 

Are  you  right,  Charmides  ?  I  said.  No  doubt  some  would 
affirm  that  the  quiet  ace  the  temperate ;  but  let  us  see  whether 
there  is  any  meaning  in  this  ;  and  first  tell  me  whether  you 
would  not  acknowledge  temperance  to  be  of  the  class  of  the 
honorable  and  good  ? 

Yes.  —  Charmides,  i.  13. 

Race,  community  of.     See  Colonization. 
Races,  metallic  symbols  of.     See  Metallic. 
Real,  shadows  seeming.     See  Shadows,  etc. 
Real  being      See  Being. 

Reason  ana  principle,  our  guides.     See  Principle. 
Reason,  incorrupt  passion  the  rod  of.     See  Passion. 
Reason,  steps  of.     See  Hypotheses. 

Reason  in  the  spnere  of  sense.     See  Intellect  and  Knowledge. 
Reason  the  rule  of  life.     See  Life,  etc. 
Recollection,  learning  a  process  of.     See  Learning. 
Reconciling  judge. 

Ath.  Now,  which  would  be  the  better  judge,  one  who  de- 
stroyed the  bad,  and  required  the  good  to  govern  themselves ; 
or  one  who,  while  allowing  the  good  to  govern,  let  the  bad 
live,  and  made  them  voluntarily  submit  ?  Or,  lastly,  there 
might  be  a  third  excellent  judge,  who,  finding  the  family  dis- 
tracted, not  only  did  not  destroy  any  one,  but  reconciled  them 
to  one  another  forever  after,  and  gave  them  laws  which  they 
mutually  observed,  and  was  able  to  keep  them  friends. 

Cle.  The  last  would  be  by  far  the  best  sort  of  judge  and 
legislator.  —  Laws,  iv.  158. 
Reflecting  and  unchanging,  the  soul. 

Were  we  not  saying  long  ago  that  the  soul  when  using 

the  body  as  an  instrument  of  perception,  that  is  to  say,  when 
using  the  sense  of  sight  or  hearing  or  some  other  sense  (for 
the  meaning  of  perceiving  through  the  body  is  perceiving 
>hrough  the  senses).  —  were  we  not  saying  that  the  soul  too  is 
24 


370  PLATO'S  BEST  THOJGHTS 

then  dragged  by  the  body  into  the  region  of  the  changeable,  and 
wanders  and  is  confused ;  the  world  spins  round  her,  and  she  is 
like  a  drunkard  when  possessed  by  change  ? 

Very  true. 

But  when  returning  into  herself  she  reflects ;  then  she  passes 
into  the  other  world,  the  abode  of  purity,  and  eternity,  and  im- 
mortality, and  unchangeableness,  which  are  her  kindred,  and 
with  them  she  ever  lives,  when  she  is  by  herself  and  is  not  let 
or  hindered  ;  then  she  ceases  from  her  erring  ways,  and  being 
in  communion  with  the  unchanging  is  unchanging.  And  this 
etate  of  the  soul  is  called  wisdom  ? 

That  is  well  and  truly  said,  Socrates,  he  replied. 

And  to  which  class  is  the  soul  more  nearly  alike  and  akin, 
as  far  as  may  be  inferred  from  this  argument,  as  well  as  from 
the  preceding  one  ? 

I  think,  Socrates,  that,  in  the  opinion  of  every  one  who  fol- 
lows the  argument,  the  soul  will  be  infinitely  more  like  the  un- 
changeable,—  even  the  most  stupid  person  will  not  deny  that. 

And  the  body  is  more  like  the  changing  ? 

Yes.  —  Phaedo,  I  407. 

Reflection,  not  sensation,  the  source  of  knowledge.     See  Sensation. 
Refutation  a  common  good. 

You  are  only  doing  what  you  denied  that  you  were  doing 

just  now,  trying  to  refute  me,  instead  of  pursuing  the  argu- 
ment. 

And  what  if  I  am  ?  How  can  you  think  that  I  have  any 
other  motive  in  refuting  you  but  what  I  should  have  in  exam- 
ining into  myself  ?  which  motive  would  be  just  a  fear  of  my 
unconsciously  fancying  that  I  knew  something  of  which  I  was 
ignorant.  And  at  this  moment  I  pursue  the  argument  chiefly 
for  my  own  sake,  and  perhaps  in  some  degree  also  for  the  sake 
of  my  other  friends.  For  is  not  the  discovery  of  things  as 
they  truly  are  a  common  good  to  all  mankind  ? 

Yes,  certainly,  Socrates,  he  said. 

Then,  I  said,  be  cheerful,  sweet  sir,  and  give  your  opinion  in 
answer  to  the  question  which  I  asked,  without  minding  whether 
Critias  or  Socrates  is  the  person  refut(  d ;  attend  only  to  the 
argument,  and  see  what  will  come  of  the  refutation. 

I  think  that  you  are  right,  he  replied ;  and  I  will  do  as  you 
say.  —  Charmides,  i.  22. 
Refutation,  a  purification.     See  Purification. 
Remembrance  and  burial  of  the  dead.     See  Burial,  etc. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  371 

Respiration  and  inspiration. 

Let  us  further  consider  the  phenomena  of  njspiratiou,  and 

inquire  what  are  the  real  causes  of  it.  They  are  as  follows :  — 
Seeing  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  vacuum  into  which  any 
of  those  things  which  are  moved  can  enter,  and  the  breath  is 
carried  from  us  into  the  external  air,  the  next  point  is,  as  will 
be  clear  to  every  one,  that  it  does  not  go  into  a  vacant  space, 
but  pushes  its  neighbor  out  of  its  place,  and  that  which  is 
thrust  out  again  thrusts  out  its  neighbor ;  and  in  this  way 
everything  of  necessity  at  last  comes  round  to  that  place  from 
whence  the  breath  came  forth,  and  enters  in  there,  and  follows 
with  the  breath,  and  fills  up  the  place ;  and  this  goes  on  like 
the  circular  motion  of  a  wheel,  because  there  can  be  no  such 
thing  as  a  vacuum.  Wherefore  also  the  breast  and  the  lungs, 
which  emit  the  breath,  are  again  filled  up  by  the  air  which  sur- 
rounds the  body  and  which  enters  in  through  the  pores  of  the 
flesh  and  comes  round  in  a  circle ;  and,  again,  the  air  which  is 
sent  away  and  passes  out  through  the  body  forces  the  breath 
within  to  find  a  way  round  through  the  passage  of  the  mouth 
and  the  nostrils.  Now,  the  origin  of  this  may  be  supposed  to 
be  as  follows  :  —  Every  animal  has  his  inward  parts  about  the 
blood  and  the  veins  as  warm  as  possible  ;  he  has  within  him  a 
fountain  of  fire,  which  we  compare  to  the  texture  of  a  net  of 
fire  extended  through  the  centre  of  the  body,  while  the  outer 
parts  are  composed  of  air.  Now,  we  must  admit  that  heat 
naturally  precedes  outward  to  its  own  place  and  to  its  kindred 
element ;  and  as  there  are  two  exits  for  the  heat,  the  one 
through  the  body  outwards,' and  the  other  through  the  mouth 
and  nostrils,  when  it  moves  towards  the  one,  it  drives  round 
the  other  air,  and  that  which  is  driven  round  falls  into  the  fire 
and  is  warmed,  and  that  which  goes  forth  is  cooled.  But  when 
the  condition  of  the  heat  changes,  and  the  particles  at  the  other 
exit  grow  warmer,  the  hotter  air  inclining  in  that  direction  and 
carried  towards  its  native  element,  fire,  pushes  round  the  other ; 
and  thus,  by  action  and  reaction,  there  being  this  circular  agita- 
tion and  alternation  produced  by  the  two, — by  this  double 
cause,  I  say,  inspiration  and  expiration  are  produced.  —  Tim- 
aeus,  ii.  570. 
Rest  and  motion  of  things. 

Some  one  says  to  me,  "  O  Stranger,  are  all  things  in  rest 

and  nothing  in  motion,  or  is  the  exact  opposite  of  this  true,  or 
are  some  things  in   motion   and  others  at  rest  ?  "     To  this  T 


372  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

shall  reply  that  some  are  in  motion  and  others  at  rest.  "  And 
do  not  things  which  move,  move  in  place,  and  are  not  the 
things  which  are  at  rest,  at  rest  in  a  place  ? "  Certainly. 
"  And  some  move  or  rest  in  one  place  and  some  in  more  places 
than  one?"  You  mean  to  say,  we  shall  rejoin,  that  those 
things  which  rest  at  the  centre  move  in  the  same  place,  as 
when  the  circumference  goes  round  and  the  circle  is  said  to  be 
at  rest  ?  "  Yes."  And  we  observe  that,  in  the  revolution,  the 
motion  which  carries  round  the  larger  and  the  lesser  circle  at 
the  same  time  is  proportionally  distributed  to  greater  and 
smaller,  and  is  greater  and  smaller  in  a  certain  proportion. 
Here  is  a  wonder  which  might  be  thought  an  impossibility,  that 
the  same  motion  should  impart  swiftness  and  slowness  in  due 
proportion  to  larger  and  lesser  circles.  Very  true.  "  And 
when  you  speak  of  bodies  moving  in  many  places,  you  seem  to 
me  to  mean  those  which  move  from  one  place  to  another,  and 
sometimes  have  one  centre  of  motion  and  sometimes  several  in 
the  course  of  their  revolutions  ;  and  sometimes  impinging  upon 
each  other  they  come  against  bodies  which  are  at  rest,  and  are 
divided  by  them,  or  meeting  other  bodies  which  are  coming 
violently  from  an  opposite  direction  unite  with  them  and  inter- 
penetrate them."  —  Laws,  iv.  405. 
Retribution  for  the  erring.  See  Punishment,  etc. 
Retribution  for  injustice.  See  Injustice.,  etc. 
Reverence,  youthful,  for  the  aged.  See  Mind,  etc.,  referenced. 
Rewards,  glorious. 

The  Olympic  victor  I  said,  is  deemed  happy  in  receiving 

a  part  only  of  the  happiness  which  is  the  lot  of  our  citizens, 
who  have  won  a  more  glorious  victory  and  have  a  more  com- 
plete maintenance  at  the  public  cost.  For  the  victory  which 
they  have  won  is  the  salvation  of  the  whole  State  ;  and  the 
crown  with  which  they  and  their  children  are  crowned  is  the 
fullness  of  all  that  life  needs  ;  they  receive  rewards  from  the 
hands  of  their  country  while  living,  and  after  death  have  an 
honorable  burial. 

Yes,  he  said,  they  are  are  indeed  glorious  rewards.  —  The 
Republic,  ii.  292. 
Rhadamanthus,  the  decision  of. 

The  so-called  decision  of  Rhadamanthus  is  worthy  of  all 

admiration.  He  knew  that  the  men  of  his  own  time  believed 
and  1  ad  no  doubt  that  there  were  Gods,  which  was  a  reason- 
able belief  in  those  days,  because  most  men  were  the  sons  of 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  373 

Gods,  and  according  to  tradition  he  was  one  himself.  He  ap- 
pears to  have  thought  that  he  ought  to  commit  judgment  to  no 
man,  but  to  the  Gods  only,  and  in  this  way  suits  were  simply 
and  speedily  decided  by  him.  For  he  made  the  two  parties  at 
issue  take  an  oath  respecting  the  points  in  dispute,  and  so  got 
rid  of  the  matter  speedily  and  safely.  But  now  that  a  certain 
portion  of  mankind  do  not  believe  at  all  in  the  existence  rf 
the  Gods,  and  others  imagine  that  they  have  no  care  of  us,  and 
the  opinion  of  most  men  and  of  the  worst  men  is  that  in  re- 
turn for  a  small  sacrifice  and  flattering  words  they  will  aid 
them  in  abstracting  a  great  deal  of  money,  and  deliver  them 
from  divers  and  great  penalties,  the  way  of  Rhadamanthus  is 
.no  longer  suited  to  the  needs  of  justice,  for  as  the  opinions  of 
men  about  the  Gods  are  changed,  the  laws  should  also  be 
changed.  —  Laws,  iv.  458. 
Rhapsode,  the  profession  of  a.  See  Homer. 
Rhetoric  and  dialecticians. 

Soc.  I  am  a  great  lover  of  these  processes  of  division  and 

generalization  ;  they  help  me  to  speak  and  think.  And  if  I 
find  any  man  who  is  able  to  see  a  One  and  Many  in  nature, 
him  I  follow,  and  walk  in  his  steps  as  if  he  were  a  God.  And 
those  who  have  this  art,  I  have  hitherto  been  in  the  habit  of 
calling  dialecticians ;  but  God  knows  whether  the  name  is  right 
or  not.  And  I  should  like  to  know  what  name  you  would  give 
to  your  or  Lysias'  disciples,  and  whether  this  may  not  be  that 
famous  art  of  rhetoric  which  Thrasymachus  and  others  practice  ? 
Skillful  speakers  they  are,  and  impart  their  skill  to  any  who 
will  consent  to  worship  them  as  kings  and  to  bring  them  gifts. 
Phaedr.  Yes,  they  are  royal  men ;  but  their  art  is  not  the 
same  with  the  art  of  those  whom  you  call,  and  rightly,  in  my 
opinion,  dialecticians.  —  Phaedrus,  i.  571. 

Rhetoric,  flattery  in.     See  Flattery. 
Rhetoric,  persuasion  the  crown  of.     See  Persuasion. 
Rhetoric,  the  art  of  discourse. 

Soc.  Why  if  you  call  rhetoric  the  art  which  treats  of  dis- 
course, and  all  the  other  arts  treat  of  discourse,  do  you  not  call 
them  arts  of  rhetoric  ? 

Gor.  Because,  Socrates,  the  knowledge  of  the  other  arts  has 
only  to  do  with  some  sort  of  external  action,  as  of  the  hand ; 
but  there  is  no  such  action  of  the  hand  in  rhetoric  which  oper- 
ates and  is  perfected  through  the  medium  of  discourse.  And 
therefore  I  am  justified  as  I  maintain,  in  saying  that  rhetoric 
treats  of  discourse. 


374  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Soc.  I  do  not  know  whether  I  entirely  understand  you,  but 
I  dare  say  that  I  shall  soon  find  out :  please  to  answer  me  a 
question  :  you  would  allow  that  there  are  arts  ? 

Gor.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  in  some  of  the  arts  a  great  deal  is  done  and  noth- 
ing or  very  little  said ;  in  painting,  or  statuary,  or  many  other 
arts,  the  work  may  proceed  in  silence  ;  and  these  are  the  arts 
with  which,  as  I  suppose  you  would  say,  rhetoric  has  no  con- 
cern ? 

Gor.  You  perfectly  conceive  my  meaning,  Socrates. 

Soc.  And  there  are  other  arts  which  work  wholly  by  words, 
and  require  either  no  action  or  very  little,  as,  for  example,  the 
arts  of  arithmetic,  of  calculation,  of  geometry,  and  of  playing 
draughts  ;  in  some  of  which  words  are  nearly  coextensive  with 
things  :  but  the  greater  number  of  them  are  dependent  wholly 
on  words  for  their  efficacy  and  power :  and  I  take  your  meaning 
to  be  that  rhetoric  is  an  art  of  this  better  sort  ? 

Gor.  Exactly.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  35. 
Rhetoric  an  experience,  process,  or  habit. 

Pol.  I  will   ask ;  and  do  you  answer  me,  Socrates,  the 

same  question  which   Gorgias,  as  you    suppose,  is    unable    to 
answer  :  What  is  rhetoric  ? 

Soc.  Do  you  mean  what  sort  of  an  art  ? 

Pol.  Yes. 

Soc.  Not  an  art  at  all,  in  my  opinion,  if  I  am  to  tell  you 
the  truth,  Polus. 

Pol.  Then  what,  in  your  opinion,  is  rhetoric  ? 

Soc.  A  thing  of  which,  I  was  lately  reading  in  a  book  of 
of  yours,  you  say  that  you  have  made  an  art. 

Pol.  What  thing  ? 

Soc.  I  should  say  a  sort  of  experience. 

Pol.  Does  rhetoric  seem  to  you  to  be  an  experience  ? 

Soc.  That  is  my  view,  if  that  is  yours. 

Pol.  An  experience  in  what  ? 

Soc.  An  experience  in  producing  a  sort  of  delight  and  grati- 
fication. 

Pol.  And  if  able  to  gratify  others,  must  not  rhetoric  be  a 
fine  thing  ? 

Soc.  What  are  you  saying,  Polus  ?  Why  do  you  ask  me 
whether  rhetoric  is  a  fine  thing  or  not,  when  I  have  not  as  yet 
told  you  what  rhetoric  is  ? 

Pol.  Why,  did  you  not  tell  me  that  rhetoric  was  a  sort  of 
experience  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  375 

•Sbe.  As  you  are  so  fond  of  gratifying  others,  will  yoa 
gratify  roe  in  a  small  particular  ? 

Pol  1  will. 

Soc.  "Will  you  ask  me,  what  sort  of  an  art  is  cookery  ? 

Pol.  What  sort  of  an  art  is  cookery  ? 

Soc.  Not  an  art  at  all,  Polus. 

Pol.  What  then  ? 

Soc.  I  should  say  an  experience. 

Pol.  In  what  ?     I  wish  that  you  would  tell  me. 

Soc  An  experience  in  producing  a  sort  of  delight  and  grat- 
ification, Polus. 

Pol.  Then  are  cookery  and  rhetoric  the  same  ? 

Soc.  No,  they  are  only  different  parts  of  the  same  pro- 
fession, 

Pol.  And  what  is  that  ? 

Soc.  I  am  afraid  that  the  truth  may  seem  discourteous ;  I 
should  not  like  Gorgias  to  imagine  that  I  am  ridiculing  his 
profession,  and  therefore  I  hesitate  to  answer.  For  whether 
or  no  this  is  that  art  of  rhetoric  which  Gorgias  practices  I 
really  do  not  know  :  from  what  he  was  just  no\v  saying,  noth- 
ing appeared  of  what  he  thought  of  his  art,  but  the  rhetoric 
which  I  mean  is  a  part  of  a  not  very  creditable  whole.  —  Gor- 
gias, Hi.  47. 

Rhetorician,  the  skillful. 

Soc.  Until  a  man  knows  the  truth  of  the  several  partic- 
ulars of  which  he  is  writing  or  speaking,  and  is  able  to  define 
them  as  they  are,  and  having  defined  them  again  to  divide 
them  until  they  can  be  no  longer  divided,  and  until  in  like 
manner  he  is  able  to  discern  the  nature  of  the  soul  and  dis- 
cover the  different  modes  of  discourse  which  are  adapted  to 
different  natures,  and  to  arrange  and  dispose  them  in  such  a 
way  that  the  simple  form  of  speech  may  be  addressed  to  the 
simpler  nature,  and  the  complex  and  composite  to  the  complex 
nature  —  until  he  has  accomplished  all  this,  he  will  be  unable 
to  handle  arguments  according  to  rules  of  art,  as  far  as  their 
nature  allows  them  to  be  subjected  to  art,  either  for  the  pur- 
pose of  teaching  or  persuading ;  that  is  the  view  which  is  im- 
plied in  the  whole  preceding  argument. 

Phaedr.  Yes,  that  was  our  view,  certainly. 

Soc.  Secondly,  as  to  the  justice  of  the  censure  which  was 
passed  on  speaking  or  writing  discourses  —  did  not  our  previ- 
ous argument  show  —  ? 


376  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Phaedr.   Show  what  ? 

Soc.  That  whether  Lysias  or  any  other  writer  that  ever 
was  or  will  be,  whether  private  man  or  statesman,  tries  his 
hand  at  authorship  in  making  laws,  and  fancies  that  there  is  a 
great  certainty  and  clearness  in  his  performance,  the  fact  of 
his  writing  as  he  does  is  only  a  disgrace  to  him.  whatever  men 
may  say.  For  entire  ignorance  about  the  nature  of  justice 
and  injustice,  and  good  and  evil,  and  the  inability  to  distin- 
guish the  dream  from  the  reality,  cannot  in  truth  be  otherwise 
than  disgraceful  to  him,  even  though  he  have  the  applause  of 
the  whole  world. 

Phaedr.  Certainly. 

Soc.  But  he  who  thinks  that  in  the  written  word  there  is 
necessarily  much  which  is  not  serious,  and  that  neither  poetry 
nor  prose,  spoken  or  written,  are  of  any  great  value  —  if.  like 
the  compositions  of  the  rhapsodes,  they  are  only  recited  in 
order  to  be  believed,  and  not  with  any  view  tov  criticism  or  in- 
struction ;  and  who  thinks  that  even  the  best  of  them  are  but 
a  reminiscence  of  what  we  know,  and  that  only  in  principles  of 
justice  and  goodness  and  nobility  taught  and  communicated 
orally  and  written  in  the  soul,  which  is  the  true  way  of  writ- 
ing, is  there  clearness  and  perfection  and  seriousness ;  and 
that  such  principles  are  like  legitimate  offspring ;  being,  in  the 
first  place,  that  which  the  man  finds  in  his  own  bosom ;  sec- 
ondly, the  brethren  and  descendants  and  relations  of  his  idea 
which  have  been  duly  implanted  in  the  souls  of  others ;  and 
who  cares  for  them  and  no  others  —  this  is  the  right  sort  of 
man  ;  and  you  and  I,  Phaedrus,  would  pray  that  we  may  become 
like  him. 

Phaedr.  That  is  most  assuredly  my  desire  and  prayer. 

Soc.  And    now    the  play  is    played  out ;    and    of    rhetoric 
enough. — Phaedrus,  i.  582. 
Rhetorician  to  make  good  use  of  his  art. 

Gor.  I  like  your  way  of  leading  us   on,  Socrates,  and   I 

will  endeavor  to  reveal  to  you  the  whole  nature  of  rhetoric. 
You  must  have  heard,  I  think,  that  the  docks  and  the  walls  of 
the  Athenians  and  the  plan  of  the  harbor  were  devised  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  counsels,  partly  of  Themistocles  and  partly 
of  Pericles  and  not  at  the  suggestion  of  the  builders. 

Soc.  Certainly,  Gorgias,  that  is  the  tradition  about  Themis- 
tocies,  and  I  myself  heard  the  speech  of  Pericles  when  he  ad- 
vised us  about  the  middle  wall. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  377 

(for  And  you  will  observe,  Socrates,  that  when  a  decision 
aas  to  be  given  in  such  matters  the  rhetoricians  are  the  advis- 
ers ;  they  are  the  men  who  win  their  poiut. 

Soc.  I  had  that  in  my  admiring  mind,  Gorgias,  when  I  asked 
what  is  the  nature  of  rhetoric,  which  always  appears  to  me, 
when  I  look  at  the  matter  in  this  way,  to  be  a  marvel  of  great- 
ness. 

Gor.  A  marvel  indeed,  Socrates,  if  you  only  knew  how 
rhetoric  comprehends  and  holds  under  her  sway  all  the  inferior 
arts,  Let  me  offer  you  a  striking  example  of  this.  On  sev- 
eral occasions  I  have  been  with  my  brother  Herodicus  or  some 
other  physician  to  see  one  of  his  patients,  who  would  not  allow 
the  physician  to  give  him  medicine,  or  apply  the  knife  or  hot 
iron  to  him  ;  and  I  have  persuaded  him  to  do  for  me  what  he 
would  not  do  for  the  physician  just  by  the  use  of  rhetoric. 
And  I  say  that  if  a  rhetorician  and  a  physician  were  to  go  to 
any  city,  and  there  had  to  argue  in  the  Ecclesia  or  any  other 
assembly  as  to  which  should  be  elected,  the  physician  would 
have  no  chance ;  but  he  who  could  speak  would  be  chosen  if 
he  wished,  and  in  a  contest  with  a  man  of  any  other  profession 
the  rhetorician  more  than  any  one  would  have  the  power 
of  getting  himself  chosen,  for  he  can  speak  more  persuasively 
to  the  multitude  that  any  of  them,  and  on  any  subject.  Such 
is  the  power  and  quality  of  rhetoric,  Socrates.  And  yet  rhet- 
oric ought  to  be  used  like  any  other  competitive  art,  not  against 
everybody,  —  the  rhetorician  ought  not  to  abuse  his  strength 
any  more  than  a  pugilist  or  pancratiast  or  other  master  of 
fence  ;  because  he  has  powers  which  are  more  than  a  match 
either  for  enemy  or  friend,  he  ought  not  therefore  to  strike, 
stab,  or  slay  his  friends.  And  suppose  a  man  who  has  been 
trained  in  the  palaestra  and  is  a  skillful  boxer,  and  in  the  full- 
ness of  his  strength  he  goes  and  strikes  his  father  or  mother 
or  one  of  his  familiars  or  friends,  that  is  no  reason  why  the 
trainer  or  master  of  fence  should  be  held  in  detestation  or 
banished, — surely  not.  For  they  taught  this  art  for  a  good 
purpose,  as  an  art  to  be  used  against  enemies  and  evil-doers,  in 
self-defense,  not  in  aggression,  and  others  have  perverted  their 
instructions,  making  a  bad  use  of  their  strength  and  skill. 
But  not  on  this  account  are  the  teachers  bad,  neither  is  the  art 
in  fault  or  bad  in  itself  ;  I  should  rather  say  that  those  who 
make  a  bad  use  of  the  art  are  to  blame.  And  the  same  holds 
good  of  rhetoric ;  for  the  rhetorician  can  speak  against  all  men 


378  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

and  on  any  subject,  and  in  general  he  can  persuade  the  multi- 
tude of  anything  better  than  any  other  man,  but  he  ought  not 
on  that  account  to  defraud  the  physician  or  any  other  artist  of 
his  reputation  merely  because  he  has  the  power ;  he  ought  to 
use  rhetoric  fairly,  as  he  would  also  use  his  athletic  powers. 
And  if  after  having  become  a  rhetorician  he  makes  a  bad  use 
of  his  strength  and  skill,  his  instructor  surely  ought  not  on 
that  account  to  be  held  in  detestation  or  banished.  For  he 
was  intended  by  his  teacher  to  make  a  good  use  of  his  instruc- 
tions, and  he  abuses  them.  And  therefore  he  is  the  person 
who  ought  to  be  held  in  detestation,  banished,  and  put  to  death, 
and  not  his  instructor. —  Gorgias,  iii.  41. 
Rhetoricians,  two  sorts  of. 

Soc.   Do  the  rhetoricians  appear  to  you  always  to  aim  at 

what  is  best  in  their  speeches,  and  to  desire  only  the  greatest 
improvement  of  the  citizens,  or  are  they  too  bent  upon  giving 
them  pleasure,  forgetting  the  public  good  in  the  thought  of  their 
own  interest,  playing  with  the  people  as  with  children,  and  try- 
ing to  amuse  them,  but  never  considering  whether  they  are 
better  or  worse  for  this  ? 

CaL  I  must  distinguish.  There  are  some  who  have  a  real 
care  of  the  public  in  what  they  say,  while  others  are  such  as 
you  describe. 

Soc.  I  am  contented  with  the  admission  that  rhetoric  is  of 
two  sorts  ;  one  which  is  mere  flattery  and  disgraceful  declama- 
tion ;  the  other,  which  is  noble  and  aims  at  the  training  and 
improvement  of  the  souls  of  the  citizens,  and  strives  to  say 
what  is  best,  whether  welcome  or  unwelcome,  to  the  audience  ; 
but  have  you  ever  known  such  a  rhetoric  ;  or  if  you  have,  and 
can  point  out  any  rhetorician  who  is  of  this  stamp,  will  you  tell 
me  who  he  is  ? 

CaL  But,  indeed,  I  am  afraid  that  I  cannot  tell  you  of  any 
such  among  the  orators  who  are  at  present  living. 

Soc.  Well,  then,  can  you  mention  any  one  of  'a  former  gen- 
eration, who  may  be  said  to  have  improved  the  Athenians,  who 
found  them  worse  and  made  them  better,  from  the  day  that  he 
began  to  make  speeches  ?  for,  indeed,  I  do  not  know  of  such  a 
man.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  94. 
Rhetoricians,  none  noble.     See  Nolle,  etc. 
Rhythm,  the  order  of  motion . 

Ath.  I  was  speaking  at  the  commencement  of  our  dis- 
course, as  you  will  remember,  of  the  fiery  nature  of  young 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  379 

creatures  ;  I  said  that  they  were  unable  to  keep  quiet  either  in 
limb  or  voice,  and  that  they  called  out  and  jumped  about  in  a 
disorderly  manner  ;  and  that  no  other  animal  attained  to  any  per- 
ception of  order,  but  man  only.  Now  the  order  of  motion  is 
called  rhythm,  and  the  order  of  the  voice,  in  which  high  and 
low  are  duly  mingled,  is  called  harmony ;  and  both  together  are 
termed  choric  song.  And  I  said  that  the  Gods  had  pity  on  us, 
and  gave  us  Apollo  and  the  Muses  to  be  our  playfellows  and 
leaders  in  the  dance  ;  and  Dionysus,  as  I  dare  say  that  you  will 
remember,  was  the  third. 

Cle.  I  quite  remember.  —  Laws,  iv.  194. 
Rich  man,  bad  company. 

May  I  ask,  Cephalus,  whether  you  inherited  or  acquired 

the  greater  part  of  your  wealth  ? 

Acquired  !  Socrates  ;  do  you  want  to  know  how  much  I  ac- 
quired? In  the  art  of  making  money  I  have  been  midway  be- 
tween my  father  and  grandfather ;  for  my  grandfather,  whose 
name  like  my  own  was  Cephalus,  doubled  and  trebled  the  value 
of  his  inheritance,  but  my  father  Lysanias  reduced  the  prop- 
erty below  what  I  now  have ;  and  I  shall  be  satisfied  if  I  leave 
my  sons  a  little  more  than  I  received. 

That  was  why  I  asked  you  the  question,  I  said,  because  I 
saw  that  you  were  indifferent  about  money,  which  is  a  charac- 
teristic rather  of  those  who  have  inherited  their  fortunes  than 
of  those  who  have  acquired  them  ;  for  the  latter  have  a  second 
love  of  money  as  a  creation  of  their  own,  resembling  the  affec- 
tion of  authors  for  their  own  poems,  or  of  parents  for  their 
children,  besides  that  natural  love  of  money  for  the  sake  of  use 
and  enjoyment  which  is  common  to  them  and  all  men.  And 
hence  they  are  very  bad  company,  for  they  talk  about  nothing 
but  the  praises  of  wealth. 

That  is  true,  he  said. 

Yes,  that  is  very  true,  I  said ;  but  may  I  ask  another  ques 
tion?  —  What  do  you  consider  to    be    the    greatest    blessing 
which  you  have  reaped  from  wealth  ?  —  The  Republic,  ii.  150. 
Rich  man,  the  true  and  noble.     See  No'ile,  etc. 
Riches  in  government.      See  Money  a  ruler. 
Riches  and  poverty  in  age.      See  Poverty. 
Riches  an  evil  left  to  children.     See  Children. 
Ridicule  no  test  of  truth. 

But  then,   I   said,  as  we  have  determined  to  speak  our 

minds,  we  must  not  fear  the  jests  of  the  wits  which  will  be  di- 


380  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

rected  against  this  sort  of  innovation  ;  how  they  will  ta/k  of 
women's  attainments  in  music  as  well  as  in  gymnastic,  and 
above  all  about  their  wearing  armor  and  riding  upon  horse- 
back ! 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

Yet  having  begun,  we  must  go  on  and  attack  the  difficulty ; 
at  the  same  time  begging  of  these  gentlemen  for  once  in  their 
life  to  be  serious.  Not  long  ago,  as  we  shall  remind  them,  the 
Greeks  were  of  the  opinion,  which  is  still  generally  received 
among  the  barbarians,  that  the  sight  of  a  naked  man  was  ridic- 
ulous and  improper  ;  and  when  first  the  Cretans  and  then  the 
Lacedaemonians  introduced  naked  exercises,  the  wits  of  that 
day  might  have  ridiculed  them  equally. 

No  doubt. 

But  when  experience  showed  that  to  let  all  things  be  uncov- 
ered was  far  better  than  to  cover  them  up,  and  the  ludicrous 
effect  to  the  outward  eye  vanished  before  the  approval  of  rea- 
son, then  the  man  was  seen  to  be  a  fool  who  laughs  or  directs 
the  shafts  of  his  ridicule  at  any  other  sight  but  that  of  folly 
and  vice,  or  seriously  inclines  to  measure  the  beautiful  by  any 
other  standard  but  that  of  the  good. 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

First,  then,  whether  the  question  is  to  be  put  in  jest  or  in 
earnest,  let  us  ask  about  the  nature  of  woman  ;  Is  she  capable 
of  sharing  either  wholly  or  partially,  in  the  actions  of  men  or 
not  at  all  ?  And  is  the  art  of  war  one  of  those  arts  in  which 
she  can  or  cannot  share  ?  That  will  be  the  best  way  of  com- 
mencing the  inquiry,  and  will  probably  lead  to  the  fairest  con- 
clusion. 

That  will  be  best.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  276. 
Ridicule  at  self-conceit.     See  Laughter. 
Right  and  duty  versus  life  and  death.     See  Death  and  life. 
Right,  ridicule  no  test  of.      See  Ridicule. 
Right  determined  by  might.     See  Might. 
Right  and  wrong  determined  by  the  State. 

Soc.  Again,  in  politics,  while  affirming    that  right    and 

wrong,  honorable  and  disgraceful,  holy  and  unholy,  are  in  real- 
ity to  each  State  such  as  the  State  thinks  and  makes  lawful, 
and  that  in  determining  these  matters  no  individual  or  State  is 
wiser  than  another,  still  the  followers  of  Protagoras  will  not 
deny  that  in  determining  the  sphere  of  expediency  one  coun- 
selor is  better  than  another,  and  one  State  wiser  than  another . 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  381 

they  will  scarcely  venture  to  maintain,  that  what  a  city  deems 
expedient  will  always  be  really  expedient.     But  in  the  other 
case,  I  mean  when  they  speak  of  justice  and  injustice,  piety  and 
impiety,  they  are  confident  that  these  have  no  natural  or  essen- 
tial basis  —  the  truth  is  that  which  is  agreed  on  at  the  time  of 
agreement,  and  as  long  as  the  agreement  lasts ;  and  this  is  the 
philosophy  of  many  who  do  not  altogether  go  along  with  Pro- 
tagoras. —  Thaeatetus,  iii.  374. 
Right  opinion,  differences  as  to.     See  Differences,  etc. 
Righteous  judge.     See  Judge,  etc. 
Round  world.     See  Earth,  rotundity  of  the. 
Rulers  swaying  the  people. 

Your  own  Agathocles  pretended  to  be  a  musician,  but 

was  really  an  eminent  Sophist ;  also  Pythocleides  and  Cean ; 
and  there  were  many  others ;  and  all  of  them,  as  I  was  saying, 
adopted  these  arts  as  veils  or  disguises  because  they  were  afraid 
of  the  envy  of  the  multitude.  But  that  is  not  my  way,  for  I 
do  not  believe  that  they  effected  their  purpose,  which  was  to 
deceive  the  government,  who  were  not  blinded  by  them ;  and 
as  to  the  people,  they  have  no  understanding,  and  only  repeat 
what  their  rulers  are  pleased  to  tell  them.  —  Protagoras,  L 
117. 
Rulers  in  the  State,  who  should  be. 

Now  then,  I  said,  I  go  to  meet  that  which  I  liken  to  the 

greatest  of  the  waves,  yet  shall  the  word  be  spoken,  even 
though  the  overflowing  of  the  laughing  wave  shall  drown  me 
in  laughter  and  dishonor ;  and  do  you  attend  to  me. 

Proceed. 

I  said :  Until,  then,  philosophers  are  kings,  or  the  kings  and 
princes  of  this  world  have  the  spirit  and  power  of  philosophy, 
and  political  greatness  and  wisdom  meet  in  one,  and  those  com- 
moner natures  who  follow  either  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other 
are  compelled  to  stand  aside,  cities  will  never  cease  from  ill  — 
n6,  nor  the  human  race,  as  I  believe  —  and  then  only  will  our 
State  have  a  possibility  of  life  and  behold  the  light  of  day  : 
this  was  the  thought,  my  dear  Glaucon,  which  I  was  wanting  to 
utter,  if  it  had  not  seemed  too  extravagant ;  for  to  be  con- 
vinced that  in  no  other  State  can  there  be  private  or  public 
happiness  is  indeed  a  hard  thing. 

Socrates,  what  do  you  mean  ?  I  would  have  you  consider 
that  the  word  which  you  have  spoken  is  one  at  which  numer- 
ous persons,  and  very  respectable  persons  too,  pulling  off  their 


382  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

coats  in  a  moment  and  seizing  any  weapon  that  comes  to  hand, 
will  run  at  you  might  and  main,  intending  to  do  heaven  knows 
what ;  and  if  you  don't  prepare  an  answer,  and  put  yourself 
in  motion,  you  will  be  "  pared  by  their  fine  wits,"  and  no  mis- 
take. 

You  got  me  into  the  scrape,  I  said. 

And  I  was  quite  right ;  however,  I  will  do  all  I  can  to  get 
you  out ;  but  I  can  only  give  you  wishes  and  exhortations, 
and  also,  perhaps,  I  may  be  able  to  fit  answers  to  your  ques- 
tions better  than  another  —  that  is  all.  And  no\v  having 
such  an  auxiliary,  you  must  do  your  best  to  show  the  unbe- 
lievers that  you  are  right. 

I  ought  to  try,  I  said,  since  you  offer  me  such  valuable 
assistance.  And  I  think  that,  if  there  is  to  be  a  chance  of  our 
escaping,  we  must  define  who  those  philosophers  are  who,  as 
we  say,  are  to  rule  in  the  State  ;  then  we  shall  be  able  to  de- 
fend ourselves  :  there  will  be  discovered  to  be  some  natures 
who  ought  to  rule  and  to  study  philosophy ;  and  others  who 
are  not  born  to  be  philosophers,  and  are  meant  to  be  followers 
rather  than  leaders. —  The  Republic,  ii.  301. 
Rulers,  who  and  what  they  must  be. 

The  women  and  children  are  done  with  but  there  remains 

the  further  question  of  the  rulers,  which  I  must  now  investi- 
gate from  the  beginning.  We  were  saying,  as  you  will  re- 
member, that  they  were  to  be  lovers  of  their  country,  tried  by 
the  test  of  pleasures  and  pains,  and  neither  in  labors,  nor  fears, 
nor  any  other  change  of  circumstances  were  to  lose  their  pa- 
triotism ;  he  was  to  be  rejected  who  failed  but  he  who  al- 
ways came  forth  pure,  like  goU  tried  in  the  refiner's  fire,  was 
to  be  made  a  ruler,  and  to  receive  honors  and  rewards  in  life 
and  after  death.  That  was  the  sort  of  thing  which  was  being 
said,  and  then  the  argument  turned  aside  and  veiled  her  face ; 
not  liking  to  stir  the  question  which  has  now  arisen. 

I  perfectly  remember,  he  said. 

Yes,  my  friend,  I  said  and  I  then  shrank  from  hazarding 
the  bold  word  ;  but  now  let  me  dare  to  say,  —  that  the  perfect 
guardian  must  be  a  philosopher. 

Yes,  he  said,  let  that  be  proclaimed. 

And  do  not  suppose  that  there  will  be  many  of  them,  — 
for  the  gifts  which  we  said  were  essential  rarely  grow  to- 
gether ;  they  are  mostly  found  in  shreds  and  patches. 

What  do  you  mean  ?  he  said. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  383 

You  are  aware,  I  replied,  that  persons  who  have  quick  in- 
telligence, memory,  sagacity,  shrewdness,  and  similar  gifts,  are 
not  often  of  a  nature  which  is  willing  at  the  same  time  to  live 
orderly  and  in  a  peaceful  and  settled  manner  ;  and  this  is  equally 
true  of  the  high-spirited  and  magnanimous  ;  they  are  drive  a 
any  way  by  their  impetuosity,  and  all  solid  principle  goes  out 
of  them. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  steadfast,  immovable  natures  which 
in  a  battle  are  impregnable  to  fear  and  can  better  be  depended 
on  are  equally  immovable  when  there  is  anything  to  be  learned ; 
they  seem  to  be  in  a  torpid  state,  and  are  apt  to  yawn  and  go 
to  sleep  over  any  intellectual  toil. 

Quite  true. 

And  yet  we  were  saying  that  both  qualities  were  necessary 
in  those  to  whom  the  higher  education  is  to  be  imparted,  and 
who  are  to  share  in  any  office  or  command. 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  will  they  be  a  class  which  is  rarely  found  ? 

Yes,  indeed. 

Then  the  aspirant  must  not  only  be  tested  in  those  labors 
and  dangers  and  pleasures  which  we  mentioned  before  ;  and 
there  is  another  kind  of  probation  which  we  did  not  mention, 
he  must  be  exercised  also  in  many  kinds  of  knowledge,  to  see 
whether  the  soul  will  be  able  to  endure  the  highest  of  all, 
or  will  faint  under  them,  as  many  do  amid  the  toils  of  the 
games. 

Yes,  he  said,  you  are  quite  right  in  testing  them.  —  The  Re- 
public, ii.  330. 
Rulers  compared  to  gold  and  silver. 

1  have  only  told  you  half.     Citizens,  we  shall  say  to  them 

in  our  tale,  you  are  brothers,  yet  God  has  framed  you  differ- 
ently. Some  of  you  have  the  power  of  command,  and  these 
he  has  composed  of  gold,  wherefore  also  they  have  the  greatest 
honor ;  others  of  silver,  to  be  auxiliaries ;  others  again  who  are 
to  be  husbandmen  and  craftsmen  he  has  made  of  brass  and 
iron ;  and  the  species  will  generally  be  preserved  in  the  chil- 
dren. But  as  you  are  of  the  same  original  family,  a  golden 
parent  will  sometimes  have  a  silver  son,  or  a  silver  parent  a 
golden  son.  And  God  proclaims  to  the  rulers,  as  a  first  prin- 
ciple, that  before  all  they  should  watch  over  their  offspiing, 
and  see  what  elements  mingle  in  their  nature ;  for  if  the  son 


384  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

of  a  golden  or  silver  parent  has  an  admixture  of  brass  and  iron, 
then  nature  orders  a  transposition  of  ranks,  and  the  eye  of  the 
ruler  must  not  be  pitiful  towards  his  child  because  he  has  to 
descend  in  the  scale  and  become  a  husbandman  or  artisan,  just 
as  there  may  be  others  sprung  from  the  artisan  class  who  are 
raised  to  honor,  and  become  guardians  and  auxiliaries.  For  an 
oracle  says  that  when  a  man  of  brass  or  iron  guards  the  State, 
it  will  then  be  destroyed.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  240. 
Rulers  must  be  characterized  by  truth  and  virtue. 

Inasmuch   as    philosophers  only  are    able    to    grasp    the 

eternal  and  unchangeable,  and  those  who  wander  in  the  region 
of  the  many  and  variable  are  not  philosophers,  I  must  ask  you 
which  of  the  two  kinds  should  be  the  rulers  of  our  State  ? 

And  how  can  we  truly  answer  that  question  ?  he  said. 

Ask  yourself,  I  replied,  which  of  the  two  are  better  able  to 
guard  the  laws  and  institutions  of  our  State ;  and  let  them  be 
our  guardians. 

Very  good. 

Neither,  I  said,  can  there  be  any  question  that  the  guardian 
who  is  to  keep  anything  should  have  eyes  rather  than  no 
eyes? 

There  can  be  no  question  of  that. 

And  are  not  those  who  are  truly  and  indeed  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  true  being  of  each  thing,  and  have  in  their 
souls  no  clear  pattern,  and  are  unable  as  with  a  painter's  eye  to 
look  at  the  very  truth  and  to  that  original  to  repair,  and  having 
perfect  vision  of  the  other  world  to  order  the  laws  about  beauty, 
goodness,  justice  in  this,  if  not  already  ordered  and  to  guard 
and  preserve  the  order  of  them  —  are  they  not,  I  say,  simply 
blind  ? 

Assuredly,  he  replied,  that  is  very  much  their  condition. 

And  shall  they  be  our  guardians  when  there  are  others  who, 
besides  being  their  equals  in  experience  and  not  inferior  to 
them  in  any  particular  of  virtue,  have  also  the  knowledge  of 
the  truth  ? 

There  can  be  no  reason,  he  said,  for  rejecting  those  who 
have  this  great  and  preeminent  quality,  if  they  do  not  fail  in 
any  other  respect. 

Suppose  then,  I  said,  that  we  determine  how  far  they  can 
unite  this  and  the  other  excellences. 

By  all  means. 

In   the  first  place,  as  we  began  by  observing,  the  nature  of 


PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS.  385 

the  philosopher  was  to  be  ascertained;  about  which,  if  we  are 
agreed,   then,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  we  shall  also  be  agreed 

O  '  *  '  O 

that   such  an  union  of    qualities    is   possible,  and    that    those 
in  whom  they  are  united,  and   those  only,  should  be  rulers  in 
the  State.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  310. 
Rulers  compared  to  pilots  and  physicians. 

Sir.   I   must  again   have  recourse  to  my  favorite  images ; 

through  them,  and  them  alone,  can  I  describe  kings  and  rulers. 

T.  Soc.  What  images  ? 

Str.  The  noble  pilot  and  the  wise  physician,  who  "  is  worth 
many  another  man ; "  in  the  similitude  of  these  let  us  endeavor 
to  discover  some  image  of  the  king. 

Y.  Soc.  What  sort  of  an  image  ? 

Str.  Well,  such  as  this :  every  man  will  reflect  that  he 
suffers  strange  things  at  their  hands ;  the  physician  saves  any 
whom  he  wishes  to  save,  and  many  whom  he  wishes  to  injure 
he  injures  —  cutting  or  burning  them,  and  at  the  same  time 
requiring  them  to  bring  him  payments,  which  are  a  sort  of  trib- 
ute, of  which  a  very  small  part  is  spent  upon  the  sick  man, 
and  the  greater  part  is  consumed  by  him  and  his  domestics  ; 
and  the  finale  is,  that  he  receives  money  from  the  relations  of 
the  sick  man  or  from  some  enemy  of  his,  and  puts  him  out  of 
the  way.  And  the  captains  of  ships  are  guilty  of  numberless 
evil  deeds  of  the  same  kind ;  they  play  false  and  leave  you 
ashore  when  the  hour  of  sailing  arrives,  or  they  wreck  their 
vessels  and  cast  away  freight  and  lives  ;  not  to  speak  of  other 
rogueries.  Now  suppose  that  we,  bearing  all  this  in  mind, 
were  to  determine,  after  consideration,  that  neither  of  these 
arts  shall  any  longer  be  allowed  to  exercise  absolute  control 
either  over  freemen  or  over  slaves,  but  that  we  will  summon 
an  assembly  either  of  all  the  people,  or  of  the  rich  only,  and 
that  anybody  who  likes,  whatever  may  be  his  calling,  or  even 
if  he  have  no  calling,  may  offer  an  opinion  either  about  ships 
or  about  diseases  ;  whether  as  to  the  manner  in  which  physic 
or  surgical  instruments  are  to  be  applied  to  the  patient,  or 
about  the  vessels  and  the  nautical  instruments  which  are  re- 
quired in  navigation,  and  how  to  meet  the  dangers  of  winds 
and  waves  which  are  incidental  to  the  voyage  —  how  to  behave 
when  encountering  pirates  ;  and  what  is  to  be  done  with  the 
old-fashioned  galleys,  if  they  have  to  fight  with  others  of  a 
similar  build :  and  that,  whatever  shall  be  decreed  by  the  mul- 
titude on  these  points,  upon  the  advice  of  persons  skilled  or 
35 


386  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

unskilled,  shall  be  written  down  on  triangular  tablets  and  col- 
umns, or  embalmed  unwritten  as  national  customs  ;  and  that  in 
all  future  time  vessels  shall  be  navigated  and  remedies  admin- 
istered to  the  patient  after  this  fashion. 

T.  Soc.  What  a  strange  notion  ! 

Sir.  Suppose,  further,  that  the  admirals  and  physicians  are 
appointed  annually,  either  out  of  the  rich,  or  out  of  the  whole 
people,  and  that  they  are  elected  by  lot,  and  that  after  their 
election  they  navigate  vessels  and  heal  the  sick  according  to 
.the  written  rules. 

Y.  Soc.  Worse  arid  worse. 

Str.  But  hear  what  follows  :  when  the  year  of  office  has  ex- 
pired, the  admiral  or  physician  has  to  come  before  a  court  of 
review,  in  which  the  judges  are  either  selected  from  the  wealthy 
classes  or  chosen  by  lot  out  of  the  whole  people ;  and  anybody 
who  pleases  may  accuse  them,  and  he  will  lay  to  their  charge, 
that  during  the  past  year  they  have  not  navigated  their  vessels 
or  healed  their  patients,  according  to  the  letter  of  the  law  or 
according  to  the  ancient  customs  of  their  ancestors  ;  and  if 
either  of  them  is  condemned,  there  must  be  persons  to  fix  what 
he  is  to  suffer  or  pay. 

Y.  Soc.  He  who  is  willing  to  take  a  command  under  such 
conditions,  deserves  to  suffer  any  penalty.  —  Statesman,  iii.  583. 
Rulers  and  warriors,  gentleness  of.     See  Gentleness. 
Rulers,  qualities  of.     See  Magistrates. 

Salvation  of  human  life.     See  Human  life,  etc. 
Science  of  time. 

Soc.  And  now  let  me  see  whether  you  agree  with  Laches 

and  myself  in  a  third  point. 

Nic.  What  is  that  ? 

Soc.  I  will  tell  you.  He  and  I  have  a  notion  that  there  is 
not  one  knowledge  or  science  of  the  past,  another  of  the  pres- 
ent, a  third  of  what  will  be  and  will  be  best  in  the  future  ; 
but  that  of  all  three  there  is  one  science  only  :  for  example, 
there  is  one  science  of  medicine  which  is  concerned  with  the 
Inspection  of  health  equally  in  all  times,  present,  past,  and  fu- 
ture ;  and  of  husbandry  in  like  manner,  which  is  concerned 
with  the  productions  of  the  earth  in  all  times.  As  to  the  gen- 
eral's art,  yourselves  will  be  my  witnesses,  that  the  general 
has  to  think  of  the  future  as  well  as  the  present  ;  and  he  con- 
siders that  he  is  not  to  be  the  servant  of  the  soothsayer,  but 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  387 

his  master,  because  he  knows  better  what  is  happening  or  ia 
likely  to  happen  in  war  :  and  accordingly  the  law  places  the 
soothsayer  under  the  general,  and  not  the  general  under  the 
soothsayer.  Am  I  not  correct,  Laches  ? 

La.  Quite  correct. 

Soc.  And  do  you,  Nicias,  also  acknowledge  that  the  same 
science  has  understanding  of  the  same  things,  whether  future, 
present,  or  past  ? 

Nic.  Yes,  indeed,  Socrates  ;  that  is  my  opinion.  —  Laches, 
i.  92. 
Science  versus  sense. 

You,  I  replied,  have  in  your  mind  a  sublime  conception 

of  how  we  know  the  things  above.  And  I  dare  say  that  if  a 
person  were  to  throw  his  head  back  and  study  the  fretted  ceil- 
ing, you  would  still  think  that  his  mind  was  the  percipient  and 
not  his  eyes.  And  you  are  very  likely  right  and  I  may  be  a 
simpleton,  but  in  my  opinion,  that  knowledge  only  which  is  of 
being  and  of  the  unseen  can  make  the  soul  look  upwards  and 
whether  a  man  gapes  at  the  heavens  or  blinks  on  the  ground, 
seeking  to  learn  some  particular  of  sense,  I  would  deny  that 
he  can  learn,  for  nothing  of  that  sort  is  matter  of  science;  his 
soul  is  looking,  not  upwards,  but  downwards,  whether  his  way 
to  knowledge  is  by  water  or  by  land,  in  whichever  element  he 
may  lie  on  his  back  and  float.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  357. 
Science,  certain  knowledge  necessary  to. 

I  must  add  that  the  power  of  dialectic  alone  can  re- 
veal this,  and  only  to  one  who  is  a  disciple  of  the  previous 
sciences. 

Of  that  assertion  you  may  be  as  certain  as  of  the  last. 

And  certainly  no  one,  will  argue  that  there  is  any  other 
method  or  way  of  comprehending  all  true  existe?  ce  ;  for  the 
\rts  in  general  are  concerned  with  the  wants  c  opinions  of 
men,  or  are  cultivated  for  the  sake  of  production  and  con- 
struction or  for  the  care  of  such  productions  and  construc- 
tions ;  and  as  to  the  mathematical  arts  which,  as  we  were  say- 
ing, have  some  apprehension  of  true  being  —  geometry  and 
the  like  —  they  only  dream  about  being,  and  never  can  they 
behold  the  waking  reality  so  long  as  they  leave  the  hypotheses 
which  they  use  unexamined  and  are  unable  to  give  an  account 
of  them.  For. when  a  man  knows  not  his  own  first  principle, 
and  when  the  conclusion  and  intermediate  steps  are  also  con- 
structed out  of  he  knows  not  what,  how  can  he  imagine  that 
such  a  conventional  statement  will  ever  become  science  ? 


888  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Impossible,  he  said. 

Then  dialectic,  and  dialectic  alone,  goes  directly  to  the  first 
principle,  and  is  the  only  science  which  does  away  with  hypoth- 
eses in  order  to  make  certain  of  them  ;  the  eye  of  the  soul, 
which  is  literally  buried  in  an  outlandish  slough,  is  by  her 
taught  to  look  upwards ;  and  she  uses  as  handmaids,  iu  the 
work  of  conversion,  the  sciences  which  we  have  been  discuss- 
ing. Custom  terms  them  sciences,  but  they  ought  to  have 
some  other  name,  implying  greater  clearness  than  opinion  and 
less  clearness  than  science  :  and  this,  in  our  previous  sketch, 
was  called  understanding.  But  there  is  no  use  in  our  disput- 
ing about  names  when  we  have  realities  of  such  importance  to 
consider. 

No,  he  said ;  any  name  will  do  which  expresses  the  thought 
clearly.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  361. 

Science  of  government,  wherein  resident.     See    Government,  sci- 
ence of. 

Science,  political,  not  attained  by  the  many.     See  Government,  sci- 
ence of. 

Science,  political,  refining  of. 

Str.  There  are,  however,  natures  more  nearly  akin  to  the 

king,  and  more  difficult  to  discern  ;  the  examination  of  them 
may  be  compared  to  the  process  of  refining  gold. 

Y.  Soc.  What  is  your  meaning  ? 

Str.  The  workmen  begin  by  sifting  away  the  earth  and 
stones  and  the  like ;  they  then  draw  off  in  the  fire,  which  is 
the  only  way  of  abstracting  them,  the  more  precious  elements  of 
copper,  silver,  or  other  metallic  substance,  which  have  an  affin- 
ity to  gold ;  these  are  at  last  refined  away  by  the  use  of  tests, 
and  the  gold  is  left  quite  pure. 

T.  Soc.  Yes,  that  is  the  way  in  which  these  things  are  said 
to  be  done. 

Str.  In  like  manner,  all  alien  and  uncongenial  matter  has 
been  separated  from  political  science  ;  and  what  is  precious  and 
of  a  kindred  nature  has  been  left ;  there  remain  the  nobler 
arts  of  the  general  and  the  judge,  and  the  higher  sort  of  ora- 
tory, which  is  an  ally  of  the  royal  art,  and  persuades  men  to  do 
justice,  and  assists  in  guiding  the  helm  of  States.  What  way 
can  be  found  of  taking  them  away,  leaving  him  whom  we  seek 
alone  and  unalloyed  ? 

1".  Soc.  That  is  clearly  what  has  to  be  attempted.  —  State* 
man.  iii.  589. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  389 

Sculpture,  deception  in.     See  Likeness-making. 
Sea,  evil  influence  of  the,  on  cities.     See  Cities. 
Seen  and  unseen. 

What  would  you  say  of  the  many  beautiful  —  whether 

•men  or  horses  or  garments  or  any  other  things  which  may  be 
called  equal  or  beautiful,  —  are  they  all  unchanging  and  the 
same  always,  or  quite  the  reverse  ?     May  they  not  rather  be 
described  as  almost  always  changing  and  hardly  ever  the  same, 
either  with  themselves  or  with  one  another  ? 

The  latter,  replied  Cebes  ;  they  are  always  in  a  state  of 
change. 

And  these  you  can  touch  and  see  and  perceive  with  the 
senses,  but  the  unchanging  things  you  can  only  perceive  with 
the  mind  —  they  are  invisible  and  are  not  seen  ? 

That  is  very  true,  he  said. 

Well  then,  Socrates,  let  us  suppose  that  there  are  two  sorts 
2>f  existences,  one  seen,  the  other  unseen. 

Let  us  suppose  them. 

The  seen  is  the  changing,  and  the  unseen  is  the  unchanging  ? 

That  may  be  also  supposed. 

And,  further,  is  not  one  part  of  us  body,  and  the  rest  of  us 
soul  ? 

To  be  sure. 

And  to  which  class  may  we  say  that  the  body  is  more  alike 
and  akin  ? 

Clearly  to  the  seen  :   no  one  can  doubt  that. 

And  is  the  soul  seen  or  not  seen  ? 

Not  by  man,  Socrates. 

And  what  we  mean  by  "  seen  "  and  "  not  seen  "  is  that 
which  is  or  is  not  visible  to  the  eye  of  man  ? 

Yes,  to  the  eye  of  man. 

And  what  do  we  say  of  the  soul  ?  is  that  seen  or  not  seen  ? 

Not  seen. 

Unseen  then  ? 

Yes. 

Then  the  soul  is  more  like  to  the  unseen,  and  the  body  to 
the  seen  ? 

ThJt  is  most  certain,  Socrates.1  —  Phaedo,  i.  407. 
Self-assertion  of  Hippias. 

End.  I  am  sure  that  Hippias  will  have  no  objection  to 

answer  anything  that  you  ask  him ;  tell  me,  Hippias,  if  Soc- 
rates asks  you  a  question,  will  you  answer  him  ? 

1  For  the  further  discussion  of  this  point,  see  Reflecting,  etc. 


390  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Hippias.  Indeed,  Eudicus,  I  should  be  strangely  inconsistent 
if  I  refused  to  answer  Socrates,  when  at  each  Olympic  festival, 
as  I  went  up  from  my  house  at  Elis  to  the  temple  of  Olympia, 
where  all  the  Hellenes  were  assembled,  I  continually  professed 
my  willingness  to  perform  any  of  the  exhibitions  which  I  had 
prepared,  and  to  answer  any  questions  which  any  one  had  to 
ask. 

Soc.  Truly,  Hippias  you  are  a  happy  man  if  at  every  Olym- 
pic festival  you  have  such  an  encouraging  opinion  of  your  own 
powers  when  you  go  up  to  the  temple.  I  doubt  whether  any 
mu.-cular  hero  would  be  as  fearless  and  confident  in  offering 
his  body  to  the  combat  at  Olympia,  as  you  are  in  offering  your 
mind. 

Hip.  And  with  good  reason,  Socrates ;  for  since  the  day 
when  I  first  entered  the  lists  at  Olympia  I  never  found  any 
one  who  was  my  superior  in  anything. 

Soc.  What  an  ornament,  Hippias,  will  the  reputation  of  your 
wisdom  be  to  the  city  of  Elis  and  to  your  parents  !  But  to 
return  :  what  do  you  say  of  Odysseus  and  Achilles  ?  Which 
of  the  two  is  the  better  of  them  ?  and  in  what  particular  does 
either  surpass  the  other  ?  For  when  you  were  exhibiting  and 
company  was  in  the  room,  though  I  could  not  follow  you,  I  did 
not  like  to  ask  what  you  meant,  because  there  were  other 
people  present,  and  I  was  afraid  that  the  question  might  inter- 
rupt your  exhibition.  —  Lesser  Hippias,  iv.  493. 
Self-conceit  of  youth. 

At  length  they  seize  upon  the  citadel  of  the  young  man's 

soul,  which  they  perceive  to  be  void  of  all  fair  accomplishments 
and  pursuits  and  of  every  true  word,  which  are  the  best  guard- 
ians and  sentinels  in  the  minds  of  men  who  are  dear  to  the 
Gods. 

None  better. 

False  and  boastful  words  and  conceits  mount  upwards  in- 
stead of  them,  and  occupy  the  vacant  post. 

They  are  sure  to  do  so. 

And  so  the  young  man  returns  into  the  country  of  the  lotus- 
eaters  and  takes  up  his  abode  there  in  the  face  of  all  men ;  and 
if  any  help  be  sent  by  his  friends  to  the  oligarchical  part  of 
him  the  same  vain  conceits  shut  the  gate  of  the  king's  fastness; 
ihey  will  not  allow  the  new  allies  to  pass.  And  if  private  in- 
dividuals, venerable  for  their  age,  come  and  parley,  they  do  not 
receive  them ;  there  is  a  battle  and  they  win  ;  then  modesty 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  391 

which  they  call  silliness,  is  ignominiously  thrust  into  exile  by 
them.  They  affirm  temperance  to  be  unmanliness  and  her  also 
they  contemptuously  eject ;  and  they  pretend  that  moderation 
and  orderly  expenditure  are  vulgarity  and  meanness,  and  by 
the  help  of  a  rabble  of  evil  appetites  they  drain  them  beyond 

the  border Neither  does  he  receive  or  let  pass  into  the 

fortress  any  true  word  of  advice,  if  any  one  says  to  him  that 

some  pleasures  are  the  satisfactions  of  good  and  noble  desires, 

and  others  of  evil  desires,  and  that  he  ought  to  use  and  honor 

some,  and  curtail   and  reduce  others,  whenever  this  is  repeated 

to  him  he  shakes  his  head  and    says  that  they  are  all  alike 

and  that  one  is  as  honorable  as  another.  —  The  Republic,  ii. 

388. 

Self-conceit,  laughter  at.     See  Laughter,  etc. 

Self-conceit  purged  out  by  refutation.     See  Purification,  etc. 

Self-control.     See  Intemperance  and  Self-mastery. 

Self-deception. 

Crat.  You  are  right,   Socrates,  in  saying  that  I  have  at- 

tended  to  these  matters,  and  possibly  I  might  even  turn  you 
into  a  disciple.      But  I  fear  that  the  converse  is  more  probable 
and  I  already  find  myself  moved  to  say  to  you  what  Achilles 
in  the  "  Prayers  "  says  to  Ajax,  — 

"Illustrious  Ajax,  son  of  Telamon,  king  of  men, 
You  appear  to  have  spoken  in  all  things  much  to  my  mind." 

And  you,  Socrates,  appear  to  me  to  be  an  oracle,  and  to  give 
answers  much  to  my  mind,  whether  you  are  inspired  by  Euthy- 
phro,  or  whether  some  Muse  may  have  long  been  an  inhabi- 
tant of  your  breast,  unconsciously  to  yourself. 

Soc.  Excellent  Cratylus,  I  have  long  been  wondering  at  my 
own  wisdom  ;  I  cannot  trust  myself.     And  I  think  that  I  ought 
to  stop  and  ask  myself  what  am  I  saying,  for  there  is  nothing 
worse    thau  self-deception  —  when    the  deceiver  is  always  at 
home  and  always  with   you  —  that  is  indeed  terrible,  and  there- 
fore I  ought  often  to  retrace  my  steps  and  endeavor  to  "  look 
before   me  and    behind  me "   in    the   words   of    the    aforesaid 
Homer.  —  Cratylus,  i.  667. 
Self-elevation.     See  Elevation,  etc. 
Self-gratification.     See  Intemperance. 
Self-ignorance. 

Soc.  Are  there  not  three  ways  in  which  ignorance  of  self 

may  be  shown  ? 

Pro.  What  are  they  ? 


892  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Soc.  In  the  first  place,  about  money:  the  ignorant  may 
fancy  himself  richer  than  he  is. 

Pro.  Yes,  that  is  a  very  common  error. 

Soc.  And  still  more  often  he  will  fancy  that  he  is  taller  or 
fairer  than  he  is,  or  that  he  has  some  other  advantage  of  per- 
son which  he  has  not  really. 

Pro.   Certainly. 

Soc.  And  yet  surely  by  far  the  greatest  number  err  about 
the  goods  of  the  mind  ;  they  imagine  that  they  are  a  great 
deal  better  than  they  are. 

Pro.   Yes,  that  is  by  far  the  commonest  delusion. 

Soc.  And  of  all  the  virtues,  is  not  wisdom  the  one  which  the 
mass  of  mankind  are  always  claiming,  and  which  most  arouses 
in  them  a  spirit  of  contention  and  lying  conceit  of  wisdom  ? 

Pro.   Certainly. 

Soc.  And  may  not  all  this  be  truly  called  an  evil  condi- 
tion ? 

Pro.  Very  evil. 

Soc.  But  we  must  pursue  the  division  a  step  further,  Protar- 
chus,  if  we  would  find  the  singular  mixture  of  pleasure  and 
pain  ;  —  pain  is  envy  of  the  playful  sort. 

Pro.  How  can  we  make  the  further  division  which  you  sug- 
gest? 

Soc.  All  who  are  silly  enough  to  entertain  this  lying  conceit 
of  themselves  may  be  divided,  like  the  rest  of  mankind,  into  two 
classes  —  one  of  them  having  power  and  might ;  and  the  other 
the  reverse. 

Pro.   Certainly. 

Soc.  Let  this,  then,  be  the  principle  of  division ;  those  of 
them  who  are  weak  and  unable  to  revenge  themselves,  when 
they  are  laughed  at,  may  be  truly  called  ridiculous,  but  those 
who  can  defend  themselves  may  be  more  truly  described  as 
strong  and  formidable,  for  ignorance  in  the  powerful  is  hateful 
and  horrible,  because  hurtful  to  others  both  in  reality  and  in 
fiction,  but  powerless  ignorance  may  be  reckoned,  and  in  truth 
is,  ridiculous.  —  Philebus,  iii.  188. 
Self-knowledge  and  temperance. 

But,  Socrates,  he  said,  I  will  withdraw  my  previous  admis- 
sions, rather  than  admit  that  a  man  can  be  temperate  or  wise, 
who  does  not  know  himself ;  and  I  am  not  ashamed  to  confess 
that  I  was  in  error.  For  self-knowledge  would  certainly  be 
maintained  by  me  to  be  the  very  essence  of  knowledge,  and  in 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  393 

this  I  agree  with  him  who  dedicated  the  inscription,  "  Know 
thyself ! "  at  Delphi.  That  word,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  is  put 
there  as  a  sort  of  salutation  which  the  God  addresses  to  those 
who  enter  the  temple  ;  as  much  as  to  say  that  the  ordinary 
salutation  of  "  Hail  ! "  is  not  right,  and  that  the  exhortation 
"  Be  temperate  !  "  would  be  a  far  better  way  of  saluting  one 
another.  The  notion  of  him  who  dedicated  the  inscription  was, 
as  I  believe,  that  the  God  speaks  to  those  who  enter  his  tem- 
ple not  as  men  speak  :  but,  when  a  worshiper  enters,  the  first 
word  which  he  hears  is  "  Be  temperate  !  "  This,  however,  like 
a  prophet  he  expresses  in  a  sort  of  riddle,  for  "  Know  thy- 
self !  "  and  "  Be  temperate  !  "  are  the  same,  as  I  maintain,  and 
as  the  writing  implies  [crw^povci,  yvuOt.  creaurov],  and  yet  they 
may  be  easily  misunderstood ;  and  succeeding  sages  who  added 
*•  Never  too  much,"  or,  "  Give  a  pledge,  and  evil  is  nigh  at 
hand,"  would  appear  to  have  misunderstood  them ;  for  they  im- 
agined that  "  Know  thyself !  "  was  a  piece  of  advice  which  the 
God  gave,  and  not  his  salutation  of  the  worshipers  at  their 
first  coming  in  ;  and  they  wrote  their  inscription  under  the 
idea  that  they  would  give  equally  useful  pieces  of  advice. 
Shall  I  tell  you,  Socrates,  why  I  say  all  this  ?  My  object  is 
to  leave  the  previous  discussion  (in  which  I  know  not  whether 
you  or  I  are  more  right,  but,  at  any  rate,  no  clear  result  was 
attained),  and  to  raise  a  new  one  in  which  I  will  attempt  to 
prove,  if  you  deny,  that  temperance  is  self-knowledge. 

Yes,  I  said,  Critias ;  but  you  come  to  me  as  though  I  pro- 
fessed to  know  about  the  questions  which  I  ask,  and  as  though 
I  could,  if  only  I  would,  agree  with  you.  Whereas  the  fact  is 
that  I  inquire  with  you  into  the  truth  of  that  which  is  ad- 
vanced from  time  to  time,  just  because  I  do  not  know ;  and 
when  I  have  inquired,  I  will  say  whether  I  agree  with  you  or 
not.  Please  then  to  allow  me  time  to  reflect. 

Reflect,  he  said. 

I  am  reflecting.  I  replied,  and  discover  that  temperance,  or 
wisdom,  if  implying  a  knowledge  of  anything,  must  be  a  sci- 
ence, and  a  science  of  something. 

Yes,  he  said,  the  science  of  itself.  —  Charmides,  i.  20. 
Self-mastery.     See  Intemperance. 

There  is  something  ridiculous  in  the  expression  "  master 

of  himself;"  for  the  master  is  also  the  slave  and  the  slave  the 
master ;  and  in  all  these  modes  of  speaking  the  same  person  is 
denoted. 


394  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Certainly. 

The  meaning  is,  I  believe,  that  the  human  soul  has  a  better 
principle,  and  has  also  a  worse  principle ;  and  when  the  better 
principle  controls  the  worse,  then  a  man  is  said  to  be  master  of' 
himself ;  and  this  is  a  term  of  praise :  but  when,  owing  to  evil 
education  or  association,  the  better  principle,  which  is  less,  is 
overcome  by  the  worse  principle,  which  is  greater  ;  in  this  case 
he  is  blamed  and  is  called  the  slave  of  self  and  unprinci- 
pled. 

Yes,  there  is  reason  in  that. 

And  now,  I  said,  look  at  our  newly-created  State,  and  there 
you  will  find  one  of  these  two  conditions  realized ;  for  the 
State,  as  you  will  acknowledge,  may  be  justly  called  master  of 
self,  if  the  words  ''temperance"  and  "self-mastery"  truly  ex- 
press the  rule  of  the  better  over  the  worse. —  The  .Republic, 
ii.  256. 
Self-motion. 

Ath.  When  one  thing  moves  another,  and  that  another, 

will  there  be  any  primary  changing  element?  Can  there 
be,  considering  that  what  changes  first  will  always  have  been 
changed  by  another  ?  There  cannot.  And  when  the  self- 
moved  changes  other,  and  that  again  other,  and  thus,  thou- 
sands upon  tens  of  thousands  of  bodies  are  set  in  motion,  must 
not  the  beginning  of  all  this  motion  be  the  change  of  the  self- 
moving  principle  ? 

Gle.  Very  true,  and  I  quite  agree. 

Ath.  Or,  to  put  the  question  in  another  way  :  If,  as  most  of 
these  philosophers  have  the  audacity  to  affirm,  all  things  were 
at  rest  in  one  mass,  which  of  the  above-mentioned  principles 
of  motion  would  first  spring  up  among  them  ? 

Gle.  Clearly  the  self-moving  ;  for  there  could  be  no  change 
in  them  arising  out  of  any  external  cause,  if  there  had  been 
no  previous  change  in  themselves. 

Ath.  Then  we  must  say  that  self-motion  being  the  origin 
and  beginning  of  motion,  as  well  among  things  at  rest  as 
among  things  in  motion,  is  the  eldest  and  mightiest  principle  of 
change,  and  that  which  is  changed  by  another  and  yet  moves 
other  is  second. 

Clc.  Quite    true.  —  Laws,  iv.  407. 
Self-moving  power  of  the  soul. 

The  soul  is  immortal,  for  that  is  immortal  which  is  ever 

in  motion ;  but  that  which  moves  another  and  is  moved  by  an- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  395 

other,  in  ceasing  to  move  ceases  also  to  live.  Therefore,  only 
that  which  is  self-moving,  never  leaving  self,  never  ceases  to 
move,  and  is  the  fountain  and  beginning  of  motion  to  all  that 
moves  besides.  Now,  the  beginning  is  unbegotten,  for  that 
which  is  begotten  has  a  beginning ;  but  the  beginning  itself 
has  no  beginning,  for  if  a  beginning  were  begotten  of  some- 
thing, that  something  would  not  be  a  beginning.  But  that  which 
is  unbegotten  must  also  be  indestructible  ;  for  if  beginning  were 
destroyed,  there  could  be  no  beginning  out  of  anything,  or 
anything  out  of  a  beginning ;  and  all  things  must  have  a  be- 
ginning. And  therefore  the  self-moving  is  the  beginning  of 
motion  ;  and  this  can  neither  be  destroyed  nor  begotten,  else 
the  whole  heavens  and  all  creation  would  collapse  and  stand 
still,  and  never  again  have  motion  or  birth.  But  if  the  self- 
moving  is  immortal,  he  who  affirms  that  self-motion  is  the  very 
idea  and  essence  of  the  soul  will  not  be  put  to  confusion.  For 
the  body  which  is  moved  from  without  is  soulless  ;  but  that 
which  is  moved  from  within  has  a  soul,  for  such  is  the  nature 
of  the  soul.  But  if  the  soul  be  truly  affirmed  to  be  the  self- 
moving,  then  must  she  also  be  without  beginning,  and  immor- 
tal.—  Phaedrus,  i.  550. 
Self-praise,  ill  manners. 

Charmides  blushed,  and  the  blush  heightened  his  beauty, 

for  modesty  is  becoming  in  youth  ;  he  then  said  very  ingenu- 
ously, that  he  really  could  not  at  once  answer,  either  yes,  or 
no,  to  the  question  which  I  had  asked  :  For,  said  he,  if  I  affirm 
that  I  am  not  temperate,  that  would  be  a  strange  thing  for  me 
to  say  of  myself,  and  also  I  should  give  the  lie  to  Critias,  and 
many  others,  who  think  that  I  am  temperate,  as  he  tells  you  : 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  if  I  say  that  I  am,  I  shall  have  to  praise 
myself,  which  would  be  ill  manners ;  and  therefore  I  have  no 
answer  to  make  to  you.  —  Charmides,  i.  12. 
Self-ruling.     See  Intemperance,  etc.,  and  Self-mastery. 
Self-sacrifice  of  Achilles.     See  Achilles. 
Self-slavery.     See  Self-mastery. 
Self-taught  men. 

La.   Socrates  ;  did  you  never  observe  that  some  persons, 

who  have  had  no  teachers,  are  more  skillful  than  those  who 
have,  in  some  things  ? 

Soc.  Yes,  Laches,  I  have  observed  that  ;  but  you  would  not 
be  very  willing  to  trust  them  if  they  only  professed  to  be  mas 


396  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

ters  of  their  art,  unless  they  could  show  some  proof  of  their 
skill  or  excellence  in  one  or  more  works. 

La.  That  is  true. —  Laches,  i.  78. 
Self -wise  disputers.     See  Disputers. 
Sensation,  not  a  sufficient  source  of  knowledge. 

Soc.  The  simple  sensations  which  reach  the  soul  through 

the  body  are  given  at  birth  to  men  and  animals  by  nature,  but 
their  reflections  on  these  and  on  their  relations  to  being  and 
use,  are  slowly  and  hardly  gained,  if  they  are  ever  gained,  by 
education  and  long  experience. 

Theaet.  Assuredly. 

Soc.  And  can  a  man  attain  truth  who  fails  of  attaining  being* 

Theaet.  Impossible. 

Soc.  And  can  he  who  misses  the  truth  of  anything,  have  a 
knowledge  of  that  thing  ? 

Theaet.  He  cannot. 

Soc.  Then  knowledge  does  not  consist  in  impressions  of 
sense,  but  in  reasoning  about  them  ;  in  that  only,  and  not  in 
the  mere  impression,  truth  and  being  can  be  attained  ? 

Theaet.   Clearly.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  390. 
Sense,  bodily,  a  bar  to  truth.     See  Bodily  pleasures,  etc. 
Sense  versus  science.     See  Science,  etc. 
Sense,  reason  in  the  sphere  of.     See  Intellect  and  knowledge. 
Sense,  soul  at  first  without. 

By  reason  of  all  these  affections,  the  soul  when  inclosed 

in  a  mortal  body  is  at  first  without  intelligence ;  but  when  the 
stream  of  growth  and  nutriment  flows  in  with  diminished  speed, 
and   the  courses  of  the  soul  attaining  a  calm  go  their  own  way 
and  become  steadier  as  time  advances,  then  the  revolutions  of 
the  several  circles  return   to  their  natural  figure,  and  call  the 
same  and  the  other  by  their  right  names,  and   make  the  pos- 
sessor of  them  a  rational  being.     And  if  these  combine  in  him 
with  any  true  nurture  or  education,  he  attains  the  fullness  and 
health  of  the  perfect  man,  and  escapes  the  worst  disease  of  all ; 
but  if  he  neglects  education  he  walks  lame  while  alive  to  the 
end  of  his  journey,  arid  returns  imperfect  and  good  for  nothing 
to  the  world  below.  —  Timaeus,  ii.  536. 

Senses,  the  source  of  knowledge. 

Must  we  not  allow,  that  when  I  or  any  one,  looking  at 

any  object,  observes  that  the  thing  which  he  sees  aims  at  be- 
ing some  other  thing,  but  falls  short  of,  and  cannot  be  that 
other,  —  he  who  makes  this  observation  must  have  had  a  pre- 


'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  397 

vious  knowledge  of  that  to  •yhich  the  other,  although  similar, 
was  inferior  ? 

Certainly. 

And  has  not  this  been  our  own  case  in  the  matter  of  equals 
and  of  absolute  equality  ? 

Precisely. 

Then  we  must  have  known  equality  previously  to  the  time 
when  we  first  saw  the  material  equals,  and  reflected  that  all 
these  apparent  equals  strive  to  attain  absolute  equality,  but  fall 
short  of  it? 

That  is  true. 

And  we  recognize  also  that  this  absolute  equality  has  only 
been  known,  and  can  only  be  known,  through  the  medium  of 
sight  or  touch,  or  of  some  other  of  the  senses,  which  are  alike 
in  this  respect  ? 

Yes,  Socrates,  as  far  as  the  argument  is  concerned,  one  of 
them  is  the  same  as  the  other. 

And  from  the  senses  then  is  derived  the  knowledge  that  all 
sensible  things  aim  at  an  absolute  equality  of  which  they  fall 
short  —  is  not  that  true  ? 

Yes. 

Then  before  we  began  to  see  or  hear  or  perceive  in  any  way, 
we  must  have  had  a  knowledge  of  absolute  equality,  or  we 
could  not  have  referred  to  that  standard  the  equals  which  are 
derived  from  the  senses  ?  —  for  to  that  they  all  aspire,  and  of 
that  they  fall  short  ? 

That,  Socrates,  is  certainly  to  be  inferred  from  the  previous 
statements.  —  Phaedo,  i.  402. 

Sensible  images,  some  truths  have  not.     See  Images. 
Sensual  and  earthly.     See  Earthly,  etc. 

Sensual  love,  laws  against,  impossible.    See  Laws  against  sensual  Lot :. 
Sensuality  and  gluttony.     See  Gluttony,  etc. 
Shades  and  images,  the  dead  are  our.     See  Dead. 
Shadows  seeming  real. 

Let  me  show  you  in  a  figure,  how  far  our  nature  is  en- 
lightened or  unenlightened:  —  Behold!  human  beings  living  in 
an  underground  den,  which  has  a  mouth  open  towards  the  light 
and  reaching  all  along  the  den  ;  they  have  been  here  from  their 
childhood,  and  have  their  legs  and  necks  chained  so  that  they 
cannot  move,  and  can  only  see  before  them  ;  for  the  chains  are 
arranged  in  such  a  manner  as  to  prevent  them  from  turning 
round  their  heads.  Above  and  behind  them  the  light  of  a  fire 


398  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

is  blazing  at  a  distance,  and  between  the  fire  and  the  prisoners 
there  is  a  raised  way ;  and  you  will  see,  if  you  look,  a  low  wall 
built  along  the  way,  like  the  screen  which  marionette  players 
have  in  front  of  them,  over  which  they  show  the  puppets. 

I  see. 

And  do  you  see,  I  said,  men  passing  along  the  wall  some 
apparently  talking  and  others  silent,  carrying  vessels  and  stat- 
ues, and  figures  of  animals,  made  of  wood  and  stone  and  vari- 
ous materials,  and  which  appear  over  the  wall  ? 

You  have  shown  me  a  strange  image,  and  they  are  strange 
prisoners. 

Like  ourselves,  I  replied  ;  and  they  see  only  their  own  shad- 
ows, or  the  shadows  of  one  another,  which  the  fire  throws  on 
the  opposite  wall  of  the  cave  ? 

True,  he  said  ;  how  could  they  see  anything  but  the  shad- 
ows if  they  were  never  allowed  to  move  their  heads  ? 

And  of  the  objects  which  are  being  carried  in  like  manner 
they  would  only  see  the  shadows  ? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  if  they  were  able  to  talk  with  one  another,  would  they 
not  suppose  that  they  were  naming  what  was  actually  before 
them? 

Very  true. 

And  suppose,  further,  that  the  prison  had  an  echo  which  came 
from  the  other  side,  would  they  not  be  sure  to  fancy  that  the 
voice  which  they  heard  was  that  of  a  passing  shadow  ? 

No  question,  he  replied. 

Beyond  question,  I  said,  the  truth  would  be  to  them  just 
nothing  but  the  shadows  of  the  images. 

That  is  certain. 

And  now  look  again,  and  see  how  they  are  released  and 
cured  of  their  folly.  At  first,  when  any  one  of  them  is  liber- 
ated and  compelled  suddenly  to  turn  his  neck  round  and  go  up 
and  look  at  the  light,  he  will  suffer  sharp  pains  ;  thu  glare 
will  distress  him,  and  he  will  be  unable  to  see  the  realities  of 
which  in  his  former  state  he  had  seen  the  shadows ;  and  then 
imagine  some  one  saying  to  him,  that  what  he  saw  before  was 
an  illusion,  but  that  now  he  is  approaching  real  being  and  has 
a  truer  sight  and  vision  of  more  real  things,  —  what  will  be  his 
reply  ?  And  you  may  further  imagine  that  his  instructor  is 
pointing  to  the  objects  as  they  pass  and  requiring  him  to  name 
them,  —  will  he  not  be  in  a  difficulty  ;  Will  he  not  fancy  that 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS,  399 

the  shadows  which  he  formerly  saw  are  truer  than  the  objects 
which  are  now  shown  to  him? 

Far  truer. 

And  if  he  is  compelled  to  look  at  the  light,  will  he  not  havo 
a  pain  in  his  eyes  which  will  make  him  turn  away  to  take 
refuge  in  the  objects  of  vision  which  he  can  see,  and  which  he 
will  conceive  to  be  in  reality  clearer  than  the  things  which  are 
now  being  shown  to  him  ? 

Tiue.  he  said. 

And  suppose  once  more,  that  he  is  reluctantly  dragged  up  a 
Bteep  and  rugged  ascent,  and  held  fast  until  he  is  forced  into 
the  presence  of  the  sun  himself,  do  you  not  think  that  he  will  be 
pained  and  irritated,  and  when  he  approaches  the  light  he  will 
have  his  eyes  dazzled,  and  will  not  be  able  to  see  any  of  the 
realities  which  are  now  affirmed  to  be  the  truth  ? 

Not  all  in  a  moment,  he  said. 

He  will  require  to  grow  accustomed  to  the  sight  of  the  upper 
world.  And  first  he  will  see  the  shadows  best,  next  the  reflec- 
tions of  men  and  other  objects  in  the  water,  and  then  the  ob- 
jects themselves ;  then  he  will  gaze  upon  the  light  of  the  moon 
and  the  stars ;  and  he  will  see  the  sky  and  the  stars  by  night, 
better  than  the  sun,  or  the  light  of  the  sun,  by  day? 

Certainly. 

And  at  last  he  will  be  able  to  see  the  sun,  and  not  mere  re- 
flections of  him  in  the  water,  but  he  will  see  him  as  he  is  in 
his  own  proper  place,  and  not  in  another ;  and  he  will  contem- 
plate his  nature. 

Certainly. 

And  after  this  he  will  reason  that  the  sun  is  he  who  gives 
the  seasons  and  the  years,  and  is  the  guardian  of  all  that  is  in 
the  visible  world,  and  in  a  certain  way  the  cause  of  all  things 
which  he  and  his  fellows  have  been  accustomed  to  behold  ? 

Clearly,  he  said,  he  would  come  to  the  other  first  and  to  this 
afterwards. 

And  when  he  remembered  his  old  habitation,  and  the  wisdom 
nf  the  den  and  his  fellow-prisoners,  do  you  not  suppose  that  he 
n?ould  felicitate  himself  on  the  change,  and  pity  them  ? 

Certainly,  he  would. 

And  if  they  were  in  the  habit  of  conferring  honors  on  those 
who  were  quickest  to  observe  and  remember  and  for"  tell  which 
of  the  shadows  when  they  moved,  went  before,  ana  which  fol- 
lowed aftei,  and  which  were  together,  do  you  think  that  he 


400  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

would   care  for  such  honors  and  glories,  or  envy  the  possessors 
of  them  ?     "Would  he  not  say  with  Homer,  — 

"  Better  to  be  a  poor  man,  and  have  a  poor  master," 

and  endure  anything,  rather   than  to  think  and  live  after  their 
manner  ? 

Yes,  he  said,  I  think  that  he  would  rather  suffer  anything 
than  live  after  their  manner. 

Imagine  once  more,  I  said,  such  an  one  coming  suddenly  out 
of  the  sun  to  be  replaced  in  his  old  situation,  would  he  not  be 
certain  to  have  his  eyes  full  of  darkness  ? 

To  be  sure,  he  said. 

And  if  there  were  a  contest,  and  he  had  to  compete  in  meas- 
uring the  shadows  with  the  prisoners  who  had  never  moved  out 
of  the  den,  while  his  sight  was  still  weak,  and  before  his  eyes 
are  steady  (and  the  time  which  would  be  needed  to  acquire  this 
new  habit  of  sight  might  be  very  considerable),  would  he  not 
be  ridiculous  ?  Men  would  say  of  him  that  up  he  went  and 
down  he  came  without  his  eyes ;  and  that  there  was  no  use  in 
even  thinking  of  ascending ;  and  if  any  one  tried  to  loose 
another  and  lead  him  up  to  the  light,  let  them  only  catch  the 
offender  in  the  act,  and  they  would  put  him  to  death. 

No  question,  he  said. —  The  Republic,  ii.  341. 
Shams  or  simulations.     See  Cookery. 
Simplicity  of  good  men.     See  Good  men. 
Sin,  God  not  the  author  of.     See  Evil,  etc. 
Sleep,  quiet  and  unquiet. 

I  do  not  think  that  we  have  adequately  determined  the 

nature  and  number  of  the  appetites,  and  until  this  is  accom- 
plished the  inquiry  will  always  be  perplexed. 

Well,  but  you  may  supply  the  omission. 

Very  true,  I  said  ;  and  observe  the  point  which  I  want  to 
understand.  Certain  of  the  unnecessary  pleasures  and  appe- 
tites are  deemed  to  be  unlawful  ;  every  man  appears  to  have 
them,  but  in  some  persons  they  are  controlled  by  the  laws  and 
by  reason,  and  the  better  desires  prevail  over  them,  —  either  they 
are  wholly  banished  or  they  are  few  and  weak  :  while  in  the 
case  of  others  they  are  stronger,  and  there  are  more  of  them. 

Which  appetites  do  you  mean  ? 

I  mean  those  which  are  awake  when  the  reasoning  and  hu- 
man and  ruling  power  is  asleep  ;  when  the  wild  beast  in  our  nat- 
ure, gorged  with  meat  or  drink,  starts  up  and  leaps  about  and 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  401 

seeks  to  go  arid  satisfy  his  desires,  there  is  no  conceivable  folly 
or  crime,  however  shameless  or  unnatural,  —  not  excepting  in- 
cest or  parricide,  or  the  eating  of  forbidden  food,  —  of  which 
at  such  a  time,  you  know,  a  man  may  not  believe  himself  to 
be  capable. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

But  when  a  man's  pulse  is  healthy  and  temperate,  and  when 
before  going  to  sleep  he  has  awakened  his  rational  powers,  and 
fed  them  on  noble  thoughts  and  inquiries,  collecting  himself  in 
meditation ;  after  having  indulged  his  appetites  neither  too 
much  nor  too  little,  but  just  enough  to  lay  them  to  sleep,  and 
prevent  them  and  their  enjoyments  and  pains  from  interfering 
with  the  higher  principle  —  which  he  leaves  in  the  solitude  of 
pure  abstraction,  free  to  contemplate  and  aspire  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  unknown,  whether  in  past,  present,  or  future  :  when 
again  he  has  allayed  the  passionate  element,  if  he  has  a  quarrel 
against  any  one  —  I  say,  when,  after  pacifying  the  two  irrational 
principles,  he  rouses  up  the  third,  which  is  reason,  before  he  takes 
his  rest,  then,  as  you  know,  he  attains  truth  most  nearly,  and  is 
least  likely  to  be  the  sport  of  fanciful  and  lawless  visions. 

I  quite  agree.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  400. 
Social  strife,  origin  of.     See  Metallic  races. 
Society,  primitive.     See  Patriarchal  State. 
Socrates,  the  death  of. 

Me,  already,  as  the   tragic  poet  would  say,  the  voice  of 

fate  calls.  Soon  I  must  drink  the  poison  ;  and  I  think  that  I 
had  better  repair  to  the  bath  first,  in  order  that  the  women  may 
not  have  the  trouble  of  washing  my  body  after  I  am  dead. 

When  he  had  done  speaking,  Crito  said :  And  have  you  any 
commands  for  us,  Socrates  —  anything  to  say  about  your  chil- 
dren, or  any  other  matter  in  which  we  can  serve  you  ? 

Nothing  particular,  he  said :  only,  as  I  have  always  told  you, 
I  would  have  you  to  look  to  yourselves  ;  that  is  a  service 
which  you  may  always  be  doing  to  me  and  mine  as  well  as  to 
yourselves.  And  you  need  not  make  professions ;  for  if  you 
take  no  thought  for  yourselves,  and  walk  not  according  to  the 
the  precepts  which  I  have  given  you,  not  now  for  the  first 
time,  the  warmth  of  your  professions- will  be  of  no  avail. 

We  will  do  our  best,  said  Crito.  But  in  what  way  would 
you  have  us  bury  you  ? 

In  any  way  that  you  like  ;  only  you  must  get  hold  of  me, 
and  take  care  that  I  do  not  walk  away  from  you.  Then 


402  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

he  turned  to  us,  and  added  with  a  smile  :  —  I  cannot  make  Crito 
believe  that  I  am  the  same  Socrates  who  has  been  talking 
and  conducting  the  argument ;  he  fancies  that  I  am  the  other 
Secretes  whom  he  will  soon  see  a  dead  body  —  and  he  asks, 
How  shall  he  bury  me  ?  And  though  I  have  spoken  many 
words  in  the  endeavor  to  show  that  when  I  have  drunk  the 
poison  I  shall  leave  you  and  go  to  the  joys  of  the  blessed,  — 
these  words  of  mine,  with  which  I  comforted  you  and  myself, 
have  had,  as  I  perceive,  no  effect  upon  Crito.  And  therefore 
I  want  you  to  be  surety  for  me  now,  as  he  was  surety  for  me- 
at the  trial :  but  let  the  promise  be  of  another  sort ;  for  he? 
was  my  surety  to  the  judges  that  I  would  remain,  but  you 
must  be  my  surety  to  him  that  I  shall  not  remain,  but  go  away 
and  depart ;  and  then  he  will  suffer  less  at  my  death,  and  not 
be  grieved  when  he  sees  my  body  being  burned  or  buried.  I 
would  not  have  him  sorrow  at  my  hard  lot.  or  say  at  the  burial, 
Thus  we  lay  out  Socrates,  or,  Thus  we  follow  him  to  the  grave 
or  bury  him ;  for  false  words  are  not  only  evil  in  themselves, 
but  they  infect  the  soul  with  evil.  Be  of  good  cheer  then,  my 
dear  Crito,  and  say  that  you  are  burying  my  body  only,  and 
do  with  that  as  is  usual,  and  as  you  think  best. 

When  he  had  spoken  these  words,  he  arose  and  told  us  to 
wait  until  he  went  into  the  bath-chamber  with  Crito  ;  and  we 
waited,  talking  and  thinking  of  the  subject  of  discourse,  and 
also  of  the  greatness  of  our  sorrow  :  he  was  like  a  father  of 
whom  we  were  being  bereaved,  and  we  were  about  to  pass  the 
rest  of  our  lives  as  orphans.  When  he  had  taken  the  bath  his 
children  were  brought  to  him  —  (he  had  two  young  sons  and 
an  elder  one)  ;  and  the  women  of  his  family  also  came,  and 
he  talked  to  them  and  gave  them  a  few  directions  in  the  pres- 
ence of  Crito  ;  and  he  then  dismissed  them  and  returned  to  us. 

Now  the  hour  of  sunset  was  near,  for  a  good  deal  of  time 
had  passed  while  he  was  within.  When  he  came  out,  he  sat 
down  with  us  again  after  his  bath,  but  not  much  was  said. 
Soon  the  jailer,  who  was  the  servant  of  the  eleven,  entered 
and  stood  by  him,  saying :  To  you,  Socrates,  whom  I  know  to 
be  the  noblest  and  gentlest  and  best  of  all  who  ever  came  to 
this  place,  I  will  not  impute  the  angry  feelings  of  other  men, 
who  rage  and  swear  at  me  when,  in  obedience  to  the  authori- 
ties, I  bid  them  drink  the  poison  —  indeed  I  am  sure  that  you 
will  not  be  angry  with  me  ;  for  others,  as  you  are  aware,  and 
not  I,  are  the  guilty  cause.  And  so  fare  you  well,  and  try  to 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

bear  lightly  what  must  needs  be  ;  you  know  my  errand.  Thea 
bursting  into  tears  he  turned  away  and  went  out. 

Socrates  looked  at  him  and  said ;  I  return  your  good  wishes, 
and  will  do  as  you  bid.  Then  turning  to  us,  he  said,  How 
charming  the  man  is  :  since  I  have  been  iu  prison  he  has  al- 
ways been  coming  to  see  me,  and  at  times  he  would  talk  to 
me,  and  was  as  good  as  could  be,  and  now  see  how  generously 
he  sorrows  for  me.  But  we  must  do  as  he  says,  Crito  ;  let 
the  cup  be  brought,  if  the  poison  is  prepared  :  if  not,  let  the 
attendant  prepare  some. 

Yet,  said  Crito,  the  sun  is  still  upon  the  hill-tops,  ana  I  know 
that  many  a  one  has  taken  the  draught  late,  and  after  the  an- 
nouncement has  been  made  to  him,  he  has  eaten  and  drunk,  and 
enjoyed  the  society  of  his  beloved  ;  do  not  hasten  then,  there 
is  still  time. 

Socrates  &aid :  Yes,  Crito,  and  they  of  whom  you  speak  are 
right  in  doing  thus,  for  they  think  that  they  will  gain  by  the 
delay ;  but  I  am  right  in  not  doing  thus,  for  I  do  not  think 
that  I  should  gain  anything  by  drinking  the  poison  a  little 
later ;  I  should  be  sparing  and  saving  a  life  which  is  already 
gone :  I  could  only  laugh  at  myself  for  this.  Please  then  to 
do  as  I  say,  and  not  to  refuse  me. 

Crito  made  a  sign  to  the  servant,  who  was  standing  by ;  and 
he  went  out,  and  having  been  absent  for  some  time,  and  re- 
turned with  the  jailer  carrying  the  cup  of  poison.  Socrates 
said :  You,  my  good  friend,  who  are  experienced  in  these  mat- 
ters, shall  give  me  directions  how  I  am  to  proceed.  The  man 
answered :  You  have  only  to  walk  about  until  your  legs  are 
heavy,  and  then  tp  lie  down,  and  the  poison  will  act,  At  the 
same  time  he  handed  the  cup  to  Socrates,  who  in  the  easiest 
and  gentlest  manner,  without  the  least  fear  or  change  of  color 
or  feature,  looking  at  the  man  with  all  his  eyes,  Echecrates,  as 
his  manner  was.  took  the  cup  and  said :  What  do  you  say 
about  making  a  libation  out  of  this  cup  to  any  God  ?  May  I, 
or  not  ?  The  man  answered  :  We  only  prepare,  Socrates,  just 
so  much  as  we  deem  enough.  I  understand,  he  said  :  yet  I 
may  and  must  ask  the  Gods  to  prosper  my  journey  from  this 
to  that  other  world  —  even  so  —  and  so  be  it  according  to 
my  prayer.  Then  holding  the  cup  to  his  lips,  quite  readily 
arid  cheerfully  he  drank  off  the  poison.  And  hitherto  most  of 
us  had  been  able  to  control  our  sorrow ;  but  now  when  we  saw 
him  drinking,  and  saw  too  that  he  had  finished  the  draught,  we 


404  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

could  no  longer  forbear,  and  in  spite  of  myself  my  own  tears 
were  flowing  fast ;  so  that  I  covered  my  face  aud  wept  over 
myself,  for  certainly  I  was  not  weeping  over  him,  but  at  the 
thought  of  my  own  calamity  in  having  lost  such  a  friend.  Nor 
was  I  the  first,  for  Crito,  when  he  found  himself  unable  to  re- 
strain his  tears,  had  got  up  and  moved  away,  and  I  followed  ; 
and  at  that  moment,  Apollodorus,  who  had  been  weeping  all 
the  time,  broke  out  into  a  loud  and  passionate  cry  which  made 
cowards  of  us  all.  Socrates  alone  retained  his  calmness  :  What 
is  this  strange  outcry  ?  he  said.  I  sent  away  the  women  mainly 
in  order  that  they  might  not  offend  in  this  way,  for  I  have 
heard  that  a  man  should  die  in  peace.  Be  quiet  then,  and 
have  patience.  When  we  heard  that,  we  were  ashamed,  and 
refrained  our  tears ;  and  he  walked  about  until,  as  he  said,  his 
legs  began  to  fail,  and  then  he  lay  on  his  back,  according  to 
the  directions,  and  the  man  who  gave  him  the  poison  now  and 
then  looked  at  his  feet  and  legs ;  and  after  a  while  he  pressed 
his  foot  hard  and  asked  him  if  he  could  feel ;  and  he  said,  No  ; 
and  then  his  leg,  and  so  upwards  and  upwards,  and  showed  us 
that  he  was  cold  aud  stiff.  And  he  felt  them  himself,  and 
said :  When  the  poison  reaches  the  heart,  that  will  be  the  end. 
He  was  beginning  to  grow  cold  about  the  groin,  when  he  un- 
covered his  face,  for  he  had  covered  himself  up,  and  said  (they 
were  his  last  words)  —  he  said  :  Crito,  I  owe  a  cock  to  Ascle- 
pius  ;  will  you  remember  to  pay  the  debt  ?  The  debt  shall  be 
paid,  said  Crito ;  is  there  anything  else  ?  There  was  no 
answer  to  this  question  ;  but  in  a  minute  or  two  a  movement 
was  heard,  and  the  attendants  uncovered  him  ;  his  eyes  were 
set,  and  Crito  closed  his  eyes  and  mouth. 

Such  was  the  end,  Echecrates,  of  our  friend,  whom  I  may 
truly  call  the  wisest,  and  justest,  and  best  of  all  the  men  whom 
I  have  ever  known.  —  Phaedo,  i.  444. 
Socrates,  presentiment  of  death  in.     See  Presentiment,  etc. 
Soldiers  aud  Rulers.     See  Gentleness. 
Solitude  of  the  lost  soul. 

For  after  death,  as  tney  say,  the  genius  of  each  indi- 
vidual, to  whom  he  belonged  in  life,  leads  him  to  a  certain 
place  in  which  the  dead  are  gathered  together,  whence  after 
judgment  they  must  go  into  the  world  below,  following  the 
guide,  who  is  appointed  to  conduct  them  from  this  world  to 
the  other :  and  when  they  have  there  received  their  due  and 
remained  their  time,  another  guide  brings  them  back  again 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  405 

after  many  revolutions  of  ages.  Now  this  journey  to  the  other 
world  is  not,  as  Aeschylus  says  in  the  Telephus,  a  single  and 
straight  path,  —  no  guide  would  be  wanted  for  that,  and  no 
one  could  miss  a  single  path ;  but  there  are  many  partings  of 
the  road,  and  windings,  as  I  must  infer  from  the  rites  and  sac- 
rifices which  are  offered  to  the  Gods  below  in  places  where 
three  ways  meet  on  earth.  The  wise  and  orderly  sour  follows 
in  the  path,  and  knows  what  is  happening ;  but  the  soul  which 
desires  the  body,  and  which,  as  I  was  relating  before,  has  long 
been  fluttering  about  the  lifeless  frame  and  the  world  of  sight, 
is,  after  many  struggles  and  many  sufferings,  hardly  and  with 
violence  carried  away  by  her  attendant  genius,  and  when  she 
arrives  at  the  place  where  the  other  souls  are  gathered,  if  she 
be  impure  and  have  done  impure  deeds,  or  been  concerned  in 
foul  murders  or  other  crimes  which  are  the  brothers  of  these, 
and  the  works  of  brothers  in  crime,  —  from  that  soul  every  one 
flees  and  turns  away ;  no  one  will  be  her  companion,  no  one 
her  guide,  but  alone  she  wanders  in  extremity  of  evil  until  cer- 
tain times  are  fulfilled,  and  when  they  are  fulfilled,  she  is  borne 
irresistibly  to  her  own  fitting  habitation ;  as  every  pure  and 
just  soul  which  has  passed  through  life  in  the  company  and 
under  the  guidance  of  the  Gods  has  also  her  own  proper  home. 
—  Phaedo,  i.  438. 

Song  and  harmony,  choral.     See  C/ioral,  etc. 
Sons,  unfilial.     See  Parricides. 

Sons,  brave,  of  brave  fathers.     See  State,  heroes,  etc. 
Sons  of  good  fathers,  why  they  turn  out  ill.     See  Fathers,  etc. 
Sophist  and  Philosopher.     See  Philosopher  and  Sophist. 
Sophist  summarized. 

—  Sir.  And  who  is  the  maker  of  the  longer  speeches  ?     Is 
he  the  statesman  or  the  public  orator  ? 

Theaet.  The  latter. 

Sir.  And  what  shall  we  call  the  other  ?  Is  he  the  philoso- 
pher or  the  Sophist  ? 

Theaet.  The  philosopher  he  cannot  be,  for  upon  our  view 
he  is  ignorant ;  but  since  he  is  an  imitator  of  the  wise  he  will 
have  a  name  which  is  formed  by  an  adaptation  of  the  word 
cro<j6d?.  What  shall  we  name  him  ?  I  am  pretty  sure  that  I 
cannot  be  mistaken  in  terming  him  the  true  and  very  Sophist 

Sir.  Shall  we  bind  up  his  name  as  we  did  before,  making  a 
chain  from  one  end  to  the  other  ? 

Theaet.  By  a]'  means. 


406  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Sir.  He,  then,  who  traces  the  pedigree  of  his  art  as  follows : 
He  who,  belonging  to  the  conscious  or  dissembling  section  of 
the  art  of  making  contradictions,  is  an  imitator  of  appearance, 
and  has  divided  off  from  the  art  of  image-making,  which  is  a 
branch  of  phantastic,  that  further  division  of  creative  art,  the 
juggling  of  words,  a  creation  human,  and  not  divine  —  any  one 
who  affirms  the  real  Sophist  to  be  of  this  blood  and  lineage 
\vill  say  the  very  truth. 

Theaet.  Undoubtedly.  —  Sophist,  iii.  510. 
Sophists,  are  they  corrupters? 

Do   you  really  think,  as  people  are  fond  of  saying,  that 

our  youth  are  corrupted  by  the  Sophists,  or  that  private  teach- 
ers of  the  art  corrupt  them  in  any  degree  worth  speaking  of  ? 
Are  not  the  public  who  say  these  things  the  greatest  of  all 
Sophists  ?  And  do  they  not  educate  to  perfection  alike  young 
and  old,  men  and  women,  and  fashion  them  after  their  own 
hearts  ?  .  .  .  . 

To  that  I  quite  assent,  he  replied. 

Then  let  me  crave  your  assent  also  to  a  further  observation. 

What  are  you  going  to  say  ? 

Why,  that  all  those  mercenary  individuals,  whom  the  world 
calls  Sophists  and  esteems  rivals,  do  but  teach  the  collective 
opinion  of  the  many,  which  are  the  opinions  of  their  assemblies ; 
and  this  is  their  wisdom.  I  might  compare  them  to  a  man  who 
should  study  the  tempers  and  desires  of  a  mighty  strong  beast 
who  is  fed  by  him  —  he  would  learn  how  to  approach  and  han- 
dle him,  also  at  what  times  and  from  what  causes  he  is  dan- 
gerous or  the  reverse,  and  what  is  the  meaning  of  his  several 
cries,  and  by  what  sounds,  when  another  utters  them,  he  is 
soothed  or  infuriated  ;  and  you  may  suppose,  further,  that  when, 
by  constantly  living  with  him,  he  has  become  perfect  in  all  this 
he  calls  his  knowledge  wisdom,  and  he  makes  a  system  or  art, 
which  he  proceeds  to  teach,  not  that  he  has  any  real  notion  of 
what  he  is  teaching,  but  he  names  this  honorable  and  that  dis- 
honorable, or  good  or  evil,  or  just  or  unjust,  all  in  accordance 
with  the  tastes  and  tempers  of  the  great  brute,  when  he  has 
learnt  the  meaning  of  his  inarticulate  grunts.  Good  he  pro- 
nounces to  be  what  pleases  him,  and  evil  what  he  dislikes ;  and 
he  can  give  no  other  account  of  them  except  that  the  just  and 
noble  are  the  necessary,  having  never  himself  seen,  and  having 
no  power  of  explaining  to  others,  the  nature  of  either,  or  the 
immense  difference  between  them.  Would  not  he  be  a  rare 
educator  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  407 

Indeed,  he  would. 

And  in  what  respects  does  he  who  thinks  that  wisdom  is  the 
discernment  of  the  tastes  and  pleasures  of  the  assembled  multi- 
tude, whether  in  painting  or  music,  or,  finally,  in  politics,  differ 
from  such  an  one  ?  For  I  suppose  you  will  agree  that  he  who 
associates  with  the  many,  and  exhibits  to  them  his  poem  or 
other  work  of  art  or  the  service  which  he  has  done  the  State, 
making  them  his  judges,  except  under  protest,  will  also  experi- 
ence the  fatal  necessity  of  producing  whatever  they  praise. 
And  yet  the  reasons  are  utterly  ludicrous  which  they  give  in 
confirmation  of  their  notions  about  the  honorable  and  good. 
Did  you  ever  hear  any  of  them  which  were  not  ? 

Xo,  nor  am  I  likely  to  hear.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  318. 
Sorrow,  manifestations  of. 

Reflect :  —  our  principle  is  that  the  good  man  will  not 

consider  death  terrible  to  a  good  man. 

Yes,  that  is  our  principle. 

And  therefore  he  will  not  sorrow  for  his  departed  friend  as 
though  he  had  suffered  anything  terrible  ? 

He  will  not. 

Such  an  one,  as  we  further  maintain,  is  enough  for  himself  and 
his  own  happiness,  and  therefore  is  least  in  need  of  other  men. 

True,  he  said. 

And  for  this  reason  the  loss  of  a  son  or  brother,  or  the  de- 
privs  tion  of  fortune,  is  to  him  of  all  men  least  terrible. 

Assuredly. 

And  therefore  he  will  be  least  likely  to  lament,  and  will  bear 
with  the  greatest  equanimity  any  misfortune  of  this  sort  which 
may  befall  him. 

Yes,  he  will  feel  such  a  misfortune  far  less  than  another. 

Then  we  shall  be  right  in  getting  rid  of  the  lamentations  of 
famous  men,  and  making  them  over  to  women  (and  not  even  to 
women  who  are  good  for  anything),  or  to  men  of  a  baser  sort, 
that  those  who  are  being  educated  by  us  to  be  the  defenders  of 
their  country  may  scorn  to  do  the  like. 

That  will  be  very  right. 

Then  we  will  once  more  entreat  Homer  and  the  other  poets 
not  to  depict  Achilles,  who  is  the  son  of  a  goddess,  as  first 
lying  on  his  side,  then  on  his  back,  and  then  on  his  face ;  then 
starting  up  and  sailing  in  a  frenzy  along  the  shores  of  the  bar- 
ren sea,  now  taking  the  dusky  ashes  in  both  his  hands  and 
pouring  them  over  his  head,  or  bewailing  and  sorrowing  in  the 


408  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

various  modes  which  Homer  has  delineated.  Nor  should  he 
describe  Priam,  the  kinsman  of  the  Gods,  as  praying  and  be- 
seeching, 

"  Rolling  in  the  dirt,  calling  each  man  loudly  by  his  name." 

Still  more  earnestly  will  we  beg  of  him  not  to  introduce  the 
Gods  lamenting  and  saying,  — 

"  Alas!  my  misery!  alas!  that  I  bore  the  bravest  to  my  sorrow." 

—  The  Republic,  ii.  210. 

Sorrow,  parental,  to  be  lightly  borne. 

Some  of  us  have  fathers  and  mothers  still  living,  and  we 

would  urge  them,  if,  as  is  likely,  we  shall  die,  to  bear  the  calam- 
ity as  lightly  as  possible,  and  not  to  condole  with  one  another ; 
for  they  have  sorrows  enough,  and  will  not  need  any  one  to 
stimulate  them.  While  we  gently  heal  their  wounds,  let  us 
remind  them  that  the  Gods  have  heard  the  chief  part  of  their 
prayers  ;  for  they  prayed,  not  that  their  children  might  live 
forever,  but  that  they  might  be  famous  and  brave.  And  this 
which  is  the  greatest  good  they  have  attained.  A  mortal  man 
cannot  expect  to  have  everything  in  his  own  life  turning  out 
according  to  his  will ;  and  they,  if  they  bear  their  misfortunes 
bravely,  will  be  truly  deemed  brave  fathers  of  the  brave.  But 
if  they  give  way  to  their  sorrows,  either  they  will  be  suspected 
of  not  being  our  parents,  or  we  of  not  being  such  as  our  pane- 
gyrists declare.  Let  not  either  of  the  two  alternatives  happen, 
but  rather  let  them  be  our  chief  and  true  panegyrists,  who 
show  in  their  lives  that  they  are  true  men,  and  had  men  for 
their  sons.  The  ancient  saying,  "never  too  much,"  appears  to 
be,  and  really  is,  well  said.  For  he  whose  happiness  rests  with 
himself,  if  possible,  wholly,  and  if  not,  as  far  as  is  possible,  — 
who  is  not  hanging  in  suspense  on  other  men,  or  changing  with 
the  vicissi  ude  of  their  fortune,  —  has  his  life  ordered  for  the 
best.  He  is  the  temperate  and  valiant  and  wise  ;  and  when 
his  riches  come  and  go,  when  his  children  are  given  and  taken 
away,  he  will  remember  the  proverb,  "  Neither  rejoicing  over- 
much nor  grieving  overmuch,"  for  he  relies  upon  himself.  And 
such  we  Avould  have  our  parents  to  be  —  that  is  our  word  and 
wish,  and  as  such  we  now  offer  ourselves,  neither  lamenting 
overmuch,  nor  fearing  overmuch,  if  we  are  to  die  at  this  instant. 
And  we  entreat  our  fathers  and  mothers  to  retain  these  feel- 
ings throughout  their  future  life,  and  to  be  assured  that  they 
will  not  please  us  by  sorrowing  and  lamenting  over  us.  But, 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  409 

if  the  dead  have  any  knowledge  of  the  living,  they  will  dis- 
please us  most  by  making  themselves  miserable  and  by  taking 
their  misfortunes  to  heart,  and  they  will  please  us  best  if 
they  bear  their  loss  lightly  and  temperately.  For  our  life  will 
have  the  noblest  end  which  is  vouchsafed  to  man,  and  should 
be  glorified  rather  than  lamented.  And  if  they  will  direct  their 
minds  to  the  care  and  nurture  of  our  wives  and  children,  they 
will  soonest  forget  their  misfortunes,  and  live  more  honorably 
and  uprightly,  and  in  a  way  that  is  more  a^/eeable  to  us.  — 
Menexenus,  iv.  579. 
Sorrow,  suppressed. 

Were  we  not  saying  that  a  good  man,  when  he  loses  his 

son  or  anything  else  which  is  most  dear  to  him.  wil1  bear  the 
loss  with  more  equanimity  than  another  ? 

Yes. 

But  will  he  have  no  sorrow,  or  shall  we  say  that,  although 
he  cannot  help  sorrowing,  he  will  moderate  his  sorrow  ? 

Yes,  he  said,  the  latter  is  the  truer  statement. 

Tell  me  :  will  he  be  more  likely  to  struggle  and  hold  out 
against  his  sorrow,  when  he  is  seen  by  his  equals,  or  when  b<* 
is  by  himself  alone. 

He  will  be  more  likely  to  hold  out  when  he  is  in  company. 

But  when  he  is  left  alone  he  will  not  mind  saying  or  doing 
many  things  which  he  would  be  ashamed  of  any  one  hearing  or 
seeing  ? 

True. 

There  is  a  principle  of  law  and  reason  in  him  which  bids 
him  resist,  while  passion  urges  him  to  indulge  his  sorrow  ? 

True.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  435. 
Sorrow,  patience  under. 

The  law  would  say  that  to  be  patient  under  suffering  is 

best,  and  that  we  should  not  give  way  to  impatience,  as  there 
is  no  knowing  whether  such  things  are  good  or  evil ;  and  noth- 
ing is  gained  by  impatience ;  also,  because  no  human  thing  ia  of 
serious  importance,  and  grief  stands  in  the  way  of  that  which 
at  the  moment  is  most  required. 

What  is  most  required  ?  he  asked. 

That  we  should  take  counsel  about  the  past,  and  when 
the  dice  have  been  thrown,  order  our  affairs  accordingly  by 
the  advice  of  reason,  not,  like  children  who  have  had  a  fall, 
keeping  hold  of  the  part  struck  and  wasting  time  in  setting 
up  a  howl,  when  we  should  be  accustoming  the  soul  forth- 


410  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

with  to  apply  a  remedy,  raising  up  that  which  is  sickly  and 
fallen,  banishing  the  cry  of  sorrow  by  a  real  cure. 

Yes,  he  said,  there  is  no  better  way  of  meeting  the  attacks 
of  fortune. 

Yes,  I  said  ;  and  the  higher  principle  is  ready  to  follow  this 
suggestion  of  reason  ? 

Clearly. 

And  the  other  principle  which  inclines  us  to  recollection  of 
our  troubles  and  to  lamentation,  and  can  never  have  enough  of 
them,  we  may  call  irrational,  indolent,  and  cowardly  ? 

Indeed,  we  may. —  Tlie  Republic,  ii.  436. 
Soul,  immortality  of  the.     See  Self-moving  power  of  the  soul. 

Soc.  I  have  heard  from  certain  wise  men  and  women  who 

spoke  of  things  divine  that  — 

Men.  What  did  they  say  ? 

Soc.  They  spoke  of  a  glorious  truth,  as  I  conceive. 

Men.  What  was  that  ?  and  who  were  they  ? 

Soc.  Some  of  them  were  priests  and  priestesses,  who  had 
studied  how  they  might  be  able  to  give  a  reason  of  their  pro- 
fession ;  there  have  been  poets  also,  such  as  the  poet  Pindar 
and  other  inspired  men.  And  what  they  say  is  —  mark,  now 
and  see  whether  their  words  are  true  —  they  say  that  the  soul 
of  man  is  immortal,  and  at  one  time  has  an  end,  which  is 
termed  dying,  and  at  another  time  is  born  again,  but  is  never 
destroyed.  And  the  moral  is.  that  a  man  ought  to  live  always 
in  perfect  holiness.  For  in  the  ninth  year  Persephone  sends 
the  souls  of  those  from  whom  she  has  received  the  penalty  of 
ancient  crime  back  again  into  the  light  of  this  world,  and  these 
are  they  who  become  noble  kings  and  mighty  men  and  great 
in  wisdom,  and  are  called  saintly  heroes  in  after  ages.  The 
soul,  then,  as  being  immortal,  and  having  been  born  again  many 
times,  and  having  seen  all  things  that  there  are,  whether  in 
this  world  or  in  the  world  below,  has  knowledge  of  them  all ; 
and  it  is  no  wonder  that  she  should  be  able  to  call  to  remem- 
brance all  that  she  ever  knew  about  virtue,  and  about  every- 
thing ;  for  as  all  nature  is  akin,  and  the  soul  has  learned  all 
things,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  her  eliciting,  or  as  men  say 
learning,  all  out  of  a  single  recollection,  if  a  man  is  strenuous 
and  does  not  faint ;  for  all  inquiry  and  all  learning  is  but  rec^ 
ollectiou.  —  Meno,  i.  255. 

Are  you  not  aware,  I  said,  that  the  soul  is  immortal  and  im- 
perishable ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  411 

He  looked  at  me  in  astonishment,  and  said :  No,  by  heaven ; 
gurely  you  are  not  prepared  to  affirm  that  ? 

Yes,  I  said,  I  ought  to  be,  and  you  too,  for  there  is  no  difficulty 

I  see  a  great  difficulty  ;  but  I  should  like  to  hear  you  state 
this  argument  of  which  you  make  so  light. 

Listen,  then. 

I  am  attending. 

You  speak  of  good  and  of  evil  ? 

Yes,  he  replied. 

Would  you  agree  with  me  hi  thinking  that  the  corrupting  and 
destroying  element  is  the  evil,  and  the  saving  and  improving 
element  the  good  ? 

Yes. 

And  you  admit  that  everything  has  a  good  and  also  an  evil 
as  ophthalmia  is  the  evil  of  the  eyes,  and  disease  of  the  whole 
body  ;  as  mildew  is  of  corn,  and  rot  of  timber,  or  rust  of  iron 
and  steel :  in  everything,  or  in  almost  everything,  there  is  an 
inherent  evil  and  disease  ? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  anything  which  is  infected  by  any  of  these  evils  is 
made  evil,  and  at  last  wholly  dissolves  and  dies  ? 

True. 

The  vice  and  evil  which  is  inherent  in  each  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  each  ;  and  if  this  does  not  destroy  them  there  is  nothing 
else  that  will,  for  good  certainly  will  not  destroy  them,  nor, 
again,  that  which  is  neither  good  nor  evil. 

Certainly  not. 

If,  then,  we  find  any  nature  which  having  this  inherent  cor- 
ruption cannot  be  dissolved  or  destroyed,  we  may  be  certain 
that  of  such  a  nature  there  is  no  destruction  ? 

That  may  be  assumed. 

Well,  I  said,  and  is  there  no  evil  which  corrupts  the  soul  ? 

Yes,  he  said,  there  are  all  the  evils  of  which  we  were  speak- 
ing :  unrighteousness,  intemperance,  cowardice,  ignorance. 

But  do  any  of  these  dissolve  or  destroy  her  ?  —  and  here  do 
not  let  us  fall  into  the  error  of  supposing  that  the  unjust  and 
foolish,  when  they  are  detected,  perish  through  their  injustice, 
which  is  an  evil  of  the  soul.  Take  the  analogy  of  the  body : 
The  evil  of  the  body  is  a  disease  which  wastes  and  reduces  and 
annihilates  the  body  ;  and  all  the  things  of  which  we  were  just 
now  speaking  come  to  annihilation  through  their  own  inherent 
evil  clinging  to  them  and  destroying  them.  Is  not  this  true  ? 


412  PLATC  S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Yes,  he  said. 

Now  consider  the  soul  in  the  same  way.  Do  the  injustice 
and  other  evils  of  the  soul  waste  and  consume  the  soul  ?  Do 
they,  by  inhering  in  her  and  clinging  to  her  at  last,  bring  her 
to  death,  and  separate  her  from  the  body  ? 

Certainly  not. 

And  yet,  I  said,  it  is  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  anything 
can  perish  from  without  through  external  affection  of  evil, 
which  could  not  be  destroyed  from  within  by  any  internal  cor- 
ruption ? 

It  is,  he  replied. 

Consider,  I  said,  Glaucon,  that  even  the  badness  of  food, 
whether  staleness,  decomposition,  or  any  other  kind  of  badness, 
when  confined  to  the  actual  food,  is  not  supposed  to  destroy 
the  body ;  although  if  the  corruption  of  food  communicates 
corruption  to  the  body,  then  the  body  also  suffers  from  inter- 
nal corruption  or  disease  and  perishes  ;  but  that  the  body,  be- 
ing one  thing,  can  be  destroyed  by  the  badness  of  food,  which 
is  another  thing,  without  any  internal  infection  —  that  will 
never  be  admitted  by  us  ? 

Very  true. 

And,  on  the  same  principle,  unless  some  bodily  evil  can  pro- 
duce an  evil  of  the  soul,  we  must  not  suppose  that  the  soul, 
which  is  one  thing,  can  be  dissolved  by  any  external  evil  which 
belongs  to  another  ? 

Yes,  he  said,  there  is  reason  in  that. 

Either,  then,  let  us  refute  this  argument,  or,  while  this  ar- 
gument of  ours  remains  uurefuted,  let  us  never  say  that  fever, 
or  any  other  disease,  or  the  knife  put  to  the  throat,  or  even 
the  cutting  up  of  the  whole  body  into  the  minutest  pieces,  can 
destroy  the  soul,  until  the  soul  also  is  proved  to  become  more 
unholy  or  unrighteous  in  consequence  of  these  things  being 
done  to  the  body ;  but  that  the  soul  or  anything  else  which  is 
not  destroyed  by  an  internal  evil,  can  be  destroyed  by  an  ex- 
ternal one,  is  not  to  be  supposed. 

No  one,  he  replied,  will  ever  show  that  the  souls  of  men 
become  more  unjust  in  consequence  of  death. 

And  if  some  one  who  would  rather  not  admit  the  immortal- 
ity of  the  soul  boldly  denies  this,  and  says  that  the  dying  do 
really  become  more  evil  and  unrighteous,  then,  if  the  speaker 
is  right,  I  suppose  that  injustice,  like  disease,  must  be  assumed 
to  be  fatal  to  the  unjust,  and  that  those  who  take  this  disorder 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  413 

die  by  the  natural  inherent  power  of  destruction  which  evil 
has,  and  which  kills  them  sooner  or  later  in  quite  another  way 
from  that  in  which,  at  present,  the  wicked  receive  death  at 
the  hands  of  others  us  the  penalty  of  their  deeds  ? 

Nay,  he  said,  in  that  case  injustice,  if  fatal  to  the  uujust, 
will  not  be  so  very  terrible  to  him,  for  he  will  be  delivered 
from  evil.  But  I  rather  suspect  the  opposite  to  be  the  truth, 
and  that  injustice  which  murders  others  keeps  the  murderer  alive 
—  aye,  and  unsleeping  too ;  so  far  removed  is  her  dwelling- 
place  from  being  a  house  of  death. 

True,  I  said  ;  if  the  inherent  natural  vice  or  evil  of  the 
soul  is  unable  to  kill  or  destroy  her,  hardly  will  that  which  is 
appointed  to  be  the  destruction  of  the  body  destroy  a  soul  or 
anything  which  is  not  a  body. 

Yes,  that  can  hardly  be. 

But  the  soul  which  cannot  be  destroyed  by  evil,  whether  in- 
herent or  external,  must  exist  forever,  and,  if  existing  forever, 
must  be  immortal  ? 

Certainly. 

That  is  the  conclusion,  I  said  ;  and  if  a  true  conclusion,  then 
the  souls  must  always  be  the  same,  for  if  none  be  destroyed 
they  will  not  diminish  in  number.  Neither  will  they  increase, 
for  the  increase  of  the  immortal  natures  must  come  from  some- 
thing mortal,  and  all  things  would  thus  end  in  immortality. 

Very  true. 

But  the  argument  will  not  allow  us  to  believe  this,  nor  yet 
to  believe  that  the  soul,  in  her  true  nature,  is  full  of  variety 
and  difference  and  dissimilarity. 

What  do  you  mean  ?  he  said. 

The  soul,  I  said,  as  is  now  proven,  being  immortal,  must  be 
the  fairest  of  compositions,  and  cannot  be  compounded  of 
many  elements  ? 

Certainly  not.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  440. 
Soul,  change  to  all  things  having  a. 

Ath.  All  things  which  have  a  soul  change,  and  possess  in 

themselves  a  principle  of  change,  and  in  changing  move  accord 
ing  to  law  and  the  order  of  destiny  :  lesser  changes  of  nature 
move  on  level  ground,  but  greater  crimes  sink  into  the  abyss, 
that  is  to  say,  into  Hades  and  other  places  in  the  world  below, 
of  which  the  very  names  terrify  men,  and  about  which  they 
dream  that  they  live  in  them  absent  from  the  body.  And 
whenever  the  soul  receives  more  of  good  and  evil  from  her 


414  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

own  energy  and  the  strong  influence  of  others,  when  she  has 
communion  with  divine  virtue  and  becomes  divine,  she  is  car- 
ried into  another  and  better  place,  which  is  also  divine  and 
perfect  in  holiness  ;  and  when  she  has  communion  with  evil, 
then  she  also  changes  the  place  of  her  life. 

"  For  that  is  the  justice  of  the  Gods  who  inhabit  heaven." 

O  youth  or  young  man,  who  fancy  that  you  are  neglected  by 
the  Gods,  know  that  if  you  become  worse  you  shall  go  to  the 
worse  souls,  or  if  better  to  the  better,  and  in  every  succession 
of  life  and  death  you  will  do  and  suffer  what  like  may  fitly 
suffer  at  the  hands  of  like.  This  is  a  divine  justice,  which 
neither  you  nor  any  other  unfortunate  will  ever  glory  in  es- 
caping, and  which  the  ordaining  powers  have  specially  or- 
dained ;  take  good  heed  of  them,  for  a  day  will  come  when 
they  will  take  heed  of  you.  If  you  say,  I  am  small  and  will 
creep  into  the  depths  of  the  earth,  or  I  am  high  and  will  fly 
up  to  heaven,  you  are  not  so  small  or  so  high  but  that  you 
shall  pay  the  fitting  penalty,  either  in  the  world  below  or  in 
some  yet  more  savage  place  still  whither  you  shall  be  con- 
veyed. —  Laws,  iv.  417. 
Soul,  imperishability  of  the. 

What  do  we  call  that  principle  which  does  not  admit  of 

death  ? 

The  immortal,  he  said. 

And  does  the  soul  admit  of  death  ? 

No. 

Then  the  soul  is  immortal  ? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  may  we  say  that  this  is  proven  ? 

Yes,  abundantly  proven,  Socrates,  he  replied. 

And  supposing  that  the  odd  were  imperishable,  must  not 
three  be  imperishable  ? 

Of  course. 

And  if  that  which  is  cold  were  imperishable,  when  the  warm 
principle  came  attacking  the  snow,  must  not  the  snow  have  re- 
tired whole  and  unmelted  —  for  it  could  never  have  perished, 
nor  could  it  have  remained  and  admitted  the  heat  ? 

True,  he  said. 

Again,  if  the  uncooling  or  warm  principle  were  imperisha- 
ble, the  fire,  when  assailed  by  cold,  would  not  have  perished  or 
have  been  extinguished,  but  would  have  gone  away  unaffected  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  415 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  immortal :  if  the  immortal 
is  also  imperishable,  the  soul  when  attacked  by  death  cannot 
perish  ;  for  the  preceding  argument  shows  that  the  soul  will 
not  admit  of  death,  or  ever  be  dead,  any  more  than  three  or 
the  odd  number  will  admit  of  the  even,  or  fire,  or  the  heat  in 
the  fire,  of  the  cold.  Yet  a  person  may  say  :  "  But  although 
the  odd  will  not  become  even  at  the  approach  of  the  even,  why 
may  not  the  odd  perish  and  the  even  take  the  place  of  the 
odd  ?  "  Now  to  him  who  makes  this  objection,  we  cannot  an- 
swer that  the  odd  principle  is  imperishable ;  for  this  has  not 
been  acknowledged,  but  if  this  had  been  acknowledged,  there 
would  have  been  no  difficulty  in  contending  that  at  the  ap- 
proach of  the  even  the  odd  principle  and  the  number  three 
took  their  departure ;  and  the  same  argument  would  have  held 
good  of  fire  and  heat  and  any  other  thing. 

Very  true. 

And  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  immortal :  if  the  immortal 
is  also  imperishable,  then  the  soul  will  be  imperishable  as  well 
as  immortal ;  but  if  not,  some  other  proof  of  her  imperishable- 
ness  will  have  to  be  given. 

No  other  proof  is  needed,  he  said ;  for  if  the  immortal, 
being  eternal,  is  liable  to  perish,  then  nothing  is  imperishable. 

Yes,  replied  Socrates,  all  men  will  agree  that  God,  and  the 
essential  form  of  life,  and  the  immortal  in  general,  will  never 
perish.1  —  Phaedo,  i.  437. 
Soul,  truth  attained  by  the. 

What,  again,  shall  we  say  of  the  actual  acquirement  of 

knowledge  ?  —  is  the  body,  if  invited  to  share  in  the  inquiry,  a 
hinderer  or  a  helper  ?  I  mean  to  say,  have  sight  and  hearing 
any  truth  in  them  ?  Are  they  not,  as  the  poets  are  always 
telling  us,  inaccurate  witnesses?  and  yet,  if  even  they  are  in- 
accurate and  indistinct,  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  other  senses  ? 
For  you  will  allow  that  they  are  the  best  of  them? 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

Then  when  does  the  soul  attain  truth  ?  for  in  attempting  to 
consider  anything  in  company  with  the  body  .she  is  obviously 
deceived. 

Yes,  that  is  true. 

Then  must  not  existence  be  revealed  to  her  in  thought,  if  at 
all? 

1  See  the  continuation  of  this  discussion  on  p.  418. 


416  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Yes. 

And  thought  is  best  when  the  mind  is  gathered  into  herself, 
and  none  of  these  things  trouble  her  —  neither  sounds  nor 
eights  nor  pain  nor  any  pleasure,  —  when  she  has  as  little  as 
possible  to  do  with  the  body,  and  has  no  bodily  sense  or  feel- 
ing, but  is  aspiring  after  true  being? 

That  is  true. 

And  in  this  the  philosopher  dishonors  the  body  ;  his  soul 
runs  away  from  the  body  and  desires  to  be  alone  and  by  her- 
self? 

That  is  true.  —  Phaedo,  i.  391. 

Soul,  philosophy  delivering  the.      See  Philosophy  delivering,  etc. 
Soul  degenerated  by  the  body.     See  Body  affecting  soul. 
Soul,  solitude  of  the  lost.     See  Solitude. 
Soul,  nature  of  the. 

Must  we  not,  said  Socrates,  ask  ourselves  —  What  is  that 

which,  as  we  imagine,  is  liable  to  be  scattered  away,  and  about 
which  we  fear  ?  and  what,  again,  is  that  about  which  we  have 
no  fear  ?  And  then  we  may  proceed  to  inquire  whether  that 
which  suffers  dispersion  is  or  is  not  of  the  nature  of  soul  — 
our  hopes  and  fears  as  to  our  own  souls  will  turn  upon  the  an- 
swer to  these  questions. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Now  the  compound  or  composite  may  be  supposed  to  be 
naturally  capable  as  of  being  compounded  so  also  of  being  dis- 
solved ;  but  that  which  is  uncompounded,  and  that  only,  must 
be,  if  anything  is,  indissoluble. 

Yes ;  I  should  imagine  so,  said  Cebes. 

And  the  uncompounded  may  be  assumed  to  be  the  same  and 
unchanging,  whereas  the  compound  is  always  changing  and 
never  the  same. 

That  I  also  think,  he  said. 

Then,  now,  let  us  return  to  the  previous  discussion.  Is  that 
idea  or  essence,  which  in  the  dialectical  process  we  define  as 
essence  or  true  existence  —  whether  essence  of  equality,  beauty, 
or  anything  else  :  are  these  essences,  I  say.  liable  at  times  to 
some  degree  of  change  ?  or  are  they  each  of  them  always  what 
they  are,  having  the  same  simple  self-existent  and  unchanging 
forms,  and  not  admitting  of  variation  at  all,  or  in  any  way,  or 
at  any  time  ? 

They  must  be  always  the  same,  Socrates,  replied  Cebes.1  — - 
Phaedo,  i.  40P. 

l  For  the  continuation  of  this  discussion,  see  Seen  and  unseen. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOL'GHTb.  417 

Soul,  reflecting  and  unchanging.     See  Reflecting,  etc. 
Soul  resembling  the  divine.      See  Divine,  etc. 

Listen  all  ye  who  have  just  now  heard  the  laws  about 

Gods,  and  about  our  dear  forefathers  :  —  Of  all  the  things  which 
a  man  has,  next  to  the  God,  his  soul  is  the  most  divine  and 
most  truly  his  own.  Now  in  every  man  there  are  two  parts  : 
the  better  and  superior  part,  which  rules,  and  the  worse  and 
inferior  part,  which  serves  ;  and  the  ruler  is  always  to  be  pre- 
ferred to  the  servant.  Wherefore  I  am  right  in  bidding  every 
one  next  to  the  Gods,  who  are  our  masters,  and  those  who  in 
order  follow  them,  to  honor  his  own  soul,  which  every  one 
seems  to  honor,  but  no  one  honors  as  he  ought ;  for  honor  is  a 
divine  good,  and  no  evil  thing  is  honorable ;  and  he  who  thinks 
that  he  can  honor  the  soul  by  word  or  gift,  or  any  sort  of  com- 
pliance, without  making  her  in  any  way  better,  seems  to  honor 
her,  but  honors  her  not  at  all.  For  example,  every  man,  from 
his  very  boyhood,  fancies  that  he  is  able  to  know  everything,  and 
thinks  that  he  honors  his  soul  by  praising  her,  and  he  is  very 
ready  to  let  her  do  whatever  she  may  like.  But  I  mean  to 
say  that  in  acting  thus  he  only  injures  his  soul,  and  does  not 
honor  her  ;  whereas,  in  our  opinion,  he  ought  to  honor  her  as 
second  only  to  the  Gods.  Again,  when  a  man  thinks  that 
others  are  to  be  blamed,  and  not  himself,  for  the  errors  which 
he  has  committed,  and  the  many  and  great  evils  which  befell 
him  in  consequence,  and  is  always  fancying  himself  to  be  ex- 
empt and  innocent,  he  is  under  the  idea  that  he  is  honoring  his 
soul ;  whereas  the  very  reverse  is  the  fact,  for  he  is  really  in- 
juring her.  And  when,  disregarding  the  word  and  approval  of 
the  legislator,  he  indulges  in  pleasure,  then  again  he  is  far 
from  honoring  her ;  he  only  dishonors  her,  and  fills  her  full  of 
evil  and  remorse  ;  or  when  he  does  not  endure  to  the  end  the 
labors  and  fears  and  sorrows  and  pains  which  the  legislator  ap- 
proves, but  gives  way  before  them,  then,  by  yielding,  he  does 
not  honor  the  soul,  but  by  all  such  conduct  he  makes  her  to  be 
dishonorable  ;  nor  when  he  thinks  that  life  at  any  price  is  a 
good,  does  he  honor  her,  but  yet  once  more  he  dishonors  her ; 
for  the  soul  having  a  notion  that  the  world  below  is  all  evil,  he 
yields  to  her,  and  does  not  resist  and  teach  or  convince  her 
that,  for  aught  she  knows,  the  world  of  the  Gods  below,  in- 
stead of  being  evil,  may  be  the  greatest  of  all  goods.  Again, 
when  any  one  prefers  beauty  to  virtue,  what  is  this  but  the 
real  and  utter  dishonor  of  the  soul  ?  For  such  a  preference 
27 


418  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

implies  that  the  body  is  more  honorable  t,mn  the   soul :  and 
this  is  false,  for  there  is  nothing  of  earthly  birth  which  is  more 
honorable  than   the  heavenly,  and  he  who  thinks  otherwise  of 
the  soul  has  no  idea  how  greatly  he  undervalues  this  wonderful 
possession.  —  Laics,  iv.  252. 
Soul,  impure  and  pure.     See  Impure,  etc. 
Soul,  sensual  and  earthly.     See  Earthly. 
Soul,  transmigration  of  the. 

The  happiest  both  in  themselves  and  their  place  of  abode 

are  those  who  have  practiced  the  civil  and  social  virtues  which 
are  called  temperance  and  justice,  and  are  acquired  by  habit 
and  attention  without  philosophy  and  mind. 

Why  are  they  the  happiest  ? 

Because  they  may  be  expected  to  pass  into  some  gentle  so- 
cial nature  which  is  like  their  own,  such  as  that  of  bees  or  wasps 
or  ants,  or  even  back  again  into  the  form  of  man,  and  just  and 
moderate  men  to  spring  from  them. 

That  is  not  impossible.  —  Phaedo,  i.  411. 
Soul,  self-moving.     See  Self-moving. 
Soul,  indestructible. 

Seeing  then  that  the  immortal  is  indestructible,  must  not 

the  soul,  if  she  is  immortal,  be  also  imperishable  ? 

Most  certainly. 

Then  when  death  attacks  a  man,  the  mortal  portion  of  him 
may  be  supposed  to  die,  but  the  immortal  retires  at  the  ap- 
proach of  death  and  is  preserved  safe  and  sound  ? 

True. 

Then,  Cebes,  beyond  question,  the  soul  is  immortal  and  im- 
perishable, and  our  souls  will  truly  exist  in  another  world  !  — 
Phaedo,  i.  437. 
Soul,  care  for  the. 

0  my  friends,  he  said,  if  the  soul  is  really  immortal,  what 

care  should  be  taken  of  her,  not  only  in  respect  of  the  portion 
of  time  which  is  called  life,  but  of  eternity  !  And  the  danger 
of  neglecting  her  from  this  point  of  view  does  indeed  appear 
to  be  awful.  If  death  had  only  been  the  end  of  all,  the  wicked 
would  have  had  a  good  bargain  in  dying,  for  they  would  have 
been  happily  quit  not  only  of  their  body,  but  of  their  own  evil 
together  with  their  souls.  But  now,  inasmuch  as  the  soul  is 
manifestly  immortal,  there  is  no  release  or  salvation  from  evil 
except  the  attainment  of  the  highest  virtue  and  wisdom.  For 
the  soul  when  on  her  progress  to  the  world  below  takes  noth- 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  119 

ing   with  her  but  nurture  and  education  ;  and  these  are  said 

greatly  to  benefit  or  greatly  to  injure  the  departed,  at  the  very 

beginning  of  his  pilgrimage  in   the  other  world.  —  Phaedo,  i. 

437. 

Soul,  at  first  without  sense.      See  Sense. 

Soul,  giving  life  to  the  body. 

-  Soc.  You  want  me  first  of  all  to  examine  the  natural  fitness 


of  the  word  ^"X^J  (soul),  and  then  of  the  word  crw/xa  (body)? 

Her.  Yes. 

Soc.  If  I  am  to  say  what  occurs  to  me  at  the  moment,  I 
should  imagine  that  those  who  first  used  the  name  i/'ux'?  meant 
to  express  that  the  soul  when  in  the  body  is  the  source  of  life, 
and  gives  the  power  of  breath  and  revival,  and  when  this  re- 
viving power  fails  then  the  body  perishes  and  dies,  and  this,  if 
I  am  not  mistaken,  they  called  psyche.  But  please  stay  a  mo- 
ment ;  I  fancy  that  I  can  discover  something  which  will  be 
more  acceptable  to  the  disciples  of  Euthyphro,  for  I  am  afraid 
that  they  will  scorn  this  explanation.  What  do  you  say  to  an- 
otner  ? 

Her.  Let  me  hear. 

Soc.  What  is  that  which  holds  and  carries  and  gives  life  and 
motion  to  the  entire  nature  of  the  body  ?  What  is  that  but 
the  soul? 

Her.  Just  that. 

Soc.  And  do  you  not  believe  with  Anaxagoras,  that  mind  or 
soul  is  the  ordering  and  containing  principle  of  all  things  ? 

Her.  Yes  ;  I  do. 

Soc.  Then  you  may  well  call  that  power  <^vo-e^r;  which 
carries  and  holds  nature,  and  this  may  be  refined  away  into 


Her.  Certainly  ;  and  I  think  that  this  is  a  pore  scientific 
derivation. 

Soc.  True  ;  and  yet  I  cannot  help  laughing  if  I  am  to  sup- 
pose that  this  is  the  original  meaning. 

Her.  But  what  shall  we  say  of  the  next  word  ? 

Soc.  You  mean  o-w/ua  (the  body). 

Her.  Yes. 

Soc.  That  may  be  variously  interpreted  ;  and  yet  more  vari- 
ously if  a  little  permutation  is  allowed.  For  some  say  that 
,he  body  is  the  grave  (O-^AGI)  of  the  soul,  which  may  be  thought 
to  be  buried  in  our  present  life  ;  or  again  the  index  of  the 
soul,  because  the  soul  indicates  (crg/totm)  through  the  body  : 


420  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

probably  the  Orphic  poets  were  the  inventors  of  the  rame,  and 
they  were  under  the  impression  that  the  soul  is  suffering  the 
punishment  of  sin,  and  that  the  body  is  an  inclosure  or  prison 
in  which  the  soul  is  incarcerated,  kept  (trw/m  o-wf^rat),  as  the 
name  o-w/xa  implies,  until  the  penalty  is  paid ;  according  to  this 
view,  not  even  a  letter  of  the  word  need  be  changed.  —  Cra- 
tylus,  i.  638. 

Soul,  harmony  of,  and  form.     See  Harmony  of,  etc. 
Soul,  its  part  in  our  action. 

Once  more  then,  O  my  friend,  we  have  alighted  upon  an 

easy  question  —  whether  the  soul  has  these  three  principles  or 
not? 

An  easy  question !  Nay,  rather,  Socrates,  the  proverb  holds 
that  hard  is  the  good. 

Very  true,  I  said  ;  and  I  confess  that  the  method  which  we 
are  employing,  in  my  judgment,  seems  to  be  altogether  inade- 
quate to  the  accurate  solution  of  this  question ;  for  the  true 
method  is  another  and  a  longer  one.  Still  we  may  arrive  at  a 
solution  not  below  the  level  of  the  previous  inquiry. 

May  we  not  be  satisfied  with  that  ?  he  said ;  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, I  am  quite  content. 

I  too,  I  replied,  shall  be  extremely  well  satisfied. 

Then  faint  not  in  pursuing  the  speculation,  he  said. 

Can  I  be  wrong,  I  said,  in  acknowledging  that  in  the  indi- 
vidual there  are  the  same  principles  and  habits  which  there  are 
in  the  State  ?  for  if  they  did  not  pass  from  one  to  the  other, 
whence  did  they  come  ?  Take  the  quality  of  passion  or  spirit ; 
it  would  be  ridiculous  to  imagine  that  this  quality,  which  is 
characteristic  of  the  Thracians,  Scythians,  and  in  general  of 
the  northern  nations,  when  found  in  States,  does  not  originate 
in  the  individuals  who  compose  them  ;  and  the  same  may  be 
said  of  the  love  of  knowledge,  which  is  the  special  character- 
istic of  our  part  of  the  world,  or  the  love  of  money,  which  may, 
with  equal  truth,  be  attributed  to  the  Phoenicians  and  Egyp- 
tians. 

Exactly,  he  said. 

There  is  no  difficulty  in  understanding  this. 

None  whatever. 

But  the  difficulty  begins  as  soon  as  we  raise  the  question 
whether  these  principles  are  three  or  one  ;  whether,  that  is  to 
say,  we  learn  with  one  part  of  our  nature,  are  angry  with  an- 
other, and  with  a  third  part  desire  thec"fi'sfaction  of  our  natural 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  .       421 

appetites  ;  or  whether  the  whole  soul  comes  into  play  in  each 
sort  of  action  —  to  determine  that  is  the  difficulty. 

Yes,  he  said,  there  lies  the  difficulty.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  261 
Soul,  disfiguration  of  the. 

-  Her  immortality  may  be  proven  by  the  previous  argument 
and  by  other  arguments  ;  but  to  see  her  as  she  really  is,  not 
as  we  now  behold  her,  marred  by  communion  with  the  body 
and  other  miseries,  you  should  look  upon  her  with  the  eys  of 
reason,  in  her  original  purity,  and  then  her  beauty  would  be 
discovered,  and  in  her  image  justice  would  be  more  clearly  seen, 
and  injustice,  and  all  the  things  which  we  have  described.  Thus 
far  we  have  spoken  the  truth  concerning  her  as  she  appears  at 
present,  but  we  must  remember  that  we  have  seen  her  only  in 
a  condition  which  may  be  compared  to  that  of  the  sea-God 
Glaucus,  whose  original  image  can  hardly  be  discerned  because 
his  natural  members  are  broken  off  and  crushed,  and  in  many 
ways  damaged  by  the  waves,  and  incrustations  have  grown  over 
them  of  sea-weed  and  shells  and  stones,  so  that  he  is  liker  to 
some  sea-monster  than  to  his  natural  form.  And  the  soul  is 
in  a  similar  condition,  disfigured  by  ten  thousand  ills.  But  not 
there,  Glaucon,  not  there  must  we  look. 

Where  then  ? 

At  her  love  of  wisdom.  Let  us  see  whom  she  affects,  and 
what  converse  she  seeks  in  virtue  of  her  near  kindred  with  the 
immortal  and  eternal  and  divine  ;  also  how  different  she  would 
become  if  wholly  following  this  superior  principle,  and  borne 
by  a  divine  impulse  out  of  the  ocean  in  which  she  now  is,  and 
disengaged  from  the  stones  and  shells  and  things  of  earth  and 
rock  which  in  wild  variety  grow  around  her  because  she  feeds 
upon  earth,  and  is  crusted  over  by  the  good  things  of  this  life 
as  they  are  termed  :  then  you  would  see  her  as  she  is,  and 
know  whether  she  have  one  form  only  or  many,  or  what  her 
nature  is.  Of  her  character  and  affections  in  this  present  life 
I  have  said  enough. 

True,  he  aaid.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  440. 
Soul  made  priir  to  the  body.     See  Corporeal  essence, 
Soul,  disorders  of  the.     See  Mind,  etc. 
Soul,  compared  L,o  a  vessel. 

I  have  heard  a  philosopher  say  that  at  this  moment  we 


are  dead,  and  that  the  body  (crw/xa)  is  a  tomb  (cr^ua)  and  that 
the  part  of  the  soul  which  is  the  seat  of  the  desires  is  liable  to 
be  blown  and  tossed  about  ;  and  some  ingenious  man,  probably 


422       .  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

a  Sicilian  or  an  Italian,  playing  with  the  word,  invented  a  tale 
in  which  he  called  the  soul  a  vessel  (TTI'^OS),  meaning  a  believ- 
ing ^TTIOTIKOS)  vessel,  and  the  ignorant  he  called  the  uninitiated 
or  leaky,  and  the  place  in  the  souls  of  the  uninitiated  in  which 
the  desires  are  seated,  being  the  intemperate  and  incontinent 
part,  he  compared  to  a  vessel  full  of  holes,  because  they  can 
never  be  satisfied.  He  is  not  of  your  way  of  thinking,  Calli- 
cles,  for  he  declares,  that  of  all  the  souls  in  Hades,  meaning 
the  invisible  world  (aetSes),  these  uninitiated  or  leaky  persons 
are  the  most  miserable,  and  that  they  carry  water  to  a  vessel 
which  is  full  of  holes  in  a  similarly  holey  colander.  The  col- 
ander, as  he  declares,  is  the  soul,  and  the  soul  which  he  com- 
pares to  a  colander  is  the  soul  of  the  ignorant,  which  is  full  of 
holes,  and  therefore  incontinent,  owing  to  a  bad  memory  arid 
want  of  faith.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  81. 

Soul,  effect  of  harmony  and  order  in  the.     See  Harmony,  etc. 
Soul,  health  of  body  and.     See  Body,  etc. 

Soul  and  body,  two  processes  of  training.     See  Body  and  soul,  etc. 
Soul  after  death. 

Whatever  was  the  habit  of  the  body  during  life  would 

be  distinguishable  after  death,  either  perfectly,  or  in  a  great 
measure  and  for  a  considerable  time.  And  I  should  imagine 
that  this  is  equally  true  of  the  soul,  Callicles  ;  when  a  man  is 
stripped  of  the  body,  all  the  natural  or  acquired  affections  of 
the  soul  are  laid  open  to  view.  And  when  they  come  to  the 
judge,  as  those  from  Asia  come  to  Rhadamanthus,  he  places 
them  near  him  and  inspects  them  quite  impartially,  not  know- 
ing whose  the  soul  is  :  perhaps  he  may  lay  hands  on  the  soul 
of  the  great  king,  or  of  some  other  king  or  potentate,  who  has 
no  soundness  in  him,  but  his  soul  is  marked  with  the  whip,  and 
is  full  of  the  prints  and  scars  of  perjuries,  and  crimes  with 
which  each  action  has  stained  him,  and  he  is  all  crooked  with 
falsehood  and  imposture,  and  has  no  straightness,  because  he 
has  lived  without  truth.  Him  Rhadamanthus  beholds,  full  of 
deformity  and  disproportion,  which  is  caused  by  license  and 
luxury  and  insolence  and  incontinence,  and  dispatches  him  ig- 
nominiously  to  his  prison,  and  there  he  undergoes  the  punish- 
ment which  he  deserves. —  Gorgias,  iii.  116. 
Soul,  waxen  heart  of  the. 

Soc.  The  explanation  of  truth  and  error  is  as  follows  : 

when  the  wax  in  the  soul  of  any  one  is  deep  and  abundant, 
and  sriooth  and  perfectly  tempered,  then  the  impressions  which 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  i'2'6 

pass  through  the  senses  and  sink  into  the  [waxen]  heart  of 
the  soul,  as  Homer  says  in  a  parable,  meaning  to  indicate  the 
likeness  of  the  soul  to  wax  (*%>  K^pos)  —  these,  I  say,  being 
pure  and  clear,  and  having  a  sufficient  depth  of  wax,  are  also 
lasting,  and  minds  such  as  these  easily  learn  and  easily  retain, 
and  are  not  liable  to  confusion,  but  have  true  thoughts,  for 
'hey  have  plenty  of  room,  and  having  clear  impressions  of 
things,  as  we  term  them,  quickly  distribute  them  into  their 
proper  places  on  the  block.  And  such  men  are  called  wise. 
Do  you  agree  ? 

Theaet.  Entirely. 

Soc.  But  when  the  heart  of  any  one  is  shaggy,  as  the  poet 
who  knew  everything  says,  or  muddy  and  of  impure  wax,  or 
very  soft,  or  very  hard,  then  there  is  a  corresponding  defect  in 
the  mind :  the  soft  are  good  at  learning,  but  apt  to  forget ; 
and  the  hard  are  the  reverse  ;  the  shaggy  and  rugged  and 
gritty,  or  those  who  have  an  admixture  of  earth  or  dung  in 
their  composition,  have  the  impressions  indistinct,  as  also  the 
hard,  for  there  is  no  depth  in  them  ;  and  the  soft  too  are  in- 
distinct, for  their  impressions  are  easily  confused  and  effaced. 
Yet  greater  is  the  indistinctness  when  they  are  all  jostled  to- 
gether in  a  little  soul,  which  has  no  room.  These  are  the  nat- 
ures which  have  false  opinion  ;  for  when  they  see  or  hear  or 
think  of  anything,  they  are  slow  in  assigning  the  right  objects 
to  the  right  impressions  :  in  their  stupidity  they  confuse  them, 
and  are  apt  to  see  and  hear  and  think  amiss  ;  and  such  men 
are  said  to  be  deceived  in  their  knowledge  of  objects,  and  ig- 
norant. 

Theaet.  No  man,  Socrates,  can  say  anything  truer  than  that. 
—  Theaetetus,  iii.  400. 
Soul,  original  and  primeval. 

Ath.  I  suppose  that  I  must  repeat  the  singular  argument 

of  those  who  manufacture  the  soul  according  to  their  own  im- 
pious notions;  they  affirm  that  which  is  the  first  cause  of  the 
generation  and  destruction  of  all  things,  to  be  not  first  but  last, 
and  that  which  was  last  to  be  first,  and  hence  they  have  fallen 
into  error  about  the  true  nature  of  the  Gods. 

Cle.  Still  I  do  not  understand  you. 

Ath.  Nearly  all  of  them,  my  friends,  seem  to  be  ignorant  of 
the  nature  and  power  of  the  soul,  especially  in  what  relates  to 
her  origin  :  they  do  not  know  that  she  is  among  the  first  of 
bodies,  and  before  them  all,  and  is  the  chief  author  of  their 


424  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS 

changes  and  transpositions.  And  if  this  is  true,  and  if  the 
soul  is  older  than  the  body,  must  not  the  things  which  are  of 
the  soul's  kindred  be  of  necessity  before  those  which  appertain 
to  the  body  ? 

Cle.   Certainly. 

Ath.  Then  thought  and  attention  and  mind  and  art  and 
law  will  be  prior  to  that  which  is  hard  and  soft  and  heavy  and 
light ;  and  the  great  and  primitive  works  and  actions  .will  be 
works  of  art ;  they  will  be  the  first,  and  after  them  will  come 
nature  and  works  of  nature,  which,  however,  is  a  wrong  term  to 
apply  to  them  ;  these  will  follow,  and  be  under  the  govern- 
ment of  art  and  mind. 

Cle.  But  why  is  the  word  "  nature  "  wrong  ? 

Ath.  Because  those  who  use  the  term  mean  to  say  that  nat- 
ure is  the  first  creative  power ;  but  if  the  soul  turn  out  to  be 
the  primeval  element  and  not  fire  or  air,  then  in  the  truest 
sense  and  beyond  other  things  the  soul  may  be  said  to  have  a 
natural  or  creative  power :  and  this  would  be  true  if  you 
proved  that  the  soul  is  older  than  the  body,  but  not  otherwise. 

Cle.  You  are  quite  right.  —  Laws,  iv.  403. 
Soul,  like  a  book. 

Soc.  Well,  now,  I  wonder  whether  you  would  agree  in 

my  explanation  of  this  phenomenon. 

Pro.  What  is  your  explanation  ? 

Soc.  I  think  that  the  soul  at  such  times  is  a  like  a  book. 

Pro.  How  so  ? 

Soc.  Memory  and  perception  meet,  and  they  and  their  at- 
tendant feelings  seem  to  me  almost  to  write  down  words  in  the 
soul,  and  when  the  inscribing  feeling  writes  truly,  then  true 
opinion  and  true  propositions  grow  in  our  souls,  —  but  when 
the  scribe  within  us  writes  falsely  the  result  is  false. 

Pro.  I  quite  assent  and  agree  to  your  statement. 

Soc.  I  must  bespeak  your  favor  also  for  another  artist,  who 
is  busy  at  the  same  time  in  the  chambers  of  the  soul. 

Pro.  Who  is  that  ? 

Soc.  The  painter,  who  paints  the  images  of  the  words  which 
the  scribe  cr  registrar  has  already  written  down. 

Pro.  But  when  and  how  does  he  do  this  ? 

Soc.  When  abstracting  from  sight,  or  some  other  sense,  the 
opinions  which  he  then  received  or  the  words  which  he  heard, 
he  retains  the  image  of  them  in  his  mind ;  that  is  a  very  com- 
mon mental  phenomenon. 

Pro.   Certainly.  —  Philebus,  iii.  176. 


PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHTS.  425 

Soul,  divided,  feelings  of  body  and.     See  Body  and  soul,  mixtures  of. 

Soul,  envy,  a  pain  of  the.      See  Envy,  etc. 

Soul,  the  just  and  wise.     See  Just,  etc. 

Soul,  definition  of  the.      See  Mind,  movement  of. 

Soul,  prior  to  the  body.     See  also  Body  and  soul,  etc. 

Ath.  Then  we  are  right,  and  speak  the  most  perfect  and 

absolute  truth,  when  we  say  that  the  soul  is  prior  to  the  body, 
and  that  the  body  is  second  and  conies  afterwards,  and  is  born 
to  obey  the  soul  which  is  the  ruler  ? 

Cle.  Xothing  can  be  more  true. 

Ath.  Do  you  remember  our  old  admission,  that  if  the  soul 
was  prior  to  the  body  the  things  of  the  soul  were  also  prior  to 
those  of  the  body  ? 

Cle.   Certainly. 

Ath.  And  characters  and  manners,  and  wishes  and  reason- 
ings, and  true  opinions,  and  reflections,  and  recollections  are 
prior  to  length  and  breadth  and  depth  and  strength  of  bodies,  if 
the  soul  is  prior  to  the  body. 

Cle.  Of  course. 

Ath.  In  the  next  place,  must  we  not  of  necessity  admit  that 
the  soul  is  the  cause  of  good  and  evil,  base  and  honorable,  just 
and  unjust,  and  of  all  other  opposites,  if  we  suppose  her  to  be 
the  cause  of  all  things  ? 

Cle.   Certainly. 

Ath.  And  as  the  soul  orders  and  inhabits  all  things  moving 
every  way,  must  we  not  say  that  she  orders  also  the  heavens  ? 

Cle.   Of  course. 

Ath.  One  soul  or  more  ?  More  than  one  — •  I  will  answer  for 
you ;  at  any  rate,  we  must  not  suppose  that  there  are  less  than 
two  — one  the  author  of  good,  and  the  other  of  evil. 

Cle.  Very  true. 

Ath.  Yes,  very  true ;  the  soul  then  directs  all  things  in 
heaven,  and  earth,  and  sea  by  her  movements,  and  these  are 
described  by  the  terms  —  will,  consideration,  attention,  delib- 
eration, opinion  true  and  false,  joy  and  sorrow,  confidence,  fear, 
hatred,  contentment,  and  other  primary  motions  akin  to  these  ; 
which  again  receive  the  secondary  motions  of  corporate  sub- 
stances, and  guide  all  things  to  growth  and  decay,  to  composi- 
tion and  decomposition,  and  to  the  qualities  which  accompany 
them,  such  as  heat  and  cold,  heaviness  and  lightness,  hardness 
and  softness,  blackness  and  whiteness,  bitterness  and  sweetness, 
and  all  those  other  qualities  which  the  soul  uses,  herself  a  god- 


426  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

dess,  when  truly  receiving  the  divine  mind  and  disciplining  all 
things  rightly  to  their  happiness  ;  but  when  the  companion  of 
folly,  doing  the  very  contrary  of  all  this.  Shall  we  assume 
this,  or  do  we  still  entertain  doubts  ? 

Cle.  There  is  no  room  at  all  for  doubt. 

Ath.  Shall  we  say,  then,  that  soul  is  the  nature  which  con- 
trols heaven  and  earth,  and  the  whole  world  ?  Is  it  the  prin- 
ciple of  wisdom  and  virtue,  or  that  which  has  neither  wisdom 
nor  virtue  ?  Suppose  that  we  make  answer  as  follows  :  — 

Cle.  How  would  you  answer  ? 

Ath.  If,  my  friend,  we  say  that  the  whole  path  of  heaven, 
and  the  movement  of  all  that  is  therein,  is  by  nature  akin  to 
the  movement  and  revolution  and  calculation  of  mind,  and  pro- 
ceeds by  kindred  laws,  then,  as  is  plain,  we  must  say  that  the 
best  soul  takes  care  of  the  world  and  guides  it  along  the  good 
path. 

Cle.  True. 

Ath.  But  when  the  world  moves  wildly  and  irregularly,  then 
the  evil  soul  guides  it. 

Cle.  True  again.  —  Laws,  iv.  408. 
Soul,  sun  and  stars  without. 

Ath.  Are  we  assured  that  there  are  two  things  which  lead 

men  to  believe  in  the  Gods,  as  we  have  already  stated? 

Cle.  What  are  they  ? 

Ath.  One  is  the  argument  about  the  soul,  which  has  been 
already  mentioned — that  it  is  the  eldest  and  most  divine  of 
all  things,  to  which  motion  attaining  generation  gives  perpetual 
existence  ;  the  other  was  an  argument  from  the  order  of  motion 
of  the  heavens,  and  of  all  things  under  the  dominion  of  the 
mind  which  ordered  the  universe.  If  a  man  look  upon  the 
world  not  lightly  or  foolishly,  there  was  never  any  one  so  god- 
less who  did  not  experience  an  effect  opposite  to  that  which  the 
many  imagine.  For  they  think  that  those  who  handle  these 
matters  by  the  help  of  astronomy,  and  the  accompanying  arts 
of  demonstration,  may  become  godless ;  because  they  see,  as  far 
as  they  can  see,  things  happening  by  necessity,  and  not  by  an 
intelligent  will  accomplishing  good. 

Cle.  But  what,  then,  is  the  fact  ? 

Ath.  Just  the  opposite  of  that  opinion  which  once  prevailed 
among  men,  that  the  sun  and  stars  are  without  soul.  Even  in 
those  days  men  wondered  about  them,  and  that  which  is  now 
ascertained  was  then  conjectured  by  some  who  had  a  more 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  427 

exact  knowledge  of  them  —  that  if  they  had  been  things  with- 
out soul,  and  had  no  mind,  they  could  never  have  moved  ac- 
cording to  such  exact  calculations ;  and  even  at  that  time  some 
ventured  to  hazard  the  conjecture  that  mind  was  the  orderer 
of  the  universe.  But  these  same  persons,  again  mistaking  the 
nature  of  the  soul,  which  they  conceived  to  be  younger  and 
not  older  than  the  body,  once  more  overturned  the  world,  or 
rather,  I  should  say,  themselves,  for  what  they  saw  before  their 
eyes  in  heaven,  all  appeared  to  be  full  of  stones,  and  earth, 
and  many  other  lifeless  bodies,  and  to  these  they  assigned  the 
various  causes  of  all  things.  Such  studies  gave  rise  to  much 
atheism  and  perplexity,  and  the  poets  took  occasion  to  be 
abusive,  —  comparing  the  philosophers  to  she-dogs,  uttering 
vain  bowlings,  and  saying  other  nonsense  of  the  same  sort. 
But  now,  as  I  said,  the  case  is  reversed. 

Cle.  How  is  that  ? 

Ath.  No  man  can  be  a  true  worshiper  of  the  Gods  who 
does  not  know  these  two  principles  —  that  the  soul  is  the  eld- 
est of  all  things  born,  and  is  immortal  and  rules  over  all  bodies  ; 
moreover,  as  I  have  now  said  several  times,  he  who  has  not 
contemplated  the  mind  of  nature  which  is  said  to  exist  in  the 
stars,  and  acquired  the  previous  training,  and  seen  the  connec- 
tion of  them  with  music,  and  harmonized  them  all  with  laws 
and  institutions,  is  not  able  to  give  a  reason  of  such  things  as 
have  a  reason.  And  he  who  is  unable  to  acquire  this  in  addi- 
tion to  the  ordinary  virtues  of  a  citizen,  can  hardly  be  a  good 
ruler  of  a  whole  State  ;  but  he  should  be  the  subordinate  of 
other  rulers.  —  Laics,  iv.  477. 
Souls,  punishment  of.  See  Soul  after  death. 
Speech,  common,  having  a  divine  meaning. 

His  words  are  like  the  images  of  Silenus  which  open  ; 

they  are  ridiculous  when  you  first  hear  them :  he  clothes  him- 
self in  language  that  is  as  the  skin  of  the  wanton  satyr  —  for 
his  talk  is  of  pack-asses  and  smiths  and  cobblers  and  curriers, 
and  he  is  always  repeating  the  same  things  in  the  same  words, 
so  that  an  ignorant  man  who  did  not  know  him  might  feel  dis- 
posed to  laugh  at  him ;  but  he  who  opens  the  mask  and  sees 
what  is  within  will  find  that  they  are  the  only  words  which 
have  a  meaning  in  them,  and  also  the  most  divine,  abounding 
in  fair  examples  of  virtue,  and  of  the  widest  comprehension, 
or  rather  extending  to  the  whole  duty  of  a  good  and  honorable 
man.  —  The  Symposium,  i.  512. 


428  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Speech  and  thought. 

Theaet.   Give  me  the  knowledge  which  you  would  wish 

me  to  gain. 

Str.  Is  not  thought  the  same  as  speech,  with  this  exception  : 
thought  is  the  unuttered  conversation  of  the  soul  with  her- 
self? 

Theaet.   Quite  true. 

Str.  But  the  stream  of  thought  which  flows  through  the 
lips  and  is  audible  is  called  speech. 

Theaet.  True. 

Str.  And  we  know  that  in  speech  there  is  affirmation  and 
denial  ? 

Theaet.  Yes,  that  we  know. 

Str.  When  the  affirmation  or  denial  takes  place  silently  and 
in  the  mind  only,  what  would  you  call  that  but  opinion  ? 

Theaet.  There  can  be  no  other  name. 

Str.  And  when  this  state  of  opinion  is  presented,  not  sim- 
ply, but  in  some  form  of  sense,  ought  you  not  to  call  it  phan- 
tasy ? 

Theaet.   Certainly. 

Str.  And  seeing  that  language  is  true  and  false,  and  that 
thought  is  the  conversation  of  the  soul  with  herself,  and  opinion 
is  the  end  of  thinking,  and  phantasy  or  imagination  is  the 
union  of  sense  and  opinion,  the  inference  is  that  these  also,  as 
they  are  akin  to  language,  should  have  an  element  of  false  as 
well  as  true  ? 

Theaet.   Certainly.  —  Sophist,  iii.  504. 
Spherical  form  of  the  earth.     See  Earth,  rotundity  of  the. 
Spiritual  truths,  uncertainty  of. 

I  dare  say  that  you,  Socrates,  feel  as  I  do,  how  very  hard 

or  almost  impossible  is  the  attainment  of  any  certainty  about 
questions  such  as  these  in  the  present  life.  And  yet  T  should 
deem  him  a  coward  who  did  not  prove  what  is  said  about  them 
to  the  uttermost,  or  whose  heart  failed  him  before  he  had  ex- 
amined them  on  every  side.  For  he  should  persevere  until  he 
has  attained  one  of  two  things  :  either  he  should  discover  or 
be  taught  the  truth  about  them  ;  or,  if  this  is  impossible,  I 
would  have  him  take  the  best  and  most  irrefragable  of  human 
theories,  and  let  this  be  the  raft  upon  which  he  sails  through 
life  —  not  without  risk,  as  I  admit,  if  he  cannot  find  some 
word  of  God  which  will  more  surely  and  safely  carry  him.  — 
Phaedo  i.  414. 


PL  AT  OS  BEST  THOUGHTS.  429 

Spontaneous  life.     See  Life. 

Starry  heavens,  the  symbols  of  truth.     See  Heavenly  oodies,  stc. 

Stars  and  ?un,  without  soul.     See  Soul,  sun  and  stars. 

State,  loyalty  to  the.     See  Citizen,  etc. 

State  the,  a  parent.     See  Citizen,  etc. 

State,  authority  of  the.     See  Citizen,  etc. 

State,  right  of  the.     See  Citizen,  etc. 

State,  more  than  the  individual.     See  Citizen,  etc. 

State,  rulers  of  the,  who  and  what  they  must  be.      Sea  Rulert. 

State,  poetry  expelled  from  the.     See  Poetry. 

State,  origin  of  the.     See  Individual. 

State,  lies  for  the  good  of  the.     See  Lies. 

State,  object  of  constructing  the. 

How  would  you  answer,   Socrates,  said  he,  if  a  person 

were  to  say  that  you  make  your  citizens  miserable,  and  miser- 
able of  their  own  accord ;  for  they  are  the  actual  owners  of 
the  city,  and  are  none  the  better  ;  whereas  other  men  acquire 
lands,  and  build  large  and  handsome  houses,  and  have  every- 
thing handsome  about  them,  offering  sacrifices  to  the  Gods  on 
their  own  account,  and  practicing  hospitality ;  moreover,  as  you 
were  saying  just  now,  they  have  gold  and  silver,  and  all  that 
is  usual  among  the  favorites  of  fortune  ;  while  our  poor  citi- 
zens are  no  better  than  mercenaries  who  are  fixed  in  the  city 
and  do  nothing  but  mount  guard  ? 

Yes,  I  said ;  and  you  may  add  that  they  are  only  fed,  and 
not  paid,  in  addition  to  their  food,  like  other  men  ;  and  there- 
fore they  cannot  make  a  journey  of  pleasure,  they  have  no 
money  to  spend  on  a  mistress  or  any  other  luxurious  fancy, 
which,  as  the  world  goes,  is  thought  to  be  happiness ;  and  many 
other  accusations  of  the  same  nature  might  be  added. 

But,  said  he,  let  us  suppose  all  that  included  in  the  charge. 

You  mean  to  ask,  I  said,  what  is  to  be  our  nnswer  ? 

Yes.  he  replied. 

If  we  proceed  on  the  path  along  which  we  are  already  going, 
I  said,  my  belief  is  that  we  shall  find  the  answer.  Even  if  our 
guardians  were  such  as  you  describe,  there  would  not  be  any- 
thing wonderful  in  their  still  being  the  happiest  of  men  ;  but 
let  that  pass,  for  our  object  in  the  construction  of  the  State  is  the 
greatest  happiness  of  the  whole,  and  not  that  of  any  one  class  ; 
and  in  a  State  which  is  ordered  with  a  view  to  the  good  of  the 
whole,  we  think  that  we  are  most  likely  to  find  justice,  and  in 
the  ill-ordered  State  injustice:  and,  having  found  their,  we 


430  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

shall  then  be  able  to  decide  which  of  the  two  is  the  happier. 
At  present  we  are  constructing  the  happy  State,  not  piecemeal, 
or  with  a  view  of  making  a  few  happy  citizens,  but  as  a  whole ; 
and  by  and  by  we  will  proceed  to  view  the  opposite  kind  of 
State.  If  we  were  painting  a  statue,  and  some  one  were  to 
come  and  blame  us  for  not  putting  the  most  beautiful  colors  on 
the  most  beautiful  parts  of  the  body  —  for  the  eyes,  he  would 
say,  ought  to  be  purple,  but  they  are  black  —  in  that  case  we 
might  fairly  answer,  sir,  do  not  imagine  that  we  ought  to  beau- 
tify the  eyes  to  such  a  degree  that  they  are  no  longer  eyes ;  but 
see  whether,  by  giving  this  and  the  other  features  their  due,  we 
make  the  whole  beautiful.  And  so  I  would  say  now,  do  not  com- 
pel us  to  assign  to  the  guardians  a  sort  of  happiness  which  will 
make  them  anything  but  guardians ;  for  we  also  should  have  no 
difficulty  in  clothing  our  husbandmen  in  fine  linen,  and  setting 
crowns  of  gold  on  their  heads,  bidding  them  till  the  ground  no 
more  than  they  like.  There  would  be  nothing  easier  than  to  al- 
low our  potters  to  repose  on  couches,  and  feast  by  the  fireside, 
passing  round  the  glittering  bowl,  while  their  wheel  is  conven- 
iently at  hand,  and  working  at  pottery  as  much  as  they  like,  and 
no  more  ;  in  this  way  we  may  make  every  class  happy  —  and 
then  as  you  imagine,  the  whole  State  will  be  happy.  But  do  not 
suggest  this ;  for,  if  we  listen  to  you,  the  husbandman  will  be  no 
longer  a  husbandman,  the  potter  will  cease  to  be  a  potter,  and 
no  class  will  have  any  distinct  character.  Now  this  is  not  of 
much  importance  where  the  corruption  of  society,  and  preten- 
sion to  be  what  you  are  not,  extends  only  to  cobblers ;  but 
when  the  guardians  of  the  laws  of  the  government  are  only 
seemers  and  not  real  guardians,  that,  you  will  observe,  is  the 
utter  ruin  of  the  State :  as,  on  the  other  hand,  with  them 
alone  rests  the  order  and  happiness  of  a  State.  If  we  then 
really  mean  that  our  guardians  are  to  be  the  saviours  and  not 
the  destroyers  of  the  State,  and  the  advocate  of  the  other  view 
is  talking  of  peasants  at  a  festival,  enjoying  a  life  of  rev 
elry,  rather  than  fulfilling  the  duties  of  citizens,  we  mean  dif- 
ferent things,  and  he  is  speaking  of  something  which  is  not  a 
State.  And  therefore  we  must  consider  whether  in  appointing 
our  guardians  we  look  to  their  greatest  happiness,  or  whether 
this  principle  of  happiness  does  not  rather  reside  in  the  State 
as  a  whole.  But  if  so,  the  guardians  and  auxiliaries,  and  all 
others  equally  with  them,  must  be  compelled  or  induced  to  do 
tbeir  own  work  in  the  best  way ;  and  then  the  whole  State 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  431 

growing  up  in  a  noble  order,  the  several  classes  will  only  have 
to  receive  the  proportion  of  happiness  which  nature  assigns  to 
them. 

I  think  that  you  are  quite  right.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  243. 
State,  unity  in  the. 

—  The  State  may  increase  to  any  size  which  is  consistent 
with  unity ;  that,  I  think,  is  the  limit. 

Very  good,  he  said  ; 

Here  then,  I  said,  is  another  order  which  will  have  to  be 
conveyed  to  our  guardians,  —  that  our  city  is  to  be  neither 
large  nor  small,  but  of  such  a  size  as  is  consistent  with  unity. 

And  surely,  said  he,  this  is  not  a  very  severe  order  which 
we  impose  upon  them. 

And  the  other,  said  I,  of  which  we  were  speaking  before,  is 
lighter  still,  —  I  mean  the  duty  of  degrading  the  offspring  of  the 
guardians  when  inferior,  and  of  elevating  the  offspring  of  the 
lower  classes,  when  naturally  superior,  into  the  rank  of  guar- 
dians. The  intention  was,  that,  in  the  case  of  the  citizens  gen- 
erally, we  should  put  each  individual  man  to  the  use  for  which 
nature  designed  him,  and  then  every  man  would  do  his  own 
business,  and  be  one  and  not  many,  and  the  whole  city  would  be 
one  and  not  many. 

Yes,  he  said  ;  there  will  be  even  less  difficulty  in  that. 

These  things,  my  good  Adeimantus,  are  not,  as  might  be 
supposed,  a  number  of  great  principles,  but  trifles  all,  if  care 
be  taken,  as  the  saying  is,  of  the  one  great  thing,  —  a  thing, 
however,  which  I  would  rather  call  not  great,  but  enough  for 
our  purpose. 

What  may  that  be  ?  he  asked. 

Education,  I  said,  and  nurture.  For  if  our  citizens  are  well 
educated,  and  grow  into  sensible  men,  they  will  easily  see  their 
way  through  all  this  as  well  as  other  matters.  —  The  RepuW.c^ 
ii.  247. 

State,  courage  in  the.     See  Courage,  etc. 
State,  highest  good  in  the.     See  Eoil,  etc. ;  also  Injustice. 
State,  ideal  philosophers  to  be  kings  in  the.     See  Rulers,  etc. 
State,  philosophy  in  the.     See  Philosophy,  etc. 
State,  weakness  in  the. 

Where  a  body  is  weak  the  addition  of  a  touch  from  with- 
out may  bring  on  illness,  and  sometimes  even  when  there  is  no 
external  provocation,  a  commotion  may  arise  within  ;  in  the  same 
way  where  there  is  weakness  in  the  State  there  is  also  likely 


432  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

to  be  illness,  of  which  the  occasion  may  be  very  slight,  one 
party  introducing  their  democratical,  the  other  their  oligar- 
chical allies,  and  the  State  falls  sick,  and  is  at  war  with  her- 
self and  may  be  at  times  distracted,  even  when  there  is  no  ex- 
ternal cause  ?  — 

Yes  surely. 

And  then  democracy  comes  into  being  after  the  poor  have 
conquered  their  opponents,  slaughtering  some  and  banishing 
some,  while  to  the  remainder  they  give  an  equal  share  of  free- 
dom and  power ;  and  this  is  the  form  of  government  in  which 
the  magistrates  are  commonly  elected  by  lot.  —  The  Republic, 
ii.  384. 
State,  physician  for  the. 

Soc.  If  you  and  I  were  physicians,  and  were  advising  one 

another  that  we  were  competent  to  practice  as  State-physicians, 
should  I  not  ask  you,  and  would  you  not  ask  me,  Well,  but 
how  about  Socrates  himself,  has  he  good  health  ?  and  was  any 
one  else  ever  known  to  be  cured  by  him,  whether  slave  or  free- 
man ?  And  I  should  make  the  same  inquiries  about  you. 
And  if  we  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  no  one,  whether  citi- 
zen or  stranger,  man  or  woman,  had  ever  been  any  the  better 
for  the  medical  skill  of  either  of  us,  then,  by  Heaven,  Callicles, 
what  an  absurdity  to  think  that  we  or  any  human  being  should 
be  so  silly  as  to  set  up  as  a  State-physician,  and  advise  others 
like  ourselves  to  do  the  same,  without  having  first  practiced  in 
private,  whether  successfully  or  not,  and  acquired  experience  of 
the  art.  Is  not  this,  as  they  say,  to  begin  with  the  big  jar 
when  you  are  learning  the  potter's  art ;  which  is  a  foolish 
thing  ? 

Gal.  True. —  Gorgias,  iii.  105. 

State,  right  and  wrong  determined  by  the.     See  Right. 
State,  education  the  foundation  of  the.     See  Education,  etc. 
State,  divine  bonds  in  the.     See  Divine,  etc. 
State,  actual  and  ideal. 

Let  me  begin  by  reminding  you  that  we  found  our  way 

hither  in  the  search  after  justice  and  injustice. 

True,  he  replied  ;  but  what  of  this  ? 

I  was  only  going  to  ask  whether,  if  we  have  discovered  them, 
we  are  to  require  that  the  just  man  should  in  nothing  fail  of 
absolute  justice;  or  may  we  be  satisfied  with  an  approximation, 
and  the  attainment  in  him  of  a  higher  degree  of  justice  than  is 
li>  be  found  in  other  men  ? 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  433 

The  approximation  will  be  enough. 

And  we  inquired  into  the  nature  of  absolute  justice,  and  into 
the  character  of  the  perfectly  just  man  and  the  possibility  of  his 
existence,  and  into  injustice  and  the  perfectly  unjust  only  that  we 
might  have  an  ideal.  We  were  to  look  at  them  in  order  that 
we  might  judge  of  our  own  happiness  and  unhappiness  accord- 
ing to  the  standard  which  they  exhibited  and  the  degree  in 
which  we  resembled  them,  not  with  any  view  of  showing  that 
they  could  exist  in  fact. 

True,  he  said. 

How  would  a  painter  be  the  worse  painter  because,  after 
having  painted  with  consummate  art  an  ideal  of  a  perfectly  beau- 
tiful man,  he  was  unable  to  show  that  any  such  man  could  ever 
have  existed  ? 

He  would  not. 

Well,  and  were  we  not  creating  an  ideal  of  a  perfect  State  ? 

To  be  sure. 

And  is  our  theory  a  worse  theory  because  we  are  unable  to 
prove  the  possibility  of  a  city  being  ordered  in  the  manner 
described  ? 

Surely  not,  he  replied. 

That  is  the  truth,  I  said.  But  if,  at  your  request,  I  am  to 
try  and  show  how  and  under  what  condition  the  possibility  is 
highest,  I  must  ask  you,  having  this  in  view,  to  repeat  your 
former  admissions. 

What  admissions  ? 

I  want  to  know  whether  ideas  are  ever  realized  in  fact  ? 
Is  not  speech  more  than  action  and  must  not  the  actual,  what- 
ever a  man  may  think,  fall  short  of  the  truth  ?  What  do  you 
say? 

I  agree. 

Then  you  must  not  insist  on  my  proving  that  the  actual 
State  will  in  every  respect  coincide  with  the  ideal :  if  we  are 
only  able  to  discover  how  a  city  may  be  governed  nearly  as  we 
proposed,  you  will  admit  that  we  have  discovered  the  possibility 
which  you  demand  ;  and  will  be  contented  —  will  not  you? 

Yes,  I  will.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  299. 
State,  a  luxurious. 

-  The  question  which  you  would  have  me  consider  is,  not 

only  how  a  State,  but  how  a  luxurious   State  is  to  be  created  ; 

and  possibly  there  is  no  harm  in   this,  for  in  such  a  State  we 

shall  be  more  likely  to  see  how  justice  and  injustice  grow  up. 

28 


434  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

I  am  certainly  of  opinion  that  the  true  and  healthy  constitution 
of  the  State  is  the  one  which  I  have  described.  But  if  you 
wish  to  see  the  State  in  a  fever  I  have  no  objection.  For  I 
suppose  that  many  will  be  dissatisfied  with  the  simpler  way  of 
life.  They  will  be  for  adding  sofas,  and  tables,  and  other  fur- 
niture; also  dainties,  and  perfumes,  and  incense,  and  courtesans, 
and  cakes,  not  of  one  sort  only,  but  in  profusion  and  variety  ; 
we  mast  go  beyond  the  necessaries  of  which  I  was  at  first 
speaking,  such  as  houses  and  clothes  and  shoes  ;  and  the  arts  of 
the  painter  and  embroiderer  will  have  to  be  set  in  motion,  and 
gold  and  ivory  and  other  materials  of  the  arts  will  be  required. 

True,  he  said. 

Then  we  must  enlarge  our  borders  ;  for  the  original  healthy 
State  is  too  small.  Now  will  the  city  have  to  fill  and  swell 
with  a  multitude  of  callings  which  are  not  required  by  any 
natural  want ;  such  as  the  whole  tribe  of  hunters  and  actors, 
of  whom  one  large  class  have  to  do  with  postures  and  colors, 
another  are  musicians  ;  there  will  be  poets  and  their  attendant 
train  of  rhapsodists,  players,  dancers,  contractors ;  also  makers 
of  divers  kinds  of  utensils,  including  women's  ornaments.  And 
we  shall  want  more  servants.  Will  not  tutors  be  also  in  re- 
quest, and  nurses  wet  and  dry,  tirewomen  and  barbers,  as  well 
as  confectioners  and  cooks  ;  and  swineherds,  too,  who  were  not 
needed  and  therefore  had  no  place  in  the  former  edition  of  our 
State,  but  are  needed  now  ?  They  must  not  be  forgotten :  and 
there  will  be  hosts  of  animals,  if  people  are  to  eat  them. 

Certainly. 

And  living  in  this  way  we  shall  have  much  greater  need  of 
physicians  than  before  ? 

Much  greater. 

And  the  country  which  was  enough  to  support  the  original 
inhabitants  will  be  too  small  now,  and  not  enough  ? 

Quite  true. 

Then  a  slice  of  our  neighbor's  land  will  be  wanted  by  us  for 
pasture  and  tillage,  and  they  will  want  a  slice  of  ours,  if,  like 
ourselves,  they  exceed  the  limit  of  necessity,  and  give  them- 
selves up  to  the  unlimited  accumulation  of  wealth  ? 

That,  Socrates,  will  be  unavoidable. 

And  then  we  shall  go  to  war,  Glaucon,  —  that  will  be  the 
next  thing. 

So  we  shall,  he  replied. 

Then,  without  determining  as  yet  whether  war  does  good  or 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  435 

harm,  thus  much  we  may  affirm,  that  now  we  have  discovered 
war  to  be  derived  from  causes  which  are  also  the  causes  of 
almost  all  the  evils  in  States,  private  as  well  as  public. 

Undoubtedly.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  194. 
State,  what  most  conduces  to  the  excellence  of  the. 

Further,  we  affirmed   that    justice  was  doing  one's  own 

business,  and  not  being  a  busybody;  we  said  so  again  and 
again,  and  many  others  have  said  the  same. 

Yes,  we  said  so. 

Then  this  doing  in  a  certain  way  one's  own  business  may  be 
assumed  to  be  justice.  Do  you  know  why  ? 

I  do  not,  and  should  like  to  be  told. 

Because  J  think  that  this  alone  remains  in  the  State  when 
the  other  virtues  of  temperance  and  courage  and  wisdom  are 
abstracted  ;  and  this  is  the  ultimate  cause  and  condition  of  the 
existence  of  all  of  them,  and  while  remaining  in  them  is  also 
their  preservative ;  and  we  were  saying  that  if  the  three  were 
discovered  by  us.  justice  would  be  the  fourth  or  remaining  one. 

That  follows  of  necessity. 

Still.  I  said,  if  a  question  should  arise  as  to  which  of  these 
four  qualities  contributed  most  by  their  presence  to  the  excel- 
lence of  the  State,  whether  the  agreement  of  rulers  and  subjects, 
or  the  preservation  in  the  soldiers  of  the  opinion  which  the  law 
ordains  about  the  true  nature  of  dangers,  or  wisdom  and  watch- 
fulness in  the  rulers  would  claim  the  palm,  or  whether  this 
which  I  am  about  to  mention,  and  which  is  found  in  children 
and  women,  bond  and  free,  artisan,  ruler,  subject,  is  not  the  one 
which  conduces  most  to  the  excellence  of  the  State,  —  this 
quality,  I  mean,  of  every  one  doing  his  own  work,  and  not  be- 
ing a  busybody,  —  the  question  would  not  be  easily  determined. 

Certainly,  he  replied,  to  answer  the  question  would  not  be 
easy, 

Ihen  the  power  of  each  individual  in  the  State  to  do  his  own 
work  appears  to  compete  with  the  other  virtues  of  wisdom,  tem- 
perance, and  courage  ? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  the  virtue  which  enters  into  this  competition  is  justice  ? 

Exactly. 

Look  at  the  matter  in  another  light.  AT*  not  the  rulers  in 
a  State  those  to  whom  you  would  intrust  the  office  of  de- 
termining causes  ? 

Certainly. 


436  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

And  they  will  act  on  the  principle  that  individuals  are  neither 
to  take  what  is  another's,  nor  to  be  deprived  of  what  is  their 
own. 

Yes  ;  that  will  be  their  principle. 

Which  is  a  just  principle  ? 

Yes. 

Then  on  this  view,  also,  justice  will  be  admitted  to  be  the 
having  and  doing  what  is  a  man's  own,  and  belongs  to  him  ? 

That  is  true 

Let  us  not.  I  said,  be  over-positive  as  yet ;  but  if,  on  trial, 
this  conception  of  justice  be  verified  in  the  individual  as  well  as 
in  the  State,  then  there  will  be  no  longer  any  room  for  doubt  ; 
if  not,  there  must  be  another  inquiry.  Let  us,  however,  finish 
the  old  investigation,  which  we  began,  as  you  remember,  under 
the  impression  that,  if  we  could  first  examine  justice  on  the 
larger  scale,  there  would  be  less  difficulty  in  recognizing  her  in 
the  individual.  That  larger  example  appeared  to  be  the  State, 
and  accordingly  we  constructed  one,  as  good  a  one  as  we  could, 
knowing  well  that  in  the  good  State  justice  would  be  surely 
found.  Let  us  now  apply  what  we  discovered  there  to  the 
individual,  and  if  they  agree,  we  are  satisfied  ;  or,  if  there  be  a 
difference  in  the  individual,  we  will  come  back  to  the  State 
and  have  another 'trial  of  the  theory.  The  friction  of  the  two 
when  rubbed  together  may  possibly  strike  a  light  in  which 
justice  will  shine  forth,  and  the  vision  which  is  then  revealed 
we  will  fix  in  our  souls. 

That  is  reasonable ;  and  let  us  do  as  you  say.  —  The  Re- 
public, ii.  258. 
State,  an  allegory  of  the. 

1  perceive,  I  said,  that  you  are  vastly  amused  at  having 

plunged  me  into  such  a  hopeless  discussion  ;  and  now  you  shall 
hear  the  parable  in  order  that  you  may  judge  better  of  the 
meagreness  of  my  imagination  :  for  the  treatment  which  the 
the  best  men  experience  from  their  States  is  so  grievous  that  no 
single  thing  on  earth  can  be  compared  with  them  ;  and  there- 
fore if  I  would  defend  them  I  must  have  recourse  to  fiction, 
and  make  a  compound  of  many  things,  like  the  fabulous  unions 
of  goats  and  stags  which  are  found  in  pictures.  Imagine,  then, 
a  fleet  or  a  ship  in  which  there  is  a  captain  who  is  taller  and 
stronger  than  any  of  the  crew,  but  he  is  a  little  deaf  and  has  a 
similar  infirmity  in  sight,  and  his  knowledge  of  navigation  is  not 
much  better.  Now  the  sailors  are  quarreling  with  one  another 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  437 

about  the  steering  ;  every  one  is  of  opinion  that  he  ought  to 
steer,  though  he  has  never  learned  and  cannot  tell  who  taught 
him  or  when  he  learned,  and  will  even  assert  that  the  art  of 
navigation  cannot  be  taught,  and  is  ready  to  cut  in  pieces  him 
who  says  the  contrary.  They  throng  about  the  captain,  and  do 
all  that  they  can  to  make  him  commit  the  helm  to  them  ;  and  if 
he  refuses  them  and  others  prevail,  they  kill  the  others  or  throw 
them  overboard,  and  having  first  chained  up  the  noble  captain's 
senses  with  drink  or  some  narcotic  drug,  they  mutiny  and  take 
possession  of  the  ship  and  make  themselves  at  home  with  the 
stores ;  and  thus,  eating  and  drinking,  they  continue  their  voy- 
age with  such  success  as  might  be  expected  of  them.  Him 
who  is  their  partisan  and  zealous  in  the  design  of  getting  the 
ship  out  of  the  captain's  hands  into  their  own,  whether  by  force 
or  persuasion,  they  compliment  with  the  name  of  sailor,  pilot, 
able  seaman,  and  abuse  the  other  sort  of  man  and  call  him  a 
good-for-nothing  ;  but  they  have  not  even  a  notion  that  the 
true  pilot  must  pay  attention  to  the  year  and  seasons  and  sky 
and  stars  and  winds,  and  whatever  else  belongs  to  his  art,  if  he 
intends  to  be  really  qualified  for  the  command  of  a  ship ; 
while  at  the  same  time  he  must  and  will  be  the  steerer, 
whether  other  people  like  or  not ;  and  they  think  that  to  com- 
bine the  exercise  of  command  with  the  steerer's  art  is  impossi- 
ble. Now  in  vessels  which  are  thus  circumstanced,  arid  among 
sailors  of  this  class,  how  will  the  true  pilot  be  regarded  ?  Will 
he  not  be  called  by  the  mutineers  a  prater,  a  star-gazer,  a  good- 
for-nothing  ? 

Of  course,  said  Adeimantus. 

I  do  not  suppose,  I  said,  that  you  would  care  to  hear  the  in- 
terpretation of  the  figure,  which  is  an  allegory  of  the  true  phi- 
losopher in  his  relation  to  the  State ;  for  you  understand 
already. 

Certainly.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  314. 
State,  well  ordered,  a  waking  reality. 

You  have  again  forgotten,  my  friend,  I  said,  the  intention 

of  the  legislator  ;  he  did  not  aim  at  making  any  one  class  in 
the  State  happy  above  the  rest ;  the  happiness  was  to  be  in  the 
whole  State,  and  he  held  the  citizens  together  by  persuasion 
and  necessity,  making  them  benefactors  of  the  State,  and  there- 
fore benefactors  of  one  another ;  to  this  end  he  created  them, 
not  that  they  should  please  themselves,  but  they  were  to  be  his 
instruments  in  binding  up  the  State. 


438  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

True,  he  said,  I  had  forgotten. 

Observe,  Glaucon,  that  there  will  be  no  injustice  in  com- 
pelling our  philosophers  to  have  a  care  and  providence  of  others ; 
we  shall  explain  to  them  that  in  other  States,  men  of  their 
class  are  not  obliged  to  share  in  the  toils  of  politics :  and  this 
is  reasonable,  for  they  grow  up  at  their  own  sweet  will,  and 
the  government  would  rather  not  have  them.  Now  the  wild 
plant  which  owes  culture  to  nobody,  has  nothing  to  pay  for 
culture.  But  we  have  brought  you  into  the  world  to  be  rulers 
of  the  hive,  kings  of  yourselves  and  of  the  other  citizens,  and 
have  educated  you  far  better  and  more  perfectly  than  they  have 
been  educated,  and  you  are  better  able  to  share  in  the  double 
duty.  Wherefore  each  of  you,  when  his  turn  comes,  must  go 
down  to  the  general  underground  abode,  and  get  the  habit  of 
seeing  in  the  dark ;  for  all  is  habit ;  and  by  accustoming  your- 
selves you  will  see  ten  thousand  times  better  than  the  dwellers 
in  the  den,  and  you  will  know  what  the  images  are.  and  of 
what  they  are  images,  because  you  have  seen  the  beautiful  and 
just  and  good  in  their  truth.  And  thus  the  order  of  our  State 
and  of  yours  will  be  a  reality,  and  not  a  dream  only,  as  the 
order  of  States  too  often  is  ;  for  in  most  of  them  men  are 
fighting  with  one  another  about  shadows  and  are  distracted  in 
the  struggle  for  power,  which  in  their  eyes  is  a  great  good. 
Whereas  the  truth  is,  that  the  State  in  which  the  rulers  are 
most  reluctant  to  govern  is  best  and  most  quietly  governed,  and 
the  State  in  which  they  are  most  willing,  the  worst. 

Quite  true,  he  replied. 

And  will  our  pupils,  when  they  hear  this,  refuse  to  share  in 
turn  the  toils  of  State,  when  they  are  allowed  to  spend  the 
greater  part  of  their  time  with  one  another  in  the  heaven  of 
ideas  ? 

Impossible,  he  answered  ;  for  they  are  just  men,  and  the 
commands  which  we  impose  upon  them  are  just ;  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  every  one  of  them  will  take  office  as  a  stern  neces- 
sity and  not  like  our  present  ministers  of  State.1  —  The  Repub- 
lic, ii.  346. 
State,  the  corrupting  art  of  the  advocate  in  the. 

There  are  many  noble  things  in  human  life,  but  to  most 

of  them  attach  evils  which  corrupt  and  spoil  them.  Is  not 
justice  noble  which  has  been  the  civilizer  of  humanity  ?  How 
then  can  the  advocate  of  justice  be  other  than  noble  ?  And 

l  For  the  remainder  of  this  thought  see  Office-Seeker*. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  439 

yet  upon  this  profession  which  is  presented  under  the  fair  name 
of  science,  has  come  an  evil  reputation.  In  the  first  place,  we 
are  told  that  by  ingenious  pleas  and  the  help  of  an  advocate, 
the  law  enables  a  man  to  win  a  particular  cause,  whether  just 
or  unjust ;  and  that  both  the  art  and  the  power  of  speech 
which  is  thereby  imparted  are  at  the  service  of  him  who  is 
willing  to  pay  for  them.  Now,  in  our  State  this  so-called  art, 
whether  really  an  art  or  only  an  experience  and  practice  desti- 
tute of  any  art,  ought  if  possible  never  to  come  into  existence, 
or  if  existing  among  us  should  listen  to  the  request  of  the  leg- 
islator and  go  away  into  another  land,  and  not  speak  contrary 
to  justice.  If  the  offenders  obey  we  say  no  more  ;  but  if  they 
disobey  let  them  hear  the  voice  of  the  law :  If  any  one  thinks 
that  he  will  pervert  the  power  of  justice  in  the  minds  of  the 
judges,  and  unseasonably  litigate  or  advocate,  let  any  one  who 
likes  indict  him  for  malpractices  of  law  and  dishonest  advo- 
cacy, and  let  him  be  judged  in  the  court  of  select  judges  ;  and 
if  he  be  convicted  let  the  court  determine  whether  he  may 
be  supposed  to  act  from  a  love  of  money  or  from  contentious- 
ness. And  if  he  be  supposed  to  act  from  contentiousness,  the 
court  shall  fix  a  time  during  which  he  shall  not  be  allowed  to 
institute  or  plead  a  cause ;  and  if  he  be  supposed  to  act  as  he 
does  from  love  of  money,  in  case  he  be  a  stranger  he  shall 
leave  the  country,  and  never  return  under  penalty  of  death  ; 
but  if  he  be  a  citizen  he  shall  die,  because  he  is  a  lover  of 
money,  however  gained  ;  and  equally,  if  he  be  judged  to  have 
acted  more  than  once  from  contentiousness,  he  shall  die.  — 
Laics,  iv.  449. 
State,  the  order  of  the. 

Ath.  Do  we  not  see  that  the  city  is  the  trunk,  and  are 

not  the  younger  guardians,  who  are  chosen  for  their  natura1 
gifts,  placed  in  the  head  of  the  State,  having  their  souls  all  full 
of  eyes,  with  which  they  look  about  the  whole  city  ?  They 
keep  watch  and  hand  over  their  perceptions  to  the  memory, 
and  inform  the  elders  of  all  that  happens  in  the  city ;  and 
those  whom  we  compared  to  the  mind,  because  they  have  many 
wise  thoughts  —  that  is  to  say,  the  old  men — take  counsel, 
and  making  use  of  the  younger  men  as  their  ministers,  and  ad- 
vising with  them. — in  this  way  both  together  truly  preserve  the 
whole  State  —  Shall  this  be  the  order  of  our  State,  or  shall 
we  have  some  other  order  ?  Shall  we  say  that  they  are  all 
alike  the  owners  of  the  State,  and  not  merely  individual* 


440  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Among  them,  who  have  had  the  most  careful  training  and 
education  ? 

Gle.  That,  my  good  sir,  is  impossible. 

Ath.  Then  we  ought  to  proceed  to  some  mon  exact  train- 
ing than  that  which  has  preceded 

Gle.  I  bow  to  your  authority,  Stranger :  let  us  proceed  in 
the  way  which  you  propose. 

Ath.  Then,  as  would  appear,  we  must  compel  the  guardians 
of  our  divine  state  to  perceive,  in  the  first  place,  what  that 
principle  is  which  is  the  same  in  all  the  four  —  the  same,  as 
we  affirm,  in  courage  and  in  temperance,  and  in  justice  and  in 
prudence,  and  which  being  one,  we  call,  as  we  ought,  by  the 
single  name  of  virtue.  To  this,  my  friends,  we  will,  if  you 
please,  hold  fast,  and  not  let  go  until  we  have  sufficiently  ex- 
plained what  that  is  to  which  we  are  to  look,  whether  to  be 
regarded  as  one  or  as  a  whole,  or  as  both,  or  in  whatever  way. 
Are  we  likely  ever  to  be  in  a  virtuous  condition,  if  we  cannot 
tell  whether  virtue  is  many,  or  four,  or  one  ?  Certainly,  if 
you  will  take  our  advice,  we  shall  in  some  way  contrive  that 
this  principle  has  a  place  amongst  us ;  but  if  you  have  made 
up  your  mind  that  we  should  let  the  matter  alone,  we  will.  — 
Laws,  iv.  475. 
State,  heroes  who  have  died  for  the. 

Such  were  the  actions  of  the  men  who  are  here  interred, 

and  of  others  who  have  died  on  behalf  of  their  country  ;  many 
and  glorious  things  I  have  told  of  them,  and  there  are  yet 
many  more  and  more  glorious  things  remaining  to  be  told, 
which  many  days  and  nights  would  not  suffice  to  tell.  Let  them 
not  be  forgotten,  and  let  every  man  remind  their  descendants 
that  they  also  are  soldiers  who  must  not  desert  the  ranks  of 
their  ancestors,  or  fall  behind  from  cowardice.  Even  as  I  ex- 
hort you  this  day,  and  in  all  future  time,  and  on  every  occasion 
on  which  I  meet  with  any  of  you,  I  shall  continue  to  remind 
and  exhort  you,  O  ye  sons  of  heroes,  that  you  strive  to  be  the 
bravest  of  men.  And  I  think  that  I  ought  now  to  repeat  to 
you  what  your  fathers  desired  to  have  said  to  you  who  are 
their  survivors,  when  they  went  out  to  battle,  in  case  anything 
happened  to  them.  I  will  tell  you  what  I  heard  them  say,  and 
•what,  if  they  had  only  speech,  they  would  fain  be  saying,  judg- 
ing from  what  they  then  said.  And  you  must  imagine  that 
you  hear  them  saying  what  I  now  repeat  to  you. 

Sons,  the  event  proves  that  ^our  fathers  were  brave  men : 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  441 

for  we  might  have  lived  dishonorably,  but  havt  preferred  to 
die  honorably  rather  than  bring  you  and  your  children  into 
disgrace,  and  rather  than  dishonor  our  fathers  and  forefathers  ; 
considering  that  life  is  not  life  to  one  who  is  a  dishonor  to  his 
race,  and  that  to  such  an  one  neither  men  nor  Gods  are 
friendly,  either  while  he  is  on  the  earth  or  after  death  in  tho 
world  below.  Remember  our  words,  then,  and  whatever  is 
your  aim  let  virtue  be  the  condition  of  the  attainment  of  your 
aim,  and  know  that  without  this  all  possessions  and  pursuits 
are  dishonorable  and  evil.  For  neither  does  wealth  bring 
honor  to  the  owner,  if  he  be  a  coward ;  of  such  an  one  the 
wealth  belongs  to  another,  and  not  to  himself.  Nor  does 
beauty  and  strength  of  body,  when  dwelling  in  a  base  and 
cowardly  man,  appear  comely,  but  the  reverse  of  comely,  mak- 
ing the  possessor  more  conspicuous,  and  manifesting  forth  his 
cowardice.  And  all  knowledge,  when  separated  from  justice 
and  virtue,  is  seen  to  be  cunning  and  not  wisdom  ;  wherefore 
make  this  your  first  and  last  and  only  and  everlasting  desire, 
that  if  possible  you  may  exceed  not  only  us  but  all  your  an- 
cestors in  virtue ;  aud  know  that  to  excel  you  in  virtue  only 
brings  us  shame,  but  that  to  be  excelled  by  you  is  a  source  of 
joy  to  us.  And  we  shall  most  likely  be  defeated,  and  you  will 
most  likely  be  victors  in  the  contest,  if  you  learn  so  to  order 
your  lives  as  not  to  misuse  or  waste  the  reputation  of  your  an- 
cestors, knowing  that  to  a  man  who  has  any  self-respect,  noth- 
ing is  more  dishonorable  than  to  be  honored,  not  for  his  own 
sake,  but  on  account  of  the  reputation  of  his  ancestors.  The 
honor  of  parents  is  a  fair  aud  noble  treasure  to  their  posterity, 
but  to  have  the  use  of  a  treasure  of  wealth  aud  honor,  and  to 
leave  none  to  your  successors,  because  you  have  neither  money 
nor  reputation  of  your  own,  is  alike  base  and  dishonorable. 
And  if  you  follow  our  precepts  you  will  be  received  by  us  as 
friends,  when  the  hour  of  destiny  brings  you  hither ;  but  if 
you  neglect  our  words  and  are  disgraced  in  your  lives,  no  one 
will  receive  you  friendly.  This  is  the  message  which  is  to  be 
delivered  to  our  children.  —  Menexenus,  iv.  576. 
State,  the  mother  of  her  citizens. 

To   the  State  we  would  say :  —  Let  her  take  care  of  our 

parents  and  sons,  educating  the  one  in  principles  of  order,  and 
worthily  cherishing  the  old  age  of  the  other.  But  we  know 
that  she  will  of  her  own  accord  take  care  of  them,  and  doei 
not  need  exhortation  from  us. 


442  PLATL'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

These,  0  ye  children  and  parents  of  the  dead,  are  the  words 
which  they  bid  us  proclaim  to  you,  and  which  I  do  proclaim  to 
you  with  the  utmost  good-will.  And  on  their  behalf  I  be- 
seech you,  the  children,  to  imitate  your  fathers,  and  you,  par- 
ents, to  be  of  good  cheer  about  yourselves  ;  for  we  will  nour- 
ish your  age,  and  take  care  of  you  both  publicly  and  privately 
in  any  place  in  which  one  of  us  may  meet  one  of  you  who  are 
the  parents  of  the  dead.  And  the  care  which  the  city  shows 
you  yourselves  know ;  for  she  has  made  provision  by  law  con- 
cerning the  parents  and  children  of  those  who  die  in  war ;  and 
the  highest  authority  is  specially  intrusted  with  the  duty  of 
watching  over  them  above  all  other  citizens,  in  order  to  see 
that  there  is  no  wrong  done  to  them.  She  herself  takes  part 
in  the  nurture  of  the  children,  desiring  as  far  as  it  is  possible 
that  their  orphanhood  may  not  be  felt  by  them  ;  she  is  a  par- 
ent to  them  while  they  are  children,  and  when  they  arrive  at 
the  age  of  manhood  she  sends  them  to  their  several  duties, 
clothing  them  in  armor ;  she  displays  to  them  and  recalls  to 
their  minds  the  pursuits  of  their  fathers,  and  puts  into  their 
hands  the  instruments  of  their  fathers'  virtues ;  for  the  sake  of 
the  omen,  she  would  have  them  begin  and  go  to  rule  over  their 
own  houses  arrayed  in  the  strength  and  arms  of  their  fathers. 
And  she  never  ceases  honoring  the  dead  every  year,  celebrat- 
ing in  public  the  rites  which  are  proper  to  each  and  all ;  and 
in  addition  to  this,  holding  gymnastic  and  equestrian  festivals, 
and  musical  festivals  of  every  sort.  She  is  to  the  dead  in  the 
place  of  a  son  and  heir,  and  to  their  sons  in  place  of  a  father, 
and  to  their  parents  and  elder  kindred  in  the  place  of  a  pro- 
tector —  ever  and  always  caring  for  them.  Considering  this, 
you  ought  to  bear  your  calamity  the  more  gently  :  for  thus 
you  will  be  most  endeared  to  the  dead  and  to  the  living,  and 
your  sorrows  will  heal  and  be  healed.  And  now  do  you  and 
all,  having  lamented  the  dead  together  in  the  usual  manner,  go 
your  ways.  —  Menexenus,  iv.  578. 
States  destroyed  by  ignorance.  See  Ignorance,  etc. 

Ath.   Consider  what  is  really  the  greatest  ignorance.     I 

should  like  to  know  whether  you  and  Megillus  would  agree 
with  me  about  this :  for  my  opinion  is  — 

Cle.  What? 

Ath.  That  the  greatest  ignorance  is  when  a  man  hates  that 
which  he  nevertheless  thinks  to  be  good  and  noble,  and  loves 
and  embraces  that  which  1  e  knows  to  be  unrighteous  and  evil. 


PLATO  S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  443 

This  disagreement  between  the  sense  of  pleasure  and  the  judg- 
ment of  reason  in  the  soul  is,  in  my  opinion,  the  worst  igno- 
rance ;  and  the  greatest  too,  because  affecting  the  great  mass 
of  the  human  soul;  for  the  principle  which  feels  pleasure  and 
pain  in  the  individual,  is  like  the  mass  or  populace  in  a  State. 
And  when  the  soul  is  opposed  to  knowledge,  or  opinion,  or 
reason,  which  are  her  natural  lords,  that  I  call  folly,  just  as  in 
the  State,  when  the  multitude  refuses  to  obey  their  rulers  and 
the  laws ;  or,  again,  in  the  individual,  when  fair  reasonings 
have  their  habitation  in  the  soul  and  yet  do  no  good,  but  rather 
the  reverse  of  good.  All  these  cases  I  term  the  worst  igno- 
rance, whether  in  individuals  or  in  States.  I  am  not  speaking, 
Stranger,  as  you  will  understand,  of  the  ignorance  of  handi- 
craftsmen. 

Cle.  Yes,  my  friend,  we  understand  and  agree. 

Ath.  Let  this,  then,  in  the  first  place  declare  and  affirm  that 
the  citizen  who  does  not  know  these  things  ought  never  to 
have  any  kind  of  authority  intrusted  to  him ;  he  must  be  stig- 
matized as  ignorant,  even  though  he  be  skillful  in  calculation 
and  versed  in  all  sorts  of  accomplishments,  and  feats  of  mental 
dexterity  ;  and  the  opposite  are  to  be  called  wise,  even  al- 
though, in  the  words  of  the  proverb,  they  know  neither  how 
to  read  nor  how  to  swim ;  and  to  them,  as  to  men  of  sense, 
authority  is  to  be  committed.  For,  O  my  friends,  how  can 
there  be  the  least  shadow  of  wisdom  when  there  is  no  har- 
mony ?  There  is  none  ;  but  the  noblest  and  greatest  of  har- 
monies may  be  truly  said  to  be  the  greatest  wisdom ;  and  of 
this  he  is  a  partaker  who  lives  according  to  reason  ;  whereas 
he  who  is  devoid  of  reason  is  the  destroyer  of  his  house  and 
the  opposite  of  the  saviour  of  the  State  :  he  is  ignorant  of 
political  wisdom.  —  Laws,  iv.  218. 

Statesmen,  are  they  good  teachers  of  virtue  ?     See  7:~1ue,  etc. 
Any.  Have  there  not  been  many  good  men  in  this  city  ? 

Soc.  Yes,  certainly,  Anytus  :  and  many  good  statesmen  also  , 
there  always  have  been,  and  there  are  still,  in  the  city  of  Ath- 
ens. But  the  question  is  whether  they  were  also  good  teachers  of 
their  own  virtue  ;  —  not  whether  there  are,  or  have  been,  good 
men,  but  whether  virtue  can  be  taught,  is  the  question  which 
we  have  been  discussing.  Now,  do  we  mean  to  say  that  the 
good  men  of  our  own  and  of  other  times  knew  how  to  impart 
to  others  that  virtue  which  they  had  themselves  ;  or  is  this  vir- 
tue incapable  of  being  communicated  or  imparted  by  one  man 


444  PLATO'S  BEST  THC  UGHTS. 

to  another?  That  is  the  question  which  I  and  Meno  have 
been  arguing.  Look  at  the  matter  in  your  own  way.  Would 
you  not  admit  that  Themistocles  was  a  good  man  ? 

Any.   Certainly  ;  no  man  better. 

Soc.  And  must  not  he  then  have  been  a  good  teacher,  if 
any  man  ever  was  a  good  teacher,  of  his  own  virtue  ? 

Any.  Yes,  certainly,  —  if  he  wanted  to  be  that. 

Soc.  But  would  he  not  have  wanted  ?  He  would,  at  any 
rate,  have  desired  to  make  his  own  son  a  good  man  and  a  gen- 
tleman ;  he  could  not  have  been  jealous  of  him,  or  have  inten- 
tionally abstained  from  imparting  to  him  his  own  virtue.  Did 
you  never  hear  that  he  made  Cleophantus,  who  was  his  son,  a 
famous  horseman  ?  —  he  would  stand  upright  on  horseback  and 
hurl  a  javelin  ;  and  many  other  marvelous  things  he  could  do 
which  his  father  had  him  taught ;  and  in  anything  which  the 
skill  of  a  master  could  teach  him  he  was  well  trained.  Have 
you  not  heard  from  our  elders  of  this  ? 

Any.  I  have. 

Soc.  Then  no  one  could  say  that  his  son  showed  any  want 
of  capacity  ? 

Any.  Possibly  not. 

Soc.  But  did  any  one,  old  or  young,  ever  say  in  your  hear- 
ing that  Cleophantus,  the  son  of  Themistocles,  was  a  wise  or 
good  man,  as  his  father  was? 

Any.  I  have  certainly  never  heard  that. 

Soc.  And  if  virtue  could  have  been  taught,  would  his  father 
Themistocles  have  sought  to  train  him  in  minor  accomplish- 
ments, and  allowed  him  who,  as  you  must  remember,  was  his 
own  son,  to  be  no  better  than  his  neighbors  in  those  qualities 
in  which  he  himself  excelled  ? 

Any.  Indeed,  indeed  I  think  not. 

Soc.  Here,  then,  is  a  teacher  of  virtue  whom  you  admit  to 
be  among  the  best  men  of  the  past.  —  Meno,  i.  268. 
Statesmen,  called  divine. 

Soc.  Not  by  any  wisdom,  and  not  because  they  were  wise, 

did  Themistocles  and  those  others  of  whom  Anytus  spoke  gov- 
ern States.  And  this  was  the  reason  why  they  were  unable  to 
make  others  like  themselves,  —  because  their  virtue  was  not 
grounded  on  knowledge. 

Men.  That  is  probably  true,  Socrates. 

Soc.  But  if  not  by  knowledge,  the  only  alternative  which 
remains  is  that  statesmen  must  have  guided  States  by  right 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  445 

opinion,  which  is  in  politics  what  divination  is  in  religkn  ;  for 
diviners  and  also  prophets  say  many  things  truly,  but  they  know 
not  what  they  say. 

Men.  Very  true. 

Soc.  And  may  we  not,  Meno.  truly  call  those  men  divine 
who,  having  no  understanding,  yet  succeed  in  many  a  grand 
deed  and  word  ? 

Men.   Certainly. 

Soc.  Then  we  shall  also  be  right  in  calling  those  divine 
whom  we  were  just  now  speaking  of  as  diviners  and  prophets, 
as  well  as  all  poets.  Yes,  and  statesmen,  above  all,  may  be  said 
to  be  divine  and  illumined,  being  inspired  and  possessed  of  God, 
in  which  condition  they  say  many  grand  things,  not  knowing 
what  they  say. 

Men.  Yes. 

Soc.  And  the  women  too,  Meno,  call  good  men  divine ;  and 
the  Spartans,  when  they  praise  a  good  man,  say  "  that  he  is  a 
divine  man." 

Men.  And  I  think,  Socrates,  that  they  are  right ;  although 
very  likely  our  friend  Anytus  may  take  offense  at  the  word.  — 
Meno,  i.  275. 

Statesmen  and  politicians  distinguished.     See  Politicians,  etc. 
Strangers,  treatment  of. 

In  his  relations  to  strangers,  a  man  should  consider  that  a 

contract  is  a  most  holy  thing,  and  that  all  concerns  and  wrongs 
of  strangers  are  more  directly  dependent  on  the  protection  of 
God.  than  the  wrongs  done  to  citizens  ;  for  the  stranger  having 
no  kindred  and  friends,  is  more  to  be  pitied  by  Gods  and  men. 
Wherefore,  also,  he  who  is  most  able  to  assist  him  is  most  zeal- 
ous in  his  cause ;  and  he  who  is  most  able  is  the  divinity  and 
Sod  of  the  stranger,  who  follows  in  the  train  of  Zeus,  the  God 
of  strangers.  And  for  this  reason,  he  who  has  a  spark  of  cau- 
tion in  him,  will  do  his  best  to  pass  through  life  without  sinning 
against  the  stranger.  And  of  offenses  committed,  whether 
against  strangers  or  fellow-countrymen,  that  against  suppliants 
is  the  greatest.  For  the  God  who  witnessed  to  the  agreement 
made  with  the  suppliant,  becomes  in  a  special  manner  the  guar- 
dian of  the  sufferer  ;  and  he  will  certainly  not  suffer  unavenged 
—  Laws,  iv.  255. 
Strength,  physical,  inferior  to  persuasion.  See  Leyislatic  n  and  Per- 


446  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS, 

Style,  mixed  and  unmixed. 

Suppose,  I  answered,  that  a  just  and  good  man  in  tho 

course  of  narration  comes  on  some  saying  or  action  of  another 
good  man,  —  I  should  imagine  that  he  will  like  to  personate 
him,  and  will  not  be  ashamed  of  this  sort  of  imitation  :  he  will 
be  most  ready  to  play  the  part  of  the  good  man  when  he  is 
acting  firmly  and  wisely  ;  in  a  less  degree  when  his  steps  falter, 
owing  to  sickness  or  love,  or  again  from  intoxication  or  any 
other  mishap.  But  when  he  comes  to  a  character  which  is  un- 
worthy of  him,  he  will  not  make  a  study  of  that ;  he  will  dis- 
dain his  inferiors,  and  will  wear  their  likeness,  if  at  all,  for  a 
moment  only  when  they  are  doing  some  good  ;  at  other  times 
he  will  be  ashamed  to  play  a  part  which  he  has  never  practiced, 
nor  will  he  like  to  fashion  and  frame  himself  after  the  baser 
models ;  he  feels  that  the  serious  use  of  such  an  art  would  be 
beneath  him,  and  his  mind  revolts  at  it. 

That  is  what  I  should  expect,  he  replied. 

Then  he  will  adopt  a  mode  of  narration  such  as  we  have 
illustrated  out  of  Homer,  that  is  to  say,  his  style  will  be  both 
imitative  and  narrative ;  but  there  will  be  very  little  of  the 
former,  and  a  great  deal  of  the  latter.  Do  you  agree  ? 

Certainly,  he  said ;  that  is  the  model  which  such  a  speaker 
must  necessarily  take. 

But  another  sort  of  character  will  narrate  anything,  and  the 
worse  he  is  the  more  unscrupulous  he  will  be ;  nothing  will  be 
beneath  him :  moreover,  he  will  be  ready  to  imitate  anything, 
not  as  a  joke,  but  in  right  good  earnest,  and  before  a  large 
audience.  As  I  was  just  now  saying,  he  will  attempt  to  repre- 
sent the  roll  of  thunder,  the  rattle  of  wind  and  hail,  or  the 
creaking  of  wheels  and  pulleys,  and  the  various  sounds  of  flutes, 
pipes,  trumpets,  and  all  sorts  of  instruments  ;  also  he  will  bark 
like  a  dog,  bleat  like  a  sheep,  and  crow  like  a  cock  ;  his  entire 
art  will  consist  in  imitation  of  voice  and  gesture,  and  there  will 
be  very  little  narration. 

That,  he  said,  will  be  his  mode  of  speaking. 

These,  ihen,  are  the  two  kinds  of  style  ? 

Yes. 

And  you  would  agree  with  me  in  saying  that  one  of  them  is 
simple  and  has  but  slight  changes ;  and  if  the  harmony  and 
rhythm  are  also  chosen  for  their  simplicity,  the  result  is  that 
the  speaker,  if  he  speaks  correctly,  is  always  pretty  much  the 
same  in  style,  and  keeps  within  the  limits  of  a  single  harmony 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  447 

(for  the  changes  are  not  great),  and  also  keeps  pretty  nearly 
the  same  rhythm  ? 

That  is  quite  true,  he  said. 

Whereas  the  other  style  requires  all  sorts  of  harmonies  and 
all  sorts  of  rhythms,  if  the  music  is  to  be  expressive  of  the 
variety  and  complexity  of  the  words  ? 

That  is  also  perfectly  true,  he  replied. 

And  do  not  the  two  styles,  or  the  mixture  of  the  two,  com- 
prehend all  poetry,  and  every  form  of  expression  in  words  ? 
No  one  can  say  anything  except  in  one  or  other  of  them,  or  in 
both  together? 

They  include  all,  he  said. 

And  shall  we  receive  one  or  both  of  the  two  pure  styles  ?  or 
would  you  include  the  mixed  ? 

I  should  prefer  only  to  admit  the  pure  imitator  of  virtue. 

Yes,  I  said,  Adeimantus  ;  but  the  mixed  style  is  also  very 
charming :  and  indeed  the  pantomimic,  which  is  the  oppo- 
site of  the  one  chosen  by  you,  is  the  most  popular  style 
with  children  and  their  instructors,  and  with  the  world  in 
general. 

I  do  not  deny  it. 

But  I  suppose  you  mean  to  say  that  such  a  style  is  unsuita- 
ble to  our  State,  in  which  human  nature  is  not  twofold  or  mani- 
fold, for  one  man  plays  one  part  only? 

Yes  ;  quite  unsuitable.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  220. 
Substitution  and  succession  in  life.     See  Unity,  etc.,  the  greatest. 
Suffering,  community  of.     See  Evil,  etc. 
Suffering  evil,  less  than  doing  it.     See  Injustice. 
Suffering,  intermediate  state  between  pleasure  and.     See  Interme- 
diate, etc. 
Sufficiency  of  the  good. 

Soc.  And  is  not  and  was  not  this  a  further  point  which 

was  conceded  between  us  — 

Pro.  What  was  the  point  ? 

Soc.  That  the  good  differs  from  all  other  things  ? 

Pro.  In  what  way  ? 

Soc.  In  that  the  being  who  possesses  good  always,  every- 
where, and  in  all  things,  has  the  most  perfect  sufficiency,  and 
is  never  in  need  of  anything  else. 

Pro.  Exactly. 

Soc.  And  did  we  not  endeavor  to  make  an  ideal  division  of 
them  into  two  distinct  lives,  so  that  pleasure  was  wholly  ex 


-±48  PLATO'S  £EST  THOUGHTS. 

eluded  from  wisdom,  and  wisdom  in  like  manner  had  uo  part 
whatever  in  pleasure  ? 

Pro.  That  we  did. 

Soc.  And  did  we  think  that  either  of  them  alone  would  be 
sufficient  ? 

Pro.  Certainly  not. 

Soc,  And  if  we  erred  in  any  point,  then  let  any  one  who 
will,  take  up  the  inquiry  again,  and  assuming  memory  and  wis- 
dom and  knowledge  and  true  opinion  to  belong  to  the  same 
class,  let  him  consider  whether  he  would  desire  to  possess  or 
acquire,  I  will  not  say  pleasure,  however  abundant  or  intense, 
if  he  has  no  real  perception  that  he  is  pleased,  nor  any  con- 
sciousness of  what  he  feels,  nor  any  recollection,  however  mo- 
mentary, of  the  feeling,  —  but  would  he  desire  to  have  anything 
at  all,  if  these  were  wanting  to  him  ?  And  about  wisdom  I 
ask  the  same  question  ;  can  you  conceive  that  any  one  would 
choose  to  have  all  wisdom  absolutely  devoid  of  pleasure,  rather 
than  having  a  certain  degree  of  pleasure,  or  all  pleasure  de- 
void of  wisdom,  rather  than  having  a  certain  degree  of  wis- 
dom ? 

Pro.  Certainly  not,  Socrates;  but  why  repeat  such  ques- 
tions any  more  ?  —  Philebus,  iii.  201. 

"  Summum  Bonum"  in  the  State.     See  Evil,  the  greatest,  etc.,  and 

Good,  greatest. 

Sun  and  stars  without  soul.     See  Soul,  etc. 
Superhuman  knowledge.     See  Knowledge. 
Suspicious  character,  a. 

-  Your  cunning  and  suspicious  character,  who  has  com- 
mitted many  crimes  and  fancies  himself  to  be  a  master  in 
wickedness  when  he  is  among  men  who  are  like  himself,  is 
wonderful  in  his  precautions  against  others,  because  he  judges 
of  them  by  himself:  but  when  he  gets  into  the  company  of 
men  of  virtue,  who  have  the  experience  of  age,  he  appears  to 
be  a  fool  again,  owing  to  his  unseasonable  suspicion  ;  he  can- 
not recognize  an  honest  man,  because  he  has  nothing  in  himself 
which  will  tell  him  what  an  honest  man  is  like  ;  at  the  same 
time,  as  the  bad  are  more  numerous  than  the  good,  and  he 
meets  with  them  oftener,  he  thinks  himself  and  others  think 
him  rather  wise  than  foolish.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  234. 
Symbols,  the  starry  heavens  are.  See  Heavenly  bodies. 
Symbols,  metallic,  of  races.  See  Metallic,  etc. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  449 

Talents,  natural. 

Come,  now,  and  we  will  ask  you  a  question  :  —  when  you 

said  that  one  man  has  natural  gifts  and  another  not,  was  this 
your  meaning  ?  —  that  the  former  will  acquire  a  thing  easily 
which  the  latter  will  have  a  difficulty  in  acquiring  ;  a  little 
learning  will  lead  the  one  to  discover  a  great  deal ;  whereas 
the  other,  after  a  great  deal  of  learning  and  application,  will 
only  forget  what  he  has  learned ;  or  again,  you  may  mean,  that 
the  one  has  a  body  which  is  a  good  servant  to  his  mind,  while 
the  body  of  the  other  is  at  war  with  his  mind  — would  these 
be  the  sort  of  differences  which  distinguish  the  man  of  capac- 
ity from  the  man  who  is  wanting  in  capacity  ? 

The  existence  of  such  differences,  he  said,  will  be  univer- 
sally allowed. —  The.  Republic,  ii.  279. 
Talking,  idle.     See  Idle. 
Taste,  what  is  a  true.     See  Life,  the  nobler. 
Teachers,  skillful  and  unskillful. 

As  Lysimachus  and  Melesias,  in  their  anxiety  to  improve 

the  minds  of  their  sons,  have  asked  our  advice  about  them,  we 
too  should  tell  them  who  our  teachers  were,  if  we  say  that  we 
have  had  any,  and  prove  them  to  be  men  of  merit  and  expe- 
rienced trainers  of  the  minds  of  youth  and  really  our  teachers. 
Or  if  any  of  us  says  that  he  has  no  teacher,  but  that  he  has 
works  to  show  of  his  own  ;  then  he  should  point  out  to  them, 
what  Athenians  or  strangers,  bond  or  free,  he  is  generally  ac- 
knowledged to  have  improved.  But  if  he  can  show  neither 
teachers  nor  works,  then  he  should  tell  them  to  look  out  for 
others ;  and  not  run  the  risk  of  spoiling  the  children  of  friends, 
which  is  the  most  formidable  accusation  that  can  be  brought 
against  any  one  by  those  nearest  to  him.  As  for  myself,  Lysim- 
achus and  Melesias,  I  am  the  first  to  confess  that  I  have  never 
had  a  teacher ;  although  I  have  always  from  my  earliest  youth 
desired  to  have  one.  But  I  am  too  poor  to  give  money  to  the 
Sophists,  who  are  the  only  professors  of  moral  improvement ; 
and  to  this  day  I  have  never  been  able  to  discover  the  art  my- 
self, though  I  should  not  be  surprised  if  Nicias  or  Laches  may 
have  learned  or  discovered  it ;  for  they  are  far  wealthier  than 
I  am,  and  may  therefore  have  learnt  of  others.  And  they  are 
older  too  ;  so  that  they  have  had  more  time  to  make  the  discov- 
ery. And  I  really  believe  that  they  are  able  to  educate  a 
man ;  for  unless  they  had  been  confident  in  their  own  knowl- 
edge, they  would  never  have  sooken  thus  decidedly  of  the  pur- 
29 


450  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

suits  which  are  advantageous  or  hurtful  to  a  voun*  man.       I 

*>  O 

repose  confidence  in  both  of  them ;  but  I  am  surprised  to  find 
that  they  differ  from  one  another.  And  therefore,  Lysima- 
chus,  as  Laches  suggested  that  you  should  detain  me,  and  not 
let  me  go  until  I  answered,  I  in  turn  earnestly  beseech  and  ad- 
vise you  to  detain  Laches  and  Nicias,  and  question  them.  I 
would  have  you  say  to  them :  Socrates  avers  that  he  has 
no  knowledge  of  the  matter,  —  he  is  unable  to  decide  which 
of  you  speaks  truly  ;  neither  discoverer  nor  student  is  he  of 
anything  of  the  kind.  But  you,  Laches  and  Nicias,  should 
either  of  you  tell  us  who  is  the  most  skillful  educator  whom 
you  have  ever  known ;  and  whether  you  invented  the  art 
yourselves,  or  learned  of  another  ;  and  if  you  learned,  who 
were  your  respective  teachers,  and  who  were  their  brothers  in 
the  art ;  and  then,  if  you  are  too  much  occupied  in  politics  to 
teach  us  yourselves,  let  us  go  to  them,  and  present  them  with 
gifts,  or  make  interest  with  them,  or  both,  in  the  hope  that 
they  may  be  induced  to  take  charge  of  all  our  families,  in  or- 
der that  they  may  not  grow  up  inferior,  and  disgrace  their  an- 
cestors. But  if  you  are  yourselves  original  discoverers  in  that 
field,  give  us  some  proof  of  your  skill.  Who  are  they  who, 
having  been  inferior  persons,  have  become  under  your  care 
good  and  noble  ?  For  if  this  is  your  first  attempt  at  educa- 
tion, there  is  a  danger  that  you  may  be  trying  the  experiment 
not  on  the  "  vile  corpus  "  of  a  Carian  slave,  but  on  your  own 
sons,  or  the  sons  of  your  friend,  and  as  the  p.-overb  saya, 
"  Break  the  large  vessel  in  learning  to  make  pots.''  —  Laches, 
i.  78. 

Teachers,  lawyers  not.     See  Lawyers,  etc. 
Temperance  and  modesty.     See  Modesty,  etc. 
Temperance    and  justice.     See  Justice,  etc. 
Temperance,  harmony  of.     See  Harmony,  etc. 
Temperate  man,  the. 

Ought  not  the  rational  principle,  which  is  wise,  and  has 

the  care  of  the  whole  soul,  to  rule,  and  the  passionate  or 
spirited  principle  to  be  the  subject  and  ally  ? 

Certainly. 

And,  as  we  were  saying,  the  united  influence  of  music  and 
gymnastic  will  bring  them  into  accord,  nerving  and  sustaining 
the  reason  with  noble  words  and  lessons,  and  moderating  and 
soothing  and  civilizing  the  wildness  of  passion  with  harmony 
and  rhythm? 


PLATO'S  BEST   THOUGHT.  9.  431 

Quite  true,  he  said. 

And  these  two,  thus  nurtured  and  educated,  and  having 
learned  truly  to  know  their  own  functions,  will  rule  over  the 
concupiscent  part  of  every  man,  which  is  the  largest  and  most 
insatiable  ;  over  this  they  will  set  a  guard,  lest  waxing  great 
with  the  fullness  of  bodily  pleasures,  as  they  are  termed,  and  no 
longer  confined  to  her  own  sphere,  the  concupiscent  soul  should 
attempt  to  enslave  and  rule  those  who  are  not  her  natural-born 
subjects,  and  overturn  the  whole  life  of  man  ? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

The  two  will  be  the  defenders  of  the  whole  soul  and  the 
whole  body  against  attacks  from  without;  the  one  counseling, 
and  the  other  fighting  under  his  leader,  and  courageously  exe- 
cuting his  commands  and  counsels. 

True. 

And  he  is  to  be  deemed  courageous  in  whom  the  element  of 
spirit  holds  fast  in  pain  and  in  pleasure  the  command  of  reason 
about  which  he  ought  or  ought  not  to  fear? 

Right,  he  replied. 

And  he  is  wise  who  has  in  him  that  little  part  which  rules 
and  gives  orders  ;  that  part  being  supposed  to  have  a  knowl- 
edge of  what  is  for  the  interest  of  each  and  all  of  the  three 
other  parts  ? 

Assuredly. 

And  would  you  not  say  that  he  is  temperate  who  has  these 
same  elements  in  friendly  harmony,  in  whom  the  one  ruling 
principle  of  reason,  and  the  two  subject  ones  of  spirit  and  de- 
sire, are  equally  agreed  that  reason  ought  to  rule,  and  do  not 
rebel  ? 

Certainly,  he  said,  that  is  the  true  account  of  temperance, 
whether  in  the  State  or  individual.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  268. 
Temperate  and  intemperate  life,  the. 

Let  us  say  that  the  temperate  life  is  one  kind  of  life,  and 

the  rational  another,  and  the  courageous  another,  and  the 
healthful  another  ;  and  to  these  four  let  us  oppose  four  other 
lives.  —  the  foolish,  the  cowardly,  the  intemperate,  the  dis- 
eased. He  who  knows  the  temperate  life  will  describe  it  as  in 
all  things  gentle,  having  gentle  pa  ns  and  gentle  pleasures,  and 
placid  desires  and  loves  not  insane ;  whereas  the  intemperate 
life  is  impetuous  in  all  things,  and  has  violent  pains  and  pleas- 
ures, and  vehement  and  stinging  desires,  and  loves  utterly  in- 
sane ;  and  in  the  temperate  life  the  pleasures  exceed  the  pains 


452  PLATO'S  BES'S  THOUGHTS. 

and  in  the  intemperate  life  the  pains  exceed  the  pleasures  in 
greatness  and  number  and  intensity.  Hence  one  of  the  two 
lives  is  naturally  and  necessarily  more  pleasant  and  the  other 
more  painful,  and  he  who  would  live  pleasantly  cannot  possibly 
choose  to  live  intemperately.  And  if  this  is  true,  the  inference 
clearly  is  that  no  man  is  voluntarily  intemperate  ;  but  that  the 
whole  multitude  of  men  lack  temperance  in  their  lives,  either 
from  ignorance  or  from  want  of  self-control  or  both.  And  the 
same  holds  of  the  diseased  and  healthy  life  ;  they  both  have 
pleasures  and  pains,  but  in  health  the  pleasure  exceeds  the 
pain,  and  in  sickness  the  pain  exceeds  the  pleasure.  Now,  our 
intention  in  choosing  the  lives  is  not  that  the  painful  should 
exceed,  but  the  life  in  which  pain  is  exceeded  by  pleasure  we 
determine  to  be  the  more  pleasant  life.  And  we  should  say 
that  the  temperate  life  has  the  elements  both  of  pleasure  and 
pain  fewer  and  minuter  and  less  concentrated  than  the  intem- 
perate. —  Laws,  iv.  259. 
Temperate  man,  duty  of  the. 

And  will  not  the  temperate  man  do  what  is  proper,  both 

in  relation  to  Gods  and  to  men ;  for  he  would  not  be  temperate 
if  he  did  not  ?  Certainly  he  will  do  what  is  proper.  In  his  re- 
lation to  other  men  he  will  do  what  is  just ;  and  in  his  relation 
to  the  Gods  he  will  do  what  is  holy ;  and  he  who  does  what  is 
just  and  holy  cannot  be  other  than  just  and  holy  ?  Very  true. 
And  he  must  be  courageous,  for  the  duty  of  a  temperate  man  is 
not  to  follow  or  to  avoid  what  he  ought  not,  but  what  he  ought, 
whether  things  or  men  or  pleasures  or  pains,  and  patiently  to 
endure  when  he  ought ;  and  therefore,  Callicles,  the  temperate 
man  being  as  we  have  described,  also  just  and  courageous  and 
holy,  cannot  be  other  than  a  perfectly  good  man,  nor  can  the 
good  man  do  otherwise  than  well  and  perfectly  whatever  he 
does :  and  he  who  does  well  must  of  necessity  be  happy  and 
blessed,  and  the  evil  man  who  does  evil,  miserable :  now  this 
latter  is  he  whom  you  were  applauding  —  the  intemperate,  who 
is  the  opposite  of  the  temperate.  Such  is  my  position  which 
I  assert  to  be  true,  and  if  I  am  right  then  I  affirm  that  he 
who  desires  to  be  happy  must  pursue  and  practice  temper- 
ance and  run  away  from  intemperance  as  fast  as  his  legs  will 
carry  him  ;  he  had  better  order  his  life  so  as  not  to  need  pun- 
ishment. —  Gorgias,  iii.  98. 
Thought,  boldness  iq  See  Boldness. 
Thought  and  speech  See  Speech. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  453 

Time,  sc/ence  of.     See  Science. 

Trade,  ruining  virtue.     See  Money,  a  ruler. 

Trade,  men  of,  their  money-sting.     See  Business  men. 

Traditional  forms  adhered  to. 

Ath.   Long  ago  in  Egypt  they  appear  to  have  recognized 

the  very  principle  of  which  we  are  now  speaking  —  that  their 
young  citizens  must  be  habituated  to  forms  and  strains  of  vir- 
tue. These  they  fixed,  and  exhibited  the  patterns  of  them  iu 
their  temples  ;  and  no  painter  or  artist  is  allowed  to  innovate 
upon  them,  or  to  leave  the  traditional  forms  and  invent  new 
ones.  To  this  day,  no  alteration  is  allowed  either  in  these  arta, 
or  in  music  at  all.  And  you  will  find  that  their  works  of  art 
are  painted  or  moulded  in  the  same  forms  which  they  had  ten 
thousand  years  ago ;  this  is  literally  true  and  no  exaggeration, 
—  their  ancient  paintings  and  sculptures  are  not  a  whit  better 
or  worse  than  the  work  of  to-day,  but  are  made  with  just  the 
same  skill. 

Cle.  How  extraordinary ! 

Ath.  I  should  rather  say,  how  wise  and  worthy  of  a  great 
legislator !  I  know  that  other  things  in  Egypt  are  not  so  good. 
But  what  I  am  telling  you  about  music  is  true  and  deserving 
of  consideration,  because  showing  that  a  lawgiver  may  institute 
melodies  which  have  a  natural  truth  and  correctness  without 
any  fear  of  failure.  To  do  this,  however,  must  be  the  work 
of  God,  or  of  a  divine  person ;  in  Egypt  they  have  a  tradi- 
tion that  their  ancient  chants  are  the  composition  of  the  God- 
dess Isis.  And  therefore,  as  I  was  saying,  if  a  person  could 
only  find  in  any  way  the  natural  melodies,  he  might  confidently 
embody  them  in  a  fixed  and  legal  form.  For  the  love  of  nov- 
elty which  arises  out  of  pleasure  in  the  new,  and  weariness  of 
the  old,  has  not  strength  enough  to  vitiate  the  consecrated  song 
and  dance,  under  the  plea  that  they  have  become  antiquated. 
'At  any  rate  they  are  far  from  being  antiquated  in  Egypt. — 
Laws,  iv.  186.  , 

Transformation  of  man.     See  Man,  etc. 
Truth,  ridicule,  no  test  of.     See  Ridicule. 

Truthfulness  must  characterize  the  lover  of  learning.     See  Learn- 
ing. 

Truths,  spiritual,  uncertainty  of.     See  Spiritual,  etc. 
Tyrant,  produced  from  a  protector.     See  Protector. 
Tyrant  and  king  distinguished.     See  King. 


454  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

Unity  in  the  State.     See  State,  unity,  etc. 
Unity  and  individuality.     See  Individuality,  etc. 
Unjust,  misery  of  the.     See  Misery,  etc. 

Vanity  of  youth.     See  Self-conceit. 

Virtue,  can  it  be  taught  ?     See  Statesmen,  are  they  good  teachers  t 

The  best  and  wisest  of  our  citizens  are  unable  to  impart 

their  political  wisdom  to  others :  as,  for  example,  Pericles,  the 
father  of  these  young  men,  who  gave  them  excellent  instruc- 
tion in  all  that  could  be  learned  from  masters,  in  his  own  de- 
partment of  politics  neither  taught  them  nor  gave  them 
teachers,  but  they  were  allowed  to  wander  at  their  own  free- 
will, in  a  sort  of  hope  that  they  would  light  upon  virtue  of 
their  own  accord.  Or  take  another  example  :  There  was 
Cleinias  the  younger  brother  of  our  friend  Alcibiades,  of  whom 
this  very  same  Pericles  was  the  guardian  ;  and  he  being  in 
fact  under  the  apprehension  that  Cleinias  would  be  corrupted 
by  Alcibiades,  took  him  away,  and  placed  him  in  the  house  of 
Ariphron  to  be  educated  ;  but  before  six  months  had  elapsed, 
Ariphron  sent  him  back,  not  knowing  what  to  do  with  him. 
And  I  could  mention  numberless  other  instances  of  persons 
who  were  good  themselves,  and  never  yet  made  any  one  else 
good,  whether  friend  or  stranger.  Now  I,  Protagoras,  having 
before  me  these  examples,  am  inclined  to  think  that  virtue  can- 
not be  taught.  But  then,  again,  when  I  listen  to  your  words,  I 
am  disposed  to  waver  ;  and  I  believe  that  there  must  be  some- 
thing in  what  you  say,  because  I  know  that  you  have  great  ex- 
perience, and  learning,  and  invention.  And  I  wish  that  you 
would,  if  possible,  show  me  a  little  more  clearly  that  virtue 
can  be  taught.  —  Protagoras,  i.  120. 
Virtue,  the  gift  of  God. 

Soc.  To  sum  up  our  inquiry,  —  the  result  seems  to  be,  if 

we  are  at  all  right  in  our  view,  that  virtue  is  neither  naturak 
nor  acquired,  but  an  instinct  given  by  God  to  the  virtuous. 
Nor  is  the  instinct  accompanied  by  reason,  unless  there  may  be 
supposed  to  be  among  statesmen  any  one  who  is  also  the  edu- 
cator of  statesmen.  And  if  there  be  such  an  one,  he  may  be 
said  to  be  among  the  living  what  Tiresias  was  among  the  dead, 
who  "  alone,"  according  to  Homer,  "  of  those  in  the  world 

'  o  * 

below  has  understanding  ;  but  the  rest  flit  as  shades  ; "  and 
he  and  his  virtue  in  like  manner  will  be  a  reality  among 
shadows. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  455 

Men.  That  is  excellent,  Socrates. 

Soc.  Then,  Meno,  the  conclusion  is   that  virtue  comes  to  the 
virtuous  by  the  gift  of  God.  —  Meno,  i.  276. 
Virtue,  the  basis  and  bond  of  love.     See  Love,  etc. 
Virtue  and  justice,  rewards  of.     See  Justice,  etc. 
Virtue,  not  by  chance,  but  order. 

The  virtue  of  each  thing,  whether  body  or  soul,  instru- 
ment or  creature,  when  given  to  them  in  the  best  way  comes  to 
them  not  by  chance  but  as  the  result  of  the  order  and  truth 
and  art  which  are  imparted  to  them.  Am  I  not  right?  I  main- 
tain that  I  am.  And  is  not  the  virtue  of  each  thing  dependent 
on  order  or  arrangement?  Yes,  I  say.  And  that  which 
makes  a  thing  good  is  the  proper  order  inhering  in  each  thing? 
That  is  my  view.  And  is  not  the  soul  which  has  an  order  of 
her  own  better  than  that  which  has  no  order  of  her  own  ? 
Certainly.  —  Gorgias,  iii.  98. 

Virtue,  laws  answering  to.     See  Laics  answering  to,  etc. 
Virtue,  the  law-giver's  aim. 

Ath.   Remember,  my  good  friend,  what  I  said  at  first  about 

the  Cretan  laws,  that  they  looked  to  one  thing  only,  and  this, 
as  you  both  agreed,  was  war  ;  and  I  replied  that  such  laws,  in 
so  far  as  they  tended  to  promote  virtue,  were  good :  but  in 
that  they  regarded  a  part  only,  and  not  the  whole  of  virtue,  I 
disapproved  of  them.  And  now  I  hope  that  you  in  your  turn 
will  follow  and  watch  me  if  I  legislate  with  a  view  to  anything 
but  virtue,  or  only  with  a  view  to  a  part  of  virtue.  For  I 
consider  that  the  true  law-giver,  like  an  archer,  aims  only  at 
that  on  which  some  eternal  beauty  is  always  attending,  and  dis- 
misses everything  else,  whether  wealth  or  any  other  benefit, 
when  separated  from  virtue.  —  Laws,  iv.  233. 
Voice,  inner.  See  Inner. 

War,  women,  and  children. 

You  agree  then,  I  said,  that  men  and  women  are  to  have 

a  common  way  of  life  such  as  we  have  described  —  common 
education,  common  children  ;  and  they  are  to  watch  over  the 
citizens  in  common  whether  abiding  in  the  city  or  going  out  to 
war ;  they  are  to  guard  together,  and  to  hunt  together  like 
dogs  ;  and  always  and  in  all  things  women  are  to  share  with 
the  men  ?  And  in  so  doing  they  will  act  for  the  best  and  will 
not  violate,  but  preserve  the  natural  relation  of  the  sexes. 
I  agree  with  you,  he  replied. 


456  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

The  inquiry,  I  said,  has  yet  to  be  made,  whether  such  & 
community  will  be  found  possible  —  as  among  other  animals  so 
also  among  men  —  and  if  possible,  in  what  way  possible  ? 

That,  he  said,  is  just  the  question  which  I  was  going  to  ask. 

There  is  no  difficulty  I  said,  in  seeing  how  war  will  be 
carried  on  by  them. 

How? 

Why,  of  course  they  will  go  on  expeditions  together  ;  and 
will  take  with  them  any  of  their  children  who  are  strong 
enough,  that,  like  the  children  of  artisans  in  general,  they  may 
look  on  at  the  work,  which  they  will  have  to  do  when  they 
are  grown  up  ;  and  besides  looking  on  they  will  be  able  to 
help  and  be  of  use  in  war,  and  to  wait  upon  their  fathers  and 
mothers.  Did  you  never  observe  in  the  arts  how  the  potters' 
boys  look  on  and  help,  long  before  they  touch  the  wheel  ? 

Certainly. 

And  shall  potters  be  more  careful  than  our  guardians  in  ed- 
ucating their  children  and  giving  them  the  opportunity  of  see- 
ing and  practicing  their  duties  ? 

The  notion  would  be  ridiculous,  he  said. 

There  is  also  the  effect  on  the  parents,  with  whom,  as  with 
other  animals,  the  presence  of  their  cubs  will  be  the  greatest 
incentive  to  valor. 

That  is  quite  true,  Socrates  ;  and  yet  if  they  are  defeated 
which  may  often  happen  in  war,  how  great  the  danger  is  !  the 
children  will  be  lost  as  well  as  their  parents,  and  the  State  will 
never  recover. 

True,  I  said ;  but  would  you  never  allow  them  to  run  any  risk? 

I  am  far  from  saying  that. 

Well,  but  if  they  are  ever  to  run  a  risk  should  they  not  run 
the  risk  when  there  is  a  chance  of  their  improvement  ? 

Clearly.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  293. 
"War  and  discord.      See  Discord. 
War,  geometry  in.     See  Geometry. 
War  of  Gods  and  giants.     See  Essence,  etc. 
War,  two  kinds  of. 

Ath.  Come,  now,  and  let  us  all  join  in  asking  this  ques- 
tion of  Tyrtaeus :  O  most  divine  poet,  we  will  say  to  him,  thp 
excellent  praise  which  you  have  bestowed  on  those  who  excej 
in  war  sufficiently  proves  that  you  are  wise  and  good,  and  ] 
and  Megillus  and  Cleinias  of  Cnosus  do.  as  I  believe,  entirely 
agree  with  you.  But  we  should  like  to  be  quite  sure  th/it  we 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  4fT 

are  speaking  of  the  same  men  ;  tell  us,  then,  do  you  agree  with 
us  in  thinking  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  war  ;  or  what  would 
you  say  ?  A  far  inferior  man  to  Tyrtaeus  would  have  no  diffi- 
culty in  replying  quite  truly,  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  war. 
—  one  which  is  universally  called  civil  war  and  is,  as  we  were 
just  now  saying,  of  all  wars  the  worst ;  the  other,  as  we  should 
all  admit,  in  which  we  fall  out  with  other  nations  who  are  of  a 
different  race,  is  a  far  milder  form  of  warfare. 
Cle.  Certainly,  far  milder. 

Ath.  Well,  now,  when  you  praise  and  blame  war  in  this 
high-flown  strain,  whom  are  you  praising  or  blaming,  and  to 
which  kind  of  war  are  you  referring  ?  I  suppose  that  you 
must  mean  foreign  war,  if  I  am  to  judge  from  expressions  of 
yours  in  which  you  say  that  you  abominate  those  — 

"  Who  refuse  to  look  upon  fields  of  blood,  and  will  not  draw  near  and  strike  at 
their  enemies.1' 

And  we  shall  naturally  go  on  to  say  to  him,  —  You,  Tyrtaeus, 
certainly  appear  to  praise  those  who  distinguish  themselves  in 
external  and  foreign  war  ;  and  he  must  admit  this. 

Cle.  Certainly.  —  Laws,  iv.  160. 
War,  expeditions  of. 

Now  for  expeditions  of  war  much  consideration  and  manj 

laws  are  required  ;  the  great  principle  of  all  is  that  no  one  of 
either  sex  should  be  without  a  commander ;  nor  should  the 
mind  of  any  one  be  accustomed  to  do  anything  either  in  jest 
or  earnest  of  his  own  motion,  but  in  war  and  in  peace  he 
should  look  to  and  follow  his  leader,  and  in  the  least  things  be 
under  his  guidance ;  for  example,  he  should  stand  or  move,  or 
exercise,  or  wash,  or  take  his  meals,  or  get  up  in  the  night  to 
keep  guard  and  deliver  messages  when  he  is  bidden ;  and  in 
the  hour  of  danger  he  should  not  pursue  and  not  retreat  ex- 
cept by  order  of  his  superior  ;  and  in  a  word,  not  teach  the 
soul  or  accustom  her  to  know  or  understand  how  to  do  any- 
thing apart  from  others.  Of  all  soldiers  the  life  should  be  ir, 
common  and  together ;  there  neither  is  nor  ever  will  be  a 

O  w 

higher,  or  better,  or  more  scientific  principle  than  this  for  the 
attainment  of  salvation  and  victory  in  war.  And  from  youth 
upwards  we  ought  to  practice  this  habit  of  commanding  others, 
and  of  being  commanded  by  others  ;  anarchy  should  have  no 
place  in  the  life  of  man  or  of  the  beasts  who  are  subject  to 
man.  I  may  add  that  all  dances  ought  to  be  performed  with  a 
view  to  military  excellence,  and  agility  and  ease  should  be  cul- 


458  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS 

tivated  with  a  similar  view  ;  and  also  endurance  of  the  want 
of  meats  and  drinks,  and  winter  cold  and  summer  heat,  and 
hard  couches  ;  and,  above  all,  care  should  be  taken  not  to  destroy 
the  natural  qualities  of  the  head  and  the  feet  by  surrounding 
them  with  extraneous  coverings,  and  so  hindering  their  natural 
growth  of  hair  and  soles.  For  these  are  the  extremities,  and 
of  all  the  parts  of  the  body,  whether  they  are  preserved  or  not 
is  of  the  greatest  consequence  ;  the  one  is  the  servant  of  the 
whole  body  and  the  other  the  master  in  whom  all  the  ruling 
senses  are  by  nature  set.  Let  the  young  man,  when  I  say 
this,  imagine  that  he  hears  the  praises  of  the  military  life  ; 
and  the  law  shall  be  as  follows :  He  shall  serve  in  war  who  is 
enrolled  or  appointed  to  some  special  service,  and  if  any  one 
wrongly  absents  himself,  and  without  the  leave  of  the  generals, 
he  shall  be  indicted  before  the  military  commanders  for  fail- 
ure of  service  when  the  army  comes  home.  —  Laws,  iv.  452. 
"Warriors,  gentleness  of.  See  Gentleness,  etc. 
Warfare,  naval.  See  Minos. 
Wars,  civil,  how  arising. 

When  a  young  man  who  has  been  brought  up  as  we  are  just 

now  describing,  in  a  vulgar  and  miserly  way,  has  tasted  drones' 
honey  and  has  come  to  associate  with  fierce  and  dangerous  nat- 
ures who  are  able  to  provide  for  him  all  sorts  of  refinements 
and  varieties  of  pleasure,  —  then,  as  you  may  imagine,  the 
change  will  begin  of  the  oligarchical  principle  within  him  into 
the  democratical. 

Inevitably. 

And  as  in  the  city  like  was  helping  like,  and  the  change 
was  effected  by  an  alliance  from  without  assisting  one  division 
of  the  citizens,  so  the  young  man  also  changes  by  a  class  of 
desires  from  without  assisting  the  unsatisfied  desires  within  him, 
that  which  is  akin  and  alike  again  helping  that  which  is  akin 
and  alike. 

Certainly. 

And  if  there  be  any  ally  which  aids  the  oligarchical  princi- 
ple within  him,  whether  the  influence  of  friends  or  kindred,  ad- 
vising or  rebuking  him,  then  there  arises  a  faction  and  an  op- 
posite faction,  and  the  result  is  a  civil  war. 

It  must  be  so.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  388. 
Wealth  and  poverty  equally  deteriorating. 

There  seem  to  be  two  causes  of  the  deterioration  of  the 

arts. 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  459 

What  are  they  ? 

"Wealth,  I  said,  and  poverty. 

How  do  they  act  ? 

The  process  at  as  follows :  When  a  potter  becomes  rich  he 
no  longer  takes  the  same  pains  with  his  art  ? 

Certainly  not. 

He  grows  more  and  more  indolent  and  careless  ? 

Very  true. 

And  the  result  is  that  he  becomes  a  worse  potter  ? 

Yes  ;  he  greatly  deteriorates. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  he  has  no  money,  and  is  unable 
to  buy  tools  or  instruments,  he  will  not  work  equally  well  him- 
self, nor  will  he  teach  his  sons  or  apprentices  to  work  equally 
well. 

Certainly  not. 

Then  workmen,  and  also  their  works,  are  apt  to  degenerate 
under  the  influence  both  of  poverty  and  of  wealth  ? 

That  is  evident. 

Here,  then,  is  a  discovery  of  new  evils,  I  said,  which  the 
guardians  will  have  to  watch,  or  they  will  creep  into  the  city 
unobserved. 

What  evils  ? 

Wealth,  I  said,  and  poverty  ;  for  the  one  is  the  parent  of 
luxury  and  indolence,  and  the  other  of  meanness  and  vicious- 
ness,  and  both  of  discontent.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  245. 
Wickedness,  the  road  to. 

Ath.  I  should  wish  the  citizen  to  be  as  receptive  of  virtue 

as  possible  ;  this  will  surely  be  the  aim  of  the  legislator  in  all 
his  laws  is  evident. 

Cle.  Certainly. 

Ath.  What  I  have  been  proposing  appears  to  me  to  have 
some  use ;  for  a  person  will  listen  with  more  gentleness  and 
good-will  to  the  precepts  addressed  to  him  by  the  legislator, 
when  his  soul  is  not  altogether  unprepared  to  receive  them. 
Even  a  little  done  in  the  way  of  conciliation  gains  his  ear,  and 
is  always  worth  having.  For  there  is  no  great  inclination  or 
readiness  on  the  part  of  mankind  to  be  made  as  good,  or  as 
quickly  good,  as  possible.  The  case  of  the  many  proves  the 
wisdom  of  Hesiod,  who  says  that  the  road  to  wickedness  is 
smooth  and  very  short,  and  there  is  no  need  of  perspiring :  — 

"  But  before  virtue  the  immortal  Gods  have  placed  the  cv/eat  of 
labor,  and  long  and  steep  is  the  way  thither,  and  rugged  at  first 


460  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

but  when  you  have  reached  the  top,  then,  however  difficult,  it  be- 
comes easy. 

Cle.  Yes ;  and  he  certainly  speaks  well.  —  Laws,  iv.  246. 
Wine,  divers  effect  of. 

Soc.  The  wine  which  I  drink  when   I  am  in  health,  ap- 
pears sweet  and  pleasant  to  me  ? 

Theaet.  True. 

Soc.  For,  as  has  been  already  acknowledged,  the  patient 
and  agent  meet  together  and  produce  sweetness  and  a  percep- 
tion of  sweetness,  which  are  in  simultaneous  motion,  and  the 
perception  which  comes  from  the  patient  makes  the  tongue 
percipient,  and  the  quality  of  sweetness  which  arises  out  of 
and  is  moving  about  the  wine,  makes  the  wine  both  to  be  and 
to  appear  sweet  to  the  healthy  tongue. 

Theaet.   Certainly ;  that  has  been  already  acknowledged. 

Soc.  But  when  I  am  sick,  the  wine  really  acts  upon  me  as 
if  I  were  another  and  a  different  person  ? 

Theaet.  Yes. 

Soc.  The  combination  of  the  draught  of  wine,  and  the  Soc- 
rates who  is  sick,  produces  quite  another  result  which  is  the 
sensation  of  bitterness  in  the  tongue,  and  the  motion  and  crea- 
tion of  bitterness  in  the  wine,  which  becomes  not  bitterness  but 
bitter ;  as  I  myself  become  not  perception  but  percipient  ? 

Theaet.  True.  —  Theaetetus,  iii.  360. 
Wine,  forbidden. 

Aih.  I  have  first  to  add  a  crown  to  my  discourse  about 

drink. 

Cle.  What  more  would  you  say  ? 

Ath.  I  should  say  that  if  a  city  seriously  means  to  adopt  this 
practice  of  drinking,  under  due  regulation  and  with  a  view  to 
the  enforcement  of  temperance,  and  in  like  manner,  and  on 
the  same  principle,  will  allow  of  other  pleasures,  designing  to 
gain  the  victory  over  them  —  in  this  way  all  of  them  may  be 
used.  But  if  the  State  makes  drinking  an  amusement  only,  and 
whoever  likes  may  drink  whenever  he  likes,  and  with  whom  he 
likes,  and  add  to  this  any  other  indulgences,  I  shall  never  agree 
or  allow  that  this  city  or  this  man  should  adopt  such  a  usage  of 
drinking.  I  would  go  farther  than  the  Cretans  and  Lacedae- 
monians, and  am  disposed  rather  to  the  law  of  the  Carthagin- 
ians, that  no  one  while  he  is  on  a  campaign  should  be  allowed 
to  taste  wine  at  all;  but  I  would  say  that  he  should  drink 
water  during  all  that  time,  and  that  in  the  city  no  slave,  male 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  461 

or  female,  should  ever  d'ink  wine  ;  and  that  no  rulers  should 
drink  during  their  yeur  of  office,  nor  pilots  of  vessels,  nor 
judges  while  on  duty  should  taste  wine  at  all ;  nor  any  one 
who  is  going  to  hold  a  consultation  about  any  matter  of  impor- 
tance, nor  in  the  daytime  at  all,  unless  in  consequence  of  exer- 
cise or  as  medicine :  nor  again  at  night,  when  any  one,  either 
man  or  woman,  is  minded  to  get  children.  There  are  number- 
less other  cases,  also,  in  which  those  who  have  good  sense  and 
good  laws  ought  not  to  drink  wine,  so  that  if  what  I  say  is 
true,  no  city  will  need  many  vineyards.  Their  husbandry  and 
their  way  of  life  in  general  will  follow  an  appointed  order,  and 
their  cultivation  of  the  vine  will  be  the  most  limited  and  mod- 
erate of  their  employments.  And  this,  Stranger,  shall  be  the 
crown  of  my  discourse  about  wine,  if  you  agree. 

Cle.  Excellent :  we  agree.  —  Laws,  iv.  203. 
Wine-drinking,  a  bad  practice. 

Socrates  took  his  place  on  the  couch  and  supped  with  the 

rest ;  and  then  libations  were  offered,  and  after  a  hymn  had 
been  sung  to  the  God,  and  there  had  been  the  usual  ceremo- 
nies, they  were  about  to  commence  drinking  when  Pausanias 
said :  And  now  my  friends,  how  can  we  drink  with  least  injury 
to  ourselves?  I  can  assure  you  that  I  feel  severely  the  effect  of 
yesterday's  potations  and  must  have  time  to  recover,  and  I 
suspect  that  most  of  you  are  in  the  same  predicament,  for  you 
were  of  the  party  yesterday.  Consider  this.  He  would  there- 
fore ask,  How  can  the  drinking  be  made  easiest  ? 

I  entirely  agree,  said  Aristophanes,  that  we  should,  by  all 
means,  avoid  hard  drinking,  for  I  was  myself  one  of  those  who 
were  yesterday  drowned  in  drink. 

I  think  that  you  are  right,  said  Eryximachus  the  son  of 
Acumenus  ;  but  I  should  like  to  hear  one  other  person  speak. 
What  are  the  inclinations  of  our  host  ? 

I  am  not  able  to  drink,  said  Agathon. 

Then,  said  Eryximachus,  the  weak  heads  like  myself,  Aris- 
todemus,  Phaedrus,  and  others  who  never  can  drink,  are  for- 
tunate in  finding  that  the  stronger  ones  are  not  in  a  drinking 
mood.  (I  do  not  include  Socrates,  who  is  able 'either  to  drink 
or  to  abstain,  and  will  not  mind  whichever  we  do.)  Well,  as 
none  of  the  company  seem  disposed  to  drink  much,  I  may  bo 
forgiven  for  saying,  as  a  physician,  that  drinking  deep  is  a  bad 
practice,  which  I  never  follow  if  I  can  help,  and  certainly  do 
not,  recommend  to  another,  least  of  all  to  any  one  who  sf.ill 
feels  the  effects  of  yesterday's  carouse. 


462  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

I  always  do  what  you  advise,  and  especially  what  you  pre- 
scribe as  a  physician,  rejoined  Phaedrus  the  Myrrhinusian,  and 
the  rest  of  the  company,  if  they  are  wise,  will  do  the  same. 

All  agreed  that  drinking  was  not  to  be  the  order  of  the  day. 
—  The  Syposium,  i.  471. 
"Wise  and  just  soul.     See  Just,  etc. 
Wisdom,  as  differing  from  other  sciences. 

I  want  to  know  what  is  that  which  is  not  wisdom,  and  of 

which  wisdom  is  the  science  ? 

That  is  precisely  the  old  error,  Socrates,  he  said.  You  come 
asking  in  what  wisdom  differs  from  the  other  sciences  ;  and  then 
you  try  to  discover  some  respect  in  which  they  are  alike  :  but 
they  are  not,  for  all  the  other  sciences  are  of  something  else, 
and  not  of  themselves  ;  wisdom  alone  is  a  science  of  other 
sciences,  and  of  itself.  And  of  this,  as  I  believe,  you  are  very 
well  aware ;  and  that  you  are  only  doing  what  you  denied  that 
you  were  doing  just  now,  trying  to  refute  me,  instead  of  pursu- 
ing the  argument. 

And  what  if  I  am  ?  How  can  you  think  that  I  have  any 
other  motive  in  refuting  you  but  what  I  should  have  in  exam- 
ining into  myself  ?  which  motive  would  be  just  a  fear  of  my 
unconsciously  fancying  that  I  knew  something  of  which  I  was 
ignorant.  And  at  this  moment  I  pursue  the  argument  chiefly 
for  my  own  sake,  and  perhaps  in  some  degree  also  for  the  sake 
of  my  other  friends.  For  is  not  the  discovery  of  things  a« 
they  truly  are  a  common  good  to  all  mankind  ? 

Yes,  certainly,  Socrates,  he  said. 

Then,  I  said,  be  cheerful,  sweet  sir,  and  give  your  opinion  in 
answer  to  the  question  which  I  asked,  never  minding  whether 
Critias  or  Socrates  is  the  person  refuted ;  attend  only  to  the 
argument,  and  see  what  will  come  of  the  refutation. 

I  think  that  you  are  right,  he  replied ;  and  I  will  do  as  you 
say. 

Tell  me,  then,  I  said,  what  you  mean  to  affirm  about  wisdom. 

I  mean,  he  said,  that  wisdom  is  the  only  science  which  is  the 
science  of  itself  and  of  the  other  sciences  as  well. 

But  the  science  of  science,  I  said,  will  also  be  the  science  of 
tfie  absence  of  science. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Then  the  wise  or  temperate  man,  and  he  only,  will  know 
himself,  and  be  able  to  examine  what  he  knows  or  does  not 
know,  and  see  what  others  know,  and  think  that  they  know  and 


PLATO' 'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  463 

do  really  know ;  and  what  they  do  not  know,  and  fancy  that 
they  know,  when  they  do  not.  No  other  person  will  be  able 
to  do  this.  And  this  is  the  state  and  virtue  of  wisdom,  or 
temperance,  and  self-knowledge,  which  is  just  knowing  what 
a  man  knows,  and  what  he  does  not  know.  That  is  your 
view  ? 

Yes,  he  said  —  Charmides,  i.  21. 
Wisdom,  advantages  of. 

What  profit,  Critias,  I  said,  is  there  any  longer  in  wisdom 

or  temperance  which  yet  remains,  if  this  is  wisdom  ?  If,  indeed, 
as  we  were  supposing  at  first,  the  wise  man  had  been  able  to 
distinguish  what  he  knew  and  did  not  know,  and  that  he  knew 
the  one  and  did  not  know  the  other,  and  to  recognize  a  similar 
faculty  of  discernment  in  others,  there  would  certainly  have 
been  a  great  advantage  in  being  wise,  for  then  we  should  never 
have  made  a  mistake,  but  have  passed  through  life  the  unerring 
guides  of  ourselves  and  of  those  who  were  under  us  ;  and  we 
should  not  have  attempted  to  do  what  we  did  not  know,  but  we 
should  have  found  out  those  who  knew,  and  confided  in  them  ; 
nor  should  we  have  allowed  those  who  were  under  us  to  do 
anything  which  they  were  not  likely  to  do  well ;  and  they 
would  be  likely  to  do  well  just  that  of  which  they  had  knowl- 
edge ;  and  the  house  or  state  which  was  ordered  or  administered 
under  the  guidance  of  wisdom,  and  everything  else  of  which 
wisdom  was  the  lord,  would  have  been  well  ordered;  for  truth 
guiding,  and  error  having  been  expelled,  in  all  their  doings, 
men  would  have  done  well,  and  would  have  been  happy.  Was 
not  this,  Critias,  what  we  spoke  of  as  the  great  advantage  of 
wisdom  —  to  know  what  is  known  and  what  is  unknown  to  us  ? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

And  now  you  perceive,  I  said,  that  no  such  science  is  to  be 
found  anywhere. 

I  perceive,  he  said. 

May  we  assume,  then,  I  said,  that  wisdom,  viewed  in  this 
new  light  merely  as  a  knowledge  of  knowledge  and  ignorance, 
has  this  advantage  —  that  he  who  possesses  such  knowledge 
will  more  easily  learn  anything  which  he  learns ;  and  that 
everything  will  be  clearer  to  him,  because,  in  addition  to  the. 
knowledge  of  individuals,  he  sees  the  science,  and  this  also  will 
better  enable  him  to  test  the  knowledge  which  others  have  of 
what  he  knows  himself ;  whereas  the  inquirer  who  is  without 
tins  knowledge  may  be  supposed  to  have  a  feebler  and  weaker 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

insight  ?  Are  not  these,  my  friend,  the  real  advantages  which 
are  to  be  gained  from  Wisdom  ?  And  are  not  we  looking  and 

o  o 

seeking  after  something  more  than  is  to  be  found  in  her  ? 

That  is  very  likely,  he  said.  —  Charmides,  i.  28. 
Wisdom,  the  sway  of. 

Let  us  suppose  that  wisdom  is  such  as  we  are  now  defin- 
ing, and  that  she  has  absolute  sway  over  us  ;  then  each  action 
will  be  done  according  to  the  arts  or  sciences,  and  no  one  pro- 
fessing to  be  a  pilot  when  he  is  not,  or  any  physician  or  gen- 
eral, or  any  one  else  pretending  to  know  matters  of  which  he 
is  ignorant,  will  deceive  or  elude  us  ;  our  health  will  be  im- 
proved ;  our  safety  at  sea,  and  also  in  battle,  will  be  assured  ; 
our  coats  and  shoes,  and  all  other  instruments  and  implements 
will  be  well  made,  because  the  workmen  will  be  good  and  true. 
Aye,  and  if  you  please,  you  may  suppose  that  prophecy,  which 
is  the  knowledge  of  the  future,  will  be  under  the  control  of 
Wisdom,  and  that  she  will  deter  deceivers  and  set  up  the  true 
prophet  in  their  place  as  the  revealer  of  the  future.  Now  I 
qiiite  agree  that  mankind,  thus  provided,  would  live  and  act 
according  to  knowledge,  for  wisdom  would  watch  and  prevent 
ignorance  from  intruding  on  us.  But  we  have  not  as  yet  dis- 
covered why,  because  we  act  according  to  knowledge,  we  act 
well  and  are  happy,  my  dear  Critias. 

Yet  I  think,  he  replied,  that  if  you  discard  knowledge  you 
will  hardly  find  the  crown  of  happiness  in   anything  else.  — 
Cfiarmides,  i.  30. 
Wisdom,  a  means  of  good. 

You  perceive  that  in  things  which  we  know  every  one 

will  trust  us,  —  Hellenes  and  barbarians,  men  and  women,  — 
and  we  may  do  as  we  please  about  them,  and  no  one  will  like 
to  interfere  with  us  ;  we  shall  be  free,  and  masters  of  others  ; 
and  these  things  will  be  really  ours,  for  we  shall  be  benefited 
by  them.  But  in  things  of  which  we  have  no  understanding, 
no  one  will  trust  us  to  do  as  seems  good  to  us  —  they  will 
hinder  us  as  far  as  they  can  ;  and  not  only  strangers,  but  father 
and  mother,  and  the  friend,  if  there  be  one,  who  is  dearer  still, 
will  also  hinder  us  ;  and  we  shall  be  subject  to  others ;  and 
these  things  will  not  be  ours,  for  we  shall  not  be  benefited  by 
them.  Do  you  admit  that? 

He  assented. 

And  shall  we  be  friends  to  others  ?  and  will  any  others  love 
us,  in  as  far  as  we  are  useless  to  them  ? 


PLATO'S  BEbT  THOUGHTS.  406 

Certainly  not. 

Neither  can  your  father  or  mother  love  you,  nor  can  any- 
body love  anybody  else,  in  as  far  as  they  are  useless  to  them  ? 

No. 

And  therefore,  my  boy,  if  you  are  wise,  all  men  will  be 
youv  friends  and  kindred,  for  you  will  be  useful  and  good  ;  but 
if  you  are  not  wise,  neither  father,  nor  mother,  nor  kindred, 
nor  any  one  else,  will  be  your  friends.  And  in  matters  of 
which  you  have  as  yet  no  knowledge  can  you  have  any  conceit 
of  knowledge  ? 

That  is  impossible,  he  replied. 

And  you,  Lysis,  if  you  require  a  teacher,  have  not  as  yet 
attained  to  wisdom. 

True. 

And  therefore  you  ai«  act  conceited,  having  nothing  of  which 
to  be  conceited  ? 

Indeed,  Socrates,  I  think  not.  —  Lysis,  i.  48. 
Wisdom  makes  men  fortunate. 

In  what  company  shall  we  find  a  place  for  wisdom  — 

among  the  goods  or  not  ? 

Among  the  goods. 

And  now,  I  said,  think  whether  we  have  left  out  any  consid- 
erable goods. 

I  do  not  think  that  we  have,  said  Cleinias. 

Upon  recollection,  I  said,  indeed  I  am  afraid  that  we  have 
left  out  the  greatest  of  them  all. 

What  is  that  ?  he  asked. 

Fortune,  Cleinias,  I  replied  ;  which  all,  even  the  most  fool- 
ish, admit  to  be  the  greatest  of  goods. 

True,  he  said. 

On  second  thoughts,  I  added,  how  narrowly,  O  son  of  Axio 
chus,  have  you  and  I  escaped  making  a  laughing-stock  of  our- 
selves to  the  strangers. 

Why  do  you  say  that? 

Why,  because  we  have  already  spoken  of  fortune,  and  ar<» 
but  repeating  ourselves. 

What  do  you  mean  ? 

I  mean  that  there  is  something  ridiculous  in  putting  fortune 
again  forward,  arid  saying  the  same  thing  twice  over. 

He  asked  what  was  the  meaning  of  this,  and  I  replied : 
Surely  wisdom  is  good  fortune  ;  even  a  child  may  know  that. 

The  simple-minded  youth  was  amazed  ;  and,  observing  this, 
30 


466  PLATO'S  BE3T  THOUGH!  1. 

I  said  to  him  :  Do  you  not  know,  Cleinias,  that  flute-players 
are  most  fortunate  and  successful  in  performing  on  the  flute  ? 

He  assented. 

And  are  not  the  scribes  most  fortunate  in  writing  and  read 
ing  letters  ? 

Certainly. 

Amid  the  dangers  of  the  sea,  again,  are  any  more  fortunate 
on  the  whole  than  wise  pilots  ? 

None,  certainly. 

And  if  you  were  engaged  in  war,  in  whose  company  would 
you  rather  take  the  risk  —  in  company  with  a  wise  general,  or 
with  a  foolish  one  ? 

With  a  wise  one. 

And  if  you  were  ill,  whom  would  you  rather  have  as  a  com- 
panion in  a  dangerous  illness  —  a  wise  physician,  or  an  igno- 
rant one  ? 

A  wise  one. 

You  think,  I  said,  that  to  act  with  a  wise  man  is  more  for- 
tunate than  to  act  with  an  ignorant  one  ? 

He  assented. 

Then  wisdom  always  makes  men  fortunate  :  for  by  wisdom 
no  man  would  ever  err,  and  therefore  he  must  act  rightly  and 
succeed,  or  his  wisdom  would  be  wisdom  no  longer. 

We  contrived  at  last  somehow  to  agree  in  a  general  conclu- 
sion, that  he  who  had  wisdom  had  no  need  of  fortune.  I  then 
recalled  to  his  mind  the  previous  state  of  the  question.  You 
remember,  I  said,  our  making  the  admission  that  we  should  be 
happy  and  fortunate  if  many  good  things  were  present  with 
us? 

He  assented. 

And  should  we  be  happy  by  reason  of  the  presence  of  good 
things,  if  they  profited  us  not,  or  if  they  profited  us  ? 

If  they  profited  us,  he  said. 

And  would  they  profit  us,  if  we  only  had  them  and  did  not 
use  them  ?  For  example,  if  we  had  a  great  deal  of  food  and 
did  not  eat,  or  a  great  deal  of  drink  and  did  not  drink,  should 
we  be  profited  ? 

Certainly  not,  he  said.  —  Euthydemus,  i.  181. 
Wisdom  through  the  touch. 

How  I  wish,  said  Socrates,  taking  his  place  as  he  was  de- 
sired, that  wisdom  could  be  infused  by  touch,  out  of  the  fuller 
into  the  emptier  man,  like  water  which  is  poured  through  wool 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  467 

out  of  a  fuller  vessel  into  an  emptier  one ;  in  that  case  how 
much  I  should  prize  sitting  by  you !  For  you  would  have 
filled  me  full  of  much  and  beautiful  wisdom,  in  comparison  of 
which  my  own  is  of  a  very  mean  and  questionable  sort,  no 
better  than  a  dream  ;  but  yours  is  bright  and  only  beginning, 
and  was  manifested  forth  in  all  the  splendor  of  youth  the  day 
before  yesterday,  in  the  presence  of  more  than  thirty  thousand 
Hellenes. 

You  are  mocking,  Socrates,  said  Agathon,  and  ere  long  you 
and  I  will  have  to  settle  who  bears  off  the  palm  of  wisdom.  — 
The  Symposium,  i.  471. 
Wise  endurance.     See  Courage. 
Wit,  no  bar  to  progress.     See  Ridicule,  etc. 
Wives,  community  of.     See  Community,  etc. 
Woman,  only  a  lesser  man. 

Can  you   mention  any  pursuit  of  man  in  which  the  male 

sex  has  not  all  these  qualities  in  a  far  higher  degree  than  the 
female  ?  Need  I  waste  time  in  speaking  of  the  art  of  weav- 
ing, and  the  management  of  pancakes  and  preserves,  in  which 
womankind  does  really  appear  to  be  great,  and  in  which  for 
her  to  be  beaten  is  the  most  absurd  of  all  things  ? 

You  are  quite  right,  he  replied,  in  maintaining  the  general 
inferiority  of  the  female  sex  ;  at  the  same  time  many  women 
are  in  many  things  superior  to  many  men,  though  speaking 
generally,  what  you  say  is  true. 

And  so,  I  said,  my  friend,  in  the  administration  of  a  State 
neither  a  woman  as  a  woman,  nor  a  man  as  a  man  has  any 
special  function,  but  the  gifts  of  nature  are  equally  diffused  in 
both  sexes ;  all  the  pursuits  of  men  are  the  pursuits  of  women 
also,  and  in  all  of  them  a  woman  is  only  a  weaker  man. 

Very  true.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  280. 
Woman,  ambitious.     See  Ambitious,  etc. 
Women  and  war.     See  War. 
Wonder  is  philosophic. 

—  Soc.  I  see,  my  dear  Theaetetus,  that  Theodorus    had  a 
true  insight  into  your  nature  when  he  said  that  you  were  a 
philosopher,  for  wonder  is  the  feeling  of   a  philosopher  and 
philosophy  begins  in  wonder ;  he  was  not  a  bad  genealogist  who 
said  that  Iris,  the  messenger  of  heaven,  is  the  child  c  f  Thaumag 
(wonder). —  Theaetetus,  u\.  356. 
Words,  a  lie  in,  an  imitation. 
7.  do  not  comprehend  you. 


468  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

The  reason  is  I  replied,  that  you  attribute  some  grand  mean- 
ing to  me ;  but  I  am  only  saying  that  deception,  or  being  de- 
ceived or  uninformed  about  realities  in  the  highest  faculty, 
which  is  the  soul,  and  in  that  part  of  them  to  have  and  to  hold 
the  lie,  is  what  mankind  least  like ;  —  that,  I  say,  is  what  they 
utterly  detest. 

There  is  nothing  more  hateful  to  them. 

And,  as  I  was  just  now  remarking,  this  ignorance  in  the  soul 
of  him  who  is  deceived  may  be  called  the  true  lie  ;  for  the  lie 
in  words  is  only  a  kind  of  imitation  and  shadowy  image  of  a 
previous  affection  of  the  soul,  not  pure  unadulterated  falsehood. 
Am  I  not  right  ? 

Perfectly  right.  —  The  Republic,  ii.  205. 
Words,  opposition  of.     See  Contratliclion,  etc. 
World,  future  state  of.     See  Future  state,  etc. 
World,  made  immortal.     See  Immortal,  etc. 
Writing,  and  painting.     See  Painting. 
Wrong-doing,  disgrace  of. 

Soc.  I  certainly  think  that  I  and  you  and  every  man  do 

really  believe,  that  to  do  is  a  greater  evil  than  to  suffer  injus- 
tice :  and  not  to  be  punished  than  to  be  punished. 

Pol.  And  I  should  say  neither  I  nor  any  man  ;  would  you 
yourself,  for  example,  suffer  rather  than  do  injustice  ? 

Soc.  Yes,  and  you,  too ;  I  or  any  man  would. 

Pol.  Quite  the  reverse  ;  neither  you,  nor  I,  nor  any  man. 

Soc.  But  will  you  answer  ? 

Pol.  To  be  sure,  I  will ;  for  I  am  curious  to  hear  what  you 
are  going  to  say. 

Soc.  Tell  me,  then,  and  you  will  know,  and  let  us  suppose 
that  I  am  beginning  at  the  beginning :  —  Which  of  the  two, 
Polus,  in  your  opinion,  is  the  worst?  —  to  do  injustice  or  to 
suffer  ? 

Pol.  I  should  say  that  suffering  was  worst. 

Soc.  And  which  is  the  greater  disgrace? — Answer. 

Pol.  To  do. —  Gorgias,  iii.  61. 
Wrong-doing,  judgment  for,  to  be  sought. 

Soc.  To  do  wrong,  then,  is  second  only  i*\  the  scale  of 

evils ;  but  to  do  wrong  and  not  to  be  punished,  is  first  and 
greatest  of  all  ? 

Pol.  That  is  true. 

Soc.  Well,  and  was  not  this  the  point  in  dispute,  my  friend 
You  deemed  Archelaus  happy,  because  he  was  a  very  grea 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  469 

criminal  and  unpunished  :  I,  on  the  other  hand,  maintained  that 
he  or  any  other  who  like  him  has  done  wrong  and  has  not  been 
punished,  is  and  ought  to  be,  the  most  miserable  of  all  men  ; 
and  that  the  doer  of  injustice,  whether  Archelaus  or  any  other, 
is  more  miserable  than  the  sufferer  ;  and  he  who  escapes  pun- 
ishment, more  miserable  than  he  who  suffers.  Was  not  that 
what  I  said  ? 
Pol  Yes. 

Soc.  And  that  has  been  proved  to  be  true  ? 
Pol.  Certainly. 

Soc.  "Well,  Polus,  but  if  this  is  true,  where  is  the  great  use 
of  rhetoric  ?     If  we  admit  what  has  been  just  now  said,  every 
man  ought  in  every  way  to  guard  himself  against  doing  wrong, 
for  he  will  thereby  suffer  great  evil  ? 
Pol.  True. 

Soc.  And  if  he,  or  any  one  about  whom  he  cares,  does 
wrong,  he  ought  of  his  own  accord  to  go  where  he  will  be  im- 
mediately punished;  he  will  run  to  the  judge,  as  he  would  to 
the  physician,  in  order  that  the  disease  of  injustice  may  not  be 
rendered  chronic  and  become  the  incurable  cancer  of  the  soul ; 
must  we  not  allow  that,  Polus,  if  our  former  admissions  are  to 
stand  ?  and  is  there  any  other  inference  which  is  consistent  wivh 
them  ? 

Pol.  To  that,  Socrates,  there  can  be  but  one  answer. 
Soc.  Then  rhetoric  is  of  no  use  to  us,  Polus,  in  helping  a 
man  to  excuse  his  own  injustice,  or  that  of  his  parents  or  friends, 
or  children  or  country  ;  but  may  be  of  use  to  any  one  who 
holds  that  instead  of  excusing  he  ought  to  accuse  —  himself 
above  all,  and  in  the  next  degree,  his  family,  or  any  of  his 
friends  who  may  be  doing  wrong ;  if  he  does  not  want  to  con- 
ceal, but  to  bring  to  light  the  iniquity,  that  the  wrong-doer  may 
suffer  and  be  healed,  and  if  he  would  force  himself  and  others 
to  stand  firm,  closing  their  eyes  manfully,  and  letting  the  phy- 
sician cut,  as  I  may  say,  and  burn  them,  in  the  hope  of  attain- 
ing the  good  and  the  honorable,  not  regarding  the  pain  ;  but  if 
he  have  done  things  worthy  of  stripes,  allowing  himself  to  be 
scourged,  or  if  of  bonds  to  be  bound,  or  if  of  a  fine  to  be 
fined,  or  if  of  exile  to  be  exiled,  or  if  of  death  to  die,  and 
himself  being  the  first  to  accuse  himself,  and  his  own  rela- 
tions, and  using  rhetoric  to  this  end,  that  his  and  their  just  ac- 
tions may  be  made  manifest,  and  that  they  themselves  may  be 
delivered  from  injustice,  which  is  the  greatest  evil.  Then,  Po- 


470  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

lus,  rhetoric  would  indeed  be  useful.  Do  you  say  "  Yes  "  or 
"  No  "  to  that  ? 

Pol.  To  me,  Socrates,  what  you  are  saying  appears  very 
strange,  though  probably  in  agreement  with  your  premises. 

Soc.  Is  not  this  the  conclusion  if  the  premises  are  not  dis- 
proven  ? 

Pol.  Yes  ;  that  is  true 

Soc.  And  from  the  opposite  point  of  view  of  doing  harm  to 
some  one,  whether  he  be  an  enemj  or  not  —  I  except  the  case 
in  which  I  am  myself  suffering  injury  at  the  hands  of  another, 
for  I  must  take  precautions  against  that  —  but  if  my  enemy  in- 
jures a  third  person,  then  in  every  sort  of  way  by  word  as  well 
as  deed,  I  should  try  to  prevent  his  being  punished,  or  appear- 
ing Before  the  judge  ;  and  if  he  appears,  I  should  contrive  that 
he  should  escape,  and  not  suffer  punishment:  if  he  has  stolen  a 
sum  of  money,  let  him  keep  and  spend  what  he  has  stolen  on 
him  and  his,  regardless  of  religion  and  justice  ;  and  if  he  have 
done  things  worthy  of  death,  let  him  not  die,  but  rather  be  im- 
mortal in  his  wickedness ;  or,  if  this  is  not  possible,  let  him  at 
any  rate  be  allowed  to  live  as  long  as  he  can.  —  Gwgias,  iii.  68. 
Wrong-doing,  responsibility  and  voluntariness  in. 

Soc.  This  appears  to  me  to  be  the  aim  which  a  man  ought 

to  have,  and  towards  which  he  ought  to  direct  all  the  energies 
both  of  himself  and  of  the  State,  acting  so  that  he  may  have 
temperance  and  justice  present  with  him  and  be  happy,  not 
suffering  his  lusts  to  be  unrestrained,  and  in  the  never-ending 
desire  to  satisfy  them  leading  a  robber's  life.  Such  an  one  is 
the  friend  neither  of  God  nor  man,  for  he  is  incapable  of  com- 
munion, and  he  who  is  incapable  of  communion  is  also  inca- 
pable of  friendship.  And  philosophers  tell  us,  Callicles,  that 
communion  and  friendship  and  orderliness  and  temperance  and 
justice  bind  together  heaven  and  earth  and  Gods  and  men,  and 
that  this  universe  is  therefore  called  Cosmos  or  order,  not  dis- 
order or  misrule,  my  friend.  But  although  you  are  a  philoso- 
pher you  seem  to  me  never  to  have  observed  that  geometrical 
equality  is  mighty,  both  among  Gods  and  men ;  you  think  that 
you  ought  to  cultivate  inequality  or  excess,  and  do  not  care 
about  geometry.  Well,  then,  either  the  principle  that  the 
happy  are  made  happy  by  the  possession  of  justice  and  temper- 
ance, and  the  miserable  miserable  by  the  possession  of  vice, 
must  be  refuted,  or,  if  it  is  granted,  what  will  be  the  conse- 
quences ?  All  the  consequences  which  I  drew  before,  Callicles, 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  471 

and  about  which  you  asked  me  whether  I  was  in  earnest  when 
I  said  that  a  man  ought  to  accuse  himself  and  his  son  and  hig 
friend  if  he  did  anything  wrong,  and  that  to  this  end  he  should 
use  his  rhetoric  —  all  these  consequences  are  true.  And  that 
which  you  thought  that  Polus  was  led  to  admit  out  of  modestj 
is  also  true,  viz :  that  to  do  injustice,  if  more  disgraceful  than 
to  suffer  is  in  that  degree  worse ;  and  the  other  position  which 
according  to  Polus  Gorgias  admitted  out  of  modesty,  that  he 
who  would  truly  be  a  rhetorician  ought  to  be  just  and  have  a 
knowledge  of  justice  —  has  also  turned  out  to  be  true.  And 
now,  let  us  proceed  in  the  next  place,  to  consider  whether  you 
are  right  in  throwing  in  my  teeth  that  I  am  unable  to  help  my- 
self or  any  of  my  friends  or  kinsmen,  or  to  save  them  in  the 
extremity  of  danger,  or  that  I  am  like  an  outlaw  to  whom  any 
one  may  do  what  he  likes  ;  he  may  box  my  ears,  which  was  a 
brave  saying  of  yours ;  or  he  may  take  away  my  goods  or 
banish  me,  or  even  do  his  worst  and  kill  me,  and  this,  as  you 
say,  is  the  height  of  disgrace.  My  answer  to  you  is  one  which 
has  been  already  often  repeated,  but  may  as  well  be  repeated 
once  more.  I  tell  you,  Callicles,  that  to  be  boxed  on  the  ears 
wrongfully  is  not  the  worst  evil  that  can  befall  a  man,  nor  to 
have  my  face  and  purse  cut  open,  but  that  to  smite  and  slay 
me  and  mine  wrongfully  is  far  more  disgraceful  and  more  evil ; 
aye,  and  to  despoil  and  enslave  and  pillage,  or  in  any  way  at. 
all  to  wrong  me  and  mine,  is  far  more  disgraceful  and  evil  to 
the  doer  of  the  wrong  than  to  me  who  am  the  sufferer.  These 
truths,  which  have  been  already  set  forth  as  I  state  them  in 
the  previous  discussion,  would  seem  now,  if  I  may  use  an  ex- 
pression which  is  certainly  bold,  to  have  been  fixed  and  riveted 
by  us  in  iron  and  adamantine  bonds  ;  and  unless  you  or  some 
other  still  more  enterprising  hero  shall  break  them,  there  is  no 
possibility  of  denying  what  I  say.  For  what  I  am  always  say- 
ing is,  that  I  know  not  the  truth  about  these  things,  and  yet 
that  I  have  never  known  anybody  who  could  say  anything  else, 
any  more  than  you  can,  and  not  be  ridiculous.  This  lias 
always  been  my  position,  and  if  this  position  is  a  true  one,  and 
if  injustice  is  the  greatest  of  evils  to  the  doer  of  injustice,  and 
yet  there  is  if  possible  a  greater  than  the  greatest  evils,  in  an 
tnjust  man  not  suffering  retribution,  what  is  that  defense  witn- 
cut  which  a  man  will  be  truly  ridiculous  ?  Must  not  the  de- 
fense be  one  which  will  avert  the  greatest  of  human  evils  ? 
And  will  not  the  worst  of  all  defenses  be  that  with  which  a 


472  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

man  is  unable  to  defend  himself  or  his  family  or  his  frie:  d?  3 
and  next  will  come  that  which  is  unable  to  avert  the  next 
greatest  evil ;  thirdly,  that  which  is  unable  to  avert  the  third 
greatest  evil ;  and  so  of  other  evils.  As  is  the  greatness  of 
evil  so  is  the  honor  of  being  able  to  avert  them  in  their  several 
degrees,  and  the  disgrace  of  not  being  able  to  avert  them.  Am 
I  not  right,  Callicles  ? 

Gal.  Yes,  quite  right. 

Soc.  Seeing,  then,  that  there  are  these  two  evils,  the  doing 
injustice  and  the  suffering  injustice,  —  and  we  affirm  that  to  do 
injustice  is  a  greater,  and  to  suffer  injustice  a  lesser  evil,  — 
how  can  a  man  succeed  in  obtaining  the  two  advantages,  the 
one  of  not  doing  and  the  other  of  not  suffering  injustice  — 
must  he  have  the  power  or  only  the  will  to  obtain  them  ?  I 
mean  whether  a  man  will  escape  injustice  if  he  has  only  the 
will  to  escape,  or  must  he  have  provided  himself  with  the 
power  ? 

Gal.  He  must  have  provided  himself  with  the  power ;  that 
is  clear. 

Soc.  And  what  do  you  say  of  doing  injustice  ?  Is  the  will 
only  sufficient,  and  will  that  prevent  him  from  doing  injustice, 
or  must  he  have  provided  himself  with  power  and  art ;  and  if 
he  have  not  studied  and  practiced  will  he  be  unjust  still  ? 
Surely  you  might  say,  Callicles,  whether  you  think  that  Polus 
and  I  were  right  in  admitting  to  the  conclusion  that  no  one 
does  wrong  voluntarily,  but  that  all  do  wrong  against  their 
will? 

Cal.   Granted,  Socrates,  if  you  will  only  have  done.  —  GOT- 
gias,  iii.  99. 
Wrong-doing.     See  Injustice. 

Young  men,  training  of. 

Youth  instructed  in  military  arts.     See  Military  arts. 

You  have   never   acquired   the   knowledge  of   the  most 

beautiful  kind  of  song  in  your  military  way  of  life,  which  is 
modeled  after  the  camp,  and  is  not  like  that  of  dwellers  in 
cities ;  and  you  have  your  young  men  herding  and  feeding  to- 
gether like  young  colts.  No  one  takes  his  own  individual  colt 
and  drags  him  away  from  his  fellows  against  his  will,  raging 
and  foaming,  and  gives  him  a  groom  for  him  alone,  and  trains 
and  rubs  him  down  privately,  and  gives  him  the  qualities  in 
education  which  will  make  him  not  only  a  good  soldier,  but 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  473 

also  a  governor  of  a  state  and  of  cities.     Such  an  one,  as  we 
were  saying  at  first,  would  be  a  greater  warrior  than  he  of 
whom    Tyrtaeus   sings  ;    and   he  would  honor  courage  every- 
where, but  always  as  the  fourth,  and  not  as  the  first  part  of 
virtue,  either  in  individuals  or  States.  —  Laws,  iv.  196. 
Youth,  philosophy  in  early.     See  Philosophy. 
Youth  to  be  tested  by  trial. 

Therefore,  as  I  was  just  now  saying,  we  must  inquire 

who  are  the  best  guardians  of  their  own  conviction  that  the 
interest  of  the  State  is  to  be  the  rule  of  all  their  actions.  We 
must  watch  them  from  their  youth  upwards,  and  make  them 
perform  actions  in  which  they  are  most  likely  to  forget  or  to 
be  deceived,  and  he  who  remembers  and  is  not  deceived  is  to 
be  selected,  and  he  who  fails  in  the  trial  is  to  be  rejected.  That 
will  be  the  way  ? 

Yes. 

And  there  should  also  be  toils  and  pains  and  conflicts  pre- 
scribed for  them,  in  which  they  will  give  further  proof  of  the 
same  qualities. 

Very  right,  he  replied. 

And  then,  I  said,  we  must  try  them  with  enchantments  — 
that  is  the  third  sort  of  test  —  and  see  what  will  be  their  be- 
havior :  like  those  who  take  colts  amid  noises  and  cries  to  see 
if  they  are  of  a  timid  nature,  so  must  we  take  our  youth  amid 
terrors  of  some  kind,  and  again  pass  them  into  pleasures,  and 
try  them  more  thoroughly  than  gold  is  tried  in  the  fire,  in  or- 
der  to  discover  whether   they  are   armed  against  all  enchant- 
ments, and  of  a  noble  bearing  always,  good  guardians  of  them- 
selves and  of  the   music  which   they  have   learned,  and  retain- 
ing   under    all    circumstances    a    rhythmical    and    harmonious 
nature,  such  as  will  be  most  serviceable  to  the  man  himself  and 
to  the   State.     And  he  who  at  every  age,  as  boy  and  youth 
and  in  mature   life,  has   come   out  of  the  trial  victorious  and 
pure,  shall  be  appointed  a  ruler  and  guardian  of  the  State ;  he 
shall  be  honored  in  life  and  death,  and  shall  receive  sepulture 
and   other  memorials   of  honor,  the  greatest  that  we  have  to 
give.  —  TJie  Republic,  ii.  238. 
Youth,  the  avaricious.     See  Miserly  men. 
Youth,  self-conceit  of.     See  Self-conceit. 
Youthful  genius.     See  Genius,  etc. 
Youth  and  children,  education  of.     See  Children,  etc. 
Ath.  Let  me  once  more  recall  our  doctrine  of  right  edu- 


474  PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS. 

cation  ;  which,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  depends  on  the  due  reg- 
ulation of  convivial  intercourse. 

Ole.  You  talk  rather  grandly. 

Ath.  Pleasure  and  pain  I  maintain  to  be  the  first  percep- 
tions of  children,  and  I  say  that  they  are  the  forms  under 
which  virtue  and  vice  are  originally  present  to  them.  As  to 
wisdom  and  true  and  fixed  opinions,  happy  is  the  man  who  ac- 
quires them,  when  declining  in  years ;  and  he  who  possesses 
them,  and  the  blessings  which  are  contained  in  them,  is  a  per- 
fect man.  Now,  I  mean  by  education  that  training  which  is 
given  by  suitable  habits  to  the  first  instincts  of  virtue  in  chil- 
dren ;  when  pleasure,  and  friendship,  and  pain,  and  hatred,  are 
rightly  implanted  in  souls  not  yet  capable  of  understanding  the 
nature  of  them,  and  who  find  them,  after  they  have  attained 
reason,  to  be  in  harmony  with  her.  This  harmony  of  the  soul, 
when  perfected,  is  virtue  ;  but  the  particular  training  in  respect 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  which  leads  you  always  to  hate  what  you 
ought  to  hate,  and  love  what  you  ought  to  love,  from  the  be- 
ginning to  the  end,  may  be  separated  off ;  and,  in  my  view,  will 
be  rightly  called  education. 

Cle.  I  think,  Stranger,  that  you  are  quite  right  in  all  that 
you  have  said  and  are  saying  about  education. 

Ath.  I  am  glad  to  hear  that  you  agree  with  me  ;  for,  in- 
deed, the  true  discipline  of  pleasure  and  pain  which,  when 
rightly  ordered,  is  a  principle  of  education,  has  been  often  re- 
laxed and  corrupted  in  human  life.  And  the  Gods,  pitying 
the  toils  which  our  race  is  born  to  undergo,  have  appointed 
holy  festivals,  in  which  men  alternate  rest  with  labor ;  and 
have  given  them  the  Muses,  and  Apollo  the  leader  of  the 
Muses,  and  Dionysus,  as  the  partners  in  their  revels,  that  they 
may  improve  what  education  they  have,  at  the  festivals  of  the 
Gods,  and  by  their  aid.  I  should  like  to  know  whether  a  com- 
mon saying  is  true  to  nature  or  not.  For  what  men  say  is 
that  the  young  of  all  creatures  cannot  be  quiet  in  their  bodies 
or  in  their  voices;  they  are  always  wanting  to  move,  and  cry 
out ;  at  one  time  leaping  and  skipping,  and  overflowing  with 
gpcrtiveness  and  delight  at  something,  and  then  again  uttering 
all  sorts  of  cries.  But,  whereas  other  animals  have  no  percep- 
tion of  order  or  disorder  in  their  movements,  that  is,  of  rhythm 
or  harmony,  as  they  are  called,  to  us,  the  Gods,  who,  as  we  say, 
have  been  appointed  to  be  our  partusrs  in  the  dance,  have 
given  the  pleasurable  sense  of  harmony  and  rhythm 


PLATO'S  BEST  THOUGHTS.  475 

Ath.  The  inference  at  which  we  arrive  for  the  third  or 
fourth  time  is,  that  education  is  the  constraining  and  directing 
of  youth  towards  that  right  reason,  which  the  law  affirms,  and 
which  the  experience  of  the  best  of  our  elders  has  agreed  to 
be  truly  right.  In  order,  then,  that  the  soul  of  the  child  may 
not  be  habituated  to  feel  joy  and  sorrow  in  a  manner  at  vari- 
ance with  the  law,  and  those  who  obey  the  law,  but  may  rather 
follow  the  law  and  rejoice  and  sorrow  at  the  same  things  as 
the  aged,  —  in  order,  I  say,  to  produce  this  effect,  songs  appear 
to  have  been  invented,  which  are  really  charms,  and  are  de- 
signed to  implant  the  harmony  of  which  we  speak.  And  be- 
cause the  mind  of  the  child  is  incapable  of  enduring  serious 
training,  they  are  called  plays  or  songs,  and  are  performed  in 
play  ;  just  as  when  men  are  sick  and  ailing  in  their  bodies, 
their  attendants  give  them  wholesome  diet  in  pleasant  meats 
and  drinks,  but  unwholesome  diet  disagreeable  in  things,  in 
order  that  they  may  learn  as  they  ought,  to  like  the  one  and 
to  dislike  the  other.  —  Laws,  iv.  182. 

Zeal  right  and  wrong. 

Soc.  Dear  Crito,  your  zeal  is  invaluable,  if  a  right  one ; 

but  if  wrong,  the  greater  the  zeal  the  greater  the  danger ;  and 
therefore  we  ought  to  consider  whether  I  shall  or  shall  not 
do  as  you  say.  For  I  am  and  always  have  been  one  of  those 
natures  who  must  be  guided  by  reason,  whatever  the  reason 
may  be  which  upon  reflection  appears  to  me  to  be  the  best ; 
and  now  that  this  fortune  has  come  upon  me,  I  cannot  put 
away  the  conclusion  at  which  I  had  arrived :  the  principles 
which  I  have  hitherto  honored  and  revered  I  still  honor,  and 
unless  we  can  at  once  find  other  and  better  principles  I  am  cer- 
tain not  to  agree  with  you  ;  no,  not  even  if  the  power  of  the 
multitude  could  inflict  many  more  imprisonments,  confiscations, 
deaths,  frightening  us  like  children  with  hobgoblin  terrors.— 
Orito,  I  350. 


STANDARD    TEXT  POORS. 


BOCRATES.  A  Translation  of  the  Apology,  Crito  and  parts  of 
the  Phaedo  of  Plato,  containing  the  Defence  of  Socrates  at 
his  Trial,  his  Conversation  in  Prison,  with  his  Thoughts  on 
the  Future  Life,  and  an  Account  of  his  Death.  With  an  In- 
troduction by  Professor  W.  W.  Goodwin,  of  Harvard  Col- 
.  lege.  12mo,  cloth,  $1.00;  paper,  50  cents. 

TALKS  WITH  SOCRATES  ABOUT  LIFE.  Translations  from 
the  Corgias  and  the  Republic  of  Plato.  12mo,  cloth,  $1.00  j 
paper,  50  cents. 

A  DAY  IN  ATHENS  WITH  SOCRATES.  Translations  from  the 
Protagoras  and  the  Republic  of  Plato.  Being  conversations 
between  Socrates  and  other  Greeks  on  Virtue  and  Justice. 
12mo  cloth,  $1.00;  paper,  50  cents. 

The  first  of  these  volumes  sketches  the  personal  character  and 
moral  position  of  Socrates,  together  with  Plato's  own  speculations ;  the 
second  volume  presents  in  forcible  and  elegant  English  the  practical 
philosophy  and  pure  morality  of  the  Gorgias  and  Republic,  accom- 
panied by  an  able  introduction  and  explanatory  notes  ;  while  the  last 
volume  has  for  its  object  to  give  a  vivid  picture  not  so  much  of  Plato's 
Philosophy  as  of  the  age  in  which  he  lived,  and  to  enable  the  reader  to 
enter  into  the  every-day  scenes  of  Athenian  life,  and  to  become,  as  it 
were,  an  actual  participator  ia  the  action. 

PROFESSOR  GOODWIN.— "I  havs  advised  the  translator  to  publish  these 
Versions  of  Plato,  In  the  belief  that  they  will  be  welcomed  by  many  to  whom  both 
Plato  and  Socrates  have  hitherto  been  merely  venerated  names ;  especially  by 
those  whose  interest  in  Knowing  what  Plato  and  Socrates  really  taught  has  been 
doubly  checked  by  Ignorance  of  Greek  and  by  the  formidable  aspect  of  Plato's 
complete  works,  even  in  an  English  translation." 

W.  D.  HOWELLS,  in  Harper's  IfontTay.— "That  ' Day  in  Athens  with  Socra- 
tes,' those  '  Talks  with  Socrates  about  Life,'  and  that  first  volume  containing  the 
Apology,  and  the  Phaedo,  all  strike  a  note  so  familiar,  deal  with  questions  so  liv- 
ing, that  they  seem  of  present  concern  and  modern  fact.  Eminent  Scholars,  men 
of  much  Latin  and  more  Greek,  attest  the  skill  and  truth  with  which  the  versions 
are  made ;  we  can  confidently  speak  of  their  English  grace  and  clearness.  They 
•eem  a  'model  of  style,'  because  they  ar«  without  manner  and  perfectly  simple." 

THE  NEW  YORK  EVENING  POST.— "We  do  not  remember  any  translation 
of  a  Greek  author  which  is  a  better  specimen  of  idiomatic  English  than  this,  or  a 
tnore  faithful  rendering  of  the  real  spirit  of  the  original  into  English  as  good  and 
•s  simple  as  the  Greek.  Such  a  translation  renders  the  reading  of  the  original 
well  nigh  superfluous," 


STANDARD   TEXT  LOOKS. 


EPOCHS  OF  MODERN  HISTORY,  A  series  of  books  narrating 
the  History  of  England  and  Europe  at  successive  epochs 
subsequent  to  the  Christian  era.  Edited  by  EDWARD  E. 
MORRIS.  Seventeen  volumes,  16mo,  with  74  Maps,  Plans, 
and  Tables.  Sold  separately.  Price  per  vol.,  SI. 00.  The 
set,  Roxburgh  style,  gilt  top,  in  box,  $17.00. 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.    By  K.  W,  CHOKCH. 

THE  NORMANS  IX  EUROPE.    By  A.  H.  JOHNSON. 

THE  CRUSADES.    By  G.  W.  Cox,  M.A. 

THE  EARLY  PLANTAGENET3.    By  WM.  STUBBS. 

EDWARD  m.    By  W.  WARBURTON. 

THE  HOUSES  OF  LANCASTER  AND  YORK.    By  JAMES  GAIRDNEB. 

THE  ERA  OF  THE  PROTESTANT  REVOLUTION.  By  FREDERIC  SEEBOHM. 
With  Notes  on  Books  In  English  relating  to  the  Reformation.  By  ProL 
GEORGE  P.  FISHEK,  D.D. 

THE  EARLY  TUDOJRS.    Henry  YH.;  Henry  Vm.     ByC.  E.  MOBERLY. 

THE  AGE  OF  ELIZABETH.    By  H.  CRSIGHTON. 

THE  THiKTX"  YEARS'  WAR,  161S-1643.    By  SAMUTL  RAWSON  GAHDDJEB. 

THE  PURITAN  REVOLUTION.     By  SAMTTEL  EAWSON  GARDINER. 

THE  FALL  OF  THE  STUARTS.    Ey  EDWARD  HALE. 

THE  AGE  OF  ANNE.    By  EDWARD  E.  MORRIS. 

THE  EARLY  HANOVERIANS.    By  EDWARD  E.  MORBIS. 

FREDERICK  THE  GREAT.    By  F.  W.  LONGMAN. 

THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  AND  FIRST  EMPIRE.     By  WILLIAM  O'CONNOB 

MORRIS.    With  Appendix  by  ANDREW  D.  WHITE,  LL.D. 
THE  EPOCH  OF  REFORM,  1S30-1850.    By  JUSTIN  MCCARTHY. 

THE  HISTORY  OF  ROME,  from  the  Earliest  Time  to  the  Period 
of  Its  Decline.  By  Dr.  THEODOR  MOMMSEN.  Translated, 
with  the  author's  sanction  and  additions,  by  W.  P.  Dickson, 
D.D.,  LL.D.  With  an  Introduction  by  Dr.  Leonhard  Schmitz. 
Reprinted  from  the  Revised  London  Edition.  Four  volumes 
crown  8vo,  gilt  top.  Price  per  set,  $8.00. 

LONDON  TIMES. — "A  work  of  the  very  highest  merit;  its  learning  Is  exact 
and  profound ;  its  narrative  full  of  genius  and  skill ;  its  descriptions  of  men  are 
admirably  vivid.  We  wish  to  place  on  record  our  opinion  that  Dr.  Mommsen's  is 
by  far  the  best  history  of  the  Decline  and  Fall  of  the  Roman  Commonwealth." 

DR.  SCHMITZ. — "Since  the  days  of  Niebuhr,  no  work  on  Roman  History  haa 
appeared  that  combines  so  much  to  attract,  instruct,  and  charm  the  reader.  Its 
etyle— a  rare  quality  in  a  German  author— is  vigorous,  spirited,  and  animated 
Professor  Mommsen's  work  can  stand  a  comparison  with  the  noblest  production* 
U  modern  history." 


CHARLES   SCEISNEffS    SONS' 


AX  ADDITION  TO   THEODOR   XOXirSBFS  HISTORY  OF  RO3TE. 

THE  PROVINCES  OF  THE  ROMAN  EMPIRE.  From  Caesar  to 
Diocletian.  By  THEODOR  MOMMScN.  Translated  with 
the  author's  sanction  and  additions,  by  William  P.  Dickson, 
D.D.,  LL.D.  With  ten  maps,  by  Professor  Kiepert.  2  vols., 
8vo,  S6.00. 

CONTENTS:  The  Northern  Frontier  of  Italy— Spain— The  Gallic 
Provinces — Roman  Germany  and  the  Free  Germans — Britain — The 
Dannbian  Lands  and  the  Wars  on  the  Danube — Greek  Europe — Asia 
Minor  —The  Euphrates  Frontier  and  the  Parthians — Syria  and  the 
Land  of  the  Nabatasans — Judea  and  the  Jews — Egypt — The  African 
Provinces. 

N.  Y.  SUN.—"  Professor  Mommsen's  work  goes  further  ;toan  any  other  ex- 
tant, or  now  looked  for,  to  provide  us  with  a  key  to  the  mediaeval  history  of  the 
Mediterranean  world." 

PROF.  W.  A.  PACKARD,  in  Presbyterian  Review.— "  The  author  draws  the 
wonderfully  rich  and  varied  picture  of  the  conquest  and  administration  of  that 
great  circle  of  peoples  and  lands  which  formed  the  empire  of  Rome  outside  of 
Italy,  their  agriculture,  trade,  and  manufactures,  their  artistic  and  scientific  lii'e, 
through  all  degrees  of  civilization,  with  such  detail  and  completeness  as  could 
have  come  from  no  other  hand  than  that  of  this  great  master  of  historical  research 
In  all  its  departments,  guided  by  that  gift  of  historical  imagination,  for  which  he 
Is  equally  eminent-" 


THE   HISTORY  OF  GREECE.    By  Prof.  Dr.  ERNST  CURTIUS. 

Translated  by  Adolphus  William  Ward,  M.  A.,  Fellow  of  St. 
Peter's  College,  Cambridge,  Prof,  of  History  in  Owen's  Col- 
lege, Manchester.  Uniform  with  Mommsen's  History  of 
Rome.  Five  volumes,  crown  8vo,  gilt  top.  Price  per  set, 
S10.00. 

LONDON  ATHEN^UM.— "Professor  Cnrtius'  eminent  scholarship  Is  a  suffi- 
cient guarantee  for  the  trustworthiness  of  his  history,  while  thj  skill  with  which 
he  groups  his  facts,  and  his  effective  mode  of  narrating  them,  combine  to  render 
It  no  less  readable  than  sound.  Prof.  Curtlus  everywhere  maintains  the  true 
tignity  and  Impartiality  of  history,  and  it  is  evident  his  sympathies  are  on  the 
£de  of  justice,  humanity,  and  progress." 

LONDON  SPECTATOR.— "We  cannot  express  our  opinion  of  Dr.  Cnrtius' 
book  better  than  by  saying  that  it  may  be  fitly  ranked  with  Theodor  Mommsen'a 
great  work." 

N.  Y.  DAILY  TRIBUNE.-'-As  an  introduction  to  the  study  of  Grecian  history, 
no  previous  work  is  comparable  to  the  present  for  vivacity  and  picturesque 
beauty,  while  in  sound  learning  and  accuracy  of  statement  it  la  not  Inferior  to 
tbe  elaborate  productions  which  enrich  the  literature  of  the  age." 


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